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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the pattern of relationship of local government institutions 
in Pakistan with the higher level of governments, particularly with the provincial 
governments, under whose jurisdictional purview they fall. Pakistan is a federation 
where the provinces are empowered to legislate on various aspects of the working of 
local councils. Despite being a provincial subject, the influence of the central 
government under both the military and civilian regimes has also been immense. To 
analyse this, field work was undertaken in two provinces of Pakistan (the Punjab and the 
N-W. F. P). In each a district was selected (Gujrat and Mardan respectively) and the 
working of their municipalities and district councils were studied in the context of the 
impact of party-politics, the administrative control exercised, and the implications of 
financial decisions taken by the higher levels of government. 
Part one of the thesis describes the origin and development of local government 
in the South Asian sub-continent, particularly an analysis of the initiatives taken for 
their growth by military and civilian regimes during the years preceding independence. 
Part two consists of the case studies of four local councils and an analysis of the 
provincial-local government relations under the present Local Government Ordinance of 
1979 introduced by General Mohammad Zia-ul Haque. 
Part three reflects the concerns and recommendations of experts and those 
involved in the working of local government in Pakistan. 
The conclusions drawn from the thesis material show that, though local 
government institutions have been operating in an environment of political expediency 
and without assistance from the general political cultural background, they have been 
able to make positive contributions to the development of democracy and to the 
provision of local services for the general welfare of the people. 
Local government in Pakistan has suffered from gaps between theory and 
practice, public statements and practical realities, and a pervasive political context 
which has neglected the development of services. There has been a tendency to proclaim 
the virtues of local government in theory and to make promises to support local 
institutions but in practice to do much less and to continue with practices which do not 
enable local government and its services to flourish. 
The clearest exemplification of this is that periods of martial law, where 
democracy at a national level has been imperilled, have seen the positive encouragement 
of local government and local democracy as a means of gaining popular support for the 
regime. In contrast, in periods of democratic central government, local institutions have 
proved to be obstacles to central authority, and they have been neglected or abused in 
favour of a more bureaucratic mode of governing. Both military and civilian rulers have 
manipulated local institutions for their own benefit. The outcome has been that the 
relationship between centre and provinces and the provinces and the local institutions 
has never been balanced or fully articulated. 
At the local level, as illustrated in the case studies, the consequences has been a 
lower level of civic amenity than is either desirable or what local persons know is 
practicable with a more stable institutional base. The past record of the cases studied 
shows that, despite the impact of local and national politics, real progress had been 
made in services and in developing local democracy. 
To the memory of my father 
Haji Awal Khan 
of Khoi Barmol, Mardan 
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PREFACE 
Tois thesis argues that the relationship between the centre anu localities is of vital 
significance in terms of determining the role of these agencies in the political, socio- 
economic and administrative development of a society. Viewed from this angle, it 
appears that the creation of new nations specially from former colonies involve varying 
degrees of change in their system of local government. In some cases, the pre- 
independence system, closely supervised by colonial officials and local subordinate 
administrators has often remained as the general pattern of a central-local government 
relations. Even the terminology and basic structures of the colonial local government 
system continue to exist for reasons of habituation and convenience. 
Pakistan is not an exception. Though the functions of local government 
institutions have expanded, particularly since the 1960s, to a considerable degree, they 
face increasing central control and supervision and, therefore, a ilarrowing of their 
independence. Ever since the first-ever planned system of local government in the form 
of Basic Democracies, promulgated by the military ruler (1959-69), the control of local 
operations by the central government was vigorous. 
Seen in this perspective, it would appear that the system of local government in 
Pakistan has neither developed nor been allowed to function on lines similar to those in 
the West. Various factors are responsible for this phenomenon. One major hurdle has 
been the role of bureaucracy which, strongly believing in the centralisation of authority, 
considers the growth of the system a threat to its dominant status and prestige and, hence, 
does not allow these institutions to take roots and flourish. 
The post- i ndepen dence history of Pakistan reveals that the devices of political 
control which, in fact, are co, trary to the principle of local autonomy, have been applied 
rigorously, the basic reason for this is the utilisation of local government for the 
attainment of vested political interests. Activities of development and a civic nature take 
a secondary position and the primary attention has been on the accomplishment of 
political objectives. For example, one major rationale behind the introduction of local 
government systems in 1959 and then in 1979 (both by military rulers) was to help seek 
legitimacy for the military regimes by establishing a new cadre of rural political leaders 
who would recruit support for the said regimes. 
It is a universally acknowledged principle that local institutions can successfully 
demonstrate their effectiveness provided that are made operative in an environment free 
from official domination where they can plan and execute development projects 
according to their own perception of local needs, where they can use their own talents 
and experience uninterrupted from outside. The peculiar circumstances in Pakistan have 
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not allowed such freedom. The general attitude has been a demand from the public 
representatives to assist the administration in carrying out its routine duties or 
instructions received from above. One of the most significant issues involved in the 
relationship between central and local government is, therefore, the issue of "local 
autonomy versus bureaucratic control. " Thus, the colonial tradition of exercising 
bureaucratic control over the functioning of local government institutions has persisted. 
Another significant aspect is their poor financial condition and, hence, greater 
financial dependence on the central/provincial governments. In order to be able to play 
some meaningful role in the economic and social development, local councils need 
access to state resources. On account of the meagre resources forthcoming from outside 
and the internal financial constraints, a very large majority of local councils find it 
difficult to undertake even a modest programme of development. This is partly because 
some of their resources are not developed and others are not properly administered. But 
the main reason which has almost a paralysing effect on their activities is that the yield, 
both actual and potential, of these sources of revenue is limited and even with the utmost 
care and economy, it is not possible to attain anything like a decent level of local 
development. 
Ideally, local councils should attain complete independence in financial matters, 
but the trend of national dominance and control in the field of local government finance 
is apparent in Pakistan. Not only does such dominance and control come from laws and 
decrees of th, ý central/provincial government, it comes also from the poWer of the 
national government to grant subsidies to local units and implement with regulations 
imposed from above. 
Under the above conditions, local institutions have not been able to concentrate 
on the efficieiiý discharge of their responsibilities. Furthermore, there prevails a 
haphazard form of local taxation. Because of centralisation, the central/provincial 
governments exercise a fairly wide control over the local bodies in matters of taxation, 
budgeting, accounting, auditing and borrowing. Because of this, local governments have 
become weak relative to central government. 
A widely accepted view is that there exists a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between democracy at the national level and local government autonomy and local 
democracy. Experiences in Pakistan, where so far three different planned systems of 
local government have been introduced, two by military rulers and one by a civilian 
ruler, reveal that this view (the above contention) is not applicable to all political 
systems. For example, the military regimes in Pakistan, being aware of their lack of an 
electoral mandate, have always sought popular legitimacy by restructuring the local 
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government system to serve as an avenue for communication with the people and foster 
the people's participation in local affairs. On the other hand, civilian rulers at both federal 
and provincial levels, because of their electoral legitimacy, were intolerant of strong 
local governments. Local governments with some autonomy were perceived as possible 
breeding grounds for opposition voices. 
A review of the historical evolution of local government in Pakistan, therefore, 
indicates that all of its rulers, both military and civilian, have been reluctant to actually 
decentralise power. They have designed local government institutions in such a way as to 
ensure control by the centre. Moreover, at the intermediate (Provincial, district and sub- 
district) levels, elite who have been in control of the existing local government 
institutions try to impede the decentralisation of power. 
Another significant factor is that even if the government decides to decentralise 
power, the elected representatives, specially in rural areas may not be able to receive it on 
account of their poor education, and low level of political mobilisation. 
Objectives of the study 
The thesis is concerned with an examination of the relations of local government 
with both provincial and federal governments under the 1979 ordinance. The focus of 
attention, primarily, is on the relations with provincial government with a chapter 
devoted to the analysis of policies initiated by the federal government under military 
regimes and electeG civilian governments. A thorough examination of the above 
ordinance has been made through studying four different local councils, two each in rural 
and urban areas and in two different provinces of Pakistan. Through this study, an 
attempt has been made to achieve the following objectives: 
a) Examination of the external (i. e., political, administrative and financial) and internal 
(composition, mode of elections, competence of the councillors, and relations with 
municipal staff) factors that shaped the actual role of the local government institutions; 
b) Bringing on record the constraints and compulsions that have hindered the smooth working 
of these institutions, one the one hand, and their development on democratic lines, on the 
other, ý 
C) Making some generalisations based on accurate information gained through the study of 
selected local councils about the operational characteristics of these institutions; 
d) Examination of the administrative trends during the civilian rule and make some 
comparisons with the military regime's administration. 
Advantages of the Study 
The primary focus of other research in Pakistan has been mostly on the 
relationship between the federal and provincial governments with particular emphasis on 
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their financial relationship. Local government has been largely a neglected area despite 
the fact that the organisational structure of these institutions reach down to the village 
level and, in a sense, effects the everyday life of the individuals in terms of the 
provisions of vital services like sanitation, drinking water, street lighting, roads etc. Very 
little information exists with regard to the pattern of relationship of these elected 
institutions with the higher levels of government, more particularly the provincial 
governments which come in direct interaction with them. 
The study, therefore, is of academic value and to some extent of regional and 
international interest. The outcome of the research would certainly add to the knowledge 
of those who are currently engaged in the studies of local government system in the 
developing nations. Further, this piece of research work may, perhaps, provide a basis to 
the future researchers to conduct study on other important aspects of the functioning of 
local government system in Pakistan and elsewhere. 
The Research Design 
The research was conducted in three parts. The first was to read as fully as 
possible the existing literature on local government in the sub-continent and on Pakistan 
in particular. The latter is quite extensive, but to tends to follow the latest government 
agendas rather than identify the continuing issues and problems of local government. It 
tends to be narrative rather than analytical. 
The second part of the research was in case studies of four local areas in Pakistan. 
The bulk of the material was derived from interviews with local councillors and officials, 
supplemented with printed materials in local newspapers and local council produced 
officials papers and, in some cases, by personal observation. The interviews permitted 
the reconstruction of the structure of local political and administrative activity. The range 
of respondents varied and the conclusions drawn are sometimes tentative because 
possible key informations were not available at the necessary time of the study. 
Nevertheless, the willingness of respondents to talk fully and frankly about their 
problems was remarkable and enabled the cases to be made as complete as possible. 
The third part of the research design was to ask of Pakistani experts a series of 
questions about the condition and health of local government in Pakistan. A wide variety 
of opinions were received and these interviews often prompted further investigations in 
the case study materials for evidence to support these views. 
The interlocking of these three research elements has provided the basis of the 
thesis. Within the research design were placed various possible explanatory possibilities, 
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notably the possibility that local government in Pakistan was more sharply varied by 
Province or by urban-rural differentiation, than proved to be the case. The thesis did not 
set out to demonstrate any particular hypothesis about central-local relations in Pakistan, 
but sought to be exploratory. The outcome of the exploration has been to produce a thesis 
that follows, as was originally hoped, from the research rather than prior expectations. 
Chapter Structure 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first consists of a brief historical 
background focusing on the origin and development of the indigenous Panchayati 
system; its working and the changing pattern of its relationship during various periods; t-ý 
the advent of foreign rulers; the impact of their priorities on the administrative system in 
general and on the panchayati system in particular; the introduction of modern system of 
local government and the subsequent reform efforts directed towards the improvement; 
modernising and stabilising of the system; the post- independence scenario in areas now 
constituting Pakistan and the obstacles faced in the way of adopting the system in the 
governmental machinery. 
The second part of the thesis consists of field work observations for which four 
local councils (one each in urban and rural areas in two provinces of Pakistan i. e., Punjab 
and the North West Frontier), were selected. Their working in accordance with the 
provisions of Local Government Ordinance of 1979 was analysed with an attempt to 
determine ý-he freedom of operation available to them. While determining the exact 
pattern of relationship through these case studies, three distinct areas have been explored 
i. e., the impact of party-politics, administrative control of the respective provincial 
governments and its impact on the actual conduct of business by these local councils, 
financial health and its impact on their service-related activities. Details of the local 
councils investigated are as under: 
Province Urban Rural 
Punjab Municipal Committee Zila Council 
Gujrat Gujrat 
N-W. F. P Municipal Committee District Council 
Mardan Mardan 
The final part deals with the emerging pattern of relationship with the provincial 
governments followed by an analysis of the policies initiated federal government in the 
field of local government under military and elected civilian governments. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn from the research findings. 
Chapter One 
Governmental control and the growth of 
local government institutions in the 
South-Asian sub-continent 
A Historical Perspective 
In the process of democratisation, the institutions of local self-government play a 
pivotal role. John Stuart Mill justified local government as 'an integral part of 
democracy and an instrument of political education. " James Bryce, expressing similar 
views, held that 'the best school of democracy and the best guarantee for its success is 
the practice of local self-government. '2 
Pakistan, like other developing nations, has benefited from these grass-root 
institutions. The genesis of the system is to be found in ancient periods. The 
excavations in Mohenjodaro and Harappa (Pakistan) indicate the organised urban life in 
ancient times. Before and after the advent of foreign rulers (Greeks, Muslims, British 
etc. ), there was an indigenous system called 'Panchayats' which was limited in the main 
to the rural areas--- Indian society in the past being predominantly rural in character. 3 
Definition 
Literally meaning a council of five, the term 'Panchayat4 is used to describe 
everything from an informal gathering called for a single occasion to the present day 
formal permanent statutory institutions of local self government. 5 The notion of 
Panchayat was taken to mean any gathering of village leaders for the purpose of arriving 
at decisions. 
Kinds 
Panchayat was a single institution that functioned on a village-wide basis and 
exercised a monopoly over the decision making power. 6Villages bigger in area and 
population had more than one panchayat each of them with a prescribed sphere of 
influence and dealt with a distinct categories of problems. In the administration of 
justice, the panchayats exercised sanctions and could levy penalty which was to be paid 
to the offended person and the ultimate sanction available was the 'outcasting' implying 
complete termination of all relationships with the offender by all members of his caste. 
1. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, London, Parker, 186 1, pp. 268-269 
2. James Bryce, Modern Democracies (vol. 1), London, Macmillan, 192 1, p. 150 
3. According to the 1978 estimates, India has a population little over 600 million (second in the world). If 
today four out of every five Indians live in the countryside, the proportion then can easily be imagined. 
Of these four, three are dependent on agriculture. Cited in B. S. Khanna and S. Bhatnagar, India, in 
Donald C. Rowat, ed., International Handbook on Local Government Reorganisation, London, 
Aldwych Press, 1980, p. 425 
4. John Matthai, Village Governmcnt in British India, London, T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1915, p. 18. In the 
opinion of the author there is no evidence that this number was adhered to with any regularity. The 
term panchayat was chosen for its sacred associations rather than for any definite numerical indication. 
5. Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj, A Study of Rural Local Government in India, London, Longman, 
1970, pp. 14-15. Also see Hugh Tinker, Authority and Community in Village India, Pacific Affairs, 
vol. 32, no. 4,1969, pp. 354-357 
6. Ralph Retzlaff conducted a field work in a village named 'Khalapur' (North India) in connection with 
his study of village government, came across with four distinct types of panchayats that functioned in 
the said village before independence. These were: Caste Panchayat, General Meeting Panchayat, 
Farmer Retainer Panchayat and Single Purpose Panchayat. Each of these panchayats was adjudicatory I 
in nature and the membership was based upon ascriptive characteristics. See Ralph Retzlaff, Village 
Government in India, London, Asia Publishing House, 1962, p. 23 
2 
Composition 
R. C. Majumdar says that the local assembly, as revealed from certain 
inscriptions, consisted of the young and old of the village and was thus merely a 
gathering of the male adults of the village. 70ther evidences suggest that there was no 
formal membership or fixed composition as it varied with time and circumstances, 
reflecting at any given point the politically significant leadership in the village. To 
Srinivasan, the traditional panchayat was a body of elders who were the acknowledged 
leaders of the village, chosen for the most part without formal elections and still 
considered to be representatives of the village. 8 
They might be drawn from the members of the founding families or from the 
Brahmins9 and the superior cultivators. 10 The menials and the landless had almost no 
say in its affairs with the result that the consensus developed in most of the cases was 
largely shaped to reflect the interests of the dominant caste in the village which, in 
numerical terms, was a minority of the total village community. There was no laid down 
method of deciding majority or minority opinion. II Being under the influence of village 
leaders, panchayats were far from democratic or welfare-oriented considerations in the 
modem sense of the terms. Regarding its democratic character, John Matthai 
commented: 
". 
.. it is, 
however, necessary to get rid of the notion that the forms of Western democratic 
communities or anything really akin to them, were in operation in the Indian village 
community. " 12 
Despite these sto. rtcomings, it is generally agreed that village in the sub- 
continent had been a corporate body throughout the ages, guided and guarded by a 
council--- the Panchayat. 
History 
In the Rig-Vedas, the oldest Hindu writings from approximately 1200 B. C., 
forms of village self-government are mentioned. 13 To Montagu Harris, more ancient 
than any of these (Local self-government) is the local self government which existed in 
7. Cited in Sayeedul Haq, A Study of Village Panchayats in Pre-British India, Sindh Local Government 
Digest, vol. 4, no. 10, October 1985, p. 4 
8. N. Srinivasan, Village Government in India, Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 15 (1955-56), p. 204 
Meaning the superior Hindu caste followed by the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas, and the Sudras. See 91t: ý 
Radhakumud Mookerji, Local Government in Ancient India, Oxford, Clerendon Press, 1919, p. 127 
Their position was mainly based on the Hindu caste system. Some villages were controlled by the 
agent of a far-away landlord, others by a powerful headman. These differences were a reflection of the 
great variations in the political and social organisation of the villages. See Klemens van de Sand, 
Foundations and Problems of Local Government in Rural India (translated from the German 
language), v. Hase & Koehler Verlag Mainz, n. d., p. 15 C71 
Cited in M. S. K Yousufzai, 'Basic Democracies in Pakistan (Unpublished doctoral thesis), London 
University College, 1963-64, p. 57 
12. Cited in G. Montagu Harris, Comparative Local Government, London, Hutchinson, 1949, p. 11 
13. Klemens van de Sand, Foundations and ..., p. 15. 
3 
Indian villages before the Christian era. 14 The extent to which village panchayats 
in the region both in terms of their distribution throughout the country and the 
period of time during which they functioned, has been a subject of considerable 
controversy. To quote Henry Maddick, "Uncertain in substance and obscure as to date 
of origin is the traditional village unit of government --- the panchayat. "15The historical 
sketch, maintains Tinker, attempts to establish that while the panchayat was an ancient 
institution of unique prestige, it provides no precedent for the village council of today. 16 
Village Features 
In ancient India, a sense of local pride and community was a powerful factor in 
shaping the life of the village. The social structure was based on three concepts: the 
autonomous village community, caste, and the joint family system. Among these the 
first two i. e., autonomous village community and caste system were the special features 
of the social structure. Administratively, it is believed that the village community had 
been a basic social and administrative unit throughout the history. Reference may be 
made to the Rigvedic period where the village unit with its Sabha (Council of elders) 
and Gramani (Headman) was a self governing unit. It was, however, the traditional 
panchayat (Council of elders) which, during the greater part of the period, seems to had 
been the normal instrument of village administration. 17 
The historical continuity of the Indian rural republics was also observed by Sir 
George Birdwood who wrote: 
"India has undergone more religious and political revolutions than an), other country in 
the world. But the village communities remain in full municipal vigour all over the 
peninsula. Scythians, Grýek, Saracen, Afghan, Mongols and Maratha have cone down 
from its mountains, and Portuguese, Dutch, English, French and Dane up out of its seas 
and set up their successive dominations in the land; but the village communities have 
remained as little affected by their coming and going as a rock by the rising and falling of 
the tide. " 18 
Two factors ensured this survival. First, the villages were largely self- 
administering and secondly, the villages were so organised as to be complete units in 
themselves. Though the main purpose for which the village would seem to had been 
organised was the farming of the land, it included every other element necessary to 
render the village's economic and cultural life possible in independence and without 
external assistance. This is illustrated from the comments of Sir Charles Metcalf who, in 
the beginning of the 19th century, remarked: 
"The Village Communities are little republics having nearly everything they want within 
themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where 
11. G. Monta(yu Harris, Comparative Local Government .... P. 
II 
. -I 15. Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj .... p. 
14 
16. Hugh Tinker, Authority and Community in .... p. 
358 
17. N. Srinivasan, Village Government.... p. 204 
18. Cited in B. S. Bhargava, Panchayats in India, 'Local Government Throughout the World, ' vol. 1, 
Hague, I. U. L. A., 1962. .., pp. 
10- 11 
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nothing else lasts. D)-nast), after aýynast)' tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution, - 
but the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself has 
contributed more than an), other cause to the preservation of the peoples of India through 
all the revolutions and changes which they, have suffered. " 19 
Functions of the Panchayats 
"The village corporations, " says R. C. Majumdar, "practically exercised all the 
powers of a state within its narrow sphere of activity. "20 To Sir Thomas Munro, 
"Panchayat was the recognised method for the settlement of disputes in rural India and 
was as much the common law of India as trial by jury was in England. "21 The 
panchayats also distributed land and collected taxes for payment to the central 
government. 
During the Muslim and the British periods, vital reforms were introduced in the 
functional jurisdiction making them responsible to impose taxes and levy extra tolls for 
specific objects of public Utility. 22 They possessed absolute authority over the village 
lands and were generally left undisturbed in the internal management of the villages. 23 
Conduct of business 
Rural society had develoPed an emotional attachment with the panchayat which, 
undoubtedly, was based on the native traditions. To Tinker, "... their deliberations had 
the great weight of religion and custom --- In the panchayat is God. "24 
Although Indian village government has never been democratic in Western 
terms, 25 it conducted its deliberations in the presence of all who cared to attend. 
Decisions were eventually reached after the interested parties had been heard. 
A ma . or weakness of the Panchayats was, however, the lack of a precise code i 
of law. Actions were, therefore, governed by customs and precedents which were often 
purely local in character and acceptance. They had certain techniques of coercion and 
since there was no appeal against their decisions, few could escape from their 
hegemony. 
19. Cited in Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj p. 23 
20. R. C. Majumdar, Ancient India, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1971, p. 421 
21. Cited in N. Srinivasan, Village Government in ..., p. 204 
22. One study reveals that the villages had no funds of their own for local matters since the English had 
abolished the right of the panchayats to impose taxes themselves. This is cited in Klemens van de 
Sand, Foundations and Problems .... p. 42 
23. This policy of non-interference seem to have been true only at an early stage of Indian history. With 
the development of larger states and a gradual change in the tribal structure of society, they could not 
enjoy that amount of freedom and autonomy. See M. S. K. Yousufzal, Basic Democracies in . p. 58 24. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan and Burma, London, 
Athlone Press, 1954, ..., P. 19 
25. Harold Zink, Rural Local Government in Sweden, Italy and India, A Comparative Study, London, 
Stevens & Sons Limited, 1957, pp. 19-20. One opinion held is that the old Indian village communities 
were constituted on a narrow basis of hereditary privilege or caste- closely restricted in the scope of 
their duties e. (, -., the collections of revenue and protection of life and property were their main 
functions. They were neither conscious instruments of political education nor important parts of the 
administrative system. 
5 
Relationships 
Books on Indian history provide inadequate infonnation with regard to the 
pattern of relationship which the panchayats had with the higher authorities of tn 
government during various periods and under different dynasties. 
Yajnavalkya (an Indian sage and law-giver) in 700 B. C., gives the village 
council a brief mention and states that it derived powers from the king, but this seems to 
be a false interpretation as there is no such evidence that the rights of the ancient village 
council ever depended on the delegation of royal power. It was independent of 
government and continued to function, whatever dynasty was ruling the district. 26 
Kautilya, in his book 'Arthashastra' has given a most elaborate account of 
administrative organisation27 that existed between the period 600 B. C and 300 A. D. The 
machinery of government appears to be highly organised. Diagrammatically, it can be 
shown as under: 
Table: I 
A hierarchy of authority reaching down to 
ine vinage pancnayats 
The King 
Bureaucracy 
(Important Administrative Departments) 
The High Priest 
The Commander-in- Chief 
The Chief Judge 
The High Treasurer (Sannidhata) 
The Collector General 
District Officer (Sthanika) 
Village Accountant (Gopa) 
Village Headman 
(assisted by an Assembly of villagers) 
Source: R. C. Majumdar, Ancient India, 
Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1971, p. 149 
In this scheme, the village headman, either nominated by the king or elected by 
the people of the village, transacted local affairs and maintained peace and order. Each 
village formed a close corporation, invested with large powers and responsibilities. It 
had a very large control over persons and property belonging to the village and was 
responsible for the regular payment of royal dueS. 28 
26. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... pp. 105-6 
27. Cited in R. C. Majumdar, Ancient India .... pp. 140-150 
28, A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1954, p. 140 
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Despite government's indirect control over a number of village councils through 
a large panchayat, these councils enjoyed a considerable amount of independence from 
outside. This liberty enabled them to evolve a complex but workable system whereby 
such important matters like agriculture, commerce, crafts, land use, family relations, and 
protection, based substantially upon mutual aid, could be efficiently handled. 29 
The Afghan and Mughal rulers did not interfere with the old customs and 
conventions as a result of which the economic and social structure of Indian life 
continued as before. 30 For instance, Ghyasuddin Tughlak, one of the prominent Afghan 
rulers (1320-1414) had issued definite instructions to his officials to preserve customary 
law. Their relative autonomy, however, did not mean that they escaped from the burden 
of taxation which the central and provincial governments levied on them and from 
which they had no escape. 
Urban Councils & their functions 
In urban areas, municipal-like institutions had their origin at a much later stage. 
Megasthenes, an ambassador-historian, has referred to the functioning of municipal 
administration of the capital city of Palimbothra (Pataliputra) of the Mauryan period. A 
commission consisting of thirty members and divided into six boards or committees 
used to be entrusted with the administration of municipal functions. Special 
departments were placed under their charge to look after all matters concerning public 
welfare such as the proper maintenance of public works of utility, markets, harbours and 
regulation of market prices. A Western scholar praised the municipal administration of 
that time thus: 
"The perfection of the arrangements is astonishing even when exhibited in outline. 
Examination of the departmental details increases our wonder that such an organisation 
could have been planned and efficiently operated in the South Asian Sub-continent in 300 
B. C. 1131 
Arthasastra shares the view and says that a city used to be divided into several 
wards and each ward into several groups of households, like the corresponding divisions 
of the country into districts and villages. 321n the development of urban administration, 
the Muslim rulers of India, specially the Mughals who, in the opinion of Sir Jadunath 
Sarkar33were essentially an urban people in India, contributed significantly. Their major 
contribution was in evolving the office of Kotwal who, being an appointee of the 
Emperor, was an effective instrument for maintaining law and order and the restitution 
of theft within the municipal areas. Local affairs, particularly in the rural areas remained 
29. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Calcutta, Asia Publishing House, 1961, pp. 261-69 
30. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery .... pp. 262-63 
3 1. N. K. Sinha and Nisith R. Ray, A History of India, Calcutta, Orient Longman, 1973, p. 184 
32. R. C. Majumdar, Ancient India. .., pp. 150-152 
33. Quoted in Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... p. 17 
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unregulated from above34 and the village officers and servants were answerable to the 
panchayats. 
Advent of the British Raj 
In its modem form, the history of the origin of local government goes back to 
1678 when the British East India Company proposed to build a wall around the young 
sealement of theirs in order to defend the little town of Madras and to protect their 
merchandise against the armies of local powers. This coupled with the deplorable 
sanitary condition of the quarters inhabited by the Indians made the company to levy a 
house tax in order to raise funds for meeting the expenditures of both constructing the 
wall as well as construction of drainage works and the regular cleaning of streets. 35The 
termination of the tax as a result of peoples' refusal to pay demonstrated through a 
general strike, made Sir Josia Child, then Governor of the Board of Directors of the 
British East India Company and a former mayor of the Portsmouth Borough Council in 
England, to hit upon a novel plan. He set up a local town council on British lines at 
Madras through a charter obtained from the British King James-11. Later, Bombay and 
Calcutta, the other presidency towns, followed SUit. 36 This then was a pattern of 
imposing English ways of working, but most notably in urban areas. 
In 1857-58, the South Asian sub-continent came under the control of the British 
Crown (and Parliament) when the government of India was placed under the overriding 
authority of the Secretary of State in London. 37The 1857-58 tragedy, in the words of 
Fitzjames Stephen, resulted in "the breakdown of the old system, the renunciation of the 
attempt to effect an impossible compromise between the Asiatic and European view of 
things, legal, military and administrative. "38Measures were undertaken to impose a 
modern and efficient administration based only on English principles. In the words of 
': )hn Lawrence (1864-69): Viceroy j 
"We have not been elected or placed in power by the people, but we are here through our 
moral superiority, by the force of circumstances, by the will of providence. This alone 
constitutes our character to govern India. In doing the best we can for the people, we are 
bound by our conscience, and not by theirs. " 39 
34. It is confirmed from the writings of Hugh Tinker that the Mughals, while avoiding any sort of 
interference with the age-old customs of village government, did incorporate the village into their 
administrative system as a unit with the sole purpo, e of assisting in the collection of revenue and the 
maintenance of law and order. See The Foundations of .... P. 
19 
35 Malik Mohammad Siddiq, History of Local Government in Pakistan, (Pamphlet), Place of publication 
and publisher unknown, c. 1965, p. 1 
36. Shahid Ali Rizvi, Local Government in Pakistan, A Study in Clash of Ideas, Karachi, The Centre for 
Research in Local Government, 1980, p. 2 
37. The construction of the Red Sea telegraph in 1870 proved to be an event of far-reaching consequences 
as it made this authority more effective by way of establishing direct communication between the 
Whitehall and Calcutta. 
38 Cited in Michael Edwardes, British India, 1772-1947, A Survey of the Nature and Effects of Alien 
Rule, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1967, p. 176 
39 Cited in Michael Edwardes, British India .... p. 176 
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The viceroy advocated a strong and absolute central authority in India to which 
all other authorities in that country must entirely defer. 40 
Impact of the British policy on traditional institutions 
The local self-government institutions had almost disappeared from towns and 
greatly decayed in villages during the turmoil ending the Mughal rule in India. A 
controversy exists with regard to the impact of the British policies on the working of 
these indigenous institutions. One view is that with the application of English laws in 
the sub-continent, the importance of village panchayats declined considerably. 41 This 
view is shared by Hugh Tinker and Henry Maddick. To Tinker, 'while on the one hand, 
the British created tier upon tier of courts of law, they also tried to revive in their 
peculiar half-hearted manner the panchayat system of judicial administration . 
'42 
Maddick holds the view that the British administration 'with its Roman system of 
justice, replacing the traditional powers of the panchayats in the more serious judicial 
cases, its system of tax gathering and of administration, made such a violent impact that 
43 the corporate life of the villages was weakened and in most cases died. ' 
There are, however, evidences to suggest that the English never had the 
deliberate intention to destroy village institutions. One revealing comment is that of 
David Potter who, while taking a balanced view on the matter, attributes the decay to 
some other factors. To him: 
"Community life in the villages was gradually weakened by several otherfactors such as 
the influence of improved communications which weakened caste by bringing new ideas to 
the village from outside and by making village labourers more mobile and adventurous, 
and the influence of both revenue and judicial administration which increasingly 
emphasised the individual in society, not the village elders of the village community. 1144 
Financial factor expedited the development of local institutions 
The immediate stimulus to the development of local institutions arose out of 
the post-1860s financial embarrassment of the Indian Government. Income depended 
largely on the inelastic land revenue, and a succession of wars had caused constant 
40 Perhaps such policy was designed in line with the English local authorities itself which, at time, acted 1) 
mainly as agents of the Central Government in London, enforcing central law and policy and 
collecting central taxes. See Anwar Syed, The Antecedents of Local Self-Government in Pakistan, 
Public Administration Review (N. I. P. A., Lahore), vol. 7, no. 2, April-June, 1969, pp. 16-17 
41 N. Srinivasan, Village Government in ..., p. 205. The author 
holds the view that the new courts set up 
by the British removed village disputes from the competence of the panchayats. The revenue and 
police functions of the villages were taken over by government officials. In the absence of any 
responsible functions, fon-nal village self-government by a panchayat of elders trying disputes, 
collecting revenues, and levying a contribution in kind or labour for public works ceased. A decay of 
village patriotism and autonomy ensued. This was not accidental but was the result of government 
policy. 
42. Hugh Tinker, Authority and Community pp. 357-358 
43. Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj ..., pp. 16-17 
44 David C. Potter, Government in Rural India, An Introduction to Contemporary District Administration, 
London, G. Bell and Sons, 1962, p. 6. The author has referred to the initiatives of Lord Ripon in 1882 
when attempts were made to revive the panchayats on a statutory basis. 
9 
deficits. The petty wars which raged all the time could no longer be financed from the 
irregular land tax revenue. The financial status of the East India Company became 
increasingly bad and by 1858 its debts had grown to 98 million pounds. Under these 
conditions the British did not regard the greater decentralisation as a method of shifting 
the responsibility and competence for certain public matters to lower levels but rather 
as a means of relieving the central administration of certain financial burdens. 45 
James Wilson, who was sent from London as Finance Minister with the task of 
bringing Indian finances into equilibrium, suggeSLed financial decentralisation as one of 
the remedies. He proposed the transference of certain categories of responsibilities to 
the local bodies such as building roads and some other public works. These local 
institutions were to raise the funds required by imposing taxes of their own. In his 
budget speech, James Wilson said: 
"It is of thefirst importance to break through the habit of keeping everything it? dependence 
on Calcutta, and to teach people not to look to governinentfor things which the), can dofar 
better themselves. 1146 
Viceroy expedited the establishment of councils 
The responses given by the newly created provincial legislatures to James 
Wilson's proposals was encouraging as in the Punjab only some forty-nine such 
committees were constituted during 1862-1864 period and of these twenty-eight were 
elected by trade or caste panchayatS47indicating thus the amount of involvement which 
the government maintained in the constitution of municipalities. These promising 
reports fiom the Punjab encouraged Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy of India (1864-69) and 
one time critic of Indian politicians, to renew his call for local self-government. In a 
resolution issued in 1864, though basically concerned with the financial questions, 
made the following declaration: 
"The people of this country, are perfectly capable of administering their own local affairs. 
The municipal feeling is deeply, rooted in them. The village communities ... are the most 
abiding of Indian institutions. They maintained the framework of society while successive 
swarms of invaders swept over the country. In the cities also ... there exists much capacity 
for corporate action ... 
Holding the position we do in India, every view of duty and policy 
should induce us to leave as much as possible of the business of the counto, to be done by 
the people ... and to confine ourselves to ... influencing and 
directing in a general way 
all the movements of the social machine. 1148 
Bureaucracy influenced composition of councils 
Since the provincial governments were authorised to determine the composition 
and strength of municipal institutions, almost every major province enacted legislation 
45. Anwar Syed, The Antecedents of. .., p. 18 
46. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of ..., p. 35 
47. Cited in Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... p. 35. These developments could be possible in C- 
accordance with a resolution issued by the Lt. Governor Sir Robert Montgomery. 
48. Gazette of India, cited in Tinker, The Foundations of ..., p. 36 
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as a result of which every town of importance in the sub-continent had become a 
municipality by the end of 1868. Despite the Lt. Governors' powers to arrange the 
election of members of boards by the ratepayers, the elective principle was held in 
abeyance. These were formed, therefore, by the District Magistrate from among his 
I mulaqatis' (private visitors) and other respectable citizens. Official influence, according 
to Tinker, was almost overpowering. 49 
Mayo Resolution of 1870 
Also called the Mayo Resolution on Financial Decentralisation, brought further 
development by enunciating two propositions i. e., certain services like roads, education 
and medical relief were treated as local and the funds required for their administration 
were raised, in the main, by local taxation; and secondly, in the management of these 
funds, opportunities were created for the development of local self-government. The 
resolution read: 
The operation of this resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford fidl 
opportunities for the development of self government, for strengthening local self- 
government institutions and for the association of natives and Europeans to a greater 
extent than heretofore in the administration of the country. 1150 
The resolution set the stage for the emergence of provinces as units for 
government. The term local government was used to denote the administration at 
provincial levels whereas municipal institutions and other local bodies were referred to 
by the general term 'local self-government. ' These initiatives introduced major changes 
in the representative character of leading municipal institutions. At a later stage, though 
the representative principle was widely extended, the government's control over the 
appointment of the commissioner, auditing of accounts and sanctioning the raising of 
loans was essentially maintained. 
The Ripon Resolution 
A second attempt at decentralisation was made in 1882 in the form of 'Ripon 
Resolution' issued by Lord Ripon, the Viceroy of India (1880-84). It gave more 
prominence to the idea of local self-government than to the idea of mere local taxes for 
local services. 51 Ripon demonstrated the realism of allowing the Indians to play a part in 
the management of state affairs. He wrote in 188 1: 
". .. we must 
be careful to maintain our military, strength, but, whatever may, have been the 
case in the past, we cannot now rely upon militaryforce alone; and policy as well as justice 
out to prompt us to endeavour to govern more and more by means of, and in 
49. Cited in Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of ..., p. 37 
50 V. Venkata Rao, Democratic Decentralisation, Theory and Practice, Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, vol. 24 (n), 1978, p. 640-41 
5 1. V. Venkata Rao, Democratic Decentralisation p. 64 1. The author regards Ripon as the father of 
democratic decentrahsation in modern India. 
accordance with, that growing public opinion, which is beginning to show itself througho 
the country. 11ý2 
To give a broader base to the British rule, Ripon brought an open liberal mind to 
political and social questions. The general principles which were to govern the future 
development of local representative institutions were set out in detail. The resolution 
outlined the intended motives thus: 
"It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put 
forward and supported. It is chiefly designed as an instrument of political and popular 
education. 1153 
Lord Ripon54 stressed the politically educative role of local institutions and 
wanted to spread these 'schools' for training future leaders all over urban and rural India. 
To enforce the elective system as the instrument of political education, he encouraged 
the expansion of elective element in local councils and boards and the replacement of 
appointed official chairmen with elected ones. 55 
To enhance the process of political training, Lord Ripon provided three classes 
of boards namely, (a) Municipal Corporations in the cities, (b) District Boards 
corresponding to the English County Councils, and (c) Local Boards. Among these, the 
last two were to serve as training grounds. Ripon attached greater importance to the role 
of the District Officer. The District Boards, in his opinion, were not to be overshadowed 
by the presence of the 'Bara Sahib' if they could be of any use for the purpose of training 
the members to manage their own affairs. 
But as Tink(-, r observed, 'The Viceroy was also alone in his liberalism; the vast 
majority of Anglo-Indian officials were conservatives, supporters of paternal 
administration, so that the reforms proposed by Lord Ripon were attenuated, or even 
ignored by the provincial governments and district officers who were free to interpret r-) 
the general directions of the resolution according to local conditionS. '56 
It was the result of this change in policy that the system produced some 
promising results by bringing into being some prominent future leaders who had the 
opportunity of getting to the provincial legislative councils constituted sometime later. 
This massive political training and progressing sense of participation also influenced the 
western -educated class who developed dissatisfaction over their share of responsibility 
52 Judith M. Brown, Modern India, The Origins of An Asian Democracy, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 
1985, p-100 
53. V. Venkata Rao, Democratic Decentralisation .... p. 45 
54. Lord Ripon, who was appointed viceroy at a time when Britain itself was ruled by a liberal prime 
minister Gladstone. had brought an open liberal mind to political and social questions. Greatly 
influenced by the teachings of John Stuart Mill, Lord Ripon wanted to introduce a western system of 
representative local government in India. 
55. Anwar Syed, The Antecedents of .. p. 18 
56. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of. . p. 43-44. 
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in local government. 57 All the provinces, therefore, had to provide for the two-thirds 
majorities of non-official members both for urban and rural boards. But as a large 
majority of these non-officials were still dependent upon the District Magistrate's favour 
for nomination, the change was more formal than real. The question of holding elections 
also depended more upon the attitudes of provinces than upon the aptitude of their 
peoples. Further, the District Officers, in their capacity as presidents of district boards, 
still dominated the councils. 
The actual conduct of council business by bureaucracy 
The dominance of government officials and passive role of elected and non-official 
members turned the district boards into petty departments of the district administration. 
They lacked a schedule of meetings and some of them failed to convene even a single 
meeting throughout the year. 58 The extent of official control was assessed by a 
contemporary thus: 
"It is generally received opinion that in North India and Burma official influence is the 
predominant factor; that in Bengal it decidedly weaker than the non-official influence, and 
that in Central and South India the two influences are more or less evenlýy balanced. 1159 
Causes of the failure 
Lord Ripon's view of entrusting the actual municipal administration to the 
elected representatives were not shared either by the local governments or the 
authorities in England. Therefore, the general picture of municipal administration 
which took shape in 1908 was of a system still largely bound by official control, and 
with public opinion operating, with some few exceptions, as a negative rather than a 
positive influence. 
Two factors i. e., limited funds and the perpetuation of elaborate official control 
proved a major hindrance in achieving the desired objectives. The government set forth 
the guiding principles, but left their execution to the provincial governments allowing 
them the discretion to legislate for their territories according to their local exigencies. 
This resulted in an uneven development of rural local boards in India. The British 
bureaucracy in India, though with several creditable points, was not interested in the 
decentralisation of its powers. 60 This view is also shared by Harold Zink who holds the 
view that official distrust and popular apathy combined to frustrate the plan of the 
57 The educated Indians cherishing the ideals of democracy and liberty started seriously striving for 
attaining freedom from the colonial rule. Lord Ripon wanted to provide for an outlet for this upsurge. 
He thought that handling of the national and provincial administration required an apprenticeship in Cý 
local administration. 
58 Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... p. 
51. In 1889, for instance, none of the municipalities in the 
Dera Ismail Khan District (N-W. F. P) held any meeting at all for reasons mainly the pre-occupation of 
the Deputy Commissioner in managing tribal affairs. 
Quoted in Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of . p. 
66 
60. V. Venkata Rao, Democratic Decentralisation ..., p. 641 
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government of Lord Ripon. 61 Later, the creation of new departments in the name of 
efficiency and allowing them a say in the local governmi-nt affairs led to the 
development of a more rigid system of supervision which ran from the smallest 
municipality to the Secretary of State. 62 
Riponian efforts brought fruits at a later stage 
The seeds which Ripon sowed made a real beginning in the direction of local 
self-government. 63 The political education desired by Ripon culminated gradually, in 
the emergence of truly representative system of local self-government based on the 
principle of democracy as is illustrated from the euphemistic statement of Gokhale: 
"We appreciate local self-government because of the fact that it teaches people of different 
castes and religions who had been kept apart for a long time to work together towards a 
common goal... 64 
Brief interlude of centralisation 
Successive Viceroys such as Lord Dufferin, Lord Elgin and Landsdowne did not 
take much interest in the development of local government. The bureaucracy, during, 
their regimes, reached its apotheosis. Specially, during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon 
(1899-1905) centralisation reached its peak when British policy was initiated not from 
Whitehall but from Calcutta and the bureaucracy also found a master who knew how to 
ensure efficiency. His measures, one after another, alienated public opinion. For 
example, his infamous Mackenzie Bill (1899) established complete official control over 
the Corporation of Calcutta something destructive of the spirit of municipal self- 
government which educated Indians had come to cherish. 65 
The Royal Commission Upon Decentralisation 
The establishment, in 1907, of this commission was to secure the development 
of local self-government not for its own sake but as an aspect of administrative 
devolution. Its major recommendations emphasised increased powers of taxation, a 
complete control over budget, and a substantial elective majority with an elected 
chairman. The continuation of District Magistrates as presidents of district boards in 
view of their unrivalled opportunities of knowing the district, elected non-official 
chairmen of urban councils including majority of elected non-officials members, a free 
hand in the determination of their budgets and other aspects of financial management 
such as taxation with a remote control to be exercised by the government were some of 
the significant recommendations of the Royal Commission. Interestingly, while Ripon 
61. Harold Zink, Rural Local Government in Sweden .... p. 21 
62. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... p. 60. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation, for instance, once 
had to seek prior approval of the Secretary of State before it could give its official chairman an extra 
allowance in 1888. 
63. R. C. Majumdar et al. An Advance History, London, Macmillan & Co., 1946, p. 860 
64. Cited in Klemens van de Sand, Foundations and Problems ..., p. 56 
65. N. K. Sinha, A History of India, Calcutta, Orient Longman, 1973, p. 543 1 
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had pleaded that boards should not be overshadowed by the presence of 'Bara Sahib', the 
Royal Commission emphasised strict official control even over villacre matters and said: 
". .. The movement should 
be completely under the eve and hand of the district authorities. 
Supervision of affairs in the villages is and should remain one of the main functions of 
tehsildars and the sub-divisional officers.,, 66 
To ensure this, the provincial governments and their principal executives at the 
district levels were given power which they could exercise whenever such a need arose. 
Similarly, powers to suspend or abolish the municipalities, in case of unsatisfactory 
working was assigned to the commissioners and deputy commissioners. 
Thus the old tradition of looking towards the District Officer as the 'Guardian' 
lingered over local government in many ways. The failure to remove certain obstacles 
such as the smallness and inelasticity of local revenues, the difficulty of devising 
further forms of taxation, the prevalence of sectarian animosities and the varying 
character of the municipal area, made it difficult for the government to carry out the 
reform proposals as enunciated by the decentralisation commission. 67 
Reversal of policy: The Government of India Act 1919 
In an attempt to counteract the sudden demands of the Indians for more 
independence, the British government announced a basic change in its Indian policy in 
August 1917. Promising the progressive realisation of responsible government by the 
gradual development of the institution of self-government, the Viceroy Lord 
Chelmsford, developed a programme in collaboration with Edwin Montagu, then British 
foreign secretary. This act, passed by the British Parliament in 1919, aimed at the safe 
and steady progress in the direction of establishing in the sub-continent a government 
responsible to the people. The act materially changed the constitution68 under which 
India had been governed since 1857. Laying policy guidelines for the grant of some 
measure of responsibility to popular representatives, special reference was made to the 
complete popular control over local bodies. 69The government's policy was that until the 
Indians had shown themselves capable of making a success of local government, they 
should not be entrusted with power in a wider field. The viceroy said: 
"The domain of urban and rural self-government is the great training ground from which 
political progress and a sense of responsibility have taken their start ... it is time ... to 
66 Report of the Royal Commission Upon Decentralisation, cited in Shahid Ali RIzvI, Local 
Government in .... P. 
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67. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of .... p. 97 
68 The control over local government, for instance, was wholly transferred to the provinces and In 1920- 
21 Indian ministers took over the departments of municipal government. Give reference. 
69. B. B. Misra, District Administration and Rural Development in India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 
1983, pp. 165-66. Under the act, local government became the responsibility of ministers responsible 
to provincial legislatures. To legislatures and to ministerial office came nationalist politicians with tn 
experience of working in urban and rural local bodies and these men were keen on securing thoroughlý 
democratic local bodies with greater autonomy and larger fiscal resources. 
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accelerate the rate of progress and thus to stimulate the sense of responsibility in the 
average citizen and to enlarge his experience. 
Envisaged involvement of local population 
It was in line with the above objective that a programme for advances in local 
government was drafted which provided a basis of converting local authorities into 
nopularly elected bodies. A loose ministerial supervi . sion, instead of a hierarchy of 
official control was devised. Both urban and rural boards were to contain a majority of 
elected members but with provisions for nomination and a general replacement of 
officials by non-official elected chairmen in cities and towns. With regard to village Z--) 
councils, it was emphasised that they must be living units as a natural expression of the 
corporate life of the individual villages. 
Substantial decentralisation 
The decentralisation and lesser outside control enabled the boards to raise or 
lower taxes within statutory limits. The government gave certain additional concessions 
in the field of finances according to which a board was not to receive dictation of 
government departments for all self-financed schemes. However, certain activities of 
the local councils, both urban and rural, were still amenable to outside sanction which 
included: senior appointments such as Executive Officer, Secretary, Engineer and 
Health Officer. The control mechanism was cut down to the degree that in the event of 
gross incompetence only, boards could be suspended or superseded. 
The impact of elected provincial ministries 
Elected ministers took over responsibility for local government late in 1920 or 
early 1921 stimulating, thus, the provinces to prepare for radical changes in local 
government. Accordingly., most heads of provinces appointed committees to make 
proposals for reform. Important recommendations made by these committees included: 
lowering of the franchise, an increase in the elected strength of the boards and the 
withdrawal of officials from their counsels. 
An important aspect of this act was the new structure of Provincial Executive 
which was designed to meet two conditions namely: 
responsibility to popular representatives and; 
the political backwardness of the people and the administrative inexperience 
of their leaders. 
Although conflicting in nature, the above were provided for in the device of 
'Dyarchy'-- a device by which the functions of the Provincial Government were divided 
between those which were to be given to popular control ad those which must continue 
to remain in official hands. The former were called "Transferred Subjects" and the latter 
"Reserved Subjects". The Governor- in-Counc iI was in charge of the Reserved subjects, 
70. B. B. Misra, District Administration and ..., p. 106 
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and the Governor acting with the Ministers of the Transferred subjects. 
The guiding principle of this division, in the opinion of M. V. Pylee, was to 
include within the Transferred List those departments which afforded most 
opportunities for local knowledge and social service, those in which people of the sub- 
continent had shown themselves to be keenly interested, those in which mistakes that 
might occur, though serious, would not be irremediable, and those which stood most in 
the need of development. 71 
Achievement of some tangible results 
Being a transferred subject, not only that local government became entirely the 
department of elected ministers, but the Secretary of State and the Government of India 
were also excluded from any form of control. This enabled the ministers to introduce 
new legislation, distribute grants-in-aid, approve nomination to local bodies, exercise 
disciplinary control and, in general, determine policies pertaining to local government 
operations. There was laid down a schedule of taxes which could be levied only by or 
on behalf of the local bodies. 72Certain drastic changes, particularly the disappearance of 
the district officer and his assistants from district and municipal boards, was a 
substitution of democratic for autocratic rule. 
The popular ininisters-in-charge of local self-government could now legit. mately 
provide a sound financial basis enabling the local governmr-nt institutions to safeguard 
their autonomy. Because of the revolutionary measures, there would have taken place 
tremendous advancement, had these newly emancipated local boards been able to 
tackle with their problems enthusiastically under circumstances that were comparatively 
calm and stable. But it was on account of the negative effect of a combination of 
adverse factors, both external and internal (e. g., an atmosphere of political dynamism, 
rising tide of costs, the archaic financial structure supplemented with complaints of 
financial embarrassment) that the system of local government could not benefit from the 
measures which the Government of British India was bold enough to initiate. 
The bitter political struggle which gripped the nation, the persistence of 
communalism and faction, the rise and dominance of party bosses in local bodies, the 
lack of experience and administrative incompetence among the officials employed by 
the local bodies were some of the factors which hindered the materialisation of the 
reform efforts. 73 
The Government of India Act 1935 
Recognising the separate legal personality of the provinces and local self- 
government, this act placed the latter on the provincial list of the federal scheme. 74The 
71. M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. 76 
72. Taxation Enquiry Committee Report (Government of Pakistan), vol. 1, June 1960, p. 292 
73. Harold Zink, Rural Local Government in Sweden .... pp. 22-23 
74. Mohit Bhattacharya, State Agency for Municipal Supervision in India, Journal of Administration 
Overseas, vol. 9, no. 3, July 1970, p. 186 
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transfer of control of local government from British bureaucracy to Indian political 
leadership had salutary effect in the beginning. 
The provincial governments could not pay attention to local government. The 
provincial autonomy, guaranteed under this constitutional reforms. shifted the focus of 
attention from local to provincial government. In the final period of political struggle in 
the country, local bodies being under the control of political parties became more intent 
on national freedom than local problems. 
In the fiscal field, the division of revenue resources in only two lists i. e., Federal 
and Provincial, obliterated the legal distinction between the sphere of taxation of local 
bodies and the provincial governments. Moreover, the incorporation in the federal list of 
the terminal taxes on goods carried by railways, the limitation on the amount of 
profession tax leviable on any one assessee to Rs. 50 per annum and the exemption of 
federal properties from local taxation, all tended to reduce the tax powers of the local 
bodies. 75Despite considerable growth in the number of local self-governing bodies in 
this period, there was no corresponding development in their effectiveness as they were 
handicapped financially. 
Post-in dependence scene 
Unlike India, only a small area constituting Pakistan in 1947 had benefit from 
the different acts passed and the reforms introduced by the British during the pre- 
partition period. While rural areas in Pakistan remained mostly in the background, there 
were only a few urban areas which had been effected by the initiatives taken during 
British , -ule. 76 
The fact that local government institutions remained largely ignored during the 
years preceding independence needs to be analysed in its broader perspective. Under the 
interim constitution of Pakistan, for which the Government of India Act of 1935 
provided a basis, there came into being a highly centralised federal system ensuring full 
predominance of the central authority. For instance, the central government's powers in 
legislative, financial, administrative and political spheres were so great that for practical 
purposes the country's governmental structure could hardly be described as truly 
federal. 77 The leadership of the Muslim League, while conceiving Pakistan to be a 
federal democratic country, had promised to establish a federal system guaranteeing 
maximum autonomy to the provinces. Contrarily, a highly centralised system was 
75. Taxation Enquiry Committee ..., p. 
292 
76. Mohammad Mohyuddin Qazi (Dr. ) holds the view that Karachi in Pakistan was one of the few cities 
where municipal administration, though in a rudimentary form, was established dunng the early days 
of the British rule. For instance, in 1846 a Board of Conservancy was established to deal with the 
epidemic of cholera which was ravaging the city in those days. See 'Law and Practice of Local 
Government in Pakistan, Lahore, Law Publishing Company, 1985, p. 4 
77. G. W. Choudhury, Democracy on Trial in Pakistan, The Middle East Journal, vol. 17, no. I&2, 
Winter-Spring, 1963, p. 8. 
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introduced which proved fatal for the cause of national integration. 78 The ruling elite, 
believing in a strong centre, planned from there for political, economic and social 
development. 
Political chaos and frequent change of governments 
The biggest dilemma was that the whole first decade of the independence of 
Pakistan proved to be an era of rapidly changing governments. Each of these 
governments were required, as a matter of urgency, to settle certain grave problems such 
as the rehabilitation of large number of refugees, 79 the distribution of assets with India, 
the framing of the constitution, 80 and similar other vital problems of national 
importance. 
Among these a significant problem which diverted the government's energy was 
the lack of an agreement on the constitution. 81 The delay in framing a constitution and 
the shape it eventually assumed, did not prove helpful in promoting the cause of local 
government institutions beyond their pre-independence circumscribed scope. The 
struggle for power and the frequent change of governments'82both at the centre and the 
provinces especially from 1953, made it difficult to implement the plans, whatsoever, of 
the provincial governments. The dearth of dedicated leaders coupled with political 
instability was a major factor hindering the development of elected institutions. The 
existing class of politicians were faced with problems of factionalism, regionalism and 
opportunism which characterised post-1947 politics of Pakistan bringing the political 
system under heavy strains from all sides. 83 The Pakistan Muslim League, which 
remained the politically dominant party in the initial stage, eroded rapidly which was 
not effectively filled either by the new group of national leaders or by a stable party 
system. 84Thus the general political process characterised by uncertainty did not allow 
78. Syed Jaffar Ahmed, Federalism in Pakistan, A Constitutional Study, Karachi, Pakistan Study Centre 
(University Campus), 1990, p. 139 
79. Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Pakistan, n. p., 1974, p. 37. Pakistan was rocked by the 
problem of refugees and their relief and welfare. Some twelve million people migrated to Pakistan 
following the violence of the communal riots. 
80 Mustafa Chowdhury, Pakistan, Its Politics and Bureaucracy, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 
1988, p. 44. The disagreement on two major questions delayed the formations of Pakistan's first 
constitution. These were: the role of Islam in the new state; and the relations between East and West 
Pakistan and the central government. Finally promulgated in 1956, the constitution had to be 
abrogated in 1959 fAlowing the military coup of October 1958. 
81. The task of writing a constitution establishing and defining the political order proved to be difficult. 
The constitution prepared with the hectic efforts of ten years and promulgated in 1956, lasted little 
more than two and a half years. See Louis D. Hayes, The Struggle for Legitimacy in Pakistan, Lahore, 
Vanguard Books Ltd., 1986, pp. 82-94. 
82. Keith Callard, The Political Stability of Pakistan, Pacific Affairs, vol. 29,1956, pp. 5-20. Also see 
Huma Naz, Bureaucratic Elite & Political Development in Pakistan (1947-58), Islamabad, National 
Institute of Pakistan Studies, (University Campus), 1990, p. 66. The author points out that the Muslim 
Leacue disintegrated soon after independence and from 1948-58, the seven political parties that were L, 
formed out of its fragments produced nine highly unstable governments during this period. 
83. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 
1986, p. 47. 
84. Huma Naz, Bureaucratic Elite & Political ..., pp. 67-68. 
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leaders to take up the question of local government. 
Dissolution/supersession of Local Government 
The general attitude of the government towards local government was negative. 
Local governments were frequently dismissed on flimsy grounds. The situation in the N- 
W. F. P., for instance, was discouraging in that by 1951-52, all the district local 
governments in the province had been suspended. 85The findings of Local Government 
Reforms Committee (constituted by the Punjab Government in 1952) revealed that local 
government institutions were totally dependent upon the provincial government and 
could not initiate any project worth the name independently. 86The situation on an all 
Pakistan basis in 1957 was such that twenty four out of thirty four district governments 
stood superseded87 and administrators were appointed to look after municipal affairs. 
Similarly, eighty per cent of the local bodieS88 in the province of West Pakistan stood 
superseded by 1958-59. 
While in operation, the councillors were not wholly elective and the franchise 
was so restricted that the elections were not a true index of public representation. No 
elections of local bodies took place for many years as a result of which the prestige of 
local authorities seriously diminished as representative institutions. Functionally, they 
were also unable to provide services because of financial constraints. 
The low priority given to the local government is also evident from the 
observations made in the First Five Year Plan. The framers of the plan recognised the 
prevalence of various trends which were apparent in the rapid deterioration of the local 
bodies. These trends, characterising the administration of local self-government for 
some years before independence and their continuation, was illustrated in the following 
manner: 
the need for developing local self-government institutions should be recognised by 
both the federal and provincial governments in clear and unequivocal terms. The tendency 
which is all too apparent, of curtailing the scope of the functions of local bodies should be 
effectively checked. The extension of bureaucratic control will tend to kill initiative, inhabit 
leadership, and prevent self-help enterprise among men and women all over the country. . 
. noticed trends to transfer educational, 
health, and animal husbandry institutions from 
local bodies to direct government management. Even if governments are able to operate 
them more efficiently, this would be little compensation for the resultant set-back to the 
development of democratic values in our society. The approach must be one of guiding and 
helping the local bodies so as to make them effective instruments of administrative and 
social progress and not one of curtailing their scope and crippling them for the sake of 
efficiency. -89 
85. Shahid Ali Rizvi, Local Bodies in Pakistan, Pakistan Quarterly 14,1966, pp. 50-57. 
86 Quoted in Mumtaz Ahmad, Local Government: An Essential Component of Rural Development 
Strategy, Pakistan Journal of Public Administration (N. I. P. A., Karachi), vol. 12, no. 1, June 1973, p. 
102. 
87. Masud-ul-Hasan, Local Bodies in Pakistan 1947-1966, Pakistan Quarterly 14,1966, pp. 65-73. 
88. Cited in Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New 
Heaven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 120 
, S9. (Ch. ) Mohammad Ashraf, The Evolution and Expansion of Local Government Institutions in the Sub- 
Continent, Public Administrative Revievi, (N. I. P. A., Lahore), vol. 25, no. 1, Jan-Jun 1987, pp. 73-74 
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Role of the bureaucracy 
Beside political instability, the bureaucratic elite which played a pivotal role in 
the perpetuation of a highly centralised administration, was also a major hindrance in 
the emergence of elected institutions. During this period, the bureaucrats not only 
disorganised other elite groups by using the tactics of divide and rule but also made 
efforts to keep other elite groups (except the military) dependent upon itself through its 
generalist role-expansion. This concentration of political powel. ý_-scalated the conflict of 
the bureaucratic elite with other elite groups and led to the ethnicization of politics 
through the polarisation of national identities. 90 
On the other hand, the progressive disassociation, at that early stage, of the 
district officers from the functioning of local bodies was a major setback to the system. 
The reason was the tremendous responsibilities which the former assumed following 
independence. 
Under these circumstances the deterioration in standards was inevitable. The 
situation, instead of bringing improvement, was left to stagnate. When matters appeared 
to be too far gone in any sphere, the method usually adopted to correct the decline was, 
in the name of efficiency, a gradual whittling away of the functions entrusted to these 
institutions, or supersession and the appointment of administrators to replace the elected 
representatives. 91 As service agencies, they were reduced to a state bordering on 
bankruptcy. Local government, therefore, remained a hotchpotch of decaying or defunct 
local self government institutions. 92 
Early Attempts at improvement 
The government's attempts to expand its activities to provide services in most 
spheres of life were frustrated by the lack of some machinery to secure public 
participation in administration at the district, sub-division, thana and village levelS. 93 
Provincial governments did attempt to establish or renovate the existing local 
government institutions. To inculcate a sense of participation to the people at the local 
level, the provincial government instituted certain reforms towards the development of 
local government. The party manifesto of the ruling Muslim League had declared: 
"In principle, the Muslim League stands for the very widest extension of local self- 
government on the model of parishes and communes of the United States. It is not logical 
or possible to have democracy at the apex sustained by bureaucracy at the base; and in 
fact, democracy should be most extensive where it comes closest in touch with the ordinary 
life of the common man. In practice, this implies that we must train our people for local 
90. Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, London, Dawson, 1979, p. 74. 
91. Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of .... p. 121. The author observed that the local 
authorities had no powers which could not be withdrawn by the district officer. 
92. Habib-ur-Rahman, Basic Democracies as Institution of Local Government in Pakistan, Journal of 
Local Administration Overseas, volume 1, no. 1-4,1962, p. 24 1. 
93 'enced through the execution of First Five Year Plan (1955-60), that the lack of popular . 
it was experi Z: ' 
involvement in the process of economic development proved to be a major impediment. See 
Inayatullah, (ed. ), Bureaucracy & Development in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural 
Development, 1970, p. 335. 
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self-government in all directions so that the decisions which are now bureaucraticallýy 
taken and executed by deputy commissioners and superintendents of police should be 
arrived at and taken responsibility for by, the elected representatt . ves of the people. 1194 
In pursuance to the above commitment, certain measures were undertaken such 
as the promulgation, in 1950, of a Municipal Act for the N-W. F. P., and the Punjab 
Village Panchayat Act of 1958.95 Some other significant measures included: 
a) introduction of the universal adult franchise in place of the restricted 
franchise; 
b) making the district local bodies fully elective; and 
c) extending the panchayat system to selected places in the villages. 
Since these attempts were undertaken while ensuring the preponderance of 
professional public servants, none of these succeeded in producing viable local 
government. These institutions remained largely adjuncts to central administration. 96 
Adverse effects of V-AID 
While meaningful participation of the people in the administration of local 
affairs could not be secured for the reasons enumerated above, some efforts were 
directed towards the involvement of rural communities in programmes of social and 
economic development. One such programme started in 1953 was known as Village- 
AID (Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme), which achieved 
greater results in terms of creating infrastructure like roads, schools, dispensaries, 
sanitation, adult education, women and youth programmes etc. 97 
The programme, despite certain remarkable achievements, proved to be a 
retrogressive step in the working of local government in that the government created a 
network of new institutions as a result of which many functions already performed by 
local councils were withdrawn. This, according to Masud-ul-Hasan, led to a great deal 
of hostilly between the V-AID created organisations and the already existing local 
bodies with the result that the councils languished, but the V-AID failed to take root 
either. 98 The lack of strong political will, national government's lack of interest in the 
programme, and the reliance on foreign assistance for the execution of the programme 
94 Quoted in Inayatullah, Changing Pattern of District Administration in Pakistan, in Inayatullah, ed., 
District Administration in West Pakistan, Its Probl-ms and Challenges, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy 
For Rural Development, 1964, p. 113 
95. Mohammad Mohy-ud-din Qazi (Dr. ), Law & Practice of .... p. 6 
96 Muneer Ahmad, Rural Self-Government in Pakistan, An Experiment in Political Development through 
Bureaucracy, in Robert D. Stevens, et al., (ed. ) Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, n. d., p. 218. The author has attributed three major reasons for 
the weakness of local government i. e., the continued dominance of the civil bureaucracy, the nature of 
the impact of public officials on rural people, and the weakness of the socio-economic base for the 
building of democratic values. Also see pp. 218-228. 
97 A. Jameel Siddiqui, A Review of Rural Development Programmes (1857-1980), Study No. 2, 
Government of Pakistan, Local Government & Rural Development Division, 1980, pp. 25-37. 
98. Quoted in Muneer Ahmad, Rural Self-Government in ..., p. 217. 
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were some of the hindrances attributable to the termination of the scheme in 1959. The 
gains symbolised by several predominantly legal reforms were undone by the failure of 
the government to follow them up with positive action. 99 
Conclusion 
Circumscribed and truncated though they were, village panchayats were 
functioning in their splendid isolation all over the country. Their functions might have 
been limited, so also their powers; they might have been overwhelmed by caste 
considerations or local customs or old parochial ties and attitudes; but they did meet 
from time to time and transact their business and, above all, manage the local affairs of 
the village community. They had survived the onslaughts of indifference and apathy and 
the slow disintegration brought about by the alien rule. 100 With all its tyrannical and 
undemocratic characteristics, the self-perpetuating panchayats of the ancient time were 
certainly self-governing. The period between 1882 and 1918 was significant as 
numerous schemes were put forward in an attempt to associate the local population in 
the management of local affairs. Despite little achievements being made, the measures 
did succeed in imparting some necessary training and a sense of participation among the 
masses. 
The system remained under the domination of district officers during the entire 
period. The Government's failure to initiate uniform principles for a balanced 
development in the sphere of local government made each provincial government free 
to progress at the speed it judged best. The practice of different provinces varied so 
much that any synthesis was impossible. 
In financial matters too, the period under discussion was of less encouragement. 
The local councils depended on the financial assistance of both the central and 
provincial governments. Thus, the classic principle 'whoever pays for a service should 
be in control' was upheld. The condition of rural boards was worse because the control 
exercised by government over district boards was more extensive than over 
municipalities. Due to the financial constraints, the local bodies everywhere were 
marking time and not only that new development was impossible but even the problem 
of maintaining existing services was itself one of acute difficulty. 
Among the three important measures put into practice during this period i. e., the 
Ripon Resolution of 1882, the Royal Commission Upon Decentralisation of 1909 and 
the Resolution of 1915, the first two seemed to be advantageous in terms of their deeper 
99. Muneer Ahmad, Rural Self-Government in .... p. 216. The author has referred to introduction of the 
principle of adult franchise, assigning of full elective nature to the councils of district governments 
with powers to elect their own chairmen from among, themselves, and the plans to extend panchayat- 
style of local government to more villages in the Punjab and other provinces. 
1()0 B. HoOia, Panchayati Raj Versus Decentralisation of Administration, Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, vol. 24, no. 2,1978, p. 655 
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impact on the gradual development of local government system. This is the period 
during which bureaucracy succeeded in subordinating the guiding principles of local 
government to its own intentions of maintaining the efficiency of administration under 
any circumstances. As regards the question of relationship between the central and local 
government institutions, none of the above measures stimulated any radicai reform. 
Almost everywhere, the old hierarchy of official control remained intact. 
Lord Ripon's reforms were the first coherent policy statement towards offering 
the educated elite an opportunity to take part in the management of local administration 
and this was taken to be a necessary precondition to expanding the future area of Indian 
participation in government and administration. Despite noble provisions contained in 
the reforms, local government could not strike root as the circumstances were still not 
conducive to the growth of self-governing institutions. 
The British government gave more attention to the districts which assumed a 
major unit of administration entrusted with the tasks of law and order, and revenue 
collection. The development of local self-government hampered by the fact that it 
neither originated in popular demand nor was it firmly founded on any traditions and it 
rapidly became subject to general political trends. The system of local government 
evolved during the nineteenth century was not more than an appendage of the district 
administration. As Tinker put it, 'District Boards were at best little more than petty 
departments of the district administration. " 01 
It is beyond any doubt that the British occupation of India was for certain 
purposes of their own. In the process, there was made such innovations and concessions 
that could facilitate the realisation of those designs. Though it was not in their interest to 
awaken the vast masses of rural India and to politicise them, genuine local government 
was carried to the village level and into urban areas. 
After independence. the concept of local government as a counterweight to the 
power of the central and provincial authorities, did not always find favour with the new 
bureaucratic-cum-pol i tic al leadership of Pakistan. 102 The struggle for sheer survival 
which the country was called upon to offer at birth, unfortunately made any immediate 
large scale changes in the administration impossible. Political instability further 
aggravated the situation. 
The events preceding the independence testify the point that while there has 
taken place some improvement in the field of local government, the setback caused to 
the system had been greater. Under no ordinances promulgated so far, has local 
government been allowed to work independently because the country has either been 
under a military ruler or an elected government giving only lip-service to the cause of 
local democracy. 
101 
' 
Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of. p. 54 
102 Nlurntaz Ahmad, Local Government in Pakistan .... p. 28. 
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During the first decade, the system remained a neglected area and was distorted 
by the politicians for their selfish ends. The politicians did not attempt to invigorate the 
system in accordance with the changed circumstances. The little efforts that were made 
could not produce the desired results. Despite choosing parliamentary democracy for 
the country, the founding fathers of Pakistan had little time to consolidate the roots of 
democracy by embarking upon a process of political training and establishing elected 
institutions at the lowest levels. 
Those local government institutions which might have served to involve the 
people in realistic planning and implementation had become ineffective. They had 
weakened by internal political rivalries and inadequate funds or had become victims of 
repeated supersession by the provincial government. Every time they suffered from 
piecemeal, sporadic and essentially hypocritical measures at reviving it. 
Several elements have contributed towards this phenomenon. The general 
political attitude to centralise power at the centre, the role of the bureaucracy and the 
rising power of the army coupled with the existence of a multi-party system consisting 
of poorly organised political parties have not helped the emergence of viable, strong and 
stable democratic institutions including local government. 
Chapter Two 
A Review of the Federal Government's initiative under 
the elected and military governments towards the 
development of local government institutions 
in Pakistan 
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"The State shall encourage Local Government Institutions composed of elected 
representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special 
representation will be given to peasants, workers and women. " 
--- Says the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), Article: 32. 
Declaring them as one of the organs of the state' being empowered to impose 
any tax or cess, the constitution seems to assign to the local councils a kind of legal 
protection. It is in the light of above constitutional obligations that the government of 
the federation is called upon to undertake measures aiming at the establishment and 
development of a sound system of local governance. In pursuance of the above, the 
following tasks fall within the purview of the Federal Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development: 
I. Promotion of local government institutions; 
2. Planning and co-ordination; 
3. Grants-in-aid; 
4. International aspects including liaison with community development and 
local government institutions in other countries; 
5. Rural Development Programme i. e., policy, guidance, follow up action, 
co-ordination, foreign assistance and evaluation. 2 
A cursory view of the post- independence history of the development of local 
government in Pakistan reveals that it were mostly the military rulers who took up the 
question and, by giving local government institutions preferential treatment over the 
higher institutions of democracy, chalked out a comprehensive plan for their growth. In 
an attempt to provide a bas. - for the development of a system of democracy, the military 
rulers have resorted to the revival of local government institutions. Despite criticism of 
the military take over and the resultant disruption of the steady democratic process, 
some scholars support the assumption of power by the military in the larger interests of 
the promotion of modern democratic institutions, economic development, social change 
and national integration. 3 Being trained on the British pattern, the concern of the 
Pakistan Army about national politics until 1958 had been that its corrupt practices 
should not infiltrate the army and undermine its integrity. Because of unscrupulous 
politicians, who dragged the armed forces time and again to assist in the restoration of 
law and order situation whenever it went out of their control, the army could not keep 
itself aloof from the political processes. 4 Under the peculiar circumstances in Pakistan, 
See the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), Article: 7 (Part-11 dealing with 
Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy). 
2. Dawn of a New Era (Rural Development), A Report by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1990, p. 6 
3. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (1947-86), Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 
1986. In the Introductory Chapter, the author has focused on the causes and consequences of military 
take over in the Third World countries. 
4. Ahmed Husain, Politics and Peoples Representation in Pakistan, Karachi, Ferozsons Ltd., 1972, p. 65. 
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it has been the failure of constitutional government within the state more than external 
threat which has accounted for political activism by the armed forces. 5 This military 
intervention has, afterwards, resulted in a successful restoration of civilian control, but 
the price paid for it had been tremendous in view of the shaky foundation of democracy. 
The army has wielded authority for almost half of the post- independence period of 
Pakistan--- a phenomenon that has rightly been termed as the Civil-Military Rotation. 6 
Having enthusiasm to eradicate corruption, nepotism in civil service, the realities of 
politics and the task of fulfilling the commitments made at the time of take over, make 
the military leaders conscious of the fact that to run the administration of the country 
smoothly, they need to make compromises. The first compromise of such kind, 
according to Hasan Askari Rizvi, takes place with the civil service. Having organised in 
relatively rigid hierarchies and sharing views with regard to political stability and 
modernisation, the understanding between the two results in a kind of civil and military 
collaboration in which the former serves as a fuel to the engine of the latter. 
Viewed in this background, the military rulers in Pakistan, have focused on: 1). 
the eradication of corruption of all sorts; 2). economic development with an attempt to 
improve the lot of the masses; and 3). laying a foundation for a sound and viable 
political system. It is in the context of the latter that an analysis of the federal 
government initiatives directed towards the development of local government 
institutions will be made. The hypothesis is that institution-building process has largely 
been undertaken during military regimes, though for obvious reasons, and that the said 
institutions have suffered a major setback during representative governments. The 
developments that took place during two military regimes i. e., General Ayub Khan 
(1958-69) and General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and the representative governments of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77) and the post-1985 short termed successive elected 
governments have been analysed in this chapter which is divided into various sections 
for convenience. 
The weakness of civilian authority and the failure of politicians to satisfy even the minimum need for 
stability, let alone to create a national consensus on behalf of democracy, social and economic 
problems confronting the nation's leadership, political violence etc., have been the grave challenges 
necessitating military intervention. Civil disturbances have required frequent intervention. The chaotic 
condition arising out of riots in Lahore during May 1953 ended in a proclamation of martial law and 
the deployment of soldiers to restore order against religious demonstrators. Then, In October 1954 
Governor General Ghulam, Mohammad took the army into confidence before dissolving the 
Constituent Assembly. Similarly, in 1957 the civil administration turned to help control the unstilted 
food smuggling across the border deteriorating the economic situation in East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh). This reliance, on the army, of unstable governments during the first decade of Pakistan's 
independence opened doors for the dismissal of civilian governments and assume direct political 
responsibility in its place. 
6 Aaron S. Klieman, "Confined to Barracks, Emergencies and the Military in Developing Societies" in 
Comparative Politics, vol. 12, No. 2, January 1980, pp. 154-161. Each attempt at easing the martial 
law regime and replacing it by a civilian one tends to be short-lived, ending in a return of the military 
to national politics once again. Civilian rule was terminated in 1958, in 1969 and again in 1977. 
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SECTION: A 
General Mohammad Ayub Khan ( 1958-69) 
Before the military take over in October 1958, local bodies were more or less 
lifeless institutions with faulty frameworks, inadequate finances, curtailed functions and 
little contact with the people whose affairs they were supposed to administer. 7 The 
military coup of 1958 ushered a new era in the history of local government in Pakistan. 
The military leader demonstrated extra-ordinary enthusiasm in the 'restoration of 
democracy and preferred to take the initiative from the grassroots level. The 4: ) 
promulgation of Basic Democracies Ordinance in 1959 was a first step of his perception 
of democracy. 8 
At the very outset it is desirable to mention that the unique system of Basic 
Democracies which Ayub Khan promulgated in October 1959 on the eve of first 
anniversary of the military revolution, was a central subject until mid- 1962 when it was 
made a provincial subject. 9 The central government, however, still exerted considerable 
control on policy determination. 10 It was during the early period (when local 
government used to be a federal subject) that vital questions with regard to the political, 
developmental and judicial role of the system were decided by the policy makers at the 
federal level under the guidelines issued by the military regime. Some of the most 
important of these were: 
1. The Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961 which gave authority to 
local councils to settle family problems i. e., women's rights, marriage 
disputes, polygamy, and other related matters. 
2. The Basic Democrats were declared to form an 'Electoral College' for the 
election of the President of Pakistan and members of the National and 
two Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan. " 
3. The controversial 'Political Parties Bill' was passed in July 1962 enabling 
Ayub Khan to build one powerful all-Pakistan political party. 12 
7. Malik Mohammad Siddique, Pakistan, I. U. L. A., Local Government in the 20th Century, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 307-8. 
8. Speeches and Statements of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, vol. i (Sept. 1959 --- June 1966), 
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1966, p. 2. The military ruler 
believed that democracy must grow and evolve from the very first rung of the political and economic 
ladder so that it finds its roots deep among the people, starting at the village level in rural areas, and at 
the mohalla level in towns. 
9. At the federal level, a Basic Democracies Unit in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting served 
as an information centre. In each province all such matters, considered to be of policy nature, were the 
realm of the Governor and the responsible minister heading Basic Democracies and Local Government 
Department. 
10. See A. T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Theories of Administrative and Political Development and Rural 
Institutions in India and Pakistan" in Journal of Administration Overseas, vol. 8, No. 4, October 1969, 
p. 25 1. 
11. While Defence Minister in the cabinet of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, General Ayub had, 
in the wake of 1954 political crisis, showed great distrust for universal suffrage and recommended an 
electoral college system. The Electoral College Ordinance was, though promulgated in 1964 but the 
lde, ý for its so becoming was put forward by the General in 1961. See the President's 
Independence 
Day Message to the Nation (August 13,1961). 
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An important characteristic of General Ayub Khan which distinguished him 
from many other military rulers elsewhere was his willingness to undertake the task of 
political institution-building for legitimising the regime and recruit support for its 
policies. 13 General Ayub Khan's experiences, who governed Pakistan without the 
benefit of a written constitution from 1958 to 1962, had taught him that it was the 
politicians 14 who had brought Pakistan to the brink of collapse. Although he recognised 
, "-it Pakistan was facing the problem of national integration and he stressed the need for 
it, this was to be achieved by paternalistic leadership through his novel creation of the 
system of Basic Democracies. Being convinced that the people of Pakistan were too 
uneducated, divided, impoverished and unsophisticated to form democratic institutions, 
General Ayub introduced a kind of grassroots system which 'the people could 
understand and operate 15 and which, according to his perception, could form the basis 
on which the superstructure of the representative institutions would ultimately grow and 
flourish. 16 The institutions that he established in the form of 'Basic Democracies' and 
the policies pursued regarding their working in the polity clearly reflected his 
perceptions about the country's politics. 
The abrogation of the constitution of 1956 through a presidential proclamation 
of October 7,1958 was the first significant step which not only banned all political 
parties but also eliminated the influence of professional politicians. For the coming 
forty-four months, during which military rule governed lives of the citizens, there was 
virtually no politics and no political party existing in the country. 17 To prevent their re- 
12 As the Basic Democrats and the government functionaries expanded their areas of close collaboration, 
the question of granting autonomy to the Basic Democracy institutions went into oblivion and more 
and more elected members preferred to join the ruling political party. This furthered the already 
existin-, trend of building one powerful all-Pakistan political party. 
13 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan, Failure in National Integration, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972, 
p. 110. The author drew conclusions from several studies that three major political institutions were 
developed by the regime for the purpose. Two of these, the Basic Democracies and the 1962 
Constitution, were parts of a deliberate political plan while the third one, formation of a political party 
(Convention Muslim League), was the result of political exigency. 
14. Speeches and Statements of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, vol. I (September 1959-June 
1966). Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (Basic Democracies Wing), p. 1. He treated politicians 
as a 'big joke' and 'dirty linen' and was firmly convinced that the affairs of the state of Pakistan could 
be very well managed without political parties and politicians. Thus the introduction of the Basic 
Democracies System in October 1959 was prompted by the apparent failure of parliamentary 
democracy, political instability, corrupt administration, and a lack of popular involvement in the 
process of economic development. 
15 The military ruler and his bureaucracy had little faith in Western democracy and politicians' 
capabilities. His ideal was to give to the people of Pakistan a political system that suited their genius 
which meant a paternalistic government leading the politically innocent masses of Pakistan on the path 
and toward the goal which they were unable to chalk out for themselves. See Shahid Javed Burki, 
"Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation" in Asian Survey, March 1972, p. 212. 
16 
. 
G. W. Choudhury, "Democracy on Trail in Pakistan" in The Middle East Journal, vol. 17, No. 1&2, 
Winter-Spring, 1963, p. I 
17. Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan" in The Middle East 
Journal, vol. -10,1966 p. 
456 
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entry into the political field, the EBDO (Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance), 8 
was issued on October 27,1959 under which the politicians found guilty of improper 
exercise of authority in the course of their tenure as Ministers were debarred from 
holding elective or political offices for a period of six years i. e., until the end of 1966. 
Though the system of Basic Democracies was fashioned to encompass both the 
rural and urban areas of Pakistan, more stress was on the former where approximately 
85 per cent of the country's population resided. For seeking legitimacy for the dictatorial 
regime, the military ruler depended more on the rural population. Huntington holds the 
view that the Basic Democracies brought politics to the rural areas and created a class of 
rural activists with a role to play in both local and national politics. For the first time 
political activity was dispersed outward from the cities and spread over the countryside. 
Political participation was broadened which was a major step toward creating the 
institutional link between government and countryside as a pre-requisite of political 
stability in a modernising society. ' 9 
Though as a device for overhauling the political structure of the country, it 
succeeded in limiting urban participation, but failed to fully mobilise the rural areas in 
view of the fact that their participation in national affairs was quite restricted. The new 
rural elite created by the Basic Democracies had a narrow social base and limited 
capability in recruiting mass support for the regime. It did not envisage the idea of 
training the more important group (the educated urban classes) in the art of 
representative government v,, ho could operate democracy at provincial and national 
levels. Thus the balance of political power moved, for a decade, in favour of the new 
rural leadership and the urban elite were eclipsed . 
20 The critics of Basic Democracies 
system, therefore, did not accept the system as a substitute for real local self- 
government. 
Basic Democracies had to perform multiple functions e. g., administrative, 
developmental, local self-government, and constitutional. The objectives of the system 
were spelled out in the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) in these words: "The 
institutions of Basic Democracies are devised to provide not only for self-government at 
the local level but also for a degree of public representation in administration at 
successive levels. , 21 In the performance of service-related functions, General Ayub 
Khan had the desire to assign to the system a paramount status. The District Council, for 
instance, was given twenty-eight obligatory and seventy optional functions to perform. 
18. airs, vol. 36, No. 4, Winter Khalid B. Sayeed, "Palcistan's Constitutional Autocracy" in the Pacific Aff 
1963-64, p. 375. The politicians, according to the author, still enjoyed considerable support as the 
ordinance (approved by the National Assembly in April 1963) was supported only by 71 votes to 62. 
19. Quoted in Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan, Failure ..., p. 
I 
20 P. Sharan, Government and Politics of Pakistan, New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Company (Pvt. ) 
Limited, 1983, p. 43. 
21. Quoted in Richard 0. Niehoff, "Basic Democracies and Rural Development" in Inayatullah (Ed. ). 
Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 
1970, p. 314. 
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Among those things which the military government brought close to the people 
and to their level of understanding, judiciary was included. The promulgation of the 
Conciliation Courts Ordinance in 1961 provided for conciliation courts at the Union 
Committee and Union Council levels. These courts had jurisdiction on all such incidents 
which were of common occurrence and could be decided through goodwill and 
understanding. A number of studieS22 conducted into their working revealed wide- 
ranging implications in the sense that they contributed significantly towards the 
development of more homogeneous society and integration of social life. The launching 
of the rural works programme in 1962 with massive investments and large scale 
participation of rural local councils gave greater impetus to the system. There was an 
upsurge of popular enthusiasm and the foundation was laid of an infrastructure to 
facilitate economic progress in the rural Pakistan. 
Although it may be assumed that there was an advantage in elected 
representatives participating in the process of executing plans originating from higher 
authority, Basic Democracies could have become meaningful only if a measure of local 
programme and policy formulation rose upward to the points at which governmental 
decisions were taken. To Rafiqur Rahman: 
"The Basic Democracies scheme was planned primarily to assist the government in 
development and only secondarily to develop autonomous local bodies ... The interest 
shown by the military government was, not in terms of their development as governing 
bodies, but in terms of their capacity to help government to execute their regular programs 
and development projects effectively. t#23 
Apart from mobilising and recruiting mass support for the regime's policies and 
programmes, a major rationale behind the Basic Democracies was that the military 
rulers needed a support base separate from the military in their efforts toward 
civilianization. 
There is no denying the fact that the system laid down, at least, a base for 
popular participation in governmental affairs. To Rushbrook Williams, "On the twin 
foundations of self-help by the people, and team-work between the people and the 
government, there were prospects of the erection of a safe and stable edifice of 
Pakistan's future. " 24 Practically, a proper balance was not achieved in the manipulation 
of administrative ecology. For instance, the Basic Democracies were made an integral 
part of the civil administration and statutory local bodies. The official chairmanship of 
the councils (except the Union Councils), official membership, and official supervision 
22 
. Salma 
Omar, "The Judicial Role of Basic Democracies in Pakistan in Journal of Administration 
23 
Overseas , vol. 5, No. 2, April, 1966, pp. 115-123. 
Quoted in Richard W. Gable, "District Administration: Its Development and its Challenges in 
Inayatullah (Ed. ) District Administration in West Pakistan, Its Problems & Challenges, Peshawar, 
Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 1964, p. 13. 
24 L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "Basic Democracies as Institutions of Local Government in Pakistan-11" in 
Journal of Local Administration Overseas, vol. 1, No. 1-4,1962, p. 256 
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and control marked the Basic Democracies more as administrative units than as 
autonomous local bodies. 25 Basic Democracies, being directly fathered by the Head of 
State and controlled by the central government, received much more effective political 
blessings than the states-fathered and politically and administratively heterogeneous 
panchayati raj institutions in India. 26 
The military government endeavoured to break the paternal control of 
bureaucracy through decentralising administration and fostering the growth of 
responsible leadership at the grassroots level. But at all the tiers above the union 
councils, the civil servants continued to dominate the scene. As chairman of the 
thana/tehsil, district and divisional council, the administrator was not only a key 
position with powers to guide and canalise the people's development effort, but the 
Basic Democrats depended increasingly on the active participation of the civil 
servants. 27 Therefore, fears were expressed at the very outset whether the combination 
of officials and appointed public representatives might work satisfactorily. It was in 
view of the fact that government officers, armed with better education, higher social 
status and extensive administrative powers, were likely to dominate the council and 
reduce the public element to abject followers. 28 
The preferences of the government to see the elected and official elements 
working together for the pursuit of vital national objectives could be determined from 
the contents of a letter addressed to the chairmen of higher local councils (March 1960) 
in which the military ruler wrote: 
"It is one of the primary objectives of Basic Democracies to develop a new government- 
people relation,; Np for tackling the tasks thatface the government today. For this purpose, 
government officials have been associated with peoples' representatives not in any superior 
capacity but as equals. Officials are there to help the local communities not to domineer 
over them. In fact it is intended that government operations should be discussed in the 
councils, so as to make the administration accountable to the people and responsive to 
their actual needs and aspirations. " 29 
To Waseem, the system was an ambitious attempt to create a social contract 
between the state and society by co-opting locally privileged individuals into the lower 
levels of administration. It was so in view of the fact that the organisation of the Basic 
Democracies was highly coterminous with the class structure of the Pakistani society. 30 
Designing the structure thus, one contention was that the demands facing Pakistan were 
25 
. A. 
T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Theories of. .. p. 
250 
26 A. T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Theories of. .. p. 
251 
27 Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies" in Guthrie S. Birkhead (Ed. ) 
Administrative Problems in Pakistan, Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 38. 
28 A. T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Basic Democracies and Rural Development in East Pakistan" in Inayatullah 
(Ed. ) Bureaucracy & Development in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 
1970, p. 338. 
29. Inayatullah, "Changing Character of District Administration in Pakistan" in Inayatullah (Ed. ) District 
Administration in West Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development., 1964, p. 108. 
'0. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, n. d., p. 159 
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numerous and complex whereas the bureaucracy at both the central and the provincial 
capitals was so limited that solutions to these problems could be achieved only with 
decentralisation of responsibility to sub-national units. 31 It was also said that the 
inclusion of government officers at different tiers of Basic Democracies was to make 
effective use of the intellectual elite of the country for bringing about a regeneration of 
national life particularly in terms of helping the nation formulate its long term policies. 32 
The association of Basic Democrats with the officials was to produce two 
wholesome results: in the first instance, it was to act as a check on the working of the 
government; while the second and more important was to provide the Basic Democrats 
with an opportunity to understand how government functioned and how to supervise 
and guide its functioning. 33 
By developing mutual trust and confidence between officers and people through 
discussion and joint work, the institutions of Basic Democracies successfully filled the 
gap between the two. Ever since the inception of the country in 1947, there had been a 
breakdown of any real understanding between them due, mainly, to the decline of 
locally elected administrative institutions. In this perspective, one of the most important 
achievements of the Basic Democracies had been to bridge this gulf by bringing the 
elected representatives of the people closely and directly in touch with the 
administrative officers . 
34 Through the prolonged gulf (that existed between the 
governing class and the governed), there had developed a certain amount of scepticism 
on both sides. This mechanism improved the situation considerably. At a later stage, the 
government officers were astonished by the value of the contribution which Basic 
35 Democrats from the grassroots were making to the work of higher level councils. The 
government's idea that "these institutions would be in a position to influence the 
administration and determine the way it should be run and thus reduce the gap which 
exists between the officials and the people , 36 could not be fully materialised on account 
of the preponderance of the bureaucracy and the fundamental role that was assigned to 
3 1. George M. Platt, "Building Local Government, The Case of East Pakistan" in Anwar S. Dil (Ed. ) 
Toward Developing Pakistan. (Pakistan Studies Series-111), Abbottabad (Pakistan), Book Service, 
1970, p. 145. 
32. Mas1huzzaman, 'Basic Democracies and Community Development' in Community Development 
Review, vol. 6, No. 1, March 1961, p. 82. 
33 Mohammad Ayub Khan (Field Marshal), Friends Not Masters, A Political Autobiography, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 228 
34 L. F. Rushbrook Williams "Basic Democracies. .. p. 247. 35 L. F. Rushbrook Williams "Basic Democracies .. p. 250. During his fact-finding visit to Pakistan 
during the years 1961-62, the author gained valuable information with regard to the trust, confidence 
and understanding that had developed between the Basic Democrats and the government officials. 
36 Ayub Khan's speech at the Lahore Basic Democracies Staff Seminar (1963) quoted in A. M. S. Ahmad, 
Community Development and Local Government in Pakistan, Rawalpindi, Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, 1966, p. 63 
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the deputy commissioner as 'Controlling Authority' for much of the activities of the 
council operations. 37 
Habibur Rahman holds the view that though the principle of bringing 
representative and non-official elements in direct contact with the administrative 
machinery at all levels was accepted, many problems were faced in subjecting the 
administration, with a long tradition of benevolent autocracy, to non-official scrutiny 
and 'interference' without suffering traumatic effects and a sharp drop in efficiency. 
Local institutions under Basic Democracies had a defective organisational 
structure compared to those of the government departments (Table: 2) While 
government departments had a network of agencies starting from the provincial capital 
down to the district level with subordinate staff in the field and an independent channel 
of communication, local councils, particularly the district councils, could reach the 
capital through the deputy commissioners and commissioners only. 38 The lack of ability 
on the part of elected representatives to reach the government greatly enhanced the 
chances of official opinion getting weight on some conflict that might have arisen 
between the tWo. 39 The appointment of official chairmen to all local councils, except 
union councils, further tightened the control of bureaucracy. 
Practically speaking, therefore, the accepted pattern of behaviour could not be 
too drastically upset. It was, perhaps, the result of this caution that the non-official 
40 
element at the upper levels was not as strong as might in theory have been possible . 
In 
certain respects, the way Basic Democracies functioned negated the idea of 'bringing 
about an effective fusion of official and non-official agencies at different tiers of the 
system. 41 
The laws with regard to the provision of services were laid open to wide 
variations in their interpretation and application which provided ample opportunities to 
the bureaucracy for exerting their influence. Perhaps its objective was to secure control 
over the activities of local councils at the district level. The role of bureaucracy, 
claiming the right of interpreting and protecting the polity of the state and the public 
interest, has been analysed by a contemporary in the following manner: 
"While the peoples representatives liked a re-division of the boundaries of bureaucratic 
power and seek to obtain a much larger say in administration at the district level than they 
ever had before, the bureaucracy, helped by its ethos, its tradition, history and competence 
37 
. Albert 
Gorvine "The Civil Service under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan" in The Middle 
East Journal, vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 1965, p. 33 1. The need for controlling authority was justified on 
the ground of being a safeguard to ensure proper functioning of these institutions. 
38. Masihuzzaman, "Basic Democracies .... p. 186 39 
. Masihuzzaman, 
"Basic Democracies. .., p. 186 40 Habibur Rahman, "Basic Democracies as Institutions of Local Government in Pakistan- I" in Journal-of 
Local Administration Overseas, vol. 1, No. 1-4,1962, p. 245. 
41 General Ayub Khan's speech broadcast to the nation on the eve of the second anniversary of the 
revolution (October 26,1960). Speeches and Statements, vol. 1, (September 1959-June 1966), p. 29 
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struggled to maintain their superiority and independence as they were before as the final 
interpreter and protector of the country's polity and the peoples interest. . 42 
The bureaucratic attitude thus negated the idea through which the military ruler 
intended to create the institutional arrangement wherein bureaucracy and the elected 
members of the localities could achieve maximum co-operation in national 
43 development. Complaints regarding the 'apathy and callousness' of the government 
officers were often heard and voiced from the platforms of the Basic Democracies 
Conventions held at the provincial capitals. The complaints made, generally, included: 
the reluctance of government officers to change their method; and the unwillingness to 
44 take the councillors into confidence . 
There existed a greater realisation on the part of the military regime to transfer 
powers from the bureaucracy to the elected local councillors gradually. The President 
once said: 
"Let us hope a time will come when these councils (Basic Democracies) would have 
attained such maturity as education spreads in the country that local administration almost 
withers away and they run their own police, they run their own revenue system and the), 
run everything. I like to see them in that direction. In ten to fifteen years time a situation 
may arise when Ohe officials are only there to guide and not as administrators and 
rulers. A5 
While Basic Democrats were struggling to establish the power and the rights of 
the people in decision-making, attempts were made, on the other hand, by various 
government departments to take away from them powers which had long vested in the 
District Boards. An outstanding example was that of primary education. The 
Department of Education tried to wrest the control of primary schools from the Basic 
Democracies and vest it in the provincial governments. Other departments, particularly 
the Police, wanted to extend their control over agencies which in the past were run by 
the people through the District Boards. Thus, instead of the Basic Democracies gaining 
control over government departments, the process was reversed and the departments of 
the government wrested control of some of the functions and powers of Basic 
42 Masihuzzaman, "Basic Democracies and District Administration, " in Inayatullah, ed. District 
Administration in West Pakistan, Its Problems & Challenges, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural 
Development, 1964, p. 190. The author has cited the example of primary education, the provision and 
maintenance of which was the first and compulsory function of the District Councils. The Department 
of Education tried to wrest the control of these schools from the Basic Democracies and vest it in the 
provincial governments. Interestingly, it did not undertake to finance primary education which 
remained the responsibility of these councils. What it wanted was the administrative control over the 
school teachers. See p. 192 
43 K. M. Bhatti, Local Government for Rural Development in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy for 
Rural Development, 1990, p. 58 
44. Ahmed Hussain, Politics and Peoples p. 79. 
45 
. General 
Ayub Khan's Inaugural Address of Seminar on Basic Democracies held at Lahore (29 May-31 
May, 1963). 
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Democracies. The mechanism to secure large-scale public participation in vital areas of 
46 
decision-making in the district could only partially be evolved . 
One major flaw in the system which did not allow the people to have a feeling of 
real self governing local bodies was, therefore, the supremacy of bureaucracy to whom 
belonged the real power and not to the elected councillors. The reason was perhaps the 
regime depended more on government officials than on the Basic Democrats, as noted 
by Rounaq Jahan, in recruiting support for itself. The different tiers of the Basic 
Democracies were linked not through their own political hierarchy but through the 
administrative hierarchy. Funds for works programme were channelled through the 
administrators and not through the politicians. Instead of being the base of a political 
hierarchy, the Basic Democracies were more like a government hierarchy. While the 
system did help the regime to survive one presidential and two assembly elections, in 
the process it created more enemies than friends for itself and the regime. 47 
The nostalgic outlook and the exercise of authority in the traditional colonial 
way has been narrated by Karl von Vorys illustrating the general attitude of bureaucracy 
who considered the Basic Democrats as lethargic, incorrigible deserving strict 
treatment. 48 This had a deeper repercussions on the actual conduct of business by these 
institutions which functioned, in most of the cases, on the reverse of established 
principles. For instance, the chairman did not bind himself by the advice of the council 
rather the latter was obliged to obey the directives of the former. In them (the official 
chairmen) had been vested the unlimited power to quash all proceedings of the councils, 
suspend their resolutions, prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done, with the 
right to give and enforce directions, hold inquiries into the activities of these councils 
and of superseding them or their individual members. Further the system of nomination, 
common membership of officials and nominated public representatives, and 
chairmanship by officials was all self-contradictory and led to the conclusion that the 
purpose was not local self-government but greater co-ordination between government 
and people. The appointment of officials as chairmen, to some critics, constituted a step 
backward in view of the fact that in the beginning of the 20th century the district officer 
had been replaced as chairman of the district board by a non-official member. This had 
been done to make the body more democratic. The principle of nomination was another 
retrospective step but thanks to the government that acceded to the demand of the 
Combined Opposition Party (COP) which stood for 'doing away with the nomination 
46. Salma Omar, "Rural Communities, District Administration and the Civil Service" in Inayatullah (Ed) 
District Administration in West Pakistan .... p. 
192. 
47 See Rounaq Jahan. Pakistan, Failure .... p. 124. 
48 Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton, University Press, 1965, p. 205, The 
author has narrated examples illustrating the kind of behaviour which the bureaucracy meted out to the 
elected local councillors. 
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system in respect of all local councils . 
49The 
matter was further aggravated by the fact 
that most of the Basic Democrats, drawn from simple rural folk, depended for most of 
their work on the local officers who were almost 'mai baap' (mother and father) for 
50 
them. 
Despite the bigger role which General Ayub Khan envisaged for Basic 
Democracies, the system could not find a place in the constitution which the military 
-. 'iler gave to the country in 1962.5 1 The Constitution Commission, while explaining the 
reason for not assigning some place to the system in the constitution, felt that a decision 
to this effect would have feasible, had it not been necessary to amend the constitution 
for bringing even a minor change to the law of local government. 52 
The system was further incapacitated, when the Basic Democracies were given 
the status to perform the functions of an electoral college for election of President and 
members of the legislative assemblies. The initiative was taken despite rejection, by the 
Constitution Commission, of the idea of converting the basic democracies into an 
electoral college. General Ayub Khan was of the view that belittling the importance of 
basic democrats in any manner would develop chaos and confusion in the country. 53 
Under the Electoral College Act, 54 each of the two provinces was divided into forty 
thousand territorial units and members elected therefrom constituted the 'Electoral 
College' for electing the President and members of the National and Provincial 
Legislatures. 55 
The importance which the Revolutionary Government attached to the electoral 
role of the Basic Democracies is illustrated from the fact that the first thing which it 
asked the newly elected members 56 to do was to decide, by secret ballot, whether they 
wanted Field Marshal Ayub Khan as President and whether they endorsed his policies. 
It was in pursuance of the same line of thought that the Basic Democrats were turned 
into an electoral college for the choice of members of the national and provincial 
assemblies in Pakistan's new Constitution. 57 Prior to that on February 14,1960, the 
49 
. 
Lawrence Ziring "The Administration of ... "p. 
52. The principle of nomination throughout the Basic 
Democracies system was abolished on June 4,1965 by the decision of the Governor's Conference. 
Thereafter only elected and official members comprised the councils including those in urban areas. 
M. S. K. Yousufzai, '11asic Democracies of Pakistan, (Unpublished doctoral thesis), London University 
College, 1963-64, p. 315. 
51 Mas1huzzaman, What is Basic Democracy? in Aziz Beg, ed. Grass Roots Government, Essays on the 
Genesis, Philosophy and Working of Basic Democracies in Pakistan, Rawalpindi, Pakistan Patriotic 
Publications, 1962, pp. 25-26 
52 Khan Mohammad Bhatti, Legislation for Local Government in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy 
for Rural Development, 1992, p. 70 
53 Khan Mohammad Bhatti, Legislation for Local pp. 70-71 
54. P. Sharan, Government and Politics .... p. 
40. The Act was passed on April 17,1964. 
In 1962 the Basic Democrats, elected in 1960, formed an electoral college for the election of members 
to the National Assembly and two provincial legislatures. Statistics revealed that a record number of 
votes were polled i. e., 96.6% and 97.8% for the National and provincial assemblies respectively. 
First elections to the Basic Democrats were held in the country between 26 December 1959 and 9 
January 1960. 
5 7. L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "The Administration of. .. 
", p. 248. 
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80,000 elected representatives were asked to express consent or disapproval in a secret 
ballot on the President's intention to set up a constitutional structure for Pakistan. An 
affirmative vote (almost 96%) had confirmed President Ayub Khan as President for a 
first term of office. 58 Next was the first general elections (held in 1965) for the office of 
President of Pakistan. 59 
The new electoral assignment involving the Basic Democrats in campaign 
oratory, made them more interested in national rather than local problems thus 
diverting their attention from development projects. Consequently, development 
projects were retarded or curtailed and the rural population lost whatever drive it had 
achieved earlier. Now the government's reliance on this indirect mechanism for the 
pursuit of political ends gave way to other problems. To Rounaq Jahan, the Basic 
Democracies alienated, by disfranchising the urban areas, the previously mobilised and 
semi-mobilized groups. The groups it enfranchised were neither mobilised nor large 
enough to counteract this urban dissatisfaction. By monopolising electoral rights the 
Basic Democracies system became the most visible target for the discontent of all 
alienated groups, who looked upon it as the mechanism by which the regime 
perpetuated itself. Thus, the system not only failed to legitimise the regime but also lost 
its own legitimacy. Yousufzai holds the view that this kind of indirect Presidential 
election was borrowed from the example of France where General de Gaulle was 
elected president through the local councillors on somewhat similar basis. The method 
was adopted here despitc, significant gap in the level of education and political 
consciousness between the two countries. 60 
Thus the National and Provincial Assemblies elected in May and June, 1962 
respectively came into existence with no political parties and no political activity 
preceding them. The candidates were given the opportunity to offer themselves as 
individuals and present to their electorate their own manifestos. There were, therefore, 
no platform, no program, and no policy for the legislature as a whole and no basis for 
concerted action therein once it came into existence. 61 While the opposition political 
parties approved the Basic Democracies as a reformed local government machinery, 
they condemned its electoral role. To them the purpose of the Basic Democracies as 
electoral college was to undermine the direct franchise and to develop a group of 
58 
. Consequently, 
Ayub Khan was sworn in as the first elected President of Pakistan on February 17,1960. 
59 
. The contested took place 
between Ayub Khan and Fatima Jinnah who secured 49,951 votes (63.3 per 
cent) and 28,691 votes (36.4 per cent) of the total votes cast respectively. G. W. Choudhury holds the 
view that the indirect method of elections did not reflect the will of the electorate. The presidential 
elections demonstrated a big gap between the verdict of the people and the actual results of the 
elections. The combined opposition parties (COP) were much frustrated and seemed inclined to resort 
to violence after seeing the futility of ballots under the Basic Democracies. See the author's 'The Last 
Days of United Pakistan ..., p. 107. 
'0. M. S. K. Yousufzai, Basic Democracies ..., p. 294. 
Saleem M. M. Qureshi "Party Politics in ..., p. 457 
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supporters who would sustain the existing regime in power. 62 As a result of this 
opposition, General Ayub Khan, at one stage, appeared to have agreed to abolish the 
political role of the Basic Democracies and introduce the principle of adult franchise, 
but the idea could not be materialised for obvious reasons. A strong reason for it, from 
the government point of view, was to ensure the election of such members of central 
and provincial assemblies who might support the new regime. 63 To Kamal Azfar: 
"Had the basic democrats not been members of the electoral college, the system might well 
have served the purpose of ensuring greater participation of the people in the resolution of 
their day to day problems. The dual capacity of the system made the elected members 
susceptible to manipulation by the power elite. Committed and talented persons were not 
attracted by the ideal of basic democracy. Those part of the system were a motley crowd 
consistipg in the main of adventurers and power brokers seeking the favour of 
government. "64 
The representative character of the Basic Democracies, therefore, and through 
this, the election of the President and the members of national and provincial 
parliaments was doubtful. Newman commented thus: 
"Although General Ayub received a vote of confidence from the local councillors, yet 
dependent as these Basic Democrats were on the sub-divisional officer of their respective 
localities, who can easily control them, and in view of the nature of the civil service now, it 
is open to doubt whether that service is the proper tutorial board for instruction in 
democracy. What is more, the entire system is vitiated by agencies of the Bureau of 
National Reconstruction, which are attached to each tier. , 65 
The election of a governing elite through the electoral college stretched the 
power of the President to every organ of the state and this, in practical terms, set up a 
highly centralised form of government which considerably affected the workings of the 
66 local government institutions as well. The parliamentarians so elected became tutees 
in the hands of the President because on matters, clashing with the interests and policies 
of the President, the legislators were not in a position to re-assert the popular will of the 
nation. In the event of legislators taking an independent view in disregard to the wishes 
of the government, they were liable to be thrown out by the Basic Democrats, who 
themselves were under the control of the deputy commissioners and the sub-divisional 
officers. 
Yet another vital objective of political importance lay ahead to be achieved. 
Considering the lack of identification with the national movement as a major cause of 
the rural population's unawareness of its responsibilities, the military saw the solution in 
turning the community of Basic Democrats into an effective and purposeful political 
62 A. T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Basic Democracies and Rural ..., p. 247. 63 M. S. K. Yousufzai, Basic Democracies. .., p. 316. 64. Kamal Azfar, Pakistan, Political and Constitutional Dilemmas, Karachi, Pakistan Law House, 1987, p. 
74 
65 
. K. J. 
Newman, "The Constitutional Evolution of Pakistan" in International Affairs, vol. 38, '199, p. 360. 
66. M. S. K. Yousufzai, Basic Democracies ..., p. 302. 
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organisation. 67 The government's earlier policy of disbanding party activities and party 
organisations had already relaxed In view of the changed circumstances. It was on the 
occasion of electing the speakers and two deputy-speakers that brought opportunity for 
concerted action on the part of members of the National Assembly. In the absence of 
national organisations, groups emerged on provincial lines. 68 The military ruler had no 
alternative but to make effective use of the Basic Democracies for making the 
'Conventional Muslim League' a strong government party. 69 With a view to 
strengthening the foundation of this newly formed political party, he called for greater 
collaboration between the party and the Basic Democracies. This combination was to 
produce a fully mobilised, ideologically disciplined and centrally directed organisation 
of well over a hundred thousand persons. The political organisation was expected to 
reinforce the Basic Democracies and vice versa. 70 The following statement of the 
President exhibits his political designs which he wanted to accomplish with the help of 
Basic Democracies: 
"The Basic Democracies system should become the basis of the political party in the 
country. Apart from the fact that there is [a] serious lack of political workers outside the 
community of Basic Democrats in the country, there is also the question offunds which an), 
political party would need to build itself into an effective organisation. Once political 
parties are identified with the system of Basic Democracies many of the administrative and 
financial difficulties will be removed. The Pakistan Muslim League as the chief protagonist 
of the system of Basic Democracies should, therefore, take the initiative in this regard. , 71 
Apart from bureaucracy, a formidable element was the influence of landed 
aristocracy which acquired a greater say in the working of Basic Democracies. The 
landlords dominLt--d the councils particularly the district councils and thus acted as 
intermediaries between the common man and the administration. The district officers 
including the deputy commissioners and the superintendent of police were easily 
accessible to them. The influence of landlords and the data provided by them to the 
district administration determined the quality of decisions taken by the latter pertaining 
to law and order, and allocation of funds for provision of services in rural areas. As a 
result there was concentration of services in the villages of landlords. The problems of 
peasantry and lower classes were never forcefully impressed upon the district 
administration due to lack of channels of communication as well as absence of any 
organised pressure from these classes. 
The hegemony of the rural elite could not be broken despite several attempts 
made by the government. Ayub Khan's land reforms, touted to reduce the power of 
67 
. Lawrence Ziring 
"The Administration of. .., p. 60 68 
69 . 
Saleem M. M. Qureshi, Party Politics. .., p. 457 
Saleem M. M. Qureshi, Party Politics .... p. 466. On December 24,1963 Ayub Khan was unanimously 
elected president of the Pakistan Muslim League (Conventional) by 400 councillors of the party in 
Dhaka. 
70 Lawrence Ziring "The Administration ..., p. 59 71 
. The 
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landlords but most analysts agree that they were ineffective. 72 The Muslim League 
governments, during their working in the first decade of independence, could not 
achieve anything concrete despite their spirited declarations on the subject because they 
could not afford to annoy their supporters who largely represented the upper strata of 
rural society. 73 The system while limiting access to the district administration by 
members of the lower tier and establishing communication links between the rural 
middle class and the bureaucracy, did not significantly change the rural power structure. 
It formalised the informal hierarchical power retations already existing in rural society. 74 
Despite some impressive strides in overall uplift especially in the rural areas, the 
system suffered from different types of shackles which inhibited its flowering into a 
viable superstructure of local government. With the fall of General Ayub Khan in 1969, 
the Basic Democracies also went into oblivion and were subsequently 75 abolished in 
1972. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the conception and structure of Basic Democracies was bold, 
imaginative, tailor-made to fit the peculiar circumstances of the Pakistan's political and 
cultural traditions, it embodied the principles of a guided and controlled democracy. It 
remained under official tutelage, and as public investment in development planning 
increased, the dominance of the official component of the system was heightened. The 
rigour of the bureaucratic and feudal tradition was particularly strong in Western 
Pakistan. The Basic Democrats themselves became a vested interest closely linked with 
the military and civil bureaucracy, which found them to be easily manipulable. Because 
of its political affiliation and the manifestation of corruption in the disposal of large 
funds and jobs, the system fell into disrepute. 76 The system had a deeper political 
implications in terms of reliance on the military junta. These institutions were 
effectively used as instruments of social and political mobilisation and as such provided 
enough political support for the martial law regime. The Basic Democrats gained vast 
local influence as a result of the political/electoral role they were invested with and the 
patronage which the process of development put in their hand. No doubt that the 
contribution of Basic Democracies was exemplary for the first 3-4 years in terms of 
72 A scheme of land reforms was announced and implemented early in 1959 according to which no land 
owner could retain more than 500 acres of Irrigated or 1000 acres of non-irrigated land. For details see 
Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller, The Political Economy of Land Reform in South Asia, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 
73. In fact, General Ayub Khan's political support rested on well-known landowning families and 
prominent members belonging to these surrounded him and occupied key positions in the federal and 
provincial cabinets. See Khalid B. Sayeed .... p. 373. 74 Inayatullah, Basic Democracies, District Administration and Development, Peshawar, Pakistan 
Academy For Rural Development, 1964, pp. 165-1721 
75 (Ch. ) Mohammad Ashraf, The Evolution and. .., p. 74 76 P. Sharan, Government and p. 44 
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involving the population and mobilisation of local resources for local development. A 
critical evaluation would, however, reveal that the government's policy of effective mass 
involvement in the management of local affairs was vague. Specially if the working of 
district councils is analysed, it would appear that this unit looked like an extension of 
the provincial administration because the government at the district level were asked to 
work in association with the elected representatives of the people organised within the 
councils or committees. The government's claim that the system had contributed to 
stability and economic development was fictitious. This so-called stability, according to 
Rafiqur Rahman, was more personalised than institutionalised and succession was likely 
to be marred by crisis rather than order. 77 
After functioning for nearly twelve years, the system was abolished. The seeds 
of its destruction lay in the military regime's decision of turning the system into an 
electoral college for the election of the President and national and provincial legislators. 
When the military ruler was able to defeat opposition candidates by what the opposition 
alleged was manipulation of members of the Basic Democracies through coercion and 
corruption, the opposition committed itself to abolishing the system. The desire was 
fulfilled by the interim military regime of General Yahya Khan who struck the final 
blow to the system under the martial law order of 197 1.78 There is no denying the fact 
that local councils under the system of Basic Democracies proved a failure because the 
elective principle had been seriously watered down and great prominence was given to 
the participation of persons appointed by the government. The system was, hence, a 
negation of the principle of democratic self-management in view of the in-built 
mechanism of buieaucratic control which did not allow the representative element to 
acquire meaningful expertise in the management of local affairs. 
The dissolution of Basic Democracies system, however, ended whatever 
experience had been gained in the field of local government. The period preceding the 
downfall of Ayub regime, proved to be a dark era in the history of local government in 
Pakistan. 
77 A. T. Rafiqur Rahman, "Basic Democracies and Rural .... p. 255 78 M. Mohyuddin Qazi (Dr. ). Law & Practice of Local Government in Pakistan, Lahore, Law Publishing 
Company, 1985, p. 7. The caretaker military ruler issued two orders for the purpose. The first (issued 
on May 27,1971) relieved all elected chairmen and members of the local councils from their offices 
whereas the second (issued on June 23,1971) dissolved all local councils constituted under the Basic 
Democracies Order, 1959 and the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960. 
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Table: 2 
A STRUCTURAL CHART OF 
BASIC DEMOCRACIES 
Divisional Council (16) 
Chairman: Commissioner 
Members: Half or more elected, remainder officials 
I 
I 
District Council (78) 
Chairman: Deputy Commissioner 
Members: Half or more elected, remainder officials 
I 
In Rural Areas 
Tehsil/Thana Council (630) 
Chairman: Sub-divisional Officer, 
Tehsildar or Circle Officer; 
Members: Half or more chairmen 
of Union Councils, remainder 
officials. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Union Councils (7614) 
or Town Committee (220) 
Chairman: Elected 
Members: 10 to 15 elected. 
In Urban Areas 
Cantonment Board (29) 
Chain-nan: Official 
Members: Half chairmen 
of Union Committees, 
half officials. 
Municipal Committee (108) 
Chairman: Official 
Members: Half chairmen of 
Union Committees, half 
officials. 
Union Committee (888) 
Chairman: Elected 
Members: Elected. 
--------------------------- --------------------------------- 
Source: Adapted from Guthrie S. Birkhead, Administrative Problems in Pakistan, 
New York, Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 32 
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SECTION: B 
Zulriqar Ali Bhutto ( 1972-77) 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed power (December 197 1) when the country was 
engulfed in a deep political crisis followed by the cataclysmic events of the war and 
secession of the eastern province. To G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan at that time could be 
compared with 'a patient in the last stages of tuberculosis' as the country was beset with 
gargantuan problems in the socio-economic sphere in addition to complex political and 
constitutional issues. ' Bhutto's rise to the office of the chief executive of the state had 
signalled the return of the politicians after an interval of about fifteen years. 
A major contribution of Bhutto lies in giving to the country a permanent 
constitution that was framed by the elected representatives of the people. The 
constitution that was passed by the entire assembly with no vote cast against it. 2 The 
constitution was distinct from the previous two constitutions (1956 and 1962) in view of 
the fact that specific provisions were incorporated with regard to Lhe establishment and 
3 development of local government institutions. The four years that followed the 
promulgation of the constitution in 1973, however, witnessed the pursuit of such 
policies and actions which furnished a strange contrast with the ideals professed by the 
new government and the hopes to which they had given rise. 4 
Though martial law was lifted after the promulgation of the interim constitution, 
a ratification was promptly obtained from the Assembly to continue the proclamation of 
5 Emergency under which most of the fundamental rights remained suspended . During 
the five and a half years of tenure (December 1971-July 1977), the elected government 
pursued a course of action leading to the establishment of near absolute authority. 
Having been associated closely with Ayub Khan's rule, Bhutto had learnt the new 
lessons of practical politics in Pakistan. These experiences facilitated him to perfect and 
expand Ayub Khan's instiuments of control. The governmental actions appeared to have 
been aimed at emphasising the radical change in circumstances and at consolidating the 
ruling party's position. Armed with the powers of the President and Chief Martial Law 
Administrator (for the first four months period), the elected government made swift and 
resolute moves. To reinforce authority, party loyalists were appointed as governors in all 
the four provinces. As Chief Martial Law Administrator, his powers were practically 
unchecked and the emergency proclaimed by Yahya Khan, remained in force, and 
G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, London, C. Hurst & Company, 1974, p. 57. 
2. Kama] Azfar, Pakistan, Political and Constitutional Dilemmas, Karachi, Pakistan Law House, 1987, 
p. 86. 
3 Articles 7 and 32 of the Constitution of 1973 deal with the subject. 
4 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77, Lahore, Afrasia Publications, 1979, p. 138. 
5 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search ..., p. 143. Bhutto had, in 
fact, Inherited the proclamation of 
tmergency but he retained it continually in operation throughout his tenure. 
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placed in the hands of government formidable powers over the life, person and property 
of a citizen. 6 
Though the constitution concentrated both executive and legislative powers in 
the office of the prime minister putting him beyond the control of both the president 
and the assembly, 7 attempts were made to convert the parliamentary form of 
government into the presidential one in order to be able to push certain pieces of 
legislation through the parliament with practically no delay or obstruction. 8 
Khalid Bin Sayeed has explained two factors that reinforced this desire for 
power. First, being a premier hailing from Sindh, Bhutto felt insecure because he was 
never sure whether the other provinces would continue to support him. Secondly, like 
General Ayub Khan, he was convinced that given the social and political heterogeneous 
conflicts of Pakistan, only a strong centralised government presided over by an 
unassailable president or premier could keep the country united. The political style and 
system of General Ayub Khan had a direct bearing on his conduct of state business. 9 
The trend towards centralisation enhanced considerably as the executive enjoyed 
a dominant status within the state apparatus. The situation, in general, was moving in 
such a way as if there would emerge a one-party system in the near future. Despite 
guarantees provided with regard to provincial autonomy, the relationship between the 
centre and the provinces (particularly those of Baluchistan and the NWFP ruled by a 
coalition of two opposition parties at that time) was characterised by hostility and 
confrontation and which finally culminated in the dismissal of the provincial 
government of Baluchistan. Later, the provincial government of the N-W. F. P., resigned 
in protest. 10 
The idea of decentralisation, which the new government stood for, could not 
fully materialise in view of the fact that the constitution of 1973, compared to the 
previous two constitutions, was leaning more towards centralisation. 11 The task of 
institution building was not given adequate attention which was evident from the fact 
that despite advice to the nation to build and respect institutions and place less emphasis 
on individuals and personal leadership, the government preferred to adopt a style that 
was characterised by over-centralisation of decision-making, non delegation of 
6 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search ..., p. 
128. 
7 Golam W. Choudhury, Pakistan, Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, Essex (England), Scorpion 
Publishing Ltd., 1988, p. 24 
8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, The Nature and Direction of Change, New York, Praeger, 
1980, P. 106 
9. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan ... I p. 
104 
10. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan. Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1982, p. 326 
Kamal Azfar, Pakistan, Political and p. 127. The author has made comparisons between the 
number of jurisdictions allocated to the federal and provincial governments under the three 
constitutions. The 1973 constitution allocated 67 items to the federal list, 47 to the concurrent and 
none to the provincial list. The 1962 gave 49 items to the federal government and none to the 
concurrent or provincial lists. The 1956 reserved 94 items for the provinces. 
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responsibility and correlating the country's stability with the Peoples Party's longe, ýity in 
office. Contrary to the professed ideals of democracy and rule of law, stable and strong 
institutions, attempts were made to reduce even the ruling party's (PPP) effectiveness by 
way of personalising it. 12 The authoritarian style of leadership on the part of the 
governing elite was illustrated from the severe restrictions imposed on opposition 
parties, on the one hand, and purging the ruling party of such members who did not 
agree with the policy of the government, on the other. 13 
The introduction of reforms in various fields, according LJ Inayatullah, was a 
part of breaking the competing centres of power in the polity in an attempt to make the 
government effective, if not absolute. Restructuring the old institutions partiL; ularly that 
of the civil bureaucracy was one of the immediate reforms undertaken by the elected 
government. Initiatives taken in this field were particularly aimed at giving to the 
service a pliant and instrumental role rather than the political role which it had assigned 
to itself. 14 The bureaucracy was thus subjected without much ado to a frontal attack. To 
weaken its power, certain drastic changes were introduced through the erstwhile 
administrative reforms of 1973. The administrative reforms, originally intended to 
decentralise governmental machinery, were welcome. The purpose was said to be the 
dismantle of the elite structure and its replacement with a more technocratic and 
efficient public service. The methods to achieve this, however, gave way to political 
patronage rather than attracting talent from the private sector., 5 Though the centralised 
framework and centralising tendencies of the bureaucracy could be checked to a 
considerable extent, their attitude and orientation towards the people permitting them to 
face the bureaucracy in an organised manner was marginal and rhetorical. This 
phenomenon also had its effects on the question of provincial autonomy., 
6 
The reservation of key administrative posts for the elite cadre was abolished and 
was subs Atuted by a unique lateral entry system. ' 
7 This facilitated the appearance on the 
scene of a new kind of civil servant much politicised and untroubled by conscience. 18 
12 
. Lawrence 
Ziring, "Pakistan, A Political Perspective" in Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 7,1975, pp. 630-6. 
13. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, Politics, Economy and Society, Karachi, Royal Book 
Agency, 1980, pp. IJ-17. 
14. Inayatullah, "Decentralisation For Rural Development in Pakistan, A Critical Review" in Building 
From Belmv: Local Initiative For Decentralised Development in Asia and Pacific, vol. 3,1988, pp. 
224-269. 
15. Omar Noman, Pakistan, A Political and Economic History Since 1947 (2nd edition), London, Kegan 
Paul International, 1990, p. 62. 
16. The dismissal of the elected provincial governments of Baluchistan and the N-W. F. P., and the 
installation of Peoples Party government there illustrated evidence of both administrative and political 
centralisation. 
17. Charles H. Kennedy, "Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Programme to the Federal Bureaucracy of 
Pakistan" in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 3, no. 4 (Summer 1980), pp. 42- 
65. As many as 1303 senior civil servants were dismissed from their jobs. This paved the way for 
appointing members of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to important administrative positions. r-1 18. Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search ..., p. 176. Through a number of actions, this core of public services 
was made the unquestioning instrument of an authoritarian rule. 
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The relationship of local party leaders with the bureaucracy was also the result of 
a random and not a properly designed mechanism. For instance, at the level of district 
and sub-district, the authority of government officers stood on an ambiguous footing. 
The local PPP chairman of mohallas, towns and union councils areas had been given the 
authority to nominate certain individuals for entitlement to charge of ration depots, 
licences for arms, and responsibility for local distribution of scarce commodities such 
as cement. These party influentials soon, for their own convenience-, developed 
friendship ties with officers, especially from the police, which helped them rise in social 
status and accumulate discretionary powers. This process brought forth an entirely new 
corps of notables in various localities. Though the party appeared to be in full command 
of policy making at the federal level, and while at the provincial level it tried to extract 
as many favours as possible from the bureaucracy, at the local level it operated as a 
privileged group of people seeking to establish new patterns of authority on the basis of 
party-sponsored patronage. In this way, the district administration was instrumentalized 
by the local PPP stalwarts at the service-giving end. 19 
In contrast to Ayub Khan, Bhutto introduced two land reforms (1972 and then 
1977) in an enthusiasm to weaken the hegemony of the landlords. The ceilings placed 
on the ownership of agricultural land were, therefore, lower than those of General Ayub 
Khan i. e., from 500 acres in the irrigated and 1000 acres in the non-irrigated areas to 
150 and 300 respectively. On the other hand it was claimed that the effective ceiling 
may not be this much but anything up to 1800 acres or even more. 20 In practice, 
therefore, the outcome of these measures were not encouraging in terms of curbing the 
power of the landlords or in distributing land to the landless. 21 
Keeping the land-owning class undisturbed was in sharp contradiction with the 
social and economic policy professed by the new government. Interestingly every other 
class or interest capable of offering resistance to the government was rendered 
powerless or polifically harmless. The landlords came, by and large, on his side to 
maintain their influence with the administration. They also successfully maintained their 
position among the rural electorate which had become independent of their hold and had 
become emotionally aligned with the new leader. They acted as a check against the 
emergence of radical leadership among the people who were now inspired with the 
ideals of a new social and economic system. 22 By doing so they were able to 
predominate in the Assemblies and in political offices. In general, the government 
appeared to had reached some compromise with the traditional rural power structure, 
19. Mohammad Wassem, Politics and. --, p. 325 20. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and .... p. 3 16. 
Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller, The Political Economy of Land Reform in South Asia, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 100- 103,117-125. 
22 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search ..., p. 142. 
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this impression being reinforced by the fact that the land reforms fell far short of 
expectations. 
The basic power structure in Pakistani society thus remained more or less intact 
with only marginal changes. The vital tasks such as transforming the intermediary 
structure of power "the end of feudalism, " ensuring greater participation to the deprived 
and poor in decision-making processes and decentralisation of power were only partially 
23 realised . 
PEOPLE'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The hypothesis that local government institutions got little opportunities to 
flourish during the representative era needs to be tested in the perspective of above 
socio-political and economic scenario. The talk of launching a system of local 
government institutions to be elected on the basis of adult franchise was something 
heard from the time of assumption of power by BhUtto, 24 it was only during the last 
quarter of his tenure in office that some concrete shape of the proposed system could 
come out. 
A three-tiered system 25 adding the word'Peoples' i. e., Peoples Local Government 
Ordinance' comprising Municipal Committees for cities, Town Committees for towns 
and District Councils for the rural areas was introduced in accordance with size and 
population. The Metropolitan cities of Karachi and Lahore were to have more than one 
Peoples Municipality under the City Corporation. Thus, for the first time, the idea of 
constitutim), 'Zonal Municipalities 26 in large urban areas was put forward. In practice, it 
did not rnýterialise. Interestingly, there were no provisions for officially nominated or 
indirectly elected members. 
During this period two ordinances were promulgated one after another. The first 
uniform law for all the urban and rural local councils called 'Peoples Local Government 
Ordinance 1972' remained merely a paper transaction. The second one promulgated in 
1975 also proved to be an effort in futility as the objectives remained unfulfilled for 
27 want of elections . In 1972, the central government had announced certain broad 
outlines to guide the future set up of local government institutions. These were meant to 
23. Inayatullah, "Decentralisation For Rural Development in Pakistan .... pp. 224-269. The author holds 
the view that the land reforms were neither radical in conception nor effectively implemented to yield 
enough land to affect the economic conditions of the rural power. 
24. See proceedings of the National Seminar on Local Government (Lahore, November 22-27,1976), p. 
2 1. Within a month of its coming into power, the People's Government appointed a Cabinet Sub- 
Committee in January 1972 to reorganise the system of local government. The committee was to 
examine what changes could be effected in the structure and functions of local bodies at different 
levels and what could be the qualifications, mode of elections etc., of the members of these bodies. 
25 
. Ahmad 
Hussain, Politics and Peoples Representation in Pakistan, Karachi, Ferozsons Ltd., 1972, pp. 
220-22 
26. o, the third term local government elections (1987 it was before holdin,,, 1 -91) in the province of Sindh that 
the city of Karachi was bifurcated into four zones for municipal administration each to have its own 
Municipal Committees (ZMC). The primary motive behind this division was political. 
27. Mohammad Mohy-ud-din Qazi (Dr. ), Law & Practice of Local Government in Pakistan, Lahore, Law 
Publishing Company, 1985, p. 7 
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serve as a general framework within which provincial governments could enact new 
legislation in the field of local government. Salient features of the system were as 
follows: 
=> Nomination of government officers to local bodies was abolished; 
=> The head of every local body was to be elected; 
=> Elected members were not to constitute any electoral college; 
=> A uniform law was to govern the rural and urban local councils; 
=> Parallel developmental bodies in the major urban areas were to be amalgamated 
with the respective municipal councils of the cities; 
=> Large municipal corporations were to be broken into smaller municipal units; 
=> The concept of controlling authority was liberalised according to which the 
provincial governments, and not the district officers, were to exercise necessary 
supervision and control over local bodies; 
To maintain liaison between the local councils of a district, a District Co- 
ordination Committee was constituted with the district officer to act as its 28 
secretary . 
The organisational structure differed significantly from that of the Basic 
Democracies in view of the fact that the old Union, Tehsil and Divisional Councils 
stood abolished. The only local council at the rural level was to be called 'Peoples 
District Council. ' Union councils in rural areas were abolished in view of their passive 
character i. e., not raising sufficient fund through tax and not performing vital 
administrative or developmental functions. In this scheme, the district council was to be 
structured along lines developed by the provincial assembly in electing its chief 
minister. The same structure was projected for the cities and towns. 29 Other 
characteristics of the proposed system were: Introduction of adult franchise, elected 
chairman, membership restricted to one local council only. The district based 
government functionaries were to be functionally responsible and answerable to the 
People's Local Councils. 
Furthermore, unlike the Basic Democracies Ordinance of 1959, provinces were 
allowed to have their own laws and determine the extent and strength of local councils 
according to their circumstances. An immediate advantage of this policy was that the 
provinces were able to restore the status of those urban local councils which were down 
graded following the promulgation of Ayub Khan's Municipal Administration 
Ordinance. 30 
28 Mumtaz Ahmad, Local Government in Pakistan, An Analysis in Retrospect, Journal of Rural 
Development & Administration, vol. 10, no. 4, October-December 1973, pp. 26-27 
29 
. 
Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan, A Political .... pp. 635-6. 30 
. 
The ex-Mayor of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Abdus Sattar Afghani) told the researcher in an 
interview that the corporation had been degraded to municipality level. One reason for doing so was 
the military ruler's policy of assigning to the urban local councils only a limited role. The 
promulgation of Sindh'Peoples Local Government Ordinance 1972 restored its previous position. 
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The ruling Peoples Party had established party branches down to the vi'. ', age 
levels in an attempt to stimulate rural political activities. Due to the party's loose 
organisation, however, the process of political recruitment and participation could only 
partially be achieved .31 The whole exercise proved to be a paper work only for want of 
local council elections which could not be convened during the five and a half year 
period despite fixing the dates for it on a number of occasions. 32 One respondent 
disagreed with this notion saying that Bhutto had, in fact, issued instructions to the 
provinces to hold local councils elections in May 1972. But it were the vested interests 
including the bureaucracy who subverted the decision. 33 
PEOPLE'S WORKS PROGRAMME 
The absence of elected local councils hampered the growth of democratic 
traditions in the country and also affected the proper implementation of the federally 
launched public welfare programmes, particularly those designed for rural uplift. 
Reference in this connection may be made to the 'People's Works Programmes. ' 
Formerly known as Rural Works Programme, it was launched in collaboration with the 
provincial governments who were responsible for the creation of organisational 
structure starting from the provincial level down to the villages. 
On account of the absence of elected local councils, members of the National 
Assembly were associated in the formulation and implementation of projects. This, 
according to Waseem, was a new characteristic of rural development in Pakistan. 34 A 
kind of substitute of local government was provided. The whole process was, at large, 
governed by administrative orders and political expediencies. This was illustrated from 
the adoption of nomination in the project committees and district bodies. The PWP 
could not be faithful to its basic concept unless its activities were allowed to operate 
35 within the elected local bodies . The concentration of power with the deputy 
commissioner remained intact and no accountability of district bureaucracy including 
31 Inayatullah, "Decentralisation For Rural Development .... p. 17 32 See editorial "Local Government: New Hopes" in the Dawn (Daily, Karachi, 27.10.1974). 
33 Dr. Mohammad Afzal, ex-Secretary, Agriculture Price Commission, Government of Pakistan narrated 
to the researcher that he was personally observing the progress in that direction. The provincial chief 
ministers met at Lahore in March 1972 and decided not to hold elections. Once that opportunity was 
lost, the idea of reviving local bodies could never come true. Another respondent, Mr. A. U. Saleem 
attributed the reason for poor response from two provinces which, at time, were ruled by opposition 
parties. 
34. Mohammad Waseem, "Economic Development and Political Change at the District Level" in Journal 
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 8, no. 1,1984, p. 230. The findings of Sayeed are that 
such a strategy was also adopted during Ayub Khan's period when members of the National Assembly 
sought elections on the promises of constructing bridges and roads in their constituencies. This also 
proved advantageous for the ruling Convention Muslim League the strength of which rose to 120 in 
the House of 155. See Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy" in Pacific Affairs, vol. 
36, no. 4, Winter 1963-64, p. 373 
35 
. 
A. Jameel Siddiqi, A Review of Rural Development Programmes (1857-1980) study no. 2. Islamabad, 
Local Government and Rural Development Division, 1980, p. 55 
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the field staff could be evolved. The effects of the programmes of rural uplift were, 
therefore, marginal. 
After abolishing the Basic Democracies system, there was an attempt to build a 
new local government. But the proposed system was never fully established and 
elections were not held confirming the earlier pattern that politicisation at national level 
was followed by the atrophy of local government and vice-versa. As a result, there was 
no political system at the grassroots which could articulate and resolve local problems, 
and support national and provincial government' rural development programme. 
Consequently, all local problems either remained unattended or were thrown up to 
higher echelons of the ruling party, particularly the chairmen of the District Councils 
who were the centre of political power. This retarded both political and economic 
development for which the PPP apparently had considerable potential. Why did the 
Bhutto regime fail to put into existence an effective local government system, despite 
necessary legislation enacted and introduced by, at least, the two provinces of Punjab 
and Sindh? 
Apart from what has been written about the Peoples' Party's approach towards 
local government institutions, there is a point of view held by experts belonging to 
different walks of life. The respondents, interviewed by the researcher during field work 
in Pakistan, looked to the problem from different angles and, therefore, differed 
significantly with regard to the causes that hindered the development of the system 
during this historic period of first elected government in Pakistan. Those interviewed 
and their professional backgrounds are as under: 
Name of Profession: Number of eXDerts 
interviewed 
I. Educationalists 6 
2. Journalists 2 
3. Lawyers 2 
4. Politicians 5 
5. Civil Servants 6 
1. The educationalists were mainly university teachers and prominent 
researchers. 
Three respondents attributed the whole phenomenon to the crucial problems 
which the government inherited following the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 
1971. The government, being product of a major crisis of national disintegration, was 
faced with a series of problems in both national and international spheres. The solution 
of these problems such as negotiating release of prisoners of war from India, evacuating 
the large territory occupied by India during the 1971 war, internally restoring 
confidence of the people and externally that of the nation in the comity of nations, 
preparation of a new constitutional document accommodating the changed 
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circumstances etc., required hectic efforts spread over a period of years. As a result, the 
question of institution-building could not be adequately attended. Local government was 
very low in the government's list of priorities. Therefore, the pre- 1975 situation was not 
conducive for holding elections and involving the people in any sort of electioneering. 
One respondent, disagreeing with this notion, held the view that the party remained in 
power for slightly less than six years and, therefore, had sufficient time to 
institutionalise agencies of public participation and decision-making at the grassroots 
level. 36 
Two respondents explained the position with reference to the new programme of 
socio-econornic change which the People's Party endeavoured to achieve. The party, on 
the other hand, was politically shaky. Going to seek popular mandate for any level of 
elected institutions could possibly harm the already shaky position. The apprehension 
was that the party would be factionalised at the local level. Though factions at the local 
level already existed, if the party supported one faction, the others could join the 
opposition ranks. Therefore, the government's top priority was to keep the party united 
under all circumstances for the pursuit of its long term objectives. 
Some respondents cxan-iined the question in view of the lack of willingness to 
share or abdicate powers. Introduction of elected local councils necessitated 
decentralisation of power while the government developed a trend towards 
centralisation in view of the peculiar political conditions. Centralisation was also the 
outcome of the consolidation of power at all levels. At one stage the government started 
losing ground and began to control everything from the centre. The experiences in the 
two provinces (Baluchistan and the N-W. F. P., ruled by a coalition of two opposition 
parties) led the federal government to restrict the role of provinces. Any thought which 
could have been given to the creation of local government institutions would have 
diluted the party's political bas, -. Therefore, not intuitively but certainly, by oblivion or 
neglect, local government was not in the list of their priorities. One respondent linked 
the issue with the question of autonomy of the provinces. To him the tendency of 
guaranteeing something in the constitution and practising against it had harmed the 
relationship between the centre and the provinces. The question of local government 
remained, therefore, unattended. 
In view of the existing political scenario at that time, one respondent held the 
view that the party's reluctance, despite a strong belief in democratic traditions, was due 
to the apprehension that the opposition might capture the local governments and 
become a source of trouble. The representative character of the government at centre 
could be challenged. It could not afford, therefore, to lose confidence of the masses at 
local level while ruling at the central and provincial levels. 
36. Prof. Dr Asrar Hussain, ex-Chairman, Department of Politics, University of Peshawar (21.9.1992). 
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Two prominent educationalists referred to certain sensitive issues which 
according to them constituted the crux of the problem. The biggest misfortune was the 
development of enmity with, almost, every vital section of the population such as the 
opposition parties, the industrialists, the bureaucracy, the army and the land-owning 
class. The party slogan of 'Socialism' (as a result of which the process of nationalisation 
of all means of production began) frightened the industrialists, feudal lords and others 
involved in the economic field. The general environment in the country was 
characterised by some sort of suffocation as a result of the drastic changes which the 
government introduced as a part of its economic programme. These initiatives could 
hardly gain general recognition and all elements in the society were affected by the 
changes introduced. One respondent commented thus: 
"The style of government should be seen in the context of feudalistic background and 
exposure tc western democratic norms. To remain in power, the government did not 
hesitate to promi I se too man -v 
things to the people. Developing mass awakening was one of 
his significant contribution but there was little readiness to consolidate this in all 
institutionalised manner simply because the establishment of true representati . ve 
institutions couldfrustrate their vested interests. " 37 
2. Two eminent journalists of national stature gave their candid views of the 
situation. To them, the government of PP was characterised by centralisation, 
confrontation with the federated units, and the reluctance to revive elected local council 
on the basis of adult franchise. It appeared from their views that the federal government 
exercised considerable influence over the policy on local councils, despite their being 
subject of provincial domain. The respondents had an identical viewpoint despite their 
affiliation with different political parties. To them the party pursued a policy of full, 
complete and indivisible control of the governmental power. It was this thrust for power 
that ended ultimately in the imposition of one party rule in all the four provinces when 
elected governments in the provinces of N-W. F. P., and the Baluchistan were ousted 
from office. One respondent termed the era with 'politics of confrontation'. This 
necessitated the consolidation of power which was thought to be in the best interest of 
the party instead of following the path of decentralisation. 
Another respondent, while referring to the statistics of 1971 general elections, 
stated that the ruling party represented only 36% of the electorate in Pakistan. Being 
aware of the party's limited popularity, the government had little prospects of winning 
local bodies' elections. Alternatively, local councils were controlled through 
administrators. The major urban areas had a constant war with the ruling party. K--eping 
these facts in view, the idea of going to polls could be tantamount to putting the fate of 
the party at stake. 
3 7.1 -Vice Chancellor, University of Karachi. Prof. Dr Manzooruddin Ahmad, ex I 
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An interesting point raised by one respondent illustrated the extent of influence 
which the federal government exercised over the plans of provincial governments. 38 It 
was pointed out that the Punjab government had devised a local government law which 
provided a suitable organisational structure. Despite the approval given by the 
provincial assembly, the federal government was reported to had stopped the chief 
minister from implementing the scheme. 39 
3 The two lawyers, both affiliated with the Pakistan Peoples Party and having 
seen the party's rule during that tragic period of Pakistan's history, interpreted the 
situation in such a manner that confirmed as well as disproved the viewpoints expressed 
by other interviewees. For instance, one of them confirmed that the conduct of elections 
to local councils and distribution of tickets for the purpose could cause dissension 
among party cadre and could weaken its already shaky position. The government found 
it unaffordable in view of the tremendous problems lying ahead. The government 
preferred to bring the people out of the condition of helplessness and hopelessness and 
undertook the task of introducing reforms with a view to promote the socio-economic 
40 well being of the masses . 
Another respondent ruled out this contention calling it invalid on the ground that 
conditions were not that much threatening in, at least, two provinces ;Ae., Punjab and 
Sindh and the general elections held in March 1977 confirmed the popular support 
which the party enjoyed in these provinces. 41 
4. The politicians interviewed consisted of two categories e. g., those who had 
the privilege of holding important positions in the cabinet of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and 
those who played an active role in the ousting of the government as a result of launching 
a national movement. Respondents of this group held the view that the government's 
reluctance to revive elected local councils was due to the general trend toward 
centralisation and the attempts to establish a one-party rule in the country. Obviously, 
the revival of elected local councils could create hindrances in the realisation of these 
designs. This also illustrates the fact that politicians, when in power, look hesitant to 
decentralise power. 42 Another respondent from the opposition side held similar views. 
To him, that was a dark age from the point of view of fostering the cause of local 
38 
. Past press records reveal 
how the provincial governments waited a green signal from the federal 
government in order to go ahead with the programme of huiding local bodies elections. 
39. From interview with Altaf Hassan Qureshi, Editor, Urdu Digest (Monthly), Lahore. The editor narrated 
how Hanif Ramay, then Chief Minister of Punjab had enthusiasm for establishing elected local 
councils in the province. 
'0. Umar Yousuf Deda (Advocate), ex-Provincial Minister for Law & Parliamentary Affairs (Sindh) and 
ex-Deputy Mayor, Metropolitan Corporation of Karachi in his interview told the researcher that party 
members elected in the general elections of 1971 had considerable influence over the local councils 
affairs. 
Pakistan had a general elections on March 7 and 10,1977 for the National Assembly and Provincial 
Assemblies respectively. The provincial elections were boycotted by the opposition's PNA (Pakistan 
National Alliance) in view of the alleged large-scale rigging in the National Assembly elections. 
Prof. Shah Faridul Haque, Vice-President, Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan, 16.6.1992. 
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government. The government was a party to the devaluation and perversion of the 
values of local government. By having a thrust for centralised and extensive authority, 
the government simply eroded the institutions of democracy including those which 
could serve as nursery of democracy. 
Another respondent, affiliated with Peoples Party, defended the party's stand on 
the question saying that the premier had delayed reviving local government in view of 
the prejudices and the hatred which the politicians still had against the defunct Basic 
43 Democracies system . Another respondent and one of the founding fathers of the 
People's Party in 1967 unearthed the secret while stating that the inattention to local 
councils was due to the reluctance to share power. 440ne respondent appeared to be 
balanced in his assessment of the phenomenon while saying that: 
"Even if the government had shown willingness to go ahead with the plan of local 
government elections, party members in the national and provincial assemblies would have 
resisted to do so. Being under the influence of paro, members, most of whom came from the 
land-owning class, the Premier preferred to pacify the part), members, this being a matter 
of mutual benefit and also in the interest of saving the partyfroni disintegration. 45 
5. Bureaucracy looked to the matter largely in its administrative and political 
perspective. While analysing the situation, the respondents gave equal weight to certain 
administrative and political problems faced by the government at that time. Apart from 
paying attention to several crucial domestic problems as a result of December 1971 
tragedy, the framing of a constitution guaranteeing integration of the New Pakistan 
needed top priority. Local Government, though, manifested in the party manifesto of the 
ruling People's Party and later embodied into the permanent constitution (1973). 
remained a neglected task because of the difficulties faced by the government. Referring 
to the role of bureaucracy, one respondent commented thus: 
"Bureaucracy had a substantial control over the working of local bodies and their 
influence on thefinancial and adminimative spheres of these institutions extended to such 
an extent that [even] an overseer could not be appointed or transferred by, a Mayor 
without the concurrence of the provincial government that meant officials in the local 
government department. A6 
Some respondents blamed the provincial governments ruled by opposition 
parties. Their lack of co-operation created hurdles in the way of going ahead with the 
programme of conducting local elections. For instance, the government of N-W. F. P., 
43 
. From interview with 
Malik Meraj Khalid. He explained how the government, in 1975, took practical 
steps for the development of local government and created a separate ministry to deal with policy 
measures in the field of local government. The interviewee was inducted in the federal cabinet as 
incharge of the ministry. Bhutto saw the solution in abolishing altogether the unit of union council in 
his system of Peoples Local Government. The credit for establishing a full-fledged ministry at the 
federal level goes to his government. Z: ý 44 Dr. Mubashir Hasan, ex-Finance Minister in Bhutto's federal cabinet. 
Ehsanullah Khan, ex-Minister of Local Government & Rural Development, Government ofthe N- 
W. F. P., 30.9-1992. 
46. Zakir All Khan, ex-Director General, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KW&SB). 
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was said to have been avoiding holding local council elections. Baluchistan's response 
too was unfavourable due to the resentment there against the military who were engaged 
47 
against several tribes . 
Views of another respondent carried some weight in view of touching the 
sensitive aspect. To him, the government simply wanted to avoid mutual rivalries 
between the elected representatives of national and provincial assemblies on the one 
hand, and those of the local councils, on the other. In the absence of elected local 
councils, the ministers and parliamentarians felt free ip managing local affairs including 
allotting residential plots to the people. 48 Examples of duality in government policy and 
reluctance to hold even the general elections were cited. To another respondent, the 
government, lacking self-confidence and adequate public support, did not feel like 
activating elected local institutions at the expense of weakening the federal 
government. 
CONCLUSION 
After its disintegration, the new Pakistan could look forward to a brighter future 
with viable democratic institutions. The contribution of the first elected government in 
Pakistan towards the development of political consciousness was, undoubtedly, 
unprecedented. Bhutto, by taking a number of initiatives, stimulated political awareness 
but attempts at the organisation and mobilisation of the masses was marginal. 
Institutionalisation of this political awakening could have strengthened his position and 
that of his pai ty, had the process been continued particularly in the rural areas. This 
resulted in the perpetuation of control in the rural areas by the land-owning class. The 
ruling elite itself assumed dictatorial style while governing the state affairs and set aside 
the observance of democratic norms which is reflected from their initiatives with regard 
to numerous domestic issues. The ascendancy of the party gave way to the rise of 
personal authority and democracy was robbed of all its substance. 
Though the slogan 'All Power to the People' was raised, attempt to give it a 
genuine expression in the form of appropriate institutions at various levels or even in the 
shape of a democratically organised political party was marginal. Though a structure 
called 'People's Local Government' came into existence but it could not make its 
presence felt by the masses for lack of elections . 
49 No doubt, that the question of 
47 
. 
A. U. Saleem, ex-Director General, Lahore Development Authority. The researcher differed with the 
views. Such elections could, at least, be conducted in the comparatively peaceful provinces of SIndh 
and Punjab being the stronghold of the ruling party as did Nawaz Sharif during his Premiership. 
Punjab was the only of four province going ahead with the forth term local bodies elections In 1991. 
48 
. 
From interview with Malik Mohammad Siddique, 30.5.1992. 
49 
. 
The government adopted delaying tactics in this respect. At one time it was announced that local 11 
council election will be held on March 15,1972. These were postponed at the eleventh hour. Next 
date was sometime in May that year. Till August, they could not be held. Next announcement fixed L, 
end of the year. It was followed by another announcement of another six to seventh month period. 
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democratisation of the organs of local government had been largely overshadowed by 
political issues of fundamental nature but the question of substitution of representative 
rule in local bodies for bureaucratic management should have been treated as a matter of 
consequence. 
Needless to say that in the history of post- independence Pakistan, no politician 
had pleaded with such passionate fervour as did Bhutto for the democratic right of the 
people and the need for social and economic justice in society. The assertion of rights. 
however, lacked a corresponding sense of obligation or the working discipline of 
democracy. This optimism, however, was replaced by a feeling of betrayal in view of 
the increasingly repressive rule of the People's Party. 50 A major contribution of Bhutto 
lies in incoi-porating into the constitution of articles which dealt specifically with tile 
question of local government. Local Government was declared to be an organ of the 
state and to encourage the development of such institutions was also made an obligation 
of those in power. 51 
The promulgation of the People's Local Government ordinance did not bring any 
meaningful change in the system as official administrators continued to administer and 
control the affairs of local councils with varying degree of efficiency. Not only was the 
whole sector in a dismal condition, 52 but the process of imparting training to the local 
leaders through involvement in decision-making and execution of local development 
plans, also came to a standstill. The failure to introduce participatory institutions, 
however, developed bitterness and mass anger culminating finally into the spontaneous 
outbreak of a popular movement in 1977. A grave price had to be paid for converting a 
mandate for democracy into a charter for an authoritarian government. 
Postponement of these elections became a routine matter and, therefore, did not attract much attention 
on the part of civic and political leaders. 
50 
51 
Omar Noman, Pakistan, A Political and Economic. .., p. 57 
See Articles 7 and 32 (Part-11) of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
52. (Ch. ) Mohammad Ashraf, "The Evolution and Expansion of Local Government Institutions in the Sub- 
continent, " in Public Administration Review ( N. I. P. A., Lahore), vol. 25, no. I (Jan-Jun) 1987 , p. 74 
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SECTION: C 
General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haque (1977--88) 
Zia took over the government after deposing an elected civilian regime as a 
result of the political crisis emanating from the election results of 1977. The imposition 
of martial law, according to a prominent Pakistani sociologist, marked the end of a short 
interregnum of the ascendancy of politicians in the national political process and 
restoration of a military-bureaucratic complex which the Bhutto regime attempted to 
challenge and depoliticise. 1 
The military take over was claimed to be the shortest one --- 90 days, as is 
illustrated from the following pronouncement of July 5,1977: 
"My sole aim is to organise free and fair elections which would be held in October this 
year ... During the next three months my total attention will be concentrated oil the holding of elections and I would not like to dissipate my power and energies as CML4 on 
anything else. " 2 
The Martial Law Administrator projected himself as a reluctant ruler and like his 
predecessors regarded the restoration of democratic order to be the only task before the 
government. Despite the publicly reiterated commitment to hold elections it turned out 
to be the longest martial law regime in Pakistan. 3 The tenure of the military regime was 
extended on account of the developing goals of the coup which, inter alia, aimed at 
introducing wide-ranging changes in the political and social spheres of the country such 
as provision of a stable foundation for democracy through the installation of elected 
local councils, decency in politics, Islamization, and the restructuring of the politico- 
economic SyStC; M. 4 
In partial fulfilment of the promises, a date for the general elections was 
announced (November 17,1979) but it was followed by major electoral changes. For 
instance, through an amendment of the Political Parties Act of 1962, political parties 
were asked to fulfil certain requirements which, called for a registration with the 
Election Commission as a pre-requisite for taking part in national elections. In fact, it 
was a survival strategy, consisting of a series of harsh electoral regulatory measures 
which were arbitrary in nature and aimed at the disqualification of undesirable parties. 
Inayatullah, Decentralisation For Rural Development in Pakistan, A Critical Review, published in Anil 
Bhatt, et al., eds. "Building from Below Local Initiatives for Decentralised Development in Asia and 
Pacific, vol. 3,1988, pp. 224-269 
2 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore. Progressive Publishers, 1986 
(Revised edition), p. 226. The author has outlined the changes in the political priorities and goals 
pursued by the military government which lingered the duration of the military rule. 
Promulgated on July 5,1977, the martial law was to be lifted in December 1985. Thus coming to power 
for a transitory period of ninety days, the military ruler completed almost eleven years in power 
(5.7.1977 to 17.8-1988) during which he ruled in three capacities first as the Chief Martial Lav,, 
Administrator, then as both President and the CMLA and finally as the elected President of Pakistan. 
4 Louis D. Hayes, The Struggle for Legitimacy in Pakistan, Lahore, Vanguard, 1986, pp. 258--266 
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While the political parties hesitated to fulfil the conditions of registration, the 
military government changed its mind and decided to hold local bodies' elections on a 
non-party basis ahead of the already announced general elections. Through this 
unexpected change in the priorities of the military regime, the pretence of being an 
interim government was dropped. At a later stage, the army's intentions were publicly 
and explicitly disclosed. 5 That necessitated certain effective measures that could 
entrench and consolidate the government's position. 
For achieving legitimacy, Zia tried a number of methods such as the 
incorporation of some of the anti-Bhutto forces in a civil ian-cum-mi I itary government; 
rule by dictate with the civilian bureaucracy playing the role of a surrogate political 
party; Islamization of the economy and the society in the belief that faith would provide 
the glue to hold together a country that had been created on the basis of religion in the 
first place; and a limited amount of popular participation through the establishment of a 
system of local government. It was the establishment of local government that was 
claimed to be a move in the right direction though it was only a small step toward the 
creation of a reasonably representative form of government. 6 
The system differed significantly from the previous ones in view of the 
following: 
0 The provinces and all areas under the administration of the federal 
government were allowed to frame laws of their own as a result of which 
eight different ordinances were promulgated; 7 
0 All laws were made uniform in order to avoid duplication and making 
them easily understandable; 
0 Seats were re, t-rved to give representation to peasants, workers , women 
and minorities; 
0 All local councils were to have elected chairmen; 
0 The principle of nomination was abolished; 
0 Local councils were given power to approve their budgets and taxation 
proposals; 
0 The system was developed on a non-party basis; 8 
0 The concept of 'controlling authority' was done away with; 
0 Independent authority was vested with the local councils in vital areas 
such as sanction of budgets, imposition of tax, sanction of by-laws, and 
making of contracts without limitations. 
In an interview with the 'Ittefaq' (a daily from Bangladesh) in April 1982, the military ruler was quoted 
to had declared that 'there was no possibility of an early end to the third and longest martial law (July 
1977--December 1986) and that the military had come to stay. ' 
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan, A Nation in the Making, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 99 
7 These were: 
i). The Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979; 11). The Sindh L. G. O., 1979; in) The NWFP 
L. G. O., 1979; iv). The Baluchistan L. G. O., 1980; v). The Capital Territory L. G. O., 1979; vi). The 
Northern Areas L. G. O., 1979; vii). The Azad Jammu & Kashmir L. G. O., 1979; viii). The Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas L. G. O., 1979. 
General Zia was of the view that in an Islamic republic, political parties had no role to play in the 
scherne of things. See Dilip Mukeriee, "Zia's Military ..., p. 
181. 
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0 In contrast to the provision of supersession under the previous laws, the 
ordinance provided for the dissolution of an incompetent local council 
and the holding of fresh elections to reconstitute a new one. 9 
Despite severe opposition by the political parties and the threat to boycott them, 
the army ruler arranged to go ahead with his plan of holding local bodies' polls. 10 The 
opposition parties demand to hold first the general elections" was turned down on the 
g, ',. lnd that parties were more concerned to come into power and then to manipulate the 
local bodies elections. With regard to the mode of elections, the r-ilitary ruler strictly 
and constantly pursued his policy of not allowing political parties to take part in local 
government elections. 12 
Why then this non-party politics? The n-filitary ruler was, in fact, afraid of 
Bhutto's ghost. 13 
Apprehensive of a victory by the Pakistan Peoples Party, 14 he preferred to test 
the credibility of the party by arranging first the local bodies elections. The results of 
local government elections held throughout Pakistan in 1979 proved the contention., 5 
Since the elections were conducted on non-party basis, there could only be formal 
claims, by political parties, of "winning" the polls. The election strategy was designed in 
this perspective though, apparently he gave the impression that in the Islamic concept of 
governance political parties had no role to play in the scheme of things., 6 His policy of 
depoliticizing local government institutions was based on the assumption that politics 
in local councils leads to chaos and confusion. 17 
Political parties are an essential component of western democratic institutions 
which Pakistan inherited at the time of independence and serves as a basis for the 
regulation of governmental processes. The military regime was, however, averse to 
allowing any role to political parties in managing the affairs of the state even in a 
9. K. M. Bhatti, Local Government for Rural Development in Pakistan, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy for 
Rural Development, 1990, pp. 65-66 
10. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, n. d., p. 377 On 30 
August, 1979 the president declared local body elections to be held in September on a non-party basis. 
These elections were to take place after a period of fifteen years. 
11. The promise of restoring democratic order by holding general elections within a period of ninety days 
could be materialised in May 1985 and that too in the form of non-party general elections. 
12. See the 'Nawai-e-Waqt' (Daily, Lahore, 18.2.1983) carrying text of the President's address at the 
Annual Fare in Sibbi (Baluchisan). 
13. Z. A. Bhutto was hanged on April 4,1979 for his alleged involvement in the murder of Nawab 
Mohammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri. 
14 
. 
The party was established by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1967 after parting with General Ayub Khan in 
protest against the signing of 'Tashkent Declaration' following the six-day Indo-Pakistan War of 
September 1965. 
15. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), April 18,1980, pp. 30202-03. Despite the PPP's 
disqualification from contesting the election, the results of the elections for local bodies paradoxically 
spoke for the PPP's popularity vis-ý-vis Zia. See Veena Kukreja, "Mi litary- Pol i tics in Pakistan", in 
M. D. Dharadasam, ed. Benazir's Pakistan, Varanasi (India), Shalimar Publishing House, 1989, pp. 29- 
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16 
. 
Dilip Mukerjee, "Zia's Military Legacy" The Round Table, 310,1989, p. 181 
General Zia-ul Haq's address to the one-day local bodies convention at Ziarat (Baluchistan). 
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democratic setting. 18 Attempts were thus made to experiment the system in Isolation of 
an essential component i. e., political parties. It is not out of place to mention here that 
the regime of General Zia was not the first one seeking to isolate parties from the 
political processes. His predecessor (General Ayub Khan) had also tried to fashion a 
political system in which political parties had little or no role to play. 
A significant development with regard to the promulgation of his system of local 
government in late 1979 was the pronouncement in which the military ruler made it 
abundantly clear that it would not, unlike General Ayub's Basic Democracies, serve as 
an electoral college. 19 The government envisaged three-fold objectives to be achieved 
through the new system of local government i. e., the creation of an effective channel of 
communication with the masses; undertaking speedy improvement of the socio- 
economic condition particularly in the rural areas and; securing a support base to claim 
20 legitimacy for the military regime . 
In a nutshell, General Zia's scheme for 
incorporating civilians had, short of the electoral college, similar objectives to Ayub 
Khan's Basic Democracies. He intended to create a network of beneficiaries who could 
lend and canvass support for the regime. While Field Marshal Ayub offered a pivotal 
role to the bureaucracy in his scheme of basic democracies, General Zia saw no need to 
make such a gesture .21 At the top of it, the scheme afforded him opportunity to 
successfully contain the demand for democratic rule. 22 
Under these laws, vast administrative and financial powers were given to the 
elected councils headed by elected mayors and chairmen. It was for the first time since 
1933 that a local government system based on democratic principles, in terms of its 
- character, was introduced. Further, unlike the previous 'aws entirely representatiN LI 
which provided for dual controlling authorities, i. e., one in the form of district officers 
being in-charge of the local councils and secondly, the provincial government, Zia's 
system abolished the middle layer of controlling authority by way of removing the 
bureaucracy's hold of the councils and placing them under the direct control of the 
respective provincial governments which enjoyed the power to supersede a local 
23 council. In most cases this was done arbitrarily and on political grounds. The 
18 Elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies were also held (1985) on a non-party basis but the 
partlyless National Assembly (NA) yielding to compulsions of reality, did give birth to the party 
system, when the NA was formally politicised with the establishment of Pakistan Muslim League. 19 Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, Politics, Economy, and Society, Karachi, Royal Book 
Agency, 1980, p. 37 
20. From interview with Altaf Hassan Qureshi, editor'Urdu Digest' (Monthly) who said to had been in the 
advisory panel sugges! mg ways and means to the military ruler for shaping the system in such a way 
that could suit the peculiar needs of Pakistani society. The editor outlined the background perspective 
of the system as envisaged by the military ruler. 
21 
. Dilip Mukerjee, 
"Zia's Military .... p. 182 22. Omar Noman, Pakistan, A Political and Economic History Since 1947, (Second edition), London, 
Kegan Paul International, 1990, p. 130 
23 
. The supersession, in 
September 1986, of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, the largest urban local 
council in Pakistan, provides a concrete evidence for this. 
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possession, by the provincial governments, of the powers to freeze accounts/funds of the 
local councils also gave a severe limitation to the autonomy of these institutions. 
Needless to say, General Zia's system had a higher degree of autonomy in the 
conduct of local government than had existed a istory. any previous stage in Pakistan's hi 
The powers of councils to elect their own Mayors and Chairmen, the latter's executive 
role and the freedom of councils to devise their own budgets and tax proposals were 
examples of this enhanced autonomy. 
General Zia had the utmost desire to vest in the chairman of the district council 
the entire administration of the district with the deputy commissioner to serve as his 
secretary. This idea could not be introduced because bureaucracy was strongly opposed 
to such drastic reforms in district administration. Since the military itself relied heavily 
on the expertise of bureaucracy, it was difficult for General Zia to go against the interest 
of the administrators. The military ruler, on the other hand, went to the extent of 
24 
proposing that only local councillors should be allowed to contest assembly elections . 
Critics hold the view that the military ruler was not prepared to grant complete 
freedom to local councils or, at least, organise them on democratic lines in terms of 
allowing the political parties to participate in local affairs. 25 He made the provincial 
governments frame laws whereby party participation in local government was 
discouraged so much so that elected councillors found having connections with political 
parties were put into a disciplinary process and declared disqualified from elections in 
future. Zia though gave a representative character to these institutions but it did not 
complete it with the sufficient funds as had been done by his predecessor under the 
Basic De. -nocracies System. 26 
The military ruler unfolded his plans in a calculated manner by taking one 
measured step after another so that his political adversaries did not wrest the political 
initiative out of his hands. For example, in 1984 he declared that he might like to stay 
on as President. It was on the basis of this statement that several local bodies, elected for 
the second term in 1983 on a non-party basis, passed resolutions urging him to continue 
as President. This kind of understanding between the President and the local councillors 
had developed as a result of direct contact through the local bodies conventions which 
the military leaders tended to convene from time to time. These conventions convened 
27 
at the federal level became a forum for the discussion of vital national issues . These 
24. This he announced while addressing the 2nd All Pakistan Local Bodies Convention. See the 'Nawai-e- 
Waqt, ' 13.5.1982 
25 Louis D. Hayes, The Struggle for p. 263. The military ruler was of the view that political parties 
are un-Islamic on the grounds that they divide the community and, therefore, is an unacceptable 
practice in Islam. 
26 From interview with Mohammad Ali Khan Hoti, Member, Senate of Pakistan (12.12.1992). 
27 The Pakistan Times (Daily, Lahore, 9.3.1980). The First All-Pakistan Local Bodies Convention took 
place at Islamabad (5-6 March, 1980) under the chairmanship of General Zia-ul 
Haque. Under similar 
arrangements, the second convention (12-13 May, 1982) at Islamabad. These conventions, most of the 
time presided over by the military ruler, used to take into consideration a number of problems 
62 
acquired great importance in view of the fact that the military ruler was able to take the 
chosen representatives of local population into confidence on vital national issues. The 
military ruler not only made the government machinery respond effectively to the 
suggestions of these conventions but also created a rapport between the government 
functionaries and the people. This development was much appreciated by the general 
public. 
Promulgation of the new local government system was followed by another step 
towards the civilianization of the military regime when in December 1981 the 'Majlis-e- 
Shoora (Federal Council) consisting of 350 nominated members and with the purpose to 
'aid and advise the government' was set UP. 28 It was a bid to find additional civilian 
source of legitimacy for the military regime though it, unlike local government, 
essentially lacked an electoral link to the people. 
The councillors elected in the first local councils' elections of 1979 were 
encouraged to become members of the nominated federal and provincial councils for the 
purpose of providing advisory assistance to the military heads at both levels. Members 
of these councils, most of whom came with the background of municipal working, 
tended to increase their involvement in matters of local development instead of filling 
the gap that had occurred as a result of the absence of elected provincial and federal 
assemblies. This intermingled the whole process and disregarded the possession of 
special skills to handle the distinctive tasks at the levels of government. This also 
created the problems of dual membership producing undesirable results . 
29 These 
tremendous responsibilities were put on their shoulders without allowing them to seek 
first some necessary training at the local level. The result was that their poor educational 
background and experience proved a major hurdle in the performance of legislative 
functions at the provincial level and dealing with the problems of management at the 
local level. 
The 11'resident's hopes for local government came true when it gave necessary 
encouragement to him to remove all doubts about his political plans. He declared that 
'power would be shared 30 rather than transferred' to the representatives (referring to 
those elected in the general elections held in February 1985 on non-party basis). 
confronting the society, for instance, the economy, government foreign policy, commerce and trade, 
education, health, law and order etc. 
28 
. Golam W. Choudhury, 
Pakistan, Transition From Military to Civilian Rule, Essex, Scorpion Publishing 
Limited, 1988, p. 55. The Majlis-e-Shoora became operational in January 1982. Such consultative 
councils (known as Provincial Councils) were also established at the provincial levels where their 
membership was largely drawn from elected heads of local councils. 
29. Javed Ahmed Qureshi, Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab told the researcher that in the 
Punjab alone, there were some 132 persons holding memberships simultaneously on both provincial 
and local councils. 
30 
. Hasan 
Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan, " in Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 
10, October 1986, p. 1068 
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Yet another favour was done to the President when the elected councillorý, along 
with members of the federal and provincial consultative councils, supported the former 
in gaining a positive vote in a referendum 31 held in December 1984. In return for all 
these, the military government determined to turn the local bodies into an effective 
viable institution for resolving problems of the masses by delegating more powers and 
functions to them. The enthusiasm to strengthen local government in that era could 
be illustrated from the fact that a high powered reform committee was constituted to 
consider administrative, developmental and other aspects of the local government 
system in Pakistan. 32 Though the report was not made public, few of the 
recommendations made were carried out. Among these, the question of imparting 
training to the elected councillors and staff of local councils also assumed a new 
dimension. 33 Special courses were designed for municipal staff and secretariat workers 
of the provincial department of local government and rural development. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion that the military tends to take up a permanent political role for itself 
once it intervenes in politics, genuinely applies to all past military revolutions in 
Pakistan including that of General Zia-ul-Haque. His take over in July 1977, created a 
political vacuum as political activities were completely banned and, later, in his 
endeavour to restore democracy, the military regime started with the grassroots level 
and introduced a system of local government. 
Like General Ayub Khan, General Zia too preferred to revive local government 
as he had little ýxust on the national level politicians including the PNA (Pakistan 
National Alliance, a forum of leading opposition parties constituted during Bhutto 
regime) which had demonstrated enthusiasm to see the armed forces intervene 
following their failure to convince Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to conduct fresh elections. Like 
General Ayub Khan, General Zia too relied on two 'sources' i. e., the army and the local 
councillors. By quickly establishing local councils, the military ruler not only mobilised 
public opinion in his favour but also strengthened his image by calling those institutions 
as the first step towards the restoration of democracy. In the absence of elected 
democratic institutions at the higher levels, local bodies filled the vacuum and served as 
an important forum for the promotion of co-operation and understanding between the 
government and the people. 
31 
. 
Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Civil ianization of Military .... p. 1068. 
The vote of confidence was sought for 
the approval of the process of Islamization initiated by the military government in 1979. 
32 
. 
General Zia-ul-Haq announced formation of the commission at the 2nd All-Pakistan Local Bodies 
Convention at Islamabad in May 1982. In a record period report was submitted which, inter alia, 
proposed measures of far-reaching consequences. 
33 
. The training programme was widened and universities in all 
the provinces were involved to offer 
diploma courses in the administration of local government. Originally, the courses started at the 
Universities of Karachi, Multan, Peshawar and the Punjab. 
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The system served dual purposes i. e., first, as an agency of socio-economic 
development and secondly, as a political support base whereby the military ruler could 
perpetuate his rule for more than a decade. Though the local councils could not be a 
substitute for the elected national and provincial assemblies, they did establish a link 
between the masses and the military. The military government was, therefore, obliged to 
grant extra-ordinary and unprecedented powers to them for the solution of local 
problems. Later, when the national and provincial advisory councils were constituted, a 
greater percentage of their membership was drawn from these local councils. 
By opting to introduce local government to provide an avenue of participation at 
the local level, the military regime followed the old strategy of depoliticization and 
curtailment of political participation at the national level and its substitution with 
controlled participation in local government to pacify the politically and economically 
34 discontented and win the support of the economically privileged rural classes . 
While there was dictatorship at the national level, democracy was attempted at 
the grassroots level. The democracy under local government could flourish and take 
roots only had there been a genuine democratic set-up at the regional and national 
levels. The rulers intended to manipulate the system for the perpetuation of one-man 
rule in that an important element of democratic processes was denied by isolating 
political parties from the working of local councils. The installation of an elected 
government, following the general elections held in 1985, coupled with the restoration 
of limited political activities, it was observed that the quantum of attention given to 
local government slowed down considerably. 
Irrespective of the drawbacks in General Zia's policy towards local government, 
one strong tradition established was the holding of regular periodic elections on fixed 
dates. During his stay in power, three successive elections to local bodies were held on a 
non-party basis in 1979,1983 and 1987. These clections were free and fair with no 
allegations of governmental interferences or rigging of the elections whatsoever. 
34 2 
. 
Inayatullah, Decentralization for Rural Development p. 2 
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SECTION: D 
Mohammad Khan Junejo ( 1985-88) 
The installation of Mohammad Khan Junejo, as the 8th prime minister of 
Pakistan following the non-party general elections of February 1985, was a novel 
development in the history of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. The strategy 
adopted by General Zia to civilianize his m-ilitary regime differed significantly from his 
predecessor General Ayub Khan. By hand-picking Junejo to head the civilian 
government, Zia gave an impression that powers could be effectively sliared between 
the army and the elected politicians. The military ruler, as a matter of fact, had agreed to 
bring forward the kind of civilian leadership who could be willing to share powers on 
his terms and serve as a counterweight to his political adversaries. In order to be on the 
safe side, the military ruler first secured and strengthened his political future by seeking 
a mandate for five years through a referendum. ' It was only afterwards that the bold step 
of holding general elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies was taken in 
response to the pressing demand of the opposition who did not seem contented with the 
establishment of elected institutions at the local level. 
Junejo worked for the first nine months (March-December 1985) under the cover 
of martial law. The logic given was to enable the non-party assemblies to consolidate 
their positions. General Zia, while calling it a transitional period for the newly elected 
government, offered himself as a bridge between the government and the armed forces. 2 
Like his local bodies elections, General Zia conducted the general elections of February 
1985 on non-party basis in order to block the way of certain political parties firmly 
opposed to the military regime. 3 However, it was soon realised that to run a 
parliamentary democracy, the need for a party led government was imperative. It was 
felt that unless the members of parliament were disciplined through some party 
platform, the rtsults would be totally chaotic. The lack of decorum in the conduct of 
parliamentary business was pointed out by one sitting member while commenting thus: 
" We do not have one party, or ten parties, or twenty parties; we have two hundred parties. 
Each member of the assembly considers himself responsible only to himself, not to any 
other person, let alone to a higher authority. ., 4 
1. Before acceding to the Opposition parties' demand of restoring parliamentary democracy, General Zia 
took the oath of office as the seventh President of Pak1SLan for a term of five years (1985-90) as a 
result of securing a positive vote from the people in the referendum held in December 1984. The 
referendum was conducted for seeking public approval for the process of Islarnizing society which 
General Zia initiated in 1979. The participation of people in the said referendum was claimed to be 
62.15 per cent with 97.71 per cent votes in favour of the measures adopted towards Islamization. See 
Hasan Askari Rizvi. The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 
1986, pp. 233 ff. 
2 The Jang (Daily, Lahore, 19.3.1986). 
3 He was certain that Zulfiqar All Bhutto's Peoples Party will win a large number of seats, and perhaps a 
majority in the National Assembly. Such an outcome was clearly unacceptable to the military generals. 
4. Mahbubul Haque, as quoted in Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan, A Nation in the Making, Karachi. Oxford 
UP., 1986, p. 92 
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It was with this background that the Muslim League, once playing a leading role 
in the movement for independence, was revived and the members were subsequently 
encouraged to band together under the umbrella of the newly formed party. 5 The party 
was thus a product of sitting legislators lacking a mass base and launched with the sole 
purpose to provide legitimacy to the civil-military arrangement. 6 Because of the random 
handling of things, it so happened that the party came first and the manifesto later. 
The introduction of representative elements in government, though limited in 
form, represented an important symbolic change. The military still retained effective 
power. 7 The changes initiated by the military ruler were thus cosmetic yet they had 
symbolic significance. Even the removal of martial law in 1985 did not alter the 
8 political power of the military . Though the withdrawal of martial law terminated the 
longest military rule (July 1977-December 1985), it restored, on the other hand, a 
carefully tailored constitutional system that civilianized the Zia regime, facilitated the 
co-option of a section of the civilian elite, and provided adequate guarantees for the 
entrenched position of the ruling generals. The much controversial and debated 
constitutional eighth amendment was passed during this period. 9 Its basic purpose was 
to create a balance in the distribution of powers between the President and the 
Premier. 10 In fact, the balance tilted decisively in favour of the former as a result of 
which the latter could not emerge as an autonomous power centre in the polity. " The 
lifting of martial law, thus, did not affect much the course of events that could lead to 
the promotion of democratic values. 
The political framework which the military regime had evolved during the eight 
years of its rule (July 1977--December 1985) served as a parameter for the elected 
government to shape its policies for the conduct of state affairs. To ensure that the 
civilian regime maintained continuity of the major policies introduced during the 
military rule, the latter closely watched the working of the former. The elected 
government, relying on military's help for survival, found it difficult to deviate from the 
agenda set for it by the military. The hallmark of the post-martial law system was, thus, 
5 The Pakistan Muslim League was formally launched on 18 January, 1986. 
6 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, Lahore, Progressive, n. d., p. 417 
7 On December 30,1985 martial law was lifted and civil liberties were restored. General Zia, though no 
more holding the position of Chief Martial Law Administrator, was still Chief of the Army Staff. 
8. Omar Noman, Pakistan, A Political and Economic History since 1947, London, Kegan Paul 
International, 1988, p. 130. General Zia was finally in a position to send the armed forces back to their 
barracks. This was done on December 30,1985 by ending the third and longest period of martial law 
rule (July 1977 --- December 1985) in the country. 
9. In March 1985 i. e., three days after the completion of the electoral process, General Zia promulgated an 
order that introduced sweeping changes in the Constitution of 1973. The purpose behind most of the 
changes was to concentrate political power in the hands of the President. See Shahid Javed Burki, 
Pakistan, A Nation .... P. 
90 
10. See Veena Kukreja, "Military-Politics in Pakistan, " in M. D. Dharamdasani, (ed. ) Benazir's Pakistan, 
Varanasi (India), Shalimar Publishing House, 1989, p. 45 
11. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan, " Asian Survey, -vol. 26, no. 10, 
October 1986, p. 1071 
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the continuity of policies and several key personnel from the martial law period. General 
Zia himself confirmed it in a statement saying: "the new order did not represent a 
departure from the policies of the martial law period. It is no rival or adversary of the 
outgoing system. It is, in fact, the extension of the system in existence for the past 
several years. , 12 The government faced tremendous challenges, during the entire period 
of its working, 13 caused by the severe opposition from the political parties, on the one 
hand, and by its inability to assert leadership over the military, on the other. ' 4 
The Premier was thus heading a quasi-civilian regime being at the mercy of the 
President. His political image was weaker, not simply by the mode of election which 
brought him to power, but also the type of elected members who won assembly seats. A 
majority of them with a rural background were consisted of the feudal elite, tribal chiefs, 
and the religious influential representing mostly the land-owning class of the society .15 
Since the elected councillors were encouraged to contest elections of the future 
parliament, 16 the candidates hardly discussed any major national issues (such as 
domestic or foreign policy) and the issues figured prominently in the election campaign 
were local in character e. g., construction of roads, streets, hospitals, and schools; 
improvement of sanitation conditions; installation of street lights and Public Call 
Offices (PCOs), supply of electricity and gas for domestic consumption etc. 17 The 
government, coming to power with these promises, had to concentrate more on the 
provision of these basic amenities which the military rulers had already been supplying 
through the local government institutions. 
12 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization ..., p. 1067 13 The government of Mohammad Khan Junejo was dismissed on May 29,1988 on the charges of 
corruption. Against the mandated period of five years, the premier could remain in power for only 27 
months (March 1986--May 1988). This was possible through the enormous executive powers with 
which the President equipped himself under the 8th amendment. Though its purpose was to create a 
balance in the distribution of powers between the President and the Prime Minister. In fact, the balance 
tilted decisively in favour of the former as a result of which the latter could not emerge as an 
autonomous power centre in the polity. The Constitution Eight Amendment (Indemnity) Bill was 
passed by the National Assembly on October 16,1985. The bill, besides dealing with the distribution 
of powers between the head of the state and that of the government, aimed at validating the 1977 coup 
and absolving Zia and the military from any legal liability for action taken during the more than eight 
subsequent years of martial law. See Veena Kukreja, "Military -Politics in Pakistan ..., " p. 45 14 The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) not only disputed the legitimacy of the 
civilianization process in view of the total reliance of the government and the parliament on the 
blessings of the armed forces but also regarded the premier as a docile to look after the day-to-day 
affairs of the state. 15. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization ..., p. 1070 16 Large number of elected councillors, particularly heads of the major urban and rural local councils, had 
demonstrated well while having membership on the nominated 'Majlls-e-Shura' (Federal) and 
Provincial Councils. 
17 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization .... pp. 1068-1070. With the introduction of controlled 
democracy after the 1985 partyless elections, legislators both provincial and federal, were getting 
money allocated for development projects in their constituencies. The idea was to keep the non-party 
legislators busy in local petty matters like construction of small roads, streets and schools, laying of ZD 
, utter lines, improving sanitation etc., in their areas. This diverted their attention 
from their primary 
task of law making and formulating of policies. C7 
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The ruling party's manifesto called the 'Prime Minister's Five Points 
Prog. ramme' 18 embarked upon a gigantic programme of development in which the share 
of rural areas was raised from 10 to 50 per cent of public service expenditures. The 
broad development programmes of the government, with greater emphasis on 
electricity, water supply, education (including adult education), health etc., were 
incorporated into the sixth five year plan (1983-88). The various targets in these areas 
envisaged: raising the literacy rate upto 50% (from the existing 26%), electrification cf 
90% villages, conferment of property right on the residents of urban slums, distribution 
of 2.2 million 7 marla plots for houses, water supply for 26 million and sanitation for 7 
million people; 1180 Basic Health Units and 151 Rural Health Centres; construction of 
11712 kilometres of rural roads; saving 4.5 million acres of land from waterlogging and 
salinity etc. 
It was in the light of the above intended measures that members of both 
chambers of the parliament ( 324 in number) were asked to identify local development 
schemes in their respective areas to be financed by the government. 19 The idea of 
associating the parliamentarians with the development projects took off mainly in two 
sectors of education and rural development . 
20 These politically motivated development 
activities strengthened the hands oil the powerful rural agricultural lobby in the 
parliament. 21 
As a result of these federally funded special development programmes, there was 
established a direct link between the Federal Ministry of Local Government with its 
counterpart in the provinces. The formal procedure required the Senators and National 
Assembly members to submit their schemes with the Ministry which, after preliminary 
scrutiny, were forwarded to the provincial departments of local government and rural 
development for detailed analysis and preparation of feasibility report. The kind of 
interaction that emerged between the ministry and the respective provincial departments 
is illustrated diagrammatically (Table-3). 
The process illustrates how the local councils and their elected members were 
by-passed both in the identification of schemes as well as their execution. Schemes 
18 Mohammad Waseem holds the view that JuneJo started this programme of economic development and 
social welfare as a part of his struggle to dispel the public image of being a proxy for General Zia. See 
"Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy, " Asian Survey, vol. xxxii, no. 7, July 1992, p. 623. The 
programme included: i). Establishment of Islamic Democratic Political System; ii). Promotion of 
equitable economic order; iii). Eradication of illiteracy; iv). Elimination of corruption; and v). 
Consolidation of national integration. 
19. Each elected member of both chambers of the parliament were allocated funds to the tune of rupees 
five million. Likewise, members of the provincial assemblies (initially elected on non-party basis and 
later joining the ruling Muslim League) were also involved in programmes of local development, 
details of funds allocated could not be known. Majority of these members prefer-red to have their 
schemes executed by provincial line departments rather than local councils. 
20. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and State .... p. 418 21 
. The rural elite constituted almost 
66% of the directly elected members in the General Elections of 
February 1985. See Omar Noman, Pakistan, A Political ..., p. 127 
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proposed were often based on the priorities of the legislators rather than the felt need, of 
the local population. 
The local government elections for the third term (1987-91) were held during 
this period. The interest of federal political bosses in these elections came into the 
limelight when vital issues with regard to the mode and schedule of elections were 
decided by the Premier, in consultation with the provincial chief ministers and with 
consensus of opinion favouring to keep the elections away from party PolitiCS. 
22 
Table: 3 
The post-1985 elections mechanism of local development in the perspective of 
identification and execution of development schemes. 
Members of the Senate Members of the National 
Assembly 
Submission of development Ministry of Local Submission of development 
schemes -------- > Government & Rural < ------- schemes 
Development 
(The schemes consisted I 
mainly of the following: 
Drainage, water supply, 
electrification, school V 
building, upgradation Referring the schemes for 
of school, street, farm-to- verification and 
market roads, Basic authentication 
Health Units etc. ) to 
I 
V 
Provincial Departments of 
Local Government & Rural 
Development 
Provincial Public Health Provincial Directorates of Provincial Departments of 
Engineering Departments Rural Development Communication 
(Main Executing Agencies) (M. E. As) (M. E. As) 
The duality in government policy was observed when the Premier, while 
announcing in the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, that the elections will be 
conducted on non-party basis, directed, in the very same meeting, the party workers to 
reach to the four comers of the country to motivate people to support the ruling party 
candidates. 23 The way local government elections, despite being a provincial subject, 
were influenced by the federal government was illustrated from the statement of a 
federal minister in which he justified the cabinet's decision on the ground that the 
involvement of political parties in them would mean harming local interests of the 
22. See the Jang, 11.3.1987. Despite government's clear instructions, however, political parties actively 
participated in the local bodies polls held in 1987. See the 'Nation' (Daily, Lahore, 18.3.1987). 
23. See the 'Nawai-e-'Vaqt' (Daily, Lahore, 29.6.1987). The Prime Minister himself planned to tour the 
four provinces prior to the holding of local bodies polls. 
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people. 24 This also revealed the influence which the military exercised on the policies of 
the elected government. 
CONCLUSION 
Junejo's government faced tragic problems of its own. First, the foundations on 
which the government was built were shaky. There was a lack of harmony between the 
President and the Premier. Political pressure exerted by the opposition, particularly 
following the withdrawal of martial law, worsened the situation further. The regime 
was, thus, concerned with its survival through retaining, at all costs, the support of 
MNAs. The MNAs, elected in the 1985 general elections, were mostly local 
councillors who contested the general elections on the basis of solving problems of a 
municipal nature. They lacked necessary training and vision to serve as an effective 
counterweight to strong and organised political adversaries. Generally viewed as a 
political non-entity and destined to play the role tailored for him by the real wielders of 
authority, the Premier fought all along to assert his authority over the military but only 
with marginal results. Zia, despite having taken the back seat so as to meet the 
, -xigencies of parliamentary democracy, was very much the real boss on whose goodwill 
hinged the fate of Junejo's political career. 
24 
. Iqbal 
Ahmad Khan's interview at Lahore prior to the holdiný, of third term local government 
elections. See the 'Pakistan Times (Daily, Lahore, 211.7.1987). 
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SECTION: E 
Benazir Bhuttj 
(1988-1990 & 1993- Onward) 
The Dismissal of Premier Junejo's government in May 1988 and the dissolution 
of national and provincial assemblies followed by the sudden and tragic death of 
General Zia in an air crash in August 1988 ended a long era of military regime and 
facilitated the restoration of parliamentary democracy for which elections took place in 
November 1988 based on an adult franchise and full party participation. Democracy 
emerged by default once the ruling regime voluntarily stepped aside and fulfilled the 
promise of handing over power to the elected representatives of the people. 
The restoration of democratic order, however, had little effect on the role of the 
army whose influence continued to be a dominant element in the working of 
representative government. ' The supremacy of the president and the influence of the 
army put strong pressure on the civilian government which relied more on the support of 
2 
the military for its survival . This phenomenon had a significant bearing on the working 
of the elected government. Apart from the army, the government also had a 
confrontation 3 with the President who, while working with the former military ruler, had 
been a key figure in drafting the Eighth amendment bill of the constitution which gave a 
superior status to the president over the premier. 
This section evaluates the policies of the People's Party government towards 
local government with ieference to two different periods i. e., from December 1988 to 
August 1990 and again -1'rom October 1993 onward. The interval i. e., from November 
1990 to April 1993,4 the period when Nawaz Sharif ruled the country on behalf of IJI 
alliance of political parties. 
1. Hamza Alavi, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan, " in Subrata Kumar 
Mitra, ed. The Post-Colonial State in Asia, Dialectics of Politics and Culture, London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp. 63-67. 
2 The Premier however, infuriated the generals because of her insistence upon the removal of some high 
ranking military officers. These were such matters on which the president claimed exclusive 
jurisdiction. Her desire to postpone the retirement of one Lieutenant General and his subsequent 
promotion to the next position was turned down. Her policy preferences with regard to Afghanistan 
and India also annoyed the military. See Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan Peoples Party ..., p. 592. 
Also see John Bray, "Nawaz Sharifs New Order in Pakistan, " The Round Table, Issue 318, April 
199 1, p. 182. 
3. A major controversy arose over the retirement of Admiral Sirohi, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, which the president declined to accept. See Mohammad Waseem, "Pakistan's Lingering 
Crisis of Dyarchy, " Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 7, July 1992, p. 624. 
4. The general elections were first ordered for July 1993 but could take place three months later in 
October. The reason was the Supreme Court of Pakistan's ruling in May declaring the sacking of the 
Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, unconstitutional. The brief return to 
office of Sharif did not help improve relationship between the two incumbents. In view of the 
continued political crisis, the army stepped in and threatened direct intervention unless fresh elections 
were held. See Deepak Tripathi, "Pakistan, The Return of Benazir Bhutto, " The World Today, vol. 49, 
no. 12, December 1993, p. 227. 
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A major hurdle in the smooth working of the government was the intense 
political confrontation between the PPP and the Opposition PML (N) ruling the centre 
and the Punjab respectively. It had never happened before that this largest province was 
ruled by a party in opposition to the central government. The IJI (Islami Jamhoori 
Ittehad) generally called an alliance of pro-Zia parties, emerged as a fierce opposition 
under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. The People's Party's inability to win the Punjab 
proved crucial to the stability of Benazir's government. While showing no tolerance to 
one another, the centre pursued vengeful policies, the Punjab government indulged in 
ceaseless agitation. The political system suffered from institutional decay, widespread 
financial corruption, and spiralling ethnic, sectarian, and religious violence, leading to 
near-anarchic conditions. 
The People's Party's confrontation with the IJI had a deeper impact on the 
relationship between the centre and the province. 5 John Bray attributes this mutual 
animosity 6 and reluctance to accept one another's political legitimacy to some past 
feuds. The Sharif family could not lightly forgive Benazir for Ittefaq's nationalisation in 
1972 as a result of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's (1972-77) policy of nationalisation, whereas 
Benazir Bhutto was unwilling to accept a politician so closely associated with Zia, the 
man responsible for her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's execution. 7 The result of this rivalry 
was that the central government spent too much of its energies trying to undermine the 
8 
opposition IJI, and not enough on practical administration . This is evident from the fact 
that during the twenty months of rule, the government brought forth no significant 
legislative proposals for Parliament to consider. 9 
The intensity of the contlict between the centre and the Punjab worsened further 
when heads of both the governments made unsuccessful attempts to topple the 
government of one another. The no-confidence moved against the PP governmentlo by 
the IJI which she could hardly survive, changed Benazirs' mind and looked reconciled to 
5. Benazir's appointment of a Chief Secretary and the Inspector General of Police was summarily turned 
down by the Punjab government and both the incumbents were sent back to the federal capital. See 
Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan Peoples Party and the Punjab .... p. 
593. 
6 John Bray, "Nawaz Sharifs New Order in Pakistan, " The Round Table, issue 318, April 1991, p. 181. 
7. Credit to bring Nawaz Sharif into the politics of Pakistan goes to General Zia whose martial law 
administrator in the Punjab invited him, in 198 1, to become Finance and Sports Minister in the 
provincial government. The military ruler, later in 1985, appointed him chief minister of the province, 
a portfolio which he retained until 1990. 
8. John Bray, "Nawaz Sharif s New Order .... p. 
18 1. Apart from two annual budgets, the government 
neither passed nor even introduced a single piece of new legislation. 
9. Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan Peoples Party and the Punjab, National Assembly Elections, 1988 and 
1990, " Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 7, July 1991, p. 591. The author has analysed the performance of 
Bhutto government during the period in the context of military influence and the discretionary 
authority available to the President because of eighth amendment to the constitution. Also see 
Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in 1990, The Fall of Benazir Bhutto, " Asian Sun, ey, vol. 31, no. 2, 
February 1991, pp, 113-124. 
10. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in 1989, The Politics of Stalemate, " Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 2, February 
1990, p. 13 1. The no-confidence motion was move on November 1,1989. In a house of 237, only 119 
votes i. e., two-third majority of the members, were needed to bring down the government. The 
Combined opposition Parties (COP) could bring only 86 votes against the government. 
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work under the rules of the games as defined by the eighth amendment and liý, e under 
the shadow of the Presidency. The most critical issue faced was the constitution's eighth 
amendment. This had shifted the balance of power in favour of the president as opposed 
to the premier, with discretion available to the former to dissolve the parliament. The 
augmented powers of the president under the eighth amendment, which the former 
military ruler had introduced in anticipation of an electoral victory by the PPP., served 
as a .., ord of Damocles' 
I that hung perilously over her head throughout the term of 
office and eventually ended her tenure. 
A common view held in Pakistan was that the 'Establishment' (meaning the 
President, the military, and the higher civil servants) accepted Benazir only when she 
agreed to fulfil certain conditions. ' 2 The army also consolidated their position by 
stipulating conditions under which the PPP was allowed to fon-n a government. Her 
party had to relinquish control over important policy decisions, notably foreign policy 
and the administration of the military. 13 During the course of its working the 
government developed severe differences with the army specially over the deteriorating 
law and order situation in the country in general and in the province of Sindh 14 in 
particular. The army, which the federal government deployed there to assist the civil 
administration, demanded a free hand under Article 245 of the ccastitution 15 in order to 
be able to fulfil their responsibilities towards restoring order while the government was 
reluctant to accede to the demand. 
The elected government, thus, began its first term of office on an unsure footing. 
With no clear ideology or plan of action, it was compelled to rely to a great extent on 
the legacy of the party's founding leader (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) and the promise of 
dqmocracy as a panacea. The absence of a strong party and a coherent programme 
compelled the government to rule through patronage. The premier's shaky majority and 
her dependen-e on the army as a stabilising influence deflected attention and energies 
from pressing national and regional issues. ' 6 
Being an opponent of the Zia system of rule, Benazir regarded local government 
as the legacy of the military ruler and threatened to abolish it. The Punjab government 
where the opposition Muslim League was ruling, reacted harshly by turning down the 
federal directives in thi, regard and by re-affirming the provincial government's 
11. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan, " Asian Survey, vol. 
32, no. 6, June 1992, p. 526. 
12 Bhola, P. L., Benazir Bhutto, Opportunities and Challenges, New Delhi, Yuvraj Publishers & 
Distributors, 1989, pp. 33-45. 
13 Seyyed Vall Reza Nasr, "Democracy and the Crisis ..., p. 
526. 
14 There started armed confrontation between Sindhis, serving as core constituency for the Peoples Party, 
and the Mohajirs (Muslim immigrants from India) now residing in the major urban areas of the 
province and a coalition partner of the ruling PPP both at the centre and the province of Sindh. 
Acceding the demand would have exempted the army actions from challenge in courts as well as would 
have suspended the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 199 of the constitution. Zý 
16 
. 
Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in 1989, The Politics of Stalemate, " Asian Sun, ey, vol. 30, no. 2. February, 
1990, p. 127. 
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determination to go ahead with the scheduled local bodies elections to be held for the 
fourth term in December 1991. 
It is pertinent to note here that as a part of their political confrontation, the 
central government of Benazir Bhutto and that of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab took 
certain counterproductive measures from each side. In one such move the Pakistan 
Railways suspended, under federal directives, the allocation of wagons to haul scrap 
iron from the Karachi port to the Ittefaq Foundries in Lahore owned by Nawaz Sharif. 
Nawaz Sharif, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Punjab, directed the 
provincial administration, particularly at the provincial headquarters and the district 
level, not to entertain People's Party legislators or honour any request made by them in 
connection with the delivery of certain services to their electorates--this being an 
effective weapon in the present day politics of the country for keeping the political 
support of the electorate intact. 
Most probably it was in the context of above phenomenon and as a part of 
defensive measure that the federal government launched a federally funded 'People's 
Works Programme' which was administered through 'Development Committees' at the 
district level. 17 A characteristic feature of this programme was the constitution of 
District Committees headcd by federally appointed 'Administrators of the People's 
Programme' who were drawn mainly from the party leaders and in certain cases were 
those who had lost their seats in the general elections held in November 1988. The main 
objective behind it was to rehabilitate the party's image by accelerating the pace of 
development particularly in the rural areas. 18 Interestingly, despite dealing with the 
problems of local nature under this programme, the federal government made futile 
attempts to bypass the respective provincial governments. 
19 It was perhaps the large 
scale embezzlements of public funds in the execution of such public welfare 
programmes, confrontation with the army, the president, the provincial governments 
that the government could last only for twenty months when it was dismissed by the 
20 President on grounds of alleged mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption . 
The dismissal of Benazirs' government in August 1990 was, in fact, the 
consensus that had arrived between the president and the army who considered her 
See "Peoples Programme, " a publication of the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Local 
Government & Rural Development, Islamabad, 1988, pp. 5-7. There were evidences that in a large 
many cases the defeated candidates of the party in the respective districts were appointed 
administrators of the Works Programme causing greater resentment in provinces like Punjab and 
Baluchistan where implementation of the programme was obstructed. 
18 
. 
During the brief span of twenty months rule, some 18,507 schemes were approved and implemented 
with a cost of RS. 28860 million. Details provided by Mr. Rang Elahi, Deputy Secretary Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
'9. See 'Peoples' Programme, ' Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Ministry of Local Government & Rural 
Development, 1988, p. 5. The schemes were to be taken over, following their completion, by the 
provincial departments/local councils/voluntary organ is ati ons/NGOs 
for maintenance and operations. 
01g Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan --- National Asse;. ibly Results, Andrew R. Wilder, Changinz., 
1988 and 1993-Asian Suri, e),, vol. 35, no. 4, April, 1995, p. 377-393. 
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continuation in power intolerable in view her differences with the president on the one 
hand and her alleged interference in the army's internal affairs 21 on the other. 
The People's Party came into power for the third time following the dismissal of 
Nawaz Sharif s government (November 1990--April 1993). Nawaz Sharif s IJI was able 
to form government at the centre and the four provinces of Pakistan. In Punjab, the party 
formed government independently whereas in other three provinces it was done through 
22 alliance with other regional and ethnic political groups. It was in the Punjab only that 
local bodies elections could be held after the expiry of their third term in December 
1991. Other provinces were reluctant in view of their shaky position and the fear of 
defeat. There is evidence that the idea of 'District Government' ( which was later put 
forward by the People's Party government as a part of its New Social Contract), 
originated during the IJI government of Nawaz Sharif with the difference that while the 
former advocated the transformation of the District Councils into District Governments, 
the latter stood for replacement of existing provincial assemblies by District 
AssemblieS23 (Annex. A). 
The October 1993 general elections 24 in the country were preceded by 
dissolution of local bodies under the pressure of "People's Democratic Alliance" (PDA) 
which doubted fairness and impartiality in the outcome of the results if local bodies 
installed during the previous regime were still operative. This made the care-taker 
government of Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi order dissolution of local councils 
throughout Pakistan. The opposition claimed their apprehensions had come tru%-, in view 
of the major setback which the Muslim League had to suffer in the elections 
particularly in the province of Punjab. 25 
Unlike the second time (November 1988 to 1990), the third PP government 
(November 1993--- onward) came with new vistas of introducing far-reaching changes 
in the polity through measures contained in its "Agenda For Change. " The agenda stood 
21 John Bray, "Nawaz Sharif s New .... p. 
182. 
22 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in 1990, The Fall of Benazir Bhutto, Asian Survey, vol. 3 1, no. 2, February 
1991, p. 121. IJI won an overwhelming 208 of the 234 seats in the Punjab Assembly, and sufficient 
seats in the NWFP and Baluchistan to form coalition governments there. In Sindh, the party formed 
government in collaboration with the ethnic Muhajir Qauami Movement and a group of defected 
members of Peoples Party headed by Jam Sadiq All who became chief minister of the province. 
23 Government of Pakistan, (Cabinet Secretariat), Management Services Division, Review of Local 
Government Structure in Pakistan, 199 1, (see summary of recommendations). 
24 The PPP, like its party position in the 1988 and 1990 general elections, could not secure a clear 
majority. It won 86 seats compared to 73 by the PML (N). The Junejo faction of PML, with six seats 
sided with the PPP. The support of third parties, independents, and minority representatives plus the 
alliance of PPP-PML(J) constituted majority of the 217-member National Assembly and re-elect 
Benazir Bhutto as Premier. 
25 Lawrence Ziring, "The Second Stage in Pakistani Politics, The 1993 Elections, " Asian Survey, vol. 33, 
no. 12, December, 1993, p. 1181. The dissolution of local councils and the division of PML into 
Nawaz and Junejo Groups caused greater setback to the party's standing in the elections. It secured 
only 72 seats compared to 105 in the General Elections held in October 1990. For details see 
Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in 1990, The Fall of Benazir Bhutto, Asian Surve. y, vol. 3 1, no. 2, 
February 199 1, pp. 119-12 1. 
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for the promotion of the modern structures of government. Considering the government 
from the centre as 'neither efficient nor effective' and regarding 'strong local 
government' as a pre-requisite of healthy democracy, the party embarked upon a 
programme of institutional re-structuring 26 based on the concept of 'New Social 
Contract. 27 It emphasised a balance of power between the three branches of the 
government, on the one hand and between the three levels of the governmental 
machinery, on the other. 28 
The 'New Social Contract' envisaged a balance of power between the local, 
29 
provincial and federal governments . Under this concept the government also intended 
to introduce certain drastic changes in the social, political, economic and legal system of 
the country. But the way different aspects of the plan were taken in hand revealed that 
not enough homework had been undertaken before the party's assumption of power. 30 
One significant aspect of the programme was the idea of 'District Government' 
which was to replace the existing set-up of local government and was to be assigned 
with some unprecedented powers (See Annexure-B). The government claimed to keep 
the system autonomous and free from the influence of both federal and provincial 
governments. Initially, the plan was to abolish the existing provincial assemblies and 
substitute for them the District Assemblies, which could then choose an executive 
authority for the respective districts to be called Lieutenant Governors. To some critics, 
the idea of District Governors who were essentially to be drawn from the locally 
influential members of the ruling party, would result in dangerous political polarisation 
of society and open new avenues of party politics. These drastic changes will have 
deeper repercussion on the power-oriented culture and lead to more clashes rather than 
26 
. 
From the speech of Benazir Bhutto delivered at Lahore on the eve of silver jubilee of the Pakistan 
Peoples Party. According to this plan, power was to be decentralised from the federal government to 
each province and to constituent units of local government within province accompanied by 
devolution of authority so that such local and provincial units can reorder priorities and allocate 
resources within their respective spheres in accordance with the mandate of their respective 
populations. 
27 The term was interpreted in different manners. Some coincided it with a new constitution needed to 
give the country and its governance a new orientation and dignity. A new set up that could put the 
country on an even stable democratic keel where all citizens are treated alike and where place and role 
of all organs and individuals in the power structure is clearly spelled out In the constitution. See 
Kunwar Idris, "What is Social Contract, " The Dawn, 20.4.1994. 
28. See the 'Agenda For Change', containing future programmes of action and issued by the Pakistan 
Peoples Party Central Secretariat, Islamabad, 1993, p. 5 
29. In an exclusive interview with the 'Pakistan' (daily) Lahore, 27.7.1992, Benazir Bhutto talked about 
fresh balance of power not only in the organs of the state (Legislature, Executive, and the Judiciary; 
but also between the three levels of government e. g., local, provincial and central. Zn 
'0. It is evident from the fact that soon after assuming power, the premier constituted several 'Task Forces' 
including the Task Force on New Social Contract, in order to translate the party's policy measures into 
reality. The chairman of the task force in an interview said: "We have no pre-conceived notions while 
introducing the NSC to the masses, because we want to communicate with all kinds of people to learn 
from them. " See The Muslini, 2.12.1993. 
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compromise. Commenting on the practicability of the scheme, one prominent civil 
servant remarked: 
"The idea is, no doubt, very fascinating. Its execution will certainly, be resisted by, certain 
quarters in view of the reluctance to delegate powers downward. My, prolonged 
administrative career suggests that both the elected people and the bureaucracy, need to 
have lion's heart in order to relinquish powersfrom their hands. io3l 
The solution, analysts hold, does not lie in the abolition of some and 
strengthening of other institutions. They argue that by converting the existing set of 
district councils into powerful and development-oriented institutions, what guarantees 
exist that the same class of people who have been dominating the central and provincial 
assemblies would not control the district governments and would not be repeating all 
that they have been doing at the higher levels of elected institutions ? 32 The scheme of 
district government could not as yet be implemented for avoiding disintegration in the 
party ranks. The federal government has again resorted to holding local bodies polls on 
non-party basis. 33 
CONCLUSION 
Democracy, though restored after a prolonged political polarization following 
the general elections of 1988, the age old rivalry and confrontation between parties 
ruling the central and provincial governments created obstacles in the smooth 
functioning of the democratic structure. This is evident from the kind of relations that 
existed during this period (1988-90) between the two leading political parties ruling the 
centre, and the Punjab--the nerve centre of Pakistan politics carrying the largest number 
of the National Assembly seats. Survival being the primary focus of attention for the 
two ruling parties, both turned their attention from the vital issues confronting the 
nation. Beside other things the consolidation of representative institutions suffered from 
the adverse effects of party politics which is evident from the fact that, except in the 
Punjab, where the opposition IJI ruled, nowhere else could the periodic elections of 
local councils be held. Not only that, their functional jurisdiction was also encroached 
upon through the execution of special development programme with federal funding and 
with the active participation of members of parliament. The sort of environment needed 
for the progress of representative institutions could not develop mainly due the lack of 
accommodation and compromise between different political elements. These, while 
weakening the base of democracy, proved a source of strength for the traditional power 
structures such as the bureaucracy and the army. 
31 From interview with Dr. Mohammad Afzal, Former Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, 
1.12.1993. 
32 From interview with Dr. Inayatullah, ex-Director, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 
Peshawar. 
33. See The Jang (Urdu Daily, London, 6.10.1995). The prime minister constituted a seven-member 
committee headed by the Punjab Chief Minister to assess the possibility of 
holding local bodies 
elections in the province by March 1996. 
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Though the overriding power of the president was no more a threat for the 
government of People's Party, during the second term of office, the incumbent being a 
party candidate, the government still faced other issues such as the continuing 
hegemony and influence of the army, the continued tussle with the opposition parties, a 
budgetary deficit affecting every vital economic matter which affected the adequate 
exercise of the peoples' mandate. Despite a constitutional obligation, the future of local 
government institutions look bleak in view of the fact that the f(-deral government could 
not even give sufficient attention to the implementation of its own programme of 
district governments. Ever since the dissolution of local councils prior to the general 
elections of 1993, people are deprived of a participatory platform at the local level. 
Because of the tremendous problems surrounding the government, there seems to be 
little prospect of the restoratioi, of elected local councils in the near future and the 
government's commitment of holding elections to these institutions could not as yet be 
materialised for fear of losing these local power bases. The idea of district governance, 
though fascinating, faces hurdles in its implementation. Besides resistance from the 
bureaucracy opposing such drastic measures of decentralisation, the politicians 
themselves look reluctant to share powers with people at the lower level. For these 
changes to become effective, constitutional amendments will be required which, in 
practical terms, does not look feasible in view of the conflict of interests around which 
the game of party politics revolves. Another point deducible from this discussion is that 
politicians in Pakistan are, gznerally speaking, in the habit of making promises which 
they often find difficult to transform into reality once they are accorded an opportunity 
of doing so. The fault is not solely of their own but the practical difficulties such as the 
poor enthusiasm and the lack of sufficient expertise at the local level to shoulder such 
gigantic responsibilities prevents the government of introducing such far-reaching 
reforms. 
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OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The Local government system in Pakistan has, since the inception of the country 
in 1947, undergone different phases of development. While some attention was given to 
the problems of local government during the colonial period, the condition worsened 
after independence. Though, there were opportunities available to fashion th%- system 
according to the requirements of a free nation, no concrete policy could be initiated to 
enable these institutions to play their role in the economic and political development of 
the country. There have been periods when local bodies have been important as a matter 
of policy both with the federal and provincial governments. There have been times when 
these institutions were relegated to the background. 
An analysis of the government's attitude towards the growth and development of 
local government institutions during the period covering two military and two civilian 
rulers testifies the hypothesis that these institutions have received priority of attention 
during martial law regimes and that the initiatives to reinstate them have invariably been 
taken by the centre. Their development during the British period too reveal that centre 
stood at the forefront in all reform efforts. For instance, the passage of Ripon 
Resolution of 1882 announcing the creation of local bodies with a view to impart 
political education and training. Again, during the period between 1909 and 1911 the 
Government of India took decisions with regard to the delegation of powers to the 
indigenous panchayats in the village with a view to widen their sphere of influence in 
the village life. 
After independence, the uncertain and unstable political conditions gave way to the 
military to intervene and after acquiring power they needed some support base that 
could legitimise their rule but also manage state affairs in collaboration with a kind of 
elected element through which some sort of liaison between the rulers and the ruled 
could be established. The development in the field of local government since 1959 
onward thus testify the assumption that military regimes, compared to the elected 
governments, have adopted generous policies towards the development and growth of 
local bodies. For instance, Ayub Khan geared them for socio-economic development of 
the country though they were misused politically and it was this political misuse which 
spoiled the whole character of the system. 
One reason could be that the military rulers take shelter behind local government 
in order to avoid elections to the higher levels of representative institutions which, in 
their opinion, could cause a threat to their rule. As against this, they treat local councils 
as loosely organised and less dangerous to the stability of the government being manned 
by politically less conscious councillors. While the military ruler endeavours to keep the 
politicians away from political arenas, a civilian ruler confronts with threats caused by 
its own class of politicians, the military and the bureaucracy. The general trend has, 
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therefore, been to avoid initiation of such measures (e. g., holding local bodies' elections) 
that could incapacitate its own position. 
Given the factionalism at the grassroots level, and in view of the poor 
organisation of party there, the elected government does not want to take the risk of 
losing control over local councils as that could exhibit a poor image of the party's 
support from the general public. Because of such apprehensions, the elected 
governments have generally avoided going to local polls with the only exception when 
there is consensus of opinion on such measures between the centre and a particular 
federated unit, both being ruled by one and the same party. Despite such consensus, the 
democratic pattern of elections are modified. 
The study also pinpoints that the civilian/elected governments have generally 
shown reluctance to allow local governments to have a role in the process of local 
development which is illustrated from the launching, by the federal government, of 
massive development programmes (i. e., Five-Point Programme, People's Programme, 
and Tameer-e-Watan 34 Programme). The attitude of federal government towards local 
government institutions during 1972-77 and then 1988-to-date (1995) testifies to the 
hypothesis. 
The only exception was that of Junejo's government when elections to the local 
councils took place in 1987 for their third terin. The government, however, managed to 
avoid party defeat by holding those elections on a non-party basis so that the councillors 
thus elected could be absorbed into the officially supported groups controlling the 
council affairs. 
A greater in"Juence from the centre comes through the casual allocation of 
finances. Funds for foreign-aided projects are also processed and cleared at the federal 
level and then channelled down to the provinces where the schemes are intended to be 
executed. Local councils have been marginally involved in the identification of such 
schemes and their execution. Foreign funds received for the purpose are generally 
utilised by various line departments of the provincial governments. 
A comparative analysis of the initiatives taken towards the development of local 
government would reveal that it were the measures taken by the military government of 
General Zia-ul-Haque which proved to be a significant milestone in this direction. 
Realising the importance of local government in the national life, the military 
government of Zia undertook efforts towards a renaissance of these institutions which 
had all along remained in a stage of dormant growth. 
34 ean- , 'Nation Building' was alven to the federally funded special development programme . 
The term rn ing I 
I launched during Primier Nawaz Sharif government Involving elected members of the National and 
Provincial Assemblies. 
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For the first time in the history of Pakistan, public representatives elected freely 
by popular Will, 35 were afforded an opportunity of active participation in the 
administration of local bodies at all levels. As a result of this, the elected chairmen 
acquired a pivotal status enjoying full powers in the conduct of local affairs. For the first 
few years there was ensured adequate safeguards against all kinds of interference in the 
working of these institutions on the part of outside elements whatsoever. 
Absence of other political institutions till 1985, proved both a boon for and a 
bane of the local government set-up. The restoration of democracy in 1985 and the 
coming into being of elected institutions at the federal and provincial levels gave way to 
a process of conflict with the local government institutions which eroded their capability 
rather than strengthening. The concentration of powers in the hands of elected chairmen 
created a greater amount of jealousy on the part of parliamentarians. The lack of 
attention to maintain a balance between the spheres of influence of the two resulted in 
the deterioration of the image of local government. Local government institutions had 
another exit from the political scene with the coming into power of the People's Party 
government in 1993.36 
The working of the local government institutions in the light of above political 
scenario and during the three consecutive terms had facilitated the determination of the 
concrete shape of the system not only in terms of their competence in service-related 
perspective but also in terms of their autonomous character when analysed in the 
context of their relationship with the higher levels of government. The researcher 
studied four local councils in two provinces of Pakistan to determine the place and role 
of these institutions, the problems faced, and the prospects of their future growth. 
35 
. 
After an interregnum of 13 years, local government Institutions were restored in 1979 by the holding of 
free and fair local council elections throughout the country on the basis of adult franchise. 
36 
. (Ch. 
) Mohammad Ashraf, The Evolution and .... p. 74 
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Fig: I 
Financial Statistics showing reliance of Municip%/, 
Committees on important sources of income. 
A Pakistan Perspective 
160fj 
NOO 
fj Fj 
2 1000 
W CL 600 
400 
200 
I11 yy 
Years 
0 Octoi N Prop. Tax 0 Vehicle Tax 13 Water Rates M Dev. Grants 
Source- Data Centre, National Centre for Rural Development, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
Source- Data Centre, National Centre for Rural Development, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
-t 
- 
(A 
44 
Q 
C. d am cl 
ýTo 
6 F* 
. 
rA 
4.0 W) 
"- 
"- 
. 
"- 
ri 
83 
en ýz qv 
"-Z r--l t- ON 00 tr "C tn tn tn ON t- IT ýz 00 ýz tn qT Zý eq en "o Cý t- 
V-0 
t I tý n V tn tn qj. aN 00 r-I a, efi ýz C: ý 00 'lv tr) ý, z tn en r-q ý, z 
tn 
tn q ck, le 00 qv 'RT =ý tn -0 = 0ý t-ý. T en = ýz 
4: 11 t- (4 ýz en ýz t- in tý. ýz C en 'RT 11-C \C ýT eq r-I en e4 r" 00 
tn 
tn 
t n 
IF 
06 N \ o q! ý 'RT tý. IV tn \ t- 06 eq r-I 00 \C , \, Z Cý t- in 'IT v C \, c M m Cs ýz C*ý t- ýz r-I r-I tn 
kn 
tn tn 
eq CA tn = -ýf = ýz 'IT On tr. IT r-. 4 I rm r-I RV 
e4 eq IRT \40 oo ' wi e, bi e- n. e en . e " ý6 14ý \ \, c t- 00 00 Cý 00 cs, = fq CN 'ýT 00 11-C 00 C t- r-o ýz IV in en 'R! r = 11-C zs en Cý IT en 00 rlo eq 
W 
0 
... m r w r. l 
-d 
"m 
Z 
9. d 
zw 
84 
Lr) 
H 
u 
E 
4-j 
.E 
u 
-7t 
4. 
> 
0 
rID 
C 
C-) 
0 
rI 
(ID 
4- 
C 
C-) 
> 
C 
CD ýý, 0 - cq ýb 
r' 
"Z: ý - Cý, CD - c, 1 (r) 
r 
Ir Z r, ý 
r- 
'Z . C-4 - 
In - CD - Z r, z> (1q : ý: -e - (-A c-, 0 ) rr) r ) L> CD 
Y ý- CD i 
rlý 
CD 
'lýI . 
CD CD cq c> (r) 
C ) 
v-) CD C, CD 3, e - C, r-1 rl) (-q F> CD 00 P ir) CD c-i CD r- - 
r, cýI r- (r) c: ý CD r-- r- oc ', M Clý ' A CA 4 - CD oo - (9 - - CD 
vý Cq wý - 
cý - CD 
0 c- 3ý, r c c r-- c Lq c I:, c- z c- C, , r) C, cD C, 1 CD . 00 rý r, C ) c--1 00 - 
oo (Y) (-) - (D0 e C> 00 CD - 7 00 ýlo t, 
, 
e cq (-A c-, 1 (', ' äý 
12ý Cl\ f) CD c::, CD " - + - V) v) ) c> ) v) , 3 , 
cý CD 00 c> (n C> 
CD C: ) 
CD 
CD CD CD 00 oo r- r- 
00 rn CD m CD V) cc tr) c: > CD 00 - \, O O, \ CD \, O r-) - CD cq (q CD C7, ir) CD 
C\ 
oo r) c- r- ü c r- c c r, ) c c:, ü ýý rn 1 00 
tf) 
oo 
r-- 
t , . rý . (r) rn - "0 . e r- 00 - 0 
0 
- r 
Z 
t 
c--1 "r) ý, CD (Z 00 oO DO le v' - ý, 0 r- - Cf) r) rn c, "0 
' 
e ir) rn rn CD cý c> 00 - "0 Z ýlo rn Z CD CD 
CA CA 
u 
X 
X 
u 
X 
U cz &ý 
r_ 
Cd 4- " 
4-3 ce W-J 
ci < 
c) 
E CD C 
cý X x 
4- x 
71 
cl 
CD CD 
E 
C) 1) cz bi Q) = C 
53 Z CD Z u 
C-1 
-6 c7s 
-C as 
a 
CA 
c7s a. 
cli 
4-1 Z. - 
7z 
zi 0 
C/D 
Chapter Three 
The Municipal Committee of Mardan 
Case Study No. 1 
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General Introduction to the Case Studies 
The four case studies i. e., the Municipal Committees of Mardan and Gujrat and 
the District Councils of the above named districts, are of two urban and two rural local 
authorities in two different provinces of Pakistan. In each case study, the initial 
paragraphs deal with the location and character of the local authority, followed by an 
analysis of the nature of the councillors, officials, and the performance and activities of 
the councils, with some initial conclusions drawn there from as interim points leading to 
the later concluding chapter. The pattern adopted for the study of these councils consists 
of an analysis of the impact of party politics and the influence of local influentials on 
their working, the nature of administrative control exercised, and the place of finances 
in their service-related activities. 
The sequence of the case studies in the presentation of the thesis was determined 
by the sequence of study investigations itself. There is, therefore, some elements of 
learning projections on the cases as the researcher developed his themes. 
Each case study stands alone in some respects. It is complete within itself as an 
account of what happened during the period of investigation and what the researcher 
found to be the case in evidences located. The cases, however, are part of the more 
general issues about local government in Pakistan and some familiarity with these 
matters is presupposed in the cases as they are developed. The conclusions drawn are 
limited by the case study material itself, without the benefit of the fuller and more 
general discussions presented both earlier and later in the thesis. 
N. B: For keeping unanimity of the respondents, fictitious names 
have been used in all the four case studies. 
NIARDAN --- One of the divisional headquarters in the North-Western Province 
of Pakistan, is situated in the middle of the Peshawar plain which is itself in the centre 
of the province. It lies about 70 km East of Peshawar --- the provincial headquarters. The 
current population of Mardan city (1981 census)' is about 166,244 which is 18.87 per 
cent of the total population of the district which comes to 881,000. The population of 
the rural areas consists of 714,755 (i. e., 81.13%). The city population is expected to 
reach a total of 266,000 by the year 2003 due, mainly, to the increasing migration2 from 
the surrounding rural areas. The population of the city consists of a number of tribes, 3 
important District-wise Socio-economic Indicators in the N-W. F. P., 199 1, Peshawar, Government of 
the N-W. F. P., Planning & Development Department (Bureau of Statistics) p. 1 
2. Second Urban Development Project, N-W. F. P., Intermediate Towns, vol. vi, MARDAN, A study 
conducted by the Asian Development Bank in collaboration with the Government of Pakistan in 
199 1, p. 7 
3. Ikram Ullah Shahid, Municipal Committee Mardan, A'ak Ta'aruf A'ak Jaiza (Urdu), Mardan, Kausar 
Press, 1987, p. 40 
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the most important of which are the Yousufzai, Afridi, Mohmand, Khattak, Mundar -ind 
Utman. 
Mardan is the second largest city in the N-W. F. P. On the South of it lies the 
district of Nowshera, on the West the district of Charsaddah, on its East the district of 
Swabi and to the North lies the Malakand agency. The city is traversed by the Kaplani 
Nullah which is a perennial waterway bisecting the city. It receives most of the city's 
waste water and storm water. 4The Kalpani is itself fed by other nullahs and streams in 
and around the city which flow in the general direction of the river to the South. 
The climate is semi-arid and is characterised by a hot summer and a very cold 
winter. 5 Being situated in the agricultural area of the valley of Peshawar, Mardan has 
developed over the years as a market town and service centre for the agricultural 
hinterland. There are a number of processing plants for agricultural products including 
large sugar refining and tobacco industries. The economy in Mardan, however, is not 
growing as fast as the population. This could be partly due to the influence of Peshawar 
which overshadows Mardan in terms of attraction and services. The elderly people6 of 
the city claim that the term 'Mardan' is derived from the name of a pious person 
'Mardan Shah' which later came to be known simply as Mardan. 
Mardan has a chequered history of the development of its civic institutions. To 
serve the civic needs of Mardanites, there are, apart from the city-based provincial 
government line departments, three different civic institutions namely, the Municipal 
Committee of Mardan, the Cantonment Board, and the Mardan Development Authority. 
Among these, the oldest institution is the Mardan Cantonment Board, the origin 
of which can be traced back to 1853 when the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, while 
making Mardan the permanent headquarters, initiated the construction of Mardan Fort 
and it was the same fort which, later on, assumed the shape of Mardan Cantonment. 7 
Since the British wanted their troops to be away from the local population they 
developed their camps, stations and posts into cantonments for security and sanitation 
purposes independent of municipal bodies in the neighbourhood. The British rulers 
introduced Cantonment Boards only in South Asia8 including Burma while no one is 
aware of them in other erstwhile British colonies anywhere in the world. 
4. Second Urban Development Project .... p. 
2 
5. Feeroz Shah, Mardan Tehsil at a Glance, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 199 1, 
p. 7 
6. From discussion with Mufti Midrarullah Midrar, District Khateeb and father of Ikram Ullah Shahid, 
Ex-chairman, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
7. Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial Series) North-Western Frontier Province, Lahore, Sang-e-Meel 
Publications, 1991, p. 163. 
8. Malik Mohammad Siddique, "Role of Cantonment Boards in Local Government, " in Sindh Local 
Councils Digest vol. 3, no. 12, December 1984, p. 3 
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The original government notification regarding the declaration of Mardan 
Cantonment is not locally available. However, it is presumed that the cantonment was 
declared sometime in the 1850s. The boundaries of the cantonment were defined in 
1890 by the then Government of the Punjab. 9 The total area of the cantonment is 2.234 
sq. miles and the population (according to the 1981 census) is about 6150. The area is 
separately governed by the Cantonment Board which collects taxes and provides 
municipal services which are subsidized by the defence budget. The Municipality of 
Mardan has no say in cantonment affairs even though it is enclaved in the city, 
occupying prime land in the centre of town with the best shopping area and most 
distinguished buildings. Apart from enjoying subsidized amenities, the people living 
within the cantonment pay lower taxes compared to those in the city areas despite the 
city's low per capita income. While the local bodies elections for the fourth term, 
scheduled to take place in December 1991 were postponed for some political and 
administrative reasons, the periodic elections of the Cantonment Board did take place in 
December 1991 filling the three seats reserved for the civilian population. The ratio 
between the nominated and the elected members is 4: 3, the elected members being 
placed in a minority. The President of the Board is an officer commanding the station 
, ýkho enjoys a casting vote. The officially nominated members, therefore, carry much 
weight because of the ubiquitous control of the military and the Ministry of Defence 
over the municipal administration of the area and the elective element is allowed a 
severely restricted role. 
Since the Cantonment provided better quality of life, well to do people began to 
settle in the area as well, purely for residential purposes. Over the years, the Mardan 
Cantonment, like many others in Pakistan, has neither retained its essential 
preponderance of military population nor its segregation from the civilian population, 
having been swamped and engulfed within the expanding city (Fig: 2) which is 
administered by the Municipal Committee. The Cantonment Act of 1924 probably 
envisioned such an eventuality and kept the boundaries of cantonments flexible, with 
provision to expand the jurisdiction of the cantonments or to withdraw from certain 
areas. The Military Land & Cantonment Directorate under the Ministry of Defence is 
reluctant'O to withdraw from Cantonments with essentially civilian populations because 
of their revenue generating potential. The Cantonment Board of Mardan, for instance, 
raised an amount of Rs. 1.85 million (equivalent to US $54030)" through the levy of 
9. Cantonment Board Mardan, Annual Administration Report, 1992 (Chapter- 1), p. I 
10. Management of Cities Policy (Draft Final Report), Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, Environment 
and Urban Affairs Division, (August 1984), p. 2.26 
This is according to the market index of April 4,1996. See the Jan-L, (Urdu daily from London) of the 
appropriate date. 
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rates and taxes12 during 1991-92. Similarly, a concurrent flow of funds13 from the 
Municipal Committee to the Cantonment Board enables the latter to receive a huge 
amount annually. 
The municipality, on the other hand, had its origin in the form of a Notified 
Area Committee constituted sometime in 1880 during British rule. When the population 
of the city reached to 13849 (according to the population census conducted in 1901), 
the city was declared an Area Committee14 under the Punjab Municipal Act of 1910. 
Municipal bodies at that time were mostly run by administrators under the controlling 
authority of the respective Assistant or Deputy Commissioners. The city was made a 
municipal committee (Class-11) when its population rose to 39200 according to the 1941 
census. Mardan at that time used to be a tehsil of Peshawar. It was in 1937 that the city 
was assignedl5with the status of a district headquarters. Under the Basic Democracies 
system of General Ayub Khan, the city was divided into six Union Committees each 
consisting of ten members. The chairmen of these union committees, responsible for 
general welfare functions, were ex-officio members of the municipal committee. An 
elected member used to be the vice-chairman of the municipality but he was a nominal 
figurehead as powers were vested with the administrator. 
During the martial law government of General Zia-ul Haque, the status of the 
municipality was further upgraded in July 1979 when it was declared an A-Class 
Municipal Committee. 16 After a vacuum of almost fifteen years, Local Government 
Elections were held in December 1979 and the elected representatives of the people 
took charge of municipal administration in January 1980. 
A new phenomenon in the administration of civic affairs has been the emergence 
of special purpose agencies that have been established in almost all major urban areas of 
Pakistan more commonly known as the Development Authorities. The concept of 
having Development Authorities for performing separate developmental and planning 
functions in big cities is of relatively recent origin in Pakistan. The first such authority 
was established in Karachi in 1957 known as the Karachi Development Authority. 17The 
12. Cantonment Board Mardan ..., 
(Chapter-III), p. 4 
13. From the Budget statement of the Cantonment Board Mardan for the year 1992-93. The municipality, 
while bearing some financial liability towards the Cantonment Board, pays I I% of the net income 
through Octroi. The Cantonment Board received an amount of Rs. 3.7 million through octrol during 
the year under review. 
14. Imperial Gazetteer of India ..., p. 
163. 
15. The 'Mashriq' (Daily, Peshawar, 1.7.1988) special supplement released on the occasion of Mardan's 
becoming divisional headquarters. Iskandar Mirza was the first Deputy Commissioner of Mardan 
who, later on, became Governor General and subsequently, the first President of Pakistan in August 
1955 and March 1956 respectively. 
16. The 'Mashriq' dated. 1.7.1988. General Fazal Haque, then Chief Minister of the province, declared 
Mardan to be the sixth Divisional Headquarters consisting of the two districts of Mardan and Swabi. 
17. Management of Cities Policy (Preliminary Report) Legal Aspects, Islamabad, Government of 
Pakistan, Environment and Urban Affairs Division, December 1982, p. 20 
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emergence of widespread problems in the fields of land development, physical planning. 
housing, water supply, sewerage and roads was thought to necessitate the creation of 
such agencies. These agencies have, over the years, encroached'8 upon the traditional 
municipal responsibilities and their mutual relationships have never been smooth. 
In fact, it is the lack of technical expertise and financial limitations on the part of 
municipal bodies to cope effectively with the problems of urban planning and 
management i. e., housing and the related urban development programmes that has 
given rise to the establishment of development authorities. Despite government's direct 
involvement in matters such as housing and related urban development programmes, the 
urban crisis is still a much talked about question among the city dwellers. 19 
While on the one hand, the government has adopted measures to strengthen the 
elected municipal bodies, the desire to have a rapid development of cities, at the same 
time, has led to the creation of development authorities. This new device of urban 
development has deprived the municipal bodies of a lucrative source of revenue 
through land development in all major urban areas where the development authorities 
exist. The municipality of Mardan also suffered from the dilemma when the 
Government of the North-West Frontier Province created a Building Control Agency20 
under the Mardan Development Authority and empowered it to prepare a plan for the 
surrounding areas of Mardan. The building control function henceforth shifted to the 
Mardan Development Authority from the Municipal Committee causing to the latter a 
loss of Rs. 0.20 million2l annually. Such measures have thus diminished municipal 
institutions from their importance as the leading civic bodies. 
The demands of decentralization and autonomy to local government institutions 
have thus been countered by the transfer of municipal functions to development 
authorities. An argument that has been put forward in support of the establishment of 
development authorities is the need to reconcile democratic aspirations with efficiency 
of service. The existence, at the urban level, of these parallel institutions for urban 
management with consequent functional and jurisdictional overlaps and lack of co- 
ordination, tends to defeat however, the basic planning and development purposes for 
which they have been formed. 22 
18. Management of Cities Policy (1984) ..., p. 
2.19 
19. Management of Cities Policy (1984), ..., p. 
2.1 
20. Government of the N-W. F. P., Notification No. 5-03-01/13302 dated. 28.11.1992. The decision also 
lately appeared in the 'Mashriq' dated. 6.2.1993 The building control is substantially a municipal 
function and the transfer to the Local Area Authority was resented by the municipality. Apart from 
the legal aspects favouring the municipality, building control is not a highly technical function. 
Reversal of the function back to the municipality would be a desirable step as the council possesses 
capability to handle the matter. 
21. Figures derived from the budget statement of Municipal Committee Mardan for the year 1992-93. C, L- 
I11 
22. Management of Cities Policy (1984) .. p. 
3.5 
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While there are provisions in the Local Government Ordinances of the provinces 
of Sindh and Baluchistan which envisage the gradual take-over of the powers, functions, 
assets and liabilities of the development authorities, there is no such evidence in the 
Local Government Ordinance of N-W. F. P as a result of which urban local councils do 
not appear to be on the top of the urban management hierarchy. 23 Established in 
February 1976, the Mardan Development Authority has been specifically concentrating 
on tht- , )ntrol and regulation of haphazard land use and development. 24 
In the light of the mandates prescribed by the N. W. F. P., Urban Development 
Ordinance'25 the Mardan Development Authority, working under the supervision of the 
Provincial Urban Development Board, is required to perform the following functions 
within the jurisdiction of Mardan Municipality: 
a). Preparation and adoption of a master plan for the city which includes both 
future direction of growth in urban settlement and changes in land use and 
density in the existing built up area; 
b). Exercising planning control over individual land use and development 
proposals; 
C). Adoption and enforcement of building regulations for the municipality. 
The problem is further compounded because the municipal bodies and 
development authorities report to different departments of the provincial government. 
Mardan is one such urban area in Pakistan which is confronted with the problems of 
duplication and functional overlapping and the conflicts of jurisdictional co-ordination. 
The three civic institutions report to different command centres. The diagram illustrates 
the position (Table: 6) 
The Cantonment Board, working within the jurisdiction of the cantonment, is 
equivalent of the urban local council, enjoys considerably more autonomy and is under 
the control of tite Army General Headquarters (GHQ). This control is exercised through 
the Director General, Military Lands and Cantonments. Down to the cantonment level, 
the military officer in command of the forces in the cantonment or a civil or military 
officer nominated in his place by the officer Commandi ng- in -Chief or the Station 
Commander is the President of the Board. Under the Cantonment Act of 1924, the 
Cantonment Board is empowered to make regulations regarding certain specified 
matters with the approval of the Central Government. Similarly, the Cantonment Board 
is required to submit an annual administration report26 to the central government. The 
Central Government and particularly the Ministry of Defence exercises control over the 
23. Management of Cities Policy, (1984), p. 3.10 
24. Interview with the Deputy- Director, Mardan Development Authority, dated. 27.3.1993 
25. N-W. F. P., Urban Planning Ordinance 1975, Department of Physical Planning & Housing cited in the 
Urban Financial Management and Accounting Proi ect- Pakistan (Interim Report), May 1993, p. 6 
26. Section 45/A of the Cantonment Act 1924. 
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Cantonment Board and enjoys power to override decisions of the board and can even 
supersede the board. The cantonment is thus a real centrally administered area placed 
under the direct administrative control of the Ministry of Defence in the Central 
Government and in sharp contrast to the other civic agencies in the city which are under 
the control of the provincial government. 
Table: 6 
Government of Pakistan 
Ministry of Defence 
Government of the 
N-W. F. P 
Department of Physical 
Planning & Housing 
Government of the 
N-W. F. P 
Local Government & 
Rural Development 
Secretary 
Director General 
Military Land & 
Cantonments 
Station Commander 
President, Cantonment 
Board Mardan 
Secretary Secretary 
Chairman Director General 
Provincial Urban Local Government & 
Development Board Rural Development 
Project Director 
Mardan 
Development Authority 
Chairman/Administrator 
Municipal Committee 
Mardan 
The tight control that is exercised over the working of Cantonment Board, it is 
worth-mentioning to note that while the municipality in the neighbourhood suffered 
from continued crisis hi the performance of her mandated responsibilities, the 
cantonment board worked smoothly and indeed in a democratic style by vigorously 
involving the elected element (one of the elected members being Vice-President of the 
Board) in board deliberations thus enabling them to represent the interests of 34% 
civilian population of the cantonment. 
While the municipal councillors have been strongly advocating the merger of the 
cantonment board with the municipality or at least making it work under the control of 
the latter, the cantonment authorities bitterly oppose27 the idea saying that either of the 
suggested measures would result in gradual deterioration of the existing level of 
services. To them, the municipality is, after all, a political institution and its relationship 
with the provincial government is based on political considerations and the nature of 
such relationship always differs after a change in power at the central government level 
in general and at the provincial level in particular. The problem of uncertainty prevalent 
always in the working of elected local council is not conducive to the relatively peaceful 
and stable environment in which the Cantonment Board functions. 
27. From discussion with the Cantonment Executive Officer, Cantonment Board Mardan, 13-3.1993. 
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In contrast to the other two civic institutions of the city, the Mardan 
Development Authority is a body dominated by the bureaucracy. Headed by a Project 
Director, the authority consists of a hierarchy of officers well-versed in the process of 
urban planning and development. It works under the supervision of the chairman, 
Provincial Urban Development Board28 (PUDB) --- an organization constituted in 1976 
as the principal urban planning agency for the Government of the N-W. F. P. To fulfil its 
official mandates, the agency has established a number of Local Area Authorities and 
the Mardan Development Authority is one of them which has, since its inception in 
1976, engaged itself in the solution of most pressing issues of urbanization in the city. 
Despite being a local agency for provincial urban development planning and execution, 
the authority works alongside a number of other government and semi-government 
agencies who also plan, execute, support, regulate or otherwise influence urban 
development in Mardan. The PUDB in general and the MDA in particular have been 
unable to make progress in co-ordinating and regulating urban development29 for 
reasons, inter alia, that these agencies operate under their respective ministries and are, 
therefore, subject to different sets of policies, priorities, procedures and practices. The 
existence of so many actors in the urban environment has major implications for an 
orderly pattern of urban development. It compounds problems in co-ordination of both 
preparation and execution of sound urban development schemes. Such schemes, 
undoubtedly, occupy a very high profile in their overall activities but little benefit to the 
population at large. Furthermore, there has not been found a solution to the operation 
and maintenance30 of completed schemes. The MDA is currently seeking to handover 
maintenance liabilities for township schemes to the municipality in the knowledge that 
by doing so it would be passing on a significant financial burden which the municipality 
has no means of meeting. Though the provisions of the law regarding the creation and 
operation of the development authorities allow'31 amongst other things, that part of the 
surpluses generated through land development may be made available to the respective 
city council so that it could take over the township schemes for maintenance purposes, 
beyond their substantial completion. The first-ever township scheme undertaken by the 
MDA (i. e., Sheikhmaltoon Township) is near completion and the probability is that the 
maintenance will remain with the MDA in view of the financial and technical 
incapability of the municipal committee. Reference in this connection may be made to 
28. Urban Financial Management and Accounting Project Pakistan. A Study conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank in collaboration with the Government of Pakistan in May 1993, p. 2 
29. Urban Municipal Management Organization Study, p. 28 
30. Though not mentioned in the Local Government Ordinance, the munIcipal bodies are required by the 
N-W. F. P., Urban Planning Ordinance to maintain urban development schemes completed by the 
Local Area Authorities. The subject has generated much controversy as LAAs do not ha,. 'e the 
mandate to maintain such schemes after completion, while the municipal 
bodies do not have funds to 
do so. 
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the construction of Public Library and Town HaI132 in June 1987 at an estimated cost of 
Rs. 12.70 million. The Provincial Government and the Municipal Committee of Mardan 
still owe to the MDA an amount of Rs. 0.493 m and 0.801 m respectively. The scheme 
was, following completion, handed over to the municipality for operation. The 
municipality, later on, sold it back to the Provincial Government in 1992 so as to accrue 
funds in order to meet several financial liabilities. 33For example, the municipality owed 
to the Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) an amount of Rs. 25.1 million 
for electricity dues in September 1992. In terms of total operating costs of the 
municipality, energy is second only to pay-roll. One cause of such huge liabilities is that 
whenever actual collections fall short of needs, the municipality tends to accumulate 
liabilities. 
The Municipality of Mardan is subjj-zýct to the control of a hierarchy of officers 
starting from the Divisional to the Provincial Headquarters level. At the Secretariat 
level, the officials including the Secretary formulate policy and regulate34 the activities 
of the local councils in the province in different sectors. Next to the Secretary is the 
Local Council Board which acts as the supervising agency assisting the Department of 
Local Government in monitoring performance of the municipality. The Director 
General, on the other hand, acts as tne Department's primary monitoring arm for the 
rural development side. Additionally, however, he has a role which involves periodic 
inspections of the municipal committee and exercise of specified administrative powers 
over the municipality affairs. 
The existence of these parallel civic institutions for the management of urban 
affairs of Mardan presents a complex pattern of administrative control by the Federal 
and Provincial Governments over these institutions. Furthermore, the lack of direct co- 
ordination between these institutions tended to defeat the basic planning and 
development purposes for which they have been formed. There did exist a co-ordination 
channel in the form of Inter-Council Co-ordination committee35constituted under the N- 
W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance 1979 designed to co-ordinate the planning and 
development functions of various agencies involved in the urban management scheme. 
This linkage has, however, since long gone into oblivion. Particularly, with the 
dissolution of local councils in the province in August 1991, the only representative 
31. Regulatory Framework For the Financial Management of Local Government, A study undertaken by 
the Asian Development Bank in Sept. 1993, p. 22. 
32. Activities of Mardan Development Authority. Details provided by the Project Director of the 
Authority on 7.3-1993. 
33. Municipal Resource Generation, A study conducted by the Asian Development Bank in September 
1993, p. 3. The matter was also confirmed by the Municipal Accounts Officer, Mardan during 
interview. 
34. A Handbook of Instructions, Laws, Bye-Laws, Rules etc., Peshawar, Department of Local 
Government &Rural Development (Part- 1), pp. 1-3. 
35. A Handbook of Instructions (Chapter- XIX) Section 161, pp. 84-85. 
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body of the three civic agencies i. e., the Municipal Committee has turned intc an 
administrative unit of the provincial government for reasons, inter alia, of the assigning 
of additional responsibilities to the Assistant Commissioner, Mardan to look after the 
municipal affairs. Thus, apart from functional overlapping among these institutions, a 
fragmented system of city administration exists from the point of view of horizontal and 
vertical linkages. In addition to these, a number of provincial government line 
departments deal with subjects which are the direct concern of the Mardan Municipality. 
For example, water supply, drainage and sewerage, road construction, land acquisition 
and development (Mardan Development Authority), housing and slum clearance etc., 
are being dealt with by the respective functional departments. Thus, under such a 
fragmentary arrangement, the urban affairs in the city do not get viewed as one 
integrated activity. Consequently, there is a haphazard and piecemeal development 
bearing an imprint of lack of co-ordination. It is, therefore, not unusual to find a Basic 
Health Unit, a primary school or a tube-well fully completed yet remaining 
inoperational for want of electricity, staff, or both. 36 
While the municipality itself is under great pressure to cope effectively with the 
proliferating civic problems due to the strong urbanization trend, certain factors such as 
political, financial and administrative have equally added to its poor performance. 
Despite having a representative character, it essentially lacked the driving force that 
could give stability to a civic institution at the city level. These reasons, beside the poor 
capacities of the elected councillors, followed from the government's policy of partyless 
polls that remained a continuous element in government's election poliCy37 since the 
promulgation of the present Local Government Ordinance of 1979. 
From the perspective of election processes, the present system too inherited the 
traditions of the two Martial Law periods. The three periodic elections conducted so far- 
--two under Martial Law i. e., 1979 and 1983 and the third one under a civilian 
government in 1987 were all on a non-party basis although politics has now penetrated 
deep into even those areas where it was not intended to have been allowed entry. The 
irony of the situation was that once the municipality was elected to power, it not only 
started operating under the name of parties but also passed through some of the worst 
public political wrangling3l ever known in Mardan particularly when the time came to 
elect the chairman and vice-chairman. 
36. From interview with Councillor Noor Alam Khan (Advocate), 5.1.1993. 
37. The election policy based on a non-party system was, in fact, a violation of several constitutional 
provisions. For example, Article-33 of the constitution binds the state to discourage parochial, racial, 
tribal and sectarian prejudices but by resorting to partyless polls, these tendencies were promoted. 
Similarly, denial of the right to contest election from some party platform was also in contravention 
of the spirit of Article- 17(2) which gives the citizens the right to form or be a member of a political 
party subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereianty 
or integrity of Pakistan. 
38. The Jehad' (Daily, Peshawar, 18.10.1979). 
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It was against the background of this fragmented civic administration and the 
partyless character of Mardan's Municipal Committee that its working was examined in 
the context of its relationship with the provincial government of the North-West 
Frontier Province. Out of the total strength of 17,13 councillors possessing diverse 
political background39 wereinterviewed with the following educational, professional 
and age background: 
Table: 7 
Educational Qualification Number of 
members 
Percentage 
1. Graduate & above 6 46 
2. Intermediate 3 23 
3. Matriculation 3 23 
4. Primary Standard 1 8 
5. Illiterate Nil Nil 
13 100% 
Age composition of the councillors interviewed: 
Table: 8 
Age Number of 
members 
Percentage 
65 & above Nil Nil 
55-64 Nil Nil 
45-54 4 31 
35-44 9 69 
25-34 Nil Nil 
Below 25 Nil Nil 
13 100% 
Occupational background: 
Table: 9 
Occupation Number of 
members 
% 
1. Landlords 4 31 
2. Businessmen/Contractor 5 39 
3. Lawyers/journalists 2 15 
4. Public/Private service 2 15 
13 100% 
39. The municipality had, at the time of this field work, the strength of 17 councillors. The provincial 
cyovernment had, however, conducted delimitation of the electoral wards as a result of which the 
numbers of wards had increased from 17 to 25.13 councillors were interviewed, 
five affiliated with 
Pakistan People Party, 4 with Awam' National Party, 3 with Pakistan Muslim League and one, elected 
in the reserved seat, represented the minorities (consisting of 
Christians and Hindus) in the city. 
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In order to understand the type of people who run the affairs of the Municipal 
Committee, this data with regard to the socio-economic background of the elected 
members was gathered. The age composition of 69% in the age range between 35-44, is 
encouraging in terms of meeting the aspirations of an emerging society. 
Experience when first elected: 
Table: 10 
Period Number of 
members 
% 
a) 1959 Nil Nil 
b) 1965 Nil Nil 
c) 1979 3 23 
d) 1983 1 8 
e) 1987 9 69 
13 100% 
Source: Information gathered through interview with individua councillor,,. 
The educational background of the members was encouraging in the sense that a 
majority of them i. e., 46% had graduate degrees followed by 23% who were educated 
upto Intermediate level. The academic characteristic carried a promising future for the 
local population. One thing deducible from the academic details is the fact that there 
was no single illiterate member in the municipality which is a marked improvement on 
the group of councillors who were elected to the council in the local bodies polls held in 
1979 and then in 1983. The following table illustrates the difference: 
Table: 11 
1979-83 1983-87 1987-91 
Educational 
Qualification 
No. of 
members 
% No. of 
members 
% No. of 
members 
% 
1. Graduate 5 29 6 35 7 41 
2. Intermediate 2 12 2 12 3 18 
3. Matric 2 12 2 12 4 24 
4. Primary 6 35 6 35 3 17 
5. Illiterate 2 12 1 6 Nil Nil 
17 17 17 
Source: Details gathered from councillors during interview. 
Despite this marked improvement in educational background, the factor which 
hindered the orderly functioning of the municipality during the third term was the low 
profile of the incumbents in terms of experience. The vast majority of the members i. e., 
II out of 17 (65%) were elected for the first time whereas 6 (35%) had served the 
municipality during the previous two terms. Interestingly, none of the elected members 
was given training so as to inculcate among them a certain degree of perception of the 
role which they were supposed to play in the administration of civic services. 
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The councillors, however, gave their candid opinion about the performance, in 
general, of the municipality and the impact which the existing legal framework has had 
on the pattern of relationship between the municipality and the provincial government. 
A common view was that the promulgation of the ordinance reviving local government 
institutions in the country in 1979 was a bold initiative of the military government 
which ensured participation of the chosen representatives of the people in the municipal 
administration of the city. 
The nature of working of the municipality and the pattern of its relationship with 
the provincial government has been determined in this study in the light of replies given 
to a set of questions asked in scheduled interviews from the elected councillors, 
municipal staff and the government officials responsible for exercising control over 
municipality affairs. The first question sought to ascertain whether the Local 
Government Ordinance of 1979 contributed anything significant towards the 
involvement of elected people in the administration of municipal affairs. Councillors 
were divided on this question. Five out of thirteen respondents (38%) expressed their 
heartfelt satisfaction over the new legal framework governing the municipality. To them 
the system introduced under the new ordinance was illustrative in terms of vast 
administrative and financial powers given to the municipality and the chairman and 
various sub-committees under the municipality. It was on account of these generous 
powers that the municipality was able to undertake development activities unparalleled 
to the developments that took place during the previous twenty years. 
, gave a mixed reaction. While being happy over the Three of the respondent-, 
revival of elected institution at the city level, they expressed their anxiety over the 
absence of a programme of decentralization through which the sphere of influence of 
the municipality could be clearly determined. They specifically referred to the vital areas 
such as education, health and communication which, despite being compulsory 
functions of the municipality40 could not be adequately attended to. This state of affairs 
provides sufficient ground to presume that the question of devolving power and function 
to the municipality has not been taken seriously as in the past. Vital decisions taken by 
the council (especially on financial matters) are required to be placed before higher 
authorities for approval. Government's unilateral decisions (particularly those of the 
courts of law)41 in financial matters (such as granting stay orders against the notice of 
the municipal authorities) have caused insurmountable financial loss to the 
municipality. 
40. N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (Chapter- X), pp. 48-60 
-11. The 'News' (Daily, Lahore, 20.1.1994). One suggestion is that the courts, before issuing stay orders 
regarding the decisions of the local councils, should first listen to the view-points of the concerned 
council. The disputes concerning these bodies should be handled on priority basis and within the 
shortest possible time. 
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Five of the replies given were indicative of the view that the politician's claim of 
strengthening the system of local government was a total myth because local 
government is not on government's priority list. The elected governments at the centre 
and the province are faced with uncertainty and, therefore, to avoid pressure and 
confrontation, they prefer to adopt the policy of strangling local authorities. The 
ordinance does not provide for a reasonable method of election42 to the seats reserved 
for minorities and women. Denial of regular periodic elections and thus disassociating 
representatives of the people from the administration of municipal affairs has had an 
adverse repercussion on the overall interest and morale of the electorates. 
The control exercised by the local government officials was bitterly resented 
because matters of immediate concern would, despite council's decisions taken therein, 
reach the top-most officials in the department for consideration. Bureaucracy, according 
to them, enjoyed an upper hand on account of possessing powers to validate the council 
decisions on matters like giving approval to the deed whereby a certain tax would be 
leased out to private contractor for collection. The chairman, although more powerful, 
having access to the provincial chief minister, found it difficult to question official 
directives governing his actions. 
With regard to the autonomy available to the municipality, three councillors 
expressed the view that the council had much power prior to the lifting of martial law in 
1985. Not only could the council take decisive actions to promote the general welfare 
but the provincial line departments, under special instructions from the martial law 
administrator, would extend all possible co-operation in achieving these objectives. The 
chairman was delegated special powers of making posting and transfers of employees 
below BPS-6 in all city-based nation-building departments. Similarly, these departments 
would prepare their Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) in consultation with the 
chairman of the municipality. This sort of situation developed harmony and 
understanding between the provincial line departments and the elected representatives 
of the local council. These powers, however, were not used to the advantage of the local 
population at large because, firstly, most of the councillors were new entrants into the 
system with no cl-f-ir perception of their roles and, secondly, despite their partyless 
character, they got involved into mutual rivalries and petty differences which caused 
set-backs to the smooth functioning of the municipality. 
Six of the respondents while agreeing to the generosity which the government 
demonstrated prior to the installation of representative governments at the central and 
42. The N-W. F. P., Local Councils (Election 
i 
to seats reserved for women and minority) Rules, 1979 
prescribes the procedure according to which the elected members on regular seats shall constitute 
'Electoral College' to elect such number of members to the reserved seats in a local council as 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, allocate to it. A member thus elected finds it 
difficult to maintain neutrality and gets inclined to the group which elected him/her to the seat. 
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provincial levels, held the view that the foundations of the system lacked legitimacy 
and needed some sort of political support which could viably be provided by grass-roots 
institutions. The immediate basis of the introduction of the system was, in fact, certain 
short-term objectives, with the result that when martial law was lifted, the municipality 
as a part of the overall system suffered a set-back and the powers once available to it 
regarding the overall administration of the city started declining. 
Party politics had a devastating effect on the working of the municipality. While 
the government preferred a partyless local government system in order to provide to the 
incumbents an environment free from the effects of party-politics where the elected 
representatives could devote their energy to the solution of local problems and, while 
doing so, gain maximum knowledge and experience in the art of local administration, 
the hopes proved ineffective when the partyless polls culminated in the emergence of 
leadership who, filled with political ambitions, gave priority to the monopolization of 
local councils in favour of the respective parties with which they were affiliated. The 
municipality of Mardan was no exception. Starting with the election process to the 
formation of post-election groups for the election of chairman and vice-chairman, 
conducting the business of the council, constitution of sub-committees, removal of 
chairman/vice-chairman through a vote of no-confidence etc., were vital matters, all 
dominated by party considerations. 
Presently because of the indirect election of the chairman and vice-chairman of 
local councils, an important event in the politics of local government is the post-election 
constitution of groups. It brings into being hectic political manoeuvring involving 
different groups based on economic, social and political factors and including the 
existing political parties. Party-based elections produce a clear party position making it 
clear which party is in a position to hold authority and who are chairmen and vice- 
chairmen in the council. The partyless polls, on the other hand, brings in its wake a 
number of problems, one of them being the absence of a strong foundation on which a 
sound and stable structure of the local council could rest. The councillors interviewed 
narrated interesting stories about this particular aspect of group formation in Mardan 
Municipality. They explained how the political parties who remained in the background 
sought to manipulate the elected councillors in an attempt to get their respective party- 
candidates elected to the chairmanship. 
Eight councillors confirmed such manoeuvres on the basis of what they 
personally had experienced. While the political parties were less involved during the 
local bodies elections campaign, their interest did arise in seeing their nominated 
candidate assuming leadership of the council and to achieve this they would leave no 
stone unturned. In this power struggle were involved the local Influent'als and notables. 
Their role was much greater and effective than the district level chief, -) of the various 
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political parties. The provincial chiefs of some leading parties were also seen to be 
campaigning for their party candidates. A major political party in the province utilized 
the service of a prominent figure of the city who, though personally affiliated with 
another political party, carried out the task most successfully. The background of the 
whole event was narrated by a respondent thus: 
"Soon after the announcement of the schedule of elections by the Provincial Election 
Authority (P. E. A) for the election of chairmen and vice-chairmen of local councils in the 
province, one Mr. Ajab Khan (Fictitious Name), baving friendship with the (military) chief 
minister of the province invited a group of ten elected councillors to dinner. They were 
affiliated with three different political parties and most of them were newly elected. The 
other six councillors (three of whom had been elected to the municipality since 1979) were 
deliberately ignored. One of the three old members was a prospective candidate for 
chairmanship on account of his profound experience in this capacity during the previous 
two terms i. e., 1979-83 and 1983-87. Because of the divergent political backgrounds of the 
councillors, the host offered his service for developing consensus upon an all-agreed 
candidatefor the seat. It revealed to us at a later stage that the whole show was rganized 
to pave the way for the election of one affiliated with a party having fiindamental political 
differences with that of the host. The reason was the personal jaimly ternis with provincial 
chiefs of the said political party. The host not onlýy was able to persu, 7de the councillors to 
support the 'desired' candidate but also provided them a place for staying overnight 
preceding the date fixed by the Election Authority for electing the chairman. The group 
could not be approached by the campaigners of the rival group. The minority member who 
was approached by, at least three influential elected councillors for his support, was 
advised by his employer to vote for a 'desired' candidate. "43 
It appears thus that the actual competition for the post of chairman was between 
the two main political parties who later formed a coalition government in the province. 
One vicw was that the local influential who played a pivotal role in ensuring the election 
of the desired candidate, was doing all this as per instructions from the military chief 
minister who, on account of his political differences with a notable local family, wanted 
it to be dislodged from local politics. From this point of view, the indirect interference 
of the provincial government in the process of chairman's election was confirmed. 
Five councillors, however, gave a contradictory view of the impact of party 
politics on the post-election emergence of groups. While strongly refuting any pressure 
from outside, they held the view that in their choice for the leader of the council, they 
were motivated by nothing more than personal conscience. The municipality, according 
to them, has been able to attract educated and politically mature people who could 
hardly be dictated from outside. They exercised complete freedom in their choice to join 
a particular group and while doing so, their main preference was to ensure the election 
of a competent, qua! ified and energetic chairman because, after all, it were they who had 
to face the consequences (good or bad) of their choice. 'How could the parties influence 
the formation of groups in their favour while no party had a clear majority? ', was the 
view of one respondent. The councillors, in their enthusiasm to choose a chairman of 
43. From discussion with Hap Awal Khan, 221.1.1993. 
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their own, did not consult even the District or City chiefs of their respective political 
parties so much so that two councillors who had affiliation with the same party, joined 
opposite groups-one being a candidate for chairmanship, facing thus the opposition of 
his co-party member. The influence of parties or local notables had negligible effect on 
their choice and in one case they boldly turned down the idea of choosing a candidate 
coming from a leading family of the city simply because of the past bleak record of the 
family in the overall development of the district, in general, and the city of Mardan, in 
particular. The respondents ruled out the evidence of any interference by the provincial 
government. The efforts of the councillors to choose a chairman from the middle class 
in order to be easily accessible by the general public was defeated by a lack of adequate 
support. 
An analysis of the two sets of replies reveal that while certain examples 
authenticate that party affiliation did not serve as a constituent element in the formation 
of post-election groups, other replies duly confirm that the choice of selecting a 
chairman was not an independent exercise. The choice of the councillors, most of them 
newly elected, was influenced by elements such as factionalism, group interests, vested 
interests of the local notables and, of course, party directives etc. On the other hand, the 
councillors deviation from the party guide-lines, voting against a co-party candidate for 
chairmanship were examples which not only demonstrate political maturity but also the 
way opinion and voting was free from any kind of effective pressure --- something 
unparalleled even with the higher levels of representative institutions in the country. 
The overall responsibility for such state of affairs lies, inter alia, on the 
politicians who have not attended to the proper organization of their party structure at 
the local level particularly the spreading of their party programmes. The governments in 
power, particularly during the military regimes, have benefitted fully from this 
phenomenon. Whenever they attempted to isolate the political parties from the electoral 
process, it was welcomed by the general public and as is evident from their heavy 
turnout in the partyless, local bodies polls in the country held so far for, at least, three 
consecutive terms. The voters were willing to choose their local leadership on the basis 
of their personal characteristics rather than their party affiliations. 
How far did the party politics effect the actual conduct of business in the council 
was another vital question put to the interviewees. Nine councillors confirmed that the 
council deliberations were overwhelmingly dominated by party politics. The 
environment in which council proceedings would take place used to be overshadowed 
by an element of distrust. To one respondent, the council meeting was nothing more 
than a get-together because most of the councillors attending the session would come 
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without doing the necessary homework for reasons especially their lack of knox., ', edge44 
about the 'Green Book'. Party politics seemed to be a major hinderance in achieving a 
spirit of team work between the councillors of both sides. Suggestions put forward by 
the opposition could summarily be turned down by putting them to voting no matter 
how useful they otherwise seemed. There were also reports of the alledged unequal 
treatment in the allocation of developmental funds to the councillors. The opposition 
councillors, duly backed by few ruling group members, were able to put the chairman to 
accountability. In one such occasion, the chairman was deprived of his strong ally and a 
right hand, the vice-chairman, through a vote of no-confidence, alerting the chairman 
executing the council decisions in letter and spirit. 
The conclusion drawn from this set of respondent replies indicate that the 
internal environment of the council was largely dominated by party rivalries consisting 
of attempts directed towards weakening the strength of one another. Even the motion of 
no-confidence was motivated by similar considerations. If parties were not involved in 
the internal transaction of business, what made all such developments to occur? One 
view given was the personal differences between the sitting chairman and a notable 
councillor who held the post during the previous term (1983-87). The sitting chairman, 
then a member of the opposition group, had played a pivotal role in the removal of the 
latter through a vote of no-confidence. 
As a result of the defection of certain councillors from the ruling group, the 
balance of power turned in favour of the opposition as the ratio of members belonging 
to the ruling and opposition came to 8 and 9. The opposition, though not powerful 
enough to remove the chairman from the office made him conduct the council business 
with a sense of responsibility, justice and fairplay. 
The early trend was to join the group of a prospective chairman because of his 
enjoying the moral, material and political support of the government in power --- a 
phenomenon which made the incumbency of chairmanship unresponsive and arbitrary. 
The situation significantly altered the position by balancing the strength of the rival 
group. A small gap between the two kept the chairman under the threat of a no- 
confidence vote. The changed party position in Mardan Municipality contributed 
significantly towards the achievement of the desired objective of conducting the council 
affairs on the basis of equality and justice. The chairman, in view of the changed 
circumstances, had to adopt a fresh strategy for the allocation of funds and this was on 
44. While collecting details from the councillors, the researcher came to know that only three out of 
thirteen coun--illors interviewed, understood the language of the Handbook containing instructions, 
laws, bye-laws and rules governing the activities of the municipality. 
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the basis of 40: 60 for the ruling and opposition groups representing 8 and 9 councillors 
respectively. 45 
Four councillors, however, held a different viewpoint. To them, the conduct of 
council business was never subjected to an external political climate. The rules of 
business as laid down in the N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance 1979 were strictly 
observed in that the questions of vital significance which essentially included the 
distribution of developmental funds among councillors, would first be referred to the 
respective sub-committees for scrutiny and recommendations and decisions would 
follow in the light of suggestions submitted therein. There was no simple evidence of 
depriving someone on political differences. The removal of the vice-chairman, 
maintained the respondents, was solely on account of his poor experience and the 
resulant inability to handle council business. 
Councillors were then asked to pin-point what impact, negative or positive, did 
the indirect election of chairman have on the working of the municipality. Views 
expressed by the respondents also revealed that the performance of the municipality 
was effected by the inclination of the chairman, on account of his indirect election, to 
his group. While the partyless polls developed a situation where no political party could 
claim victory, the councillors did give thought before casting a vote in the chairman's 
election. A significant factor which guided their electoral behaviour was the linkage of 
the prospective candidate for chairmanship with the political party ruling the province. 
A chairman elected with such background tended to lose the balance, while managing 
council affairs, between promoting his group's interests and promotion of the general 
welfare of the local population. Due to the inclination of the chairman towards some 
councillors, there were examples indicating that the biased attitude of the chairman was 
a primary cause of discontent, confrontation and uneasiness. In all, seven councillors 
gave their views on the question. Four denied any such situation arising out of the 
indirect election of the chairman. To them, the chairman exercised his authority with a 
sense of responsibility. He enjoyed special powers in the preparation of agenda for 
meeting and brought all significant questions suggested by both the ruling and 
opposition councillors which could help to strengthen the position of the council with 
regard to the achievement of the set objectives. He tried always to discuss matters of 
common interest freely followed by formal decisions based, as far possible, on a 
consensus of opinion. Deliberations in the council meeting were always free and fair 
and in which the members of opposition group were involved. Ultimate decision- 
making rested with the council where every effort used to be made to accommodate the 
constructive views of the members. These respondents strongly supported the indirect 
method of chairman's election in that it provided a built-in check and balance 
45. Interview with Haji Awal Khan. 
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mechanism. They were against the substitution of the method of a direct vote of the 
people saying it would be impracticable for a population of hundred and eighty thousand 
to ensure accountability of the chairman. Rather the chances are that a direct vote 
would develop authoritarianism on the part of the chairman. 
Three councillors including an ex-chairman were critical of the way the 
chairman performed his function. The chairman, instead of being spokesman of 
partyless councillors and working for the general welfare, tended to promote group 
interests. One respondent remarked thus: 
"Inciirect election makes the chairman dependent on the will of his group of councillors, 
effecting adversely the overall performance of the municipality. The principles of justice 
and fair play are set aside. The chairman does not respect his opponents and safeguards 
only the interests of his supporters inside the council.,, 46 
An assessment of the above observations indicate that the municipality, 
consisting of partyless members, was open to manipulation by the chairman, by the 
majority group inside the council, by the local influentiaIS47 and finally by the provincial 
government which found it easy to manipulate a chairman working always under the 
threat of no-confidence. However, real controversy existed as to whether this was in fact 
the case. 
Within the municipality, the situation could have been balanced, had the vice- 
chairman, elected in the same way as the chairman, been given some powers to exercise, 
no matter how secondary in nature to those of the chairman. The N-W. F. P., Local 
Government Ordinance 1979 is not, unlike the Basic Democracies Manuals, silent about 
the exact role of the vice-chairman. It provides for certain general powerS48 and 
functions to be exercised by the vice-chairman. The nature of these powers, however, 
suggests that these are not decisive and exercise of them is dependent, to a large extent, 
on the goodwill of the chairman. The chairman, on the other hand, wields greater 
authority as he not only presides over all meetings of the council but also takes 
decisions in policy matters. The mutual relationship between the chairman and vice- 
chairman in the municipality of Mardan was characterised, sometime, by cordiality, 
friendliness and goodwill and, in others, by confrontation, rivalry and prejudices. 
Ten councillors expressed their views with regard to the powers and role 
performed by the chairman and vice-chairman and the nature of relationship between 
46. Councillor Riaz Mohammad Khan said this in his interview, 21.12.1992. 
47. In an interview (Mardan, 12.12.1992) Senator Mohammad Ali Khan of Hoti denied any influence 
being exerted on the workinc,,, of the municipality including the chairman's election. One prominent 
member of the family, however, contested elections of the municipality held In December 1979 but 
resigned from his seat following his failure to win the subsequent election 
for chairmanshi In Ip. 
48. These powers were given to him vide a Government Notification No. ADMN (I-G) 7(24)/83 dated. 
11.1.1987 which are prescribed on p. 411 of the N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance of 1979. 
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the two. Six out of ten councillors described the position of the two incumbents on the 
basis of the powers available to them and on the basis of certain general principles 
which, according to them, determined the nature of their mutual relationship. For 
instance, a vice-chairman, under normal circumstances, was just like an ordinary 
councillor with no important powers that could make him an active participant in the 
administration of the municipal business. It was only during the absence of the chairman 
(on account of illness, leave etc. ) that the vice-chairman exercised those powers as 
acting-chairman. The lack of adequate and clearly specified powers was a major 
obstacle in the way of performing a meaningful role by the vice-chairman. Beside this 
imbalance in powers, another factor determining their mutual relationship was their 
party affiliations. There prevailed peace and tranquillity as long as the two incumbents 
were affiliated with the same political party. During the third term of the municipality 
(1987-91), when party-backed councillors returned to the council as a result of partyless 
polls, things were calm and quiet as long as the two incumbents belonged to the same 
party. The situation took a sudden turn when the opposition's attempt at the removal of 
the vice-chairman succeeded who was then replaced by one who had affiliation with a 
party other than that of the chairman. With this began a period of tussle and turmoil 
which ended finally with the dissolution of local councils in the province. 
Two respondents, authenticating the existence of unhealthy relations between 
the two, attributed two reasons to this phenomenon namely, the partyless structure of the 
municipality and the denial of adequate powers to the vice-chairman. The extent of the 
hostility could be determined from the fact that the chairman never relinquished charge 
of office to the vice-chairman while going on leave for a period exceeding ten days, this 
being in contravention of the ruleS49 under which the former was required to hand over 
the charge to the latter. 
Another two respondents, while denying any valid cause of confrontation 
between the two office-bearers stated that the two belonged, during most part of the 
term, to the ruling group and were a source of strength for one another. One councillor 
explained the situation thus: 
"The independent status of the councillors enabled them to change loyall), as a result of 
differences with the chairman on matters such as allocation offunds andfilling in of vacant 
posts under the municipality. Such a situation was full), exploited by the opposition in an 
attempt to dislodge the ruling group from power. The vice-chairman, being a member of 
the ruling group neverfullýy benefitted in the event of removal of chairman through a vote 
of no-confidence because his assumption of power as acting chairman lastedfor maximum 
three months after which the council was to meet to elect a new leader of the house. "50 
49. N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance 1979 (Chapter-1), para 175 (Rule-4), p. 88(a). 
50. From interview with Councillor Taj Mohammad Khan, 10.3.1993. 
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An analysis of the replies given to the above three questions indicate that an 
indirectly elected chairman in the council did all he could to consolidate his position and 
ward off any possible threat of no-confidence. This informal channel through which the 
councillors, loyal to the chairman, benefitted much was based on the whole-hearted 
support of the former to the latter despite the fact that they had diverse party affiliations. 
It was in view of this background that the respondents were asked as to which channel 
d, ', ' hey find convenient the solution of their ward problems i. e., the formal channel of 
convening council meetings as prescribed under the Conduct of Business Rules, 1980 of 
N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance, 1979 or the informal channel based on 
friendship and support to the chairman. 
Seven respondents gave their views on the question. Five of them belonging to 
the ruling majority group confirmed that they, being in the chairman's group, received 
preferential treatment. Indirect election made the chairman rely heavily on the support 
of his group. Within the ruling group itself, it was the comparatively influential and 
active councillors who benefitted much from this favour. One such influential councillor 
in the chairman's group explained thus: 
"The chairman depended more and more on the influential members of his group simply 
because they were in a better position to keep the support of other (less influential) 
councillors to the chairman intact. The chairman was, therefore, surrounded by a small 
group of powerful (both financially and politically) councillors and it was in return for this 
loyalty that the chairman did favour to them mostly in the form of making additional 
financial allocations out of his discretionary funds. 1151 
It appears that the funds placed under the discretion of the chairman could be 
utilized the way, he deemed fit and that he was not required to submit to the council a 
utilization report therein. In addition to financial matters, yet another significant way of 
obliging the supporters in the council was the grant of contracts to favourite parties duly 
recommenci-d by councillors loyal to the chairman. 
Another two respondents, belonging to the chairman's group, gave a different 
interpretation of the basis on which additional funds were given to a few councillors of 
the ruling group. These were the expanded size of the ward as a result of merger of the 
adjacent areas in the outskirts of the city and secondly, the greater population of the 
ward. Provision of additional funds to such wards would result, sometime, in the 
exchange of hot words during council deliberatinns because some councillors demanded 
the distribution of funds on the basis of size and population of the wards while others 
pressed for equal distribution to all fifteen wards. The chairman normally adopted the 
latter formula. One respondent52 belonging to the opposition refuted the assumption 
and clarified that had the size and population of the ward been a criterion for 
5 1. Views expressed by Taj Mohammad Khan. 
52. Haji Awal Khan. 
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distribution of funds, he would have been one of those to receive special funds because 
the ward he represented stood third in population in the city. 
Two respondents, both belonging to the opposition, described the council 
meeting as the only channel available to them for airing their concern regarding ward 
problems, which, unfortunately, was not much effective in terms of drawing chairman's 
personal attention to the problems faced by the ward population. 
An analysis of the above comments reveal that while the Local Government 
Ordinance, 1979 (N-W. F. P) does not provide any definite formula for the allocation of 
development funds to the councillors representing wards which essentially differ both in 
size and population, it gave to the chairman an opportunity to settle the question through 
exercising his discretionary powers which benefitted a majority at the expense of many. 
One method of keeping the chairman within his bounds could have been the 
exercise of a collective check over his alleged unauthorised measures while allowing 
him a free hand in the exercise of legitimate powers. A balance between the two could 
lead to a situation whereby an orderly pattern of relationship between the two could 
develop which in turn might reduce the problems of injustice, discrimination and 
favouritism. This questicn when put to the councillors, was answered by only four of 
them. Agreeing, on the one hand, that such traditions could have led to an ideal situation 
in the working of the municipality, they apologized for not being able as yet to develop 
such characteristics. They attributed, however, certain reasons for the lack of such 
feature on the part of elected councillors. These included the lack of continuity in the 
system of local govc; rnment, poor educational background and resultantly the poor 
perception of the role and responsibilities on the part of councillors, lack of training etc. 
The element of uncertainty attached with the system coupled with the partyless character 
of the councillors enhanced the need for inter-dependence among the councillors and 
the chairman and the enthusiasm for mutual survival did not allow them to think on 
such lines. In the words of one councillor: 
"The system of check and balance based on these principles could have been a constructive 
development which, unfortunately could not take root on account of the lack of mutual trust 
and confidence. Some sort of surveillance over the activities of the chairman was indeed 
there, but was not aimed at improving his actions rather it was a part of the overall 
strategy to dislodge him from power. The continued hostility between the ruling and 
opposition groups did not allow them to think about the growth of such democratic 
traditions. 1153 
The Local Government Ordinance of 1979 is said to have done away with the 
concept of controlling authority, a device that had most effectively been used by the 
government in the past over the local councils. The respondents were asked to comment 
as to what extent this claim of the government was valid? 
Views expressed by HIjl Aýýal Khan. 
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Five councillors were of the view that the government's claim was a myth. 
Though it is correct that the ordinance has, for the first time in the post-independence 
history of Pakistan, laid down the foundation of a completely representative structure of 
local government, these institutions have not yet been relieved of the bureaucracy's 
control. The control device is, in fact, an effective instrument in the hands of 
bureaucracy to regulate the activities of local councils. The control exercised in 
administrative and financial matters was rigorous. They referred specifically to areas 
such as leasing out of certain taxes for collection by private contractors, new tax 
proposals in the light of the tax schedule prescribed by the government, and submission 
of work plans for technical sanction etc., which were required to be placed before the 
provincial government for sanction. Government retains such powers under section 157 
of the L. G. O. Agreeing to the need for certain category of control over the municipal 
activities, the respondents suggested the maintenance of a balance between the 
autonomy guaranteed to the council and the control exercised by the government. While 
the government's supervision is essential, it is equally essential that the government 
undertakes periodic assessment of the problems faced by the municipality e. g., 
administrative and financial, and ensures their early solution. One respondent, analysing 
critically the existing control mechanism observed: 
"It is inadequate in that it does not help the municipality in improving its performance. 
Periodic reports are sent whenever asked for, but there is no effective feedback 
arrangt-ment in the light of which the municipality could take corrective measures for the 
errors i, -, ivolved in its operations. 1154 
Four councillors expressed their satisfaction over the freedom available to the 
municipality subject only to genuine governmental control. Reference in this connection 
was given to the process of plan formulation (ADP) and the preparation of annual 
budgets which are subject only to governmental guide-lines. They specifically referred 
to the offices of divisional and deputy commissioners who have been assigned no role in 
municipal administration while in other provinces such as Baluchistan and the Punjab, 
these officers do exercise powers to manage certain aspects of municipal 
administration. 
The deputy commissioner, during the early years of the promulgation of N- 
W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance, 1979, had powers to remove55 a local councillor 
on grounds such as involvement in political processes or having affiliation with a 
political party. Similarly, the resolution of local councils could be suspended. Their 
tutelage over local councils was, later on, abolished through amending the relevant 
54. From interview with 1kramullah Shahid, ex-Chairman, 27.2.1993. 
55. These power were, later on, withdrawn 
from the Deputy Commissioner and transferred to the 
crovernment vide N-W. F. 
P., Local Government (Second amendment) Ordinance, 1984 (Chapter- 1), p, 
41 
26. 
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provisions in the ordinance. The deputy commissioner was a source of greater strength 
to local councils in the past (particularly in Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies System) on 
account of his all-out support and particularly his role as co-ordinator between the local 
councils and the district-based functionaries of government line departments. Under the 
present system, he seems to have been completely isolated from local government 
administration. Councillors' opinion was sought regarding the impact, positive or 
negative, of this isolation on the working of Municipal Committee of Mardan. 
Six councillors replied to the question. All of them, wbile happy with the 
abolition of the hegemony which the deputy commissioner had over local councils in 
the past, emphasised the need for greater understanding and a certain degree of 
involvement of the district officers in municipal activities in that this co-operation could 
assist the municipality significantly in vital matters such as recovery of arrears of taxes, 
removal of encroachment etc., because the municipality does not posses enough powers 
to deal, with such matters independently. Currently, on account of his enormous 
administrative and judicial responsibilities, the deputy commissioner hardly finds time 
to handle even genuine demands of the municipality. 56 To this effect one respondent 
said: 
"He (the Deputy Commissioner) is, after all, a government functionary liable to transfer to 
any place any moment. While staying in the district, he remains pre-occupied with 
enormous executive tasks. Such a busy officer could hardly be relied upon. A municipalitY 
better acquires her own expertise for the management of vital civic functions. 1157 
One opinion was that though the deputy commissioner was not very co-operative 
in the management of municipal issues, he did not interfere either in municipal affairs 
particularly in the process of electing a chairman. A revealing consensus of opinion 
from the representations of the councillors is that in order to develop a meaningful 
working relationship with the deputy commissioner, some institutional arrangement is 
needed whereby Cie district officer could be practically or emotionally involved in the 
working of municipal government. 
The Local Government Ordinance provides a uniform set of functionS58 for all 
urban councils irrespective of their size (in terms of area and population) and status 
(e. g., Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee or Town Committee). These 
functions are then divided into two categories i. e., Compulsory and Optional. Out of the 
long list of these two sets of functions, the municipality of Mardan has been able to 
concentrate on a few such as construction of streets, drainage and sanitation, water 
56. For instance, the Deputy Commissioner of Mardan was of 
little help in getting few bunglows vacated 
which had unlawfully been occupied 
by executive officers belonging to different line departments of 
the provincial government stationed at Mardan. 
57. Iqbal Mohammad Khan, Councillor, 17.12.1992. 
58. Local Government Ordinance (N-W. F. P) 1979, Chapters X& XI (pp. 48-70) prescribe the 
compulsoi-y and optional functions of the municipal committees respectively. 
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supply, street lighting. This is evident from the sectoral allocations in the Annual 
Development Programme for the year 1992-93 which prioritized the services thus: 
Table: 12 
Services Rupees 
(in million) 
Percentage of 
the total ADP 
1. Communication, Drainage and Sanitation 8.08 61 
2. Water Supply 2.42 18 
3. Electrification/Street Lighting 0.60 4 
4. Building Parks 1.13 9 
5. Petty Works. 1.00 8 
Total 13.23 100% 
Source: Figures derived from the Annual Development Programme, 
Municipal Committee, Mardan for the year 1992-93, p. I 
It appears from the above that ma or portion of the developmental allocation is i 
earmarked to sanitation followed by water supply. The municipality, in its various 
annual development programmes, allocated the following amounts for the installation of 
a piped water supply: 
Table: 13 
YEAR Total ADP Allocation 
(in rupees) 
Allocation for 
water supply 
% of the total 
ADP 
1987-88 13786000 560000 4 
1988-8ý 48847570 2899995 6 
1989-90 
+ 
22553797 2240696 10 
Source: Figures derived from the budgets ot appropriate years. 
The water supply system for Mardan is based on a ground water source which is 
exploited by a network of tube-wells. There are a total of twenty-nine tube-wells in the 
city but the number of working tube-welIS59 is sixteen and out of these only eight have 
elevated storages. These tube-wells, as well as the elevated storages and major 
distribution lines, have been constructed in a number of phases by the Public Health 
Engineering Department. The total number of domestic connections, according to the 
municipality's record60 is 5520 which means that if a single family is taken to be 
consisted of ten members, then the required number of connections for the city 
population of 166,244 would be 16624. Thus only one-third of the total population has 
access to piped-water supply. One study6l reveals that the rest of the population relies 
on other sources such as private wells, hand-pumps, street taps, neighbours taps and 
mosques etc. Even those having piped-water supplies are not fully satisfied with the 
supply system and give the following reasons 
for their dissatisfaction: 
Low pressure, short duration, poor quality, nofixed timing and inadequate water. 
59. Details provided by the Chief Officer, 8.3.1993. 
60. Dctails provided by the Taxation Officer, 6.3.1993. 
61. Second Urban Development Project .... p. 
22 
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Poor service delivery in respect of potable water has been mainly due to the poor 
payment recovery system. The following table illustrates the position: 
Table: 14 
Year Previous 
Balance 
Current 
Demand 
Total 
Demand_ 
Collection Collection as % 
of total demand 
1987-88 978700 1500000 2478700 1342709 54 
1988-89 897680 1500000 2397680 1294508 54 
1989-90 892272 1700000 2592272 1285539 50 
1990-91 992427 1300000 2292427 881418 38 
1991-92 1 1084288 1 2100000 1 3184288 1154979 36 
Source: Taxation Department, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
It thus appears that the water rate, the only significant user charge currently in 
force, provides very limited cost recovery. The taxation staff seemed to be completely 
devoid of any orientation to the concept of cost recovery. In an effort to increase water 
revenue, the municipal committee, like other urban local councils in the province, made 
a move to privatize water billing and collections from July 1993. A comparison of the 
previous year's departmental collection of Rs. 0.81million with that of the contract bid 
of Rs. 1.97 million offered for the year 1993-94 gives a percentage increase of 143. It is 
presumed that unless the present level of improvement is maintained, there is 
apprehension of the constitution of a separate agency to manage the water supply sector. 
The argument made in support of such an agency is that this would be better able to 
mobilize resources, identify needs, prioritize and build infrastructure, realize economies 
of scale and improve collection performance. There are possibilities that if the idea of a 
separate agency to handle the water supply in the city materializes then, like the transfer 
of building control from the municipality to the Mardan Development Authority, the 
structure and finances of the municipality will be significantly affected. 
A review of the budgetary allocation of the municipality reveals that 
establishment charges stand at the top followed by electricity charges paid annually to 
the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). There has been virtually no 
involvement in other essential services such as education and health. The respondents 
were asked what capacity does the municipality possess to handle these services 
including police if they were transferred to them? Six councillors, including an ex- 
chairman and an ex-vice-chairman, expressed their views. Two of them held the view 
that the municipality, under the existing financial and technical difficulties, would find 
it difficult to assume these responsibilities. They specifically attributed this to the 
reluctance of the bureaucracy to devolve power to the localities in such vital matters. 
Four respondents, on the other hand, strongly suggested that the local councillors, being 
fully aware of the local needs in their respective areas, were fully capable to discharge 
these responsibilities. The municipality, they maintained, had demonstrated such 
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capability in the past when it performed a significant role in the provision of these 
services between 1980 and 1985. Finance was regarded as the major hurdle in the way 
of undertaking these services at present. They argued, however, that there was no reason 
why a start could not be taken by placing the basic institutions such as primary schools, 
dispensaries and small-sized medical centres under the control of the municipality. It 
depends, they asserted, as to how far the provincial government is willing to hand over 
to the municipality the budget which is currently being utilized on these services 
through the district based government functionaries of the provincial education and 
health departments. While police powers could not be sought under existing 
circumstances, the respondents suggested that involvement of local councillors in police 
initiatives, directed towards the prevention of crimes, could go a long way in 
improving the law and order situation in the city. Some sort of formal liaison between 
the local police officers and prominent local councillors would (through developing 
understanding and co-operation between the elected representatives and officers of law 
enforcing agency) ensure peace and stability in the municipal jurisdiction. One of the 
respondents advocated that traffic management62 within the city should fall under 
municipal control. 
Assumption of these and many other vital services are dependent on how far the 
municipality has acquired self-sufficiency in financial matters. A close review of the 
financial health of the municipality of Mardan reveals that it is characterized by an 
imbalance between income and expenditure on the one hand, and between recurrent 
(establishment) and development expenditure, on the other. The income of the 
municipality showed an increase with the assumption of its charge in 1980 by the 
elected councillors. Compared to the total budget of Rs. 8.8 million in 1979-80, it rose 
to Rs. 23.32 million in 1982-83, i. e., almost trebled within a span of three years. The 
surplus budget in the latter year showed63 an income of Rs. 23.32 million and 
expenditure of Rs. 22.7 million. The municipality, however, could not maintain the 
tempo during the succeeding years. The table (No. 15)explainsthe position. 
The municipality's unstable financial position is also evident from the 
allocations earmarked for development and non-development activities as is revealed 
from details given in Fig: 3. The views of the respondents were, therefore, sought 
regarding this imbalanced financial status of the municipality. Nine councillors gave 
their opinions. Five of them, while discussing the major causes of this phenomenon, 
referred particularly to the unsound financial management system, the general tendency 
of seeking not to pay tax because of the poor relationship between taxes and service 
62. This being one of the compulsory functions of the Municipal Committees prescribed under Chapter-X L, I 
of the Local Government Ordinance (N-W. F. P), 1979, p. 60 
63. The 'Muslim' (Daily, Islamabad, 7.5.1982). 
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delivery, ineffective audit machinery and the lack of proper follow-up on the use of 
council money. The municipality relies heavily on Octroi as the major component in 
resource generation, but the rates of which have long remained static. The departmental 
collection machinery has not been much effective with the result that almost all major 
taxes are leased out for collection to private contractors. The contracting by itself is 
not free from defects in that a gap exists between the rates on 
Table: 15 
(Rumes in thousand) 
year Receipts Payments Trend Analysis (%) 
Receipts: Payments 
1988-89 32942 32697 too 100 
1989-90 25142 24540 76 75 
1990-91 33945 32413 103 99 
1991-92 28577 30267 
_87 
93 
1992-93 47860 48192 145 147 
Source: Municipal Financial Management and Expenditure Control. 
A study conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 
collaboration with the Government of Pakistan, Sept. 1993. 
which taxes are levied and those actually collected by the contractors. The targets set by 
the municipality are thus not achieved. Reference was also made to the financial 
liabilities of the municipality which keeps on incr--asing as a result of the merger of 
new areas in the municipal jurisdiction but with no additional funds forthcoming to 
meet the civic demands of the areas so merged. 
The other four councillors narrated the initiatives which the municipality had 
undertaken thus far to meuL the situation arising out of this imbalance. Approaching the 
provincial government for the provision of special grants was one way to get out of the 
crisis. While the system of grants to local bodies in Pakistan is based almost on 
adhociSM, 64 the municipality of Mardan was fortunate enough to get a favourable 
response from the provincial government whenever approached for the purpose. On two 
occasions grants of ten million and five million rupees were provided to the 
municipality. It was to the good fortune of the municipality that on these occasions the 
provincial administration was being run by a military governor and a civilian chief 
minister respectively and both came from the district. 
The researcher, on the other hand, observed that lack of economy, efficiency and 
sincerity in the financial management coupled with the poor accountability 
devices to 
recover embezzled or misused council funds from those 
held responsible were the 
inherent causes of the weak financial health of the municipality. 
Cases of 
embezzlement, misappropriations and irregularities were 
brought to light in the special 
64. Hafiz A. Pasha et al. Municipal Finances in Pakistan, Karachi, Applied Economics 
Research Centre 
(University of Karachi), p. 227, n. d 
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Fig: 
Budgetary figures indicating the developmental role of Municipal 
Committee Mardan 
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Source: Local Council Board, Local Government and Rural Development Department. Peshawar. 
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audit report65 but action to recover the funds could not be initiated despite the fact that 
a formal provision66 to this effect exists in the Local Government Ordinance of 1979. 
The Ordinance provides, in the second schedule, a range of taxes to be levied by 
the Municipal Committee (Annexure: Q. Of all these source of income Ceneration, In C 
Octroi contributes significantly in raising the funds. It is followed by a tax on the 'Urban 
Immovable Property' and then the 'Water Rate' though it does not help in meeting even t--) 
the c,, 3. recovery. The Fig: 4 (next page) explains the place of above taxes in the overall 
revenue generation of the municipality. 
The financial data collected from the municipality indicated that there was a 
reliance on these taxes with less effort in resorting to the rest in the schedule of taxes. 
Councillors were asked why despite the wide powers of taxation, the financial position 
of the municipality was still weak? 
Eight councillors answered the question and attributed different reasons for the 
phenomenon. An ex-chairman disagreed with the notion that the municipality enjoyed 
vast powers of taxation. It was during the first few years of the promulgation of the 
ordinance that the council used to be competent to introduce new taxes or revise the 
rates of the existing ones. Later, an amendment to the taxation rules shifted this power 
to the government with the result that all such measures are referred to the government 
for approval. Four respondents described the citizens' inability to pay and the reluctance 
of councillors to put more burden of taxes on them as the major hurdle in the way of any 
meaningful improvement in revenue generation. This reluctance to introduce new taxes 
was attributed to the poor financial condition of the people and the failure on the part of 
the municipality to improve the standard of services, people were charged for. In this 
connection, the example of water supply was cited, the monthly rate of which had been 
ten rupees in 1979-80 and twenty-five rupees in 1985-86 but little attention was paid to 
improve the service in terms of quality and quantity. The revised water rate did not help 
to improve the financial position as is evident from the recovery of a small percentage 
of the total demand67 for the year 1992-93. 
Three respondents referred to the weak collection machinery as well as defective 
recovery system in the event of dues. While the departmental taxation staff is not trained 
to handle the collection adequately, the collection through private contractors also 
65 Special Audit Report (Mardan). Some 31 cases involvinc, amounts ranging between rupees 55876 and 
9260976 and spread over a period of four years (July 1987--May 1992) were brought to light. 
66 Section 132 of Chapter-XIV (Part-11) Local Government Ordinance (N-W. F. P) 1979, p. 75 empowers 
the competent aut! iority to initiate measures into the cases of financial irregularities and get the 
amount recovered from the persons involved as an arrears of land revenue under Section 139 of the 
Ordinance. 
67. The Demand & Collection Register of the Municipality showed the total demand of Rs. 3303469/- for 
the year 1992-93 but the amount recovered till Feb. 1993 was Rs. 558490 (1717r) thus showing a 
balance of Rs. 2744979 (83%). 
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Fi g: 4 
Budgetary figures indicating the developmental role of Municipal 
Committee Mardan 
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suffers from severe shortcomings. It not only deprives the municipality of the net profit 
of the contractors, they also try to shift the losses to the municipality suffered due to 
certain unforeseen circumstances arising out of heavy rains, floods, strikes as a result of 
political demonstrations, by seeking remission of the losses suffered due to these causes. 
The researcher observed that the contractors received lenient treatment from the 
government officials whenever they were approached for the grant of remission despite 
the fact that no such provision existed in the contract rules of the N-W. F. P., Local 
Government Ordinance. 
The grant of these remissions caused tremendous financial loss to the 
municipality. Further the appointment powers given to the chairman were exercised 
indiscriminately resulting in the overstaffing which, in turn, brought huge financial 
liabilities on the funds of the municipality. The municipality was able to save an amount 
of rupees two hundred thousands per month when the provincial government issued 
orders terminating the services of some 169 surplus employees on the municipality's 
pay-roll. 68 
A contrasting development in the working of Mardan Municipality was the time 
when in August 1991 its affairs were assigned to an officially appointed administrator 
following the dissolution69 of local councils in the province. With the removal of the 
representative element, the municipality became an organ administered by an officer 
(the Assistant Commissioner) in collaboration with the municipal staff headed by the 
chief officer. Due to the peculiar nature of his official responsibilities, the Assistant 
Commissioner sat in his chamber in the District Courts premises and occasionally 
visited his office in the inunicipality and, therefore, mostly relied on the chief officef 
who, while having constant liaison with the Administrator, kept him informed about the 
happenings in the municipality. The chief officer seemed to have acquired the position 
of the municipality's chief executive who, under the existing circumstances, had 
assumed a large share in the decision-making process. While the municipality was 
relieved of the adverse effects of party politics inflicted upon its working by the elected 
councillors, the consequences of the official administrator was not positive either. The 
loose control over the municipal staff by the administrator resulted in disorder, 
indiscipline and inefficiency. With the removal from the scene of elected councillors, 
the municipality turned into an administrative unit of the provincial administration 
which, working under the supervision of a civil servant, is controlled by the Secretary, 
Local Council Board as well as the Secretary of the Provincial Government's 
68. From interview with the Accounts Officer, 3.3.1993. 
69. The 'Pakistan Times' (Daily, Lahore, 25.8.1991). Local bodies in the N-W. F. P., were dissolved on the 
charges of corruption. Government announced to constitute committees for conducting special audit 
of the accounts of local councils airninor at recovery of the public funds embezzled, misappropriated 
and misused. The matters remained into the cold storage till the filing of this report. Z- L- 
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Department of Local Government and Rural Development. Under the existing 
organizational set-up of the municipality, what changes had occurred in comparison to 
that under the elected chairman was a question asked from the respondents. The 
respondents expressed conflicting views about the new arrangement. Two, out of six, 
strongly supported the replacement of elected chairman by an administrator who, 
according to them, had undertaken development activities in all wards of the 
municipality at an accelerated speed. The municipality had been relieved of the 
prolonged political crisis and the primary task of service provision could be undertaken 
in an orderly manner. Four respondents, on the other hand (all belonging to three 
different political parties) were opposed to the dissolution of local council and the 
appointment of administrator from the bureaucracy. While agreeing that the 
municipality was confronted with severe internal crisis based on political differences, 
discrimination, favouritism etc., it did well in terms of representing the will of the 
electorate and endeavouring to handle local problems with their moral and financial 
support. Under the administrator, they argued, things have worsened because of the 
absence of linkage with the people, defective planning based on inadequate statistics, 
and remote and loose control over the municipal staff had culminated into the 
deterioration of the overall performance of the municipality. With the switch over to 
bureaucracy's control, not only the element of public accountability had ceased to exist 
but the one time nursery of democracy had virtually turned into a unit of the district 
administration. Describing the present bureaucratic control, one respondent said: 
"There 'ould have some hope of improvement, had the administrator been a full-time 
functionary drawn from neutral citizens of the city on the basis of his reputation as an 
eminent scholar, social worker or one having concern for the improvement of city life. An 
administrator drawn from the bureaucracy cannot be a substitute for an elected chairman 
on account of the former's pre-occupation with magisterial and administrative 
responsibilities and lack of adequate involvement in municipality affairs. 1170 
The nature of development work being undertaken by the municipality under the 
administrator was regarded as haphazard and random because of the fact that the 
development plan was formulated with the help of inadequate data and poor statistics 
and the process was influenced by a few ex-councillors having access to the 
administrator. 
At the time of dissolving local councils in the province, the government had 
assured the public that they would revive the elected councils by holding fresh elections 
as and when conditions were found conducive for the purpose. Later on, the successive 
postponement of these elections unexpectedly prolonged the tenure of the administrator 
leading to a situation synonymous to that of the national politics where a military chief, 
70. Views of Taj Mohammad Khan. 
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while imposing martial law in the country, would declare his intention to restore 
democracy by holding fresh general elections but would rule for years and years by 
postponing them for one or another reason. The change of political scenario both at the 
central and provincial level and the centre's fresh initiatives regarding the idea of zn 
District Government have added to the uncertainty as to how long the present situation 
will persist. 
Conclusion 
In this case study an attempt has been made to analyse the working of an urban 
local council in the North-Western Frontier Province of Pakistan with a view to 
determine to what extent local government institutions have acquired competence and 
calibre to handle urban problems ever since the inception of the present system of local 
government in the country in 1979. To draw some concrete conclusions, the working of 
the municipality, chosen for case study purpose, has been analysed in the context of 
impact of the partyless politics, the typical situation in the city arising out of the 
functional and jurisdictional overlapping (i. e., as a result of the existence of these 
parallel civic institutions like the Mardan Development Authority and the Cantonment 
Board of Mardan), governmental control and the competence of the municipality in 
terms of maintaining an equitable 6ervice standard in the wake of financial self- 
sufficiency or otherwise. It appears that Mardan Municipal Committee is one of the 
urban local councils in the province reflecting the typical situation with which most of 
the municipalities are confronted. 
The governmental policy of disassociating political parties from the electoral 
processes could not materialize the pre-determined objectives in that it could not stop 
the indulgence of parties in the municipality's working. Large number of examples have 
brought to limelight the fact that all those elected had party affiliation in one way or 
another. While the elected councillors did not identify their partisan character from fear 
of disqualification, the government in power took full advantage of the situation in 
terms of manipulating and making them to work under the government's patronage. 
Another significant point revealing from this case study and, of course, 
applicable to other major urban areas in the province, is that the goverriment, instead of 
strengthening the capability of the municipality (by improving its financial position and 
upgrading its level of technical know-how), adopted the approach of urban 
development through a new device of 'Development Authorities' performing, municipal- 
like functions and with the professed objective of assisting the urban local councils in 
the discharge of greatly increased responsibilities in the wake of large-scale rural 
migration. But the result has been to steadily strip the municipality of its powers and 
thus creating the problems of overlapping of functions as well as jurisdiction. C 
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On the other hand, despite the restricted role of the municipality in the already 
narrowed sphere of influence, its performance has not been upto the mark. The 
provision of services has been constrained by resource shortfalls, political influence. 
haphazard growth in human settlements, resistance to increased user charges and, of 
course, the demoralized work force of the municipality. 
The weakness of the municipality could also be attributed to the poor resource 
generating capacity despite avenues of enhancing the revenue base as well as an 
imbalance between development and establishment expenditures as a result of which a 
satisfactory level of service standard could not be ensured. The basic problem involved 
here was the poor initiatives for efficient, economical and honest utilization of the 
available municipal resources. 
Though the installation of the elected municipal committee generated a kind of 
institutionalized leadership at the city level after two decades (1969-79) acting 
successfully as shock absorber on many local issues, the poor perception of the role 
played by the councillors and their involvement in petty rivalries discarded them to play 
a meaningful role in the materialization of people's expectations. While the attitude of 
the provincial government was equally complained against, the plain truth is that the 
politically disorganised house, being built on a partyless foundation, was one of the 
significant variables responsible for causing anarchy, mismanagement and the overall 
environment of doubt and suspicion in the working of the council. The partyless 
character of the municipality not only deprived it of striving in an organized manner for 
the attainment of the set municipal objectives, it also afforded opportunities to the 
provincial government, in general, and the bureaucracy, in particular, to enhance their 
controlling influence over its working. 
Thus a strong political influence and the prolonged disassociation of elected 
element from the municipal scene has not permitted the concept of local self- 
government to develop and mature and which is evident from the performance of 
elected local councillors lacking full maturity as politicians and business managers. 
Chapter Four 
The Municipal Committee of Gujrat 
Case Study No. 2 
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Gujrat is one of the industrial towns in the Punjab situated on the Grand Trunk 
Road at a distance of 116 kilometres from Lahore toward Rawalpindi which are the 
provincial headquarters and the Army General Headquarters respectively. Because of its 
location beside the Grand Trunk Road and the main railway track, Gujrat is also directly 
connected with other major cities in the province and outside. With an area of 3.78 sq. 
miles, Gujrat is a district in the GuJranwala Division. ' As for geographical location, the 
city is bounded on the north-west by the Jammu territory of Azad Kashmir, on the 
north-east by the river Jhelum, on the South by the river Chenab separating, it from the 
districts of Gujranwala and Sialkot, on the east by the river Tawi which divides it from 
the Sialkot district, and on the West by Sargodha district. 
The population2of the city, according to the 1981 census, was 154,203 which is 
about 7% of the district population which comes to 2,254,699. The population of the 
city is increasing due to rapid migration from the surrounding villages as a result of the 
city's emergence as one of the important industrial towns in the province. As an 
industrial hub, the whole city is dotted with heavy and light manufacturing units. There 
are some 233 production3 units in Gujrat which consists mostly of fan manufacturing 
units. 
There is little known about the history and origin of the city. The town is said to 
had grown up around a fort established by the Emperor Jalaluddin Akbar in 1580 and in 
which the GuJar inhabitants of the neighbouring areas extended to the emperor their 
fullest co-operation. It was perhaps in recognition of their whole-hearted support that 
the fort was named jointly after them and the Emperor "Gujrat Akbarabad. " Thus the 
present day Gujrat occupies the site of a city that grew up around that fort. 
Another story reveals that the city was originally known as 'Udanagri'4meaning 
the everlasting or sweet smelling city. This is confirmed from the Settlement Report 
prepared jointly by General Cunningham and Captain H. Mackenzie which serves as a 
principal work of reference concerning all matters connected with the affairs of the 
district. 
The present tehsil boundaries were fixed in 1856. The city acquired municipal 
statuS5 in 1918 consisting at that time, of 14 members (three nominated and eleven 
elected), and headed by the deputy commissioner as its president. The past records of 
the municipality reveal that it functioned in an orderly manner in that basic services 
District Census Report, Gujrat (Parts IN), Population Census of Pakistan 1961 (Chapter-4), p. 1-2. 
The size of the city has since doubled as a result of lar4ge-scale rural migration In the wake of rapid 
industrialisation and merger of the city's outskirts in the municipal jurisdiction. Z-1 
Economic Survey 1992-93, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division (Economic Adviser's Wing), 
Islarnabad, p. 25 
3. Gazetteer, Gujrat District, published by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat, n. d., p. 4 
4. Punjab District Gazetteers (vol. XXV-A) Gujrat District, Chapter I -B (Part-A), 192 1, p. 14 
5. Punjab District Gazetteers, Part-A (Chapter III-E), p. 145 
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such as a civil hospital ( funded by a special grant from the District Board), t, -. -o boys 
and one girl's school, conservancy, drainage and lighting were maintained successfully. 
This case study on Gujrat is distinct from the other case study on Mardan 
Municipality for a number of reasons. Firstly, the municipality of Gujrat is the only 
elected body in the town catering to the civic needs of the population. Secondly, the 
council carries more strength being composed of 39 elected members, each representing 
a population of 3,953 as against 11,100, represented by each of the fifteen councillors in 
Mardan Municipal Committee. Thirdly, the Gujrat municipality was not confronted with 
the problems of duplication and overlapping of functions in view of the non-existence 
of other civic institutions in the city--- the Cantonment Board, Improvement Trust and 
the Development Authority. Operational capability of the municipality does suffer from 
the loose co-ordination with the provincial line departments stationed at the district 
headquarters level. Fourthly, municipal elections held in December 1991 were 
contested, mainly, on biradari considerations, though the political factor was equally 
involved which is evident from the post-elections developments when a good number of 
councillors belonging to biradaris other than the Khattak, opted to join the Mohmand 
Group because of the fact that the party of the group was in power at both the centre and 
the province. 
The municipality, at the time of this field work, consisted of 46 members 
including the chairman and two vice-chairmen. Four seats were reserved for ladies, two 
for labourers and one for minorities. In addition to the elected element, there were some 
806 paid employees of the municipality serving in different departments. Senior 
officials (five in number) belonged to the Punjab Local Council Service and the lower 
staff belonged to the service group known as 'Servants of the Council. ' The officials 
belonging to the P. L. C. S., are appointed by the provincial government and their 
transfer, promotion, conduct, pension, benevolent fund etc., are controlled by the 
provincial government. The employees in the second category are appointed and 
controlled by the chairman. 
A brief description of the characteristics of the elected members in terms of their 
educational qualification, occupation, and level of experience in the local government 
administration is now relevant. The table (No. 16) describes the educational 
qualification of (a) the elected members, and (b) the members interviewed for this case 
study. It is revealed that a majority of the elected councillors (55%) held bachelors 
degrees, followed by those who read upto secondary school level. There was no illiterate 
which is indicative of the fact that those with no education are either hesitant to run for 
a municipality seat or are rejected by the voters through the ballots. The majority of the 
councillors interviewed were graduate with adequate experience in municipal 
administration and had some perception of the role they were expected to perform for 
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Table: 16 
F. dnentinnal Backi! round of Guirat Municit)al Councillors 
Educational 
Qualification 
Number of 
elected members 
% Number of members 
interviewed 
% 
Graduation & above 22 55 7 70 
Intermediate 2 5 1 10 
Matriculation 13 33 2 20 
Primary 3 7 --- --- 
Illiterate --- --- --- --- 
Total 40 100 10 100 
Source: Data gathered from individual councillors during interview. 
the general welfare of the local population. The following table illustrates the age 
composition of the councillors: 
Table: 17 
Councillors in their aze versvective: 
Age in years Number of 
members 
% Those 
interviewed 
% 
65 & above --- --- --- --- 
55 to 64 5 12 3 30 
45 to 54 7 18 3 30 
35 to 44 26 65 3 30 
25 to 34 2 5 1 10 
Total 40 100 10 100 
Source: Figures gathered from individual councillors during interview. 
It appears that the largest number of councillors consists of those between the 
age-group of 35 and 44 which is indicative of the fact that the local government system 
developed enthusiasm in the younger generation to be involved actively in the 
management of local affairs. The interview schedule was so designed to draw equal 
number of members from all the important age-groups. Similarly the occupational 
background of the councillors and particularly of those interviewed, exhibits another 
significant aspect in the working of Gujrat Municipality. 
Table: 18 
Councillors in their vrofessional backuound 
Occupation Number of 
members 
% Those 
interviewed 
% 
Landlords 5 12 1 10 
Industrialists 10 25 6 60 
Businessmen/Contractors 14 35 1 10 
Lawyers/Journalists 3 8 1 10 
Miscellaneous 8 20 1 10 
Total 40 100 10 100 
Source: Details gathered from individual councillors during intervi 1-n III iew. 
125 
The table indicates that persons belonging mostly to the industrialist and 
business classes dominate the municipal seats. Those interviewed. 6 consisted mostly of 
the industry owners. Equal weight was, however, given to representatives belonging to 
other professional classes. Similarly, the choice of the candidates for interview purpose 
was made in such a way so as to seek opinion of those representing different segments 
of the population and representing groups in the municipality. The fact that the number 
of interviewees was not in proportion to their actual strength (specially those involved in 
business and contracting as reveals from the fourth row of the above table) was due 
either to their reluctance to be interviewed or pre-occupation with their professions. 
The non-party polls were contested under the banners of Mohmand Group and 
the Khattak Group (representing the ruling Pakistan Muslim League and Pakistan 
Peoples Party respectively). Despite the familys' dominant position in the district, the 
candidates belonging to the Khattak Group7 had a neck to neck fight with the Mohmand 
Group of councillors and won 17 seats out of 39. The group, howe,,, er, managed to gain 
a clear majority because of the support accorded by few independents and the defection 
of some Khattak group councillors as a result of this it was possible to choose like- 
minded candidates fof filling the seven seats reserved for special interests such as 
women, labourers and minorities. A few councillors, originally elected as independent 
candidates, were also interviewed, who had lost their independent character, at a later 
stage, as a result of joining either the ruling Mohmand group or the opposition Khattak 
Group. The table (No. 19) illustrates the group affiliations of the interviewees. 
Of those interviewed, one had been a member in Ayub Khan's Basic 
Democracies System in 1962, another had been consecutively elected to the council 
since the promulgation of the present ordinance in 1979, three had been councillors 
since the second term started in 1983, four were from the third term in 1987 and one 
was elected first in 199'. Further, it was through the participation in municipal 
processes that the councillors had acquired experience in the municipal administration. 
No formal training was imparted to them despite the fact that the Punjab's Local 
6. In fact, questionnaires were supplied to 22 councillors with response given by only ten of them. The 
poor response was for reasons such as: a). there occurred a rift in the ruling group consequent upon the 
removal of Muslim League government and the installation of an interim set-up in connection with the 
fresh general elections in Pakistan. The 'Jazba' a local daily of Gujrat gave coverage to the 
developments from the rift in the ruling group in its issues from 14.5.1993 to 21.7.1993; b). there was 
a possible fear of a vote of no-confidence as a result of which few prominent councillors including the 
chairman could not spare time for interview. The chairman could not be interviewed despite several 
visits on fixed appointments as he would be surrounded by supporter councillors discussing measures 
to ward off the threats of no-confidence; c). interviews with another two councillors were not very 
informatl,,, e as they refused to give more than brief answers to the questions and their names were z1_ 
dropped froni the list of interviewees. Some others, including a lawyer, were reluctant to be 
interviewed for a doctoral thesis. 
7. Pakistan Peoples Party announced to contest the local bodies polls under the banner of 'Awarn Dost, ' 
see Daily 'Imroz'dated. 5.11.1987 
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Government Training Institute at Lalamusa was just 12 kilometres away towards the 
north-west of Gujrat city. 
Table: 19 
Partv affiliations of the councillors interviewed 
Name of 
Group 
Number of 
councillors 
% 
Mohmand Group 
(Pakistan Muslim League) 
4 40 
Khattak Group 
(Pakistan Peoples' Party) 
4 40 
Independents 2 20 
Total 10 Source: Facts gathered during interview. 
Apa. rt from a number of questions put to the respondents with a view to 
determine the pattern of relationship between the municipality and the provincial 
government under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance of 1979, the respondents 
were asked how far they understood the contents of the said ordinance generally called 
the "Green Book? " The answers given were as follows: 
Table: 20 
Familiarity with the laws iwvernim the council business 
Nature of 
knowledge 
P. P. P P. M. L Independents Total 
Fully Understood 2 1 1 4 
Partial Knowledge 1 2 --- 3 
Not studied I 1 1 3 
Total 4 41 2 10 
Source: Individual councillor provided the details. 
To determine how far the municipality enjoyed freedom to initiate and execute 
measures directed towards the betterment of city population, a similar set of 
questionnaire was used as was done in the previous study. The councillors were asked, 
first of all, how far they were satisfied with the powers and autonomy granted to the 
municipality under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance of 1979. The respondents, 
while appreciating the bold initiative taken by the military rulers in 1979 for involving 
locally elected leaders in the management of local affairs, disagreed with the 
government policy of disassociating political parties from the process, as a result of 
which these nurseries of democracy became instruments in the hands of those struggling 
for the strengthening of the sectarian and biradari hold over the local affairs. This state 
of affairs, they maintained, had adversely effected the non-party structure of the local 
council in that the municipality had virtually turned into a tool in the hands of local 
influential trying to manipulate it for personal ends. They specifically referred to the 
two powerful families of the city who, while representing the Jats and GuJars 
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respectively along with other smaller communities taking their side, dominated the 
municipality since its assumption of representative form in the year 1979. The early 
enthusiasm seen in the dedicated service on the part of the council has since slowed 
down which is evident from the deteriorating civic condition of the city. "Things could 
have been on their proper track, had the powers been exercised by the council in a 
corporate manner, " said one respondent. The participatory trend in the council 
deliberations was increasingly reduced in view of the fact that it was the group meeting 
wherein important matters on the agenda were settled with a view to develop a 
consensus of opinion among the treasury members with the result that most of the 
council meetings which suffered from crisis situation8 had virtually became a formality. 
Powers delegated to the local councils are supposed to be exercised in a corporate form, 
the best way of doing this is the regular council meetings. A cursory view of the 
municipality record pertaining to the number of meetings called and the frequency of the 
attendance of the councillors (as shown below) is indicative of the fact that the use of 
council platform as a medium of decision-making was least effective in this case. 
Table: 21 
FreQuencv of council meetim! s and attendance of members 
Date Nature of 
meeting 
Attendance 
out 
of 46 members 
Attendance of 
lady councillors 
30.1.1992 Ordinary 41 3 
30.3.1992 11 36 1 
12.5.1992 it 39 1 
3.6.1992 Emergency 17 2 
23.6.1992 Special (Budget) 38 3 
23.7.1992 Emergency 30 --- 
5.19.1992 Special 31 4 
21.10.1992 Emergency 21 3 
2.1.1993 Ordinary 35 3 
23.2.1993 Emergency 34 1 
12.4.1993 it 27 2 
9.5.1993 Ordinary 39 2 
18.5.1993 11 Special 35 2 
Total 1 
_13 
Ave: 33 Ave: 2 
Source: Chief Officer, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
It appears from the above table that in all thirteen meetings took place during a 
period of nineteen months which is a positive sign in view of the fact that the statutory 
8. The researcher had the opportunity of watching several proceedings of the council meetings particularly 
those held on 9th May, 10th May and 20th July, 1993 in which no single item on the agenda could be 
discussed in view of hot tempers, heated discussions, personal criticism and scuffles especially in the 
last meeting. 
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requirement9 is to hold at least one meeting in every two months. Another vital aspect 
revealing from the table is the frequency of attendance by the councillors (both male and 
female) and the number of resolutions passed. Furthermore, a cursory view of the nature 
of matters dealt with at full council meetings revealed that a substantial number of 
questions discussed were such which could have been settled at the sub-committee level 
or by one of the principal officers and, of course, subject to the approval of the 
chairman. The less important matters which did not merit consideration by council 
meeting included: considering an application wherein a demand for an increase of Rs. 
100/- in the monthly rent of a shop acquired by the municipality was made, considering 
a complaint lodged against the encroachment in a certain street of the city and parking 
of horses there which created a terrible smell, causing an inconvenience to the 
surrounding population; considering an application from the council employee asking 
for the grant of a selection grade in view of his being the senior most among a group of 
octroi inspectors; considering an application from the head of the traders association 
asking for the allotment of certain plot for office accommodation as promised by the 
provincial local bodies minister while administering the oath of office to the newly 
elected office-bearers of the association; and a joint motion on behalf of few ruling 
group councillors recommending the installation of an air conditioner in the office of the 
chief officer in view of the hot weather. 10 This pre-occupation of council meetings with 
such petty and ordinary matters was, perhaps, due to the inactivity of committee system 
in the municipal administration. The reason was not the absence'' of subject-matter 
sub-committees but the lack of enthusiasm on the part of members constituting them to 
take up matters falling within their purview for evaluation and reporting thereon. The 
observation made by the Inspection Team of the Director General (Inspection) merit 
consideration. Its report said: 
'f... sub-committees are not meeting regularly ... each member stands represented in one 
or more sub-committees. " 12 
One respondent (also vice-chairman of the municipality), while expressing his 
views with regard to the attitude of the chairman towards the sub-committees stated: 
"In the beginning of the forth term (1991-94), the chairman constituted some fourteen sub- 
committees. Seven each were placed under the supervision of each of the two vice- 
chairmen with the authority to verify and recommend the decisions taken on certain matter 
9. Mushtaq Ahmad Chaudhry, New Local Government Laws in the Punjab, Lahore, Municipal Law 
Publishers, 1992, Section 38 (3), pp. 154-55. 
10. Items Nos. 2,4,5,7 and 17 from the agenda for the ordinary meeting held on May 9,1993. 
In the council meeting held on 30.3.1992, the chairman constituted fourteen different sub-committees. 
These were dissolved following a rift in the party and new sub-committees were formed under the 
powers delegated to him in the meeting held on May 9,1993. Also convenors of these committees, 
mostly consisting of those in the forward-block were replaced by those loyal to the cilai i rma n. 
12. Inspection note on the working of Municipal Committee, Gujrat from 12-14 March, 199 1, p. 3 
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or proposals made by them. Practically, no single matter was channelled through the vice- 
chairmen till their dissolution in May', 1993. One sub-committee on Finance asked the 
chairman to furnish details of accounts in view of his alleged involvement in gross 
financial irregularities. Instead of doing the needful, he announced the dissolution of all 
sub-committees simply because these were headed, mostly, by, those treasury members who 
parted with the chab man andformed a forward-block aiming at the removal of chairman. 
The chairman, later on, constituted fresh sub-committees giving representation on them to 
councillors of his own choice. " 13 
Sub-committees, with the exception of few such as Finance, Works and Auction, 
were largely inactive. Opposition members were given representation on each sub- 
committee but none of them was headed by an opposition councillor. 14 
In the thirteen meetings, an average number of 33 (out of 42) councillors 
attended each meeting. The frequency of attendance by lady councillors was, however, 
not satisfactory as it comes to only two (50%) in each meeting. Thus the overall 
involvement of councillors in the decision-making process and particularly the kind of 
decisions taken are indicative of the trendwhich the municipality had toward the 
management of civic affairs in view of the large number of functions it is called upon to 
discharge under the ordinance. 
Under these circumstances, and particularly the personal feuds in which the 
groups were involved, there was little incentive for the municipality to undertake any 
meaningful programme of action for the solution of pressing civic problems. The 
Inspection Team 'observed with great concern, ' 15 the non-compliance of statutory 
requirements and government instructions based therein for the approval by the house of 
the Annual Development Programme indicating specific schemes along with the 
estimated expenditure. Instead block allocations were made to individual councillors for 
getting the schemes of their choice executed out of the allocated funds. The reason why 
the municipality showed reluctance to frame a systematic and comprehensive plan of 
action could be attributed, inter alia, to the limited institutional and financial capability 
which precluded the performance of even the obligatory functions to a satisfactory level. 
While the ordinance requires the municipality to have such important departments16 on 
its organisational structure like General Secretariat, Finance, Taxation, Education, 
Social Welfare, Public Health, Medical, Animal Husbandry, Water Supply and 
Drainage, Building and Works etc., the organisational structure of the municipality at 
present (August, 1993) was designed in the manner shown in Table: 22 
13. From discussion with Haji Imad-uddin, Vice-Chairman, 15.5.1993. 
14. The Jazba (Daily, Gujrat, 19.5.1993). Members of the forward block in the ruling group (consistin2 of 
eight councillors including two vice-chairmen) were made members but C, LI none of them was appointed 
in char, _, e of a sub-committee. 1 15. inspection note on the working of .... P. 8 
16. Budget Rules (Chapter-11) of the ordinance, p. 375. 
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Despite the freedom to modify the system of departmental organisation and 
departmental functions, 17 subject only to the sanction of provincial government, the 
municipality leaders seem to have not yet realised the need to adjust the municipal 
organisation in order to be able to deal effectively with the changed circumstances and 
operating environment. In the absence of a profession alized development authority 18 as 
are operational at other major urban areas of the province, the responsibilities of the 
municipality have enormously increased. The existing calibre of the staff manning 
various departments under the municipal secretariat are indicative of the low profile and 
less competence to handle the gigantic tasks. For example, the Public Health 
Department, headed by a Health Officer, is concerned only with sanitation and garbage 
collection. It has no significant role in the provision of medical services due, mainly, to 
the provincialization of hospitals and other medical centres by the government. The 
Engineering Department too lacked essential skills in project design, programming and 
implementation so far as the formulation of municipal development schemes were 
concerned. An addition of a Planning and Development Department to the 
organisational set-up could assist in a significant way toward the establishment of 
desired service levels as well as designing strategies for their achievement. In other 
words, the Planning Officer, in collaboration with his staff, could focus on the 
integration of physical, financial and human resource components of service delivery 
programmes into a definitive time-bound plan to which the municipality could, as a 
whole, relate and subscribe. The researcher also found the capability of the financial 
staff (including the Accounts Officer and Taxation Officer) inadequate in terms of the 
use of sophisticated tools for the handling of financial matters such as capital budgeting, 
service cost analysis, financial planning and control. 
Surprisingly, even the Education Department was without a principal officer. 
This is, perhaps, due to the fact that municipality's control over education is weaker in 
view of the fact that only three educational institutions (two primary schools and one 
model high school) are presently being run by the municipality out of its meagre 
resources. The councillors were asked how they found the working of the municipality 
in view of the typical environment surrounding it. Eight councillors (five from the 
ruling and three from opposition) answered. It was noted with interest that not only the 
opposition members but a few from the treasury group also expressed their views freely 
17. Section 130 (15) of the Ordinance, p. 377. 
18. Development Authorities are operative mostly at the Divisional Headquarters level only. A movement 
had been launched by the people of Gujrat demanding the government to upgrade the status of the 
district to that of division. The acceptance of the demand could have entitled the city to several 
advantages including the establishment of a development authority that could cope effectively with the 
civic problems now prevalent in the city through the application of modern development techniques. 
The government w-is. however, hard-pressed on the issue as a result of a similar demand made by the 
leaders of public opinion belonging to the neighbouring district of Jhelum. 
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without any reservation while evaluating critically the conditions under which the 
municipality was working. This was perhaps due to the fact that three of the five 
councillors from the treasury group actually belonged to the forward-block which came 
into existence as a result of the rift which developed within the group. This situation 
occurred following the change of government in the province. The rebels, as they were 
named by the councillors loyal to the chairman, were firmly opposed to the dictatorial 
attitude of the chairman whom they called 'a spokesman of the Mohmands' and not of 
the electorate. The chairman, on the other hand, was less concerned with the division in 
his group because he was confident that the defected members could threaten his 
position only with the concurrence of the patrons. "The municipality works under the 
thumb of the chairman, " remarked one interviewee, adding, "had the backing of local 
influential not been available to him, he would have since long been removed from the 
chairmanship. " 19 It thus appear that the political patronage kept the chairman beyond 
accountability to such an extent that in certain cases even the party councillors were 
denied access to the minutes of the meeting. 20 
Commenting on the impact which the municipality had on its working from the 
powerful local families and the way electoral behaviour of the city population was 
moulded in terms of choosing their representatives on grounds other than leadership 
qualities, one elderly respondent observed: 
"... Particularly with the civilianization of the military rule in 1985, it became virtually 
impossible for a contestant to get elected without active support of the local MNAs or 
MPAs and especially the support of those in either federal or provincial cabinets. The 
influential jamities here occupy the position of king-makers so far as the constitution of the 
municipality is concerned so much so that the final decision with regard to the nomination 
of a candidate for the election of chairman lies with these influential which is decided on 
considerations such as the suitability of the candidate for biradari's strength and the part), 
interests with which the family is affiliated. " 21 
The election of a like-minded candidate for the post of chairman is, in the words 
of another respondent: 
". 
.. a matter of 
life and death for the influential families. Personal choice supersedes that 
of the elected councillors in the group because the family takes it not simply a matter of 
municipality headship but as a matter of its own political survival. 1122 
19. The researcher also observed some trends of centralisation in that the application addressed to the 
Chief Officer seeking necessary clearance to go through the official documents was duly signed by the 
officer but it was required to be countersigned by the chairman. 
20. opposition members refused to ratify the proceedings of the meeting held on 12.4.1993 because 
minutes of the said meeting were not supplied to them for study. The researcher attended the meeting 
held on 9.5.1993 which had to be postponed till the next morning on account of the heated debate by 
opposition and Joined by the rebel group demanding provision of record of the previous sess' C- ion. 
21. From interview with Irshad Ahmad Khan, Councillor, 20.6.1993. 
22. Views expressed by Mujib-ur-Rahman, Councillor, 1.5.1993. 
133 
It was perhaps the result of this extra-ordinary involvement of the patron in the 
choice of a prospective chairman that a candidate so elected would show loyalty to his 
patrons instead of being obliged to those who voted him to power. This phenomenon 
had, subsequently, a retarding effect on the mode of relationship of the chairman with 
opposition members in general and with his own party councillors in particular. 
This also speaks of the influence which the patrons carried over the sentiments 
of the rebel councillors, who, despite severe differences with the chairman were less 
courageous and did not join hands with the opposition in an attempt to replace him. This 
was for two obvious reasons: a). the rebels and the opposition members when joined 
together did not constitute 2/3 of the total number of members which is the statutory 
requirement23 for the removal of a sitting chairman and; b). the undemocratic 
procedure24 for voting in the motion of no-confidence which requires the presiding 
officer to call upon the members supporting the motion to stand up in their seats in order 
to be counted and the declaration of a result thereon. At a later stage, the group ruling 
the municipality had virtually turned into a minority25 when a few more councillors 
joined the rebel group raising its strength to a level whereby the chairman could easily 
be removed but the attempt could not be made in view of the fact that the chairman 
enjoyed the continued SUpport26 of the patrons, and he could not be replaced by 
someone else unless and until the matter was determined by the local influential 
patronising the group. 
The councillors were then asked how far they were content with the powers 
given to the council under the present ordinance. Three respondents answered the 
question. They differed sharply on the amount of powers given and the autonomy 
available to exercise those powers freely. An elderly councillor stated, in the light of his 
prolonged association with the municipality and also having the opportunity of serving 
as its chairman, that local coun, ils enjoyed substantial powers and prestige during the 
first few years of the promulgation of present ordinance. With the revival of 
representative rule at the higher levels of the political system, there started a process of 
erosion in the range of these powers on the one hand, and tightening of the 
bureaucracy's control over the local councils, on the other. The influence of local 
political elite supplemented with the control of bureaucracy has beclouded the 
autonomy which they (the local councils) enjoyed sometime in the past. A common 
element in the views expressed was that council powers have been overshadowed by the 
23. Punjab Local Councils (Vote of no-confidence against Chairman or Vice-Chairrnan) Rules, 1980, sub- 
rule (5) of rule 6, pp. 115-16 
24. Punjab Local Councils ... sub-rule 
(2) of rule 6, pp. 115-16. The rule negates the principle of 
confidentiality. Secret ballot could, instead enable the members to express their opinion freely. 
25. See the 'Jazba' dated. 7.7.1993. In the house of 46,35 turned against the chairman including twelve 
opposition councillors. 
26. Press interview with Hanif Hydari, councillor, published in the 'Jazba' 9.7.1993. 
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chairman working under the thumb of local influential. Powers are exercised with a 
view to promoting the interests of a party instead of promoting the common interests of 
the general population. One respondent (also leader of the opposition group) said: 
"Use of powers at this level and the resultant aim of providing service to the people is, In 
fact a source of strengthening the base for political gains at the provincial and federal 
level. In order to widen and secure the vote bank, councillors affiliated to a certain group, 
organised and guided by either of two influential camps, make it sure that all-out support 
and confidence of the people is retained because on this lies the fiiture of their political 
survival. The exercise of powers at the municipality level is largely influenced bY these 
considerations. 1127 
Another respondent (also a close ally of the chairman) expressed his views thus: 
"The principle of active involvement of elected representatives in the process of decision- 
making seems to be a myth so far the working of this (Gujrat) municipality is concerned 
because the role of an elected councillor ceases with the election of chairman in that it then 
becomes the letter's discretion what amount of attention he pays to the solution of 
problems in the wards of individual councillors. 1128 
Unlike the trends prevailing in Mardan Municipality, where the councillors did 
try to have their leader of the house on the basis of their own choice, the situation in 
Gujrat council differed significantly. Here, not only the elected councillors relied 
heavily on the discretion of local influential but the electorate also anticipated the final 
decision, with regard to the nomination of the prospective candidate for chairmanship 
coming from the patrons. 29 Six respondents (one from the chairman's group, two from 
the opposition and three from the rebel group) confirmed that the local influential had a 
deeper involvement in the choice of a candidate for chairmanship. A common view held 
by the respondents was that there were least chances for an elected councillor to become 
chairman in his individual capacity unless patronised by either of the two powerful 
groups representing the two main political parties in the city. The district level 
politicians in their capacity as heads of party's district organisation did not leave any 
stone unturned in ensuring that the party's nominated candidates won the local bodies 
polls. This testifies the general complaint against the way local councils are manipulated 
by the local influential for their vested interests. 
Narrating the process leading to the nomination and subsequent election of a 
candidate to the post of chairman, one respondent stated: 
"Local Government elections and, particularly, the post-election formation of groups of 
elected councillors inside the council are the processes notfree from the direction of local 
influential. In the case of Gujrat municipality, the competition was between the Pakistan 
Muslim League (then ruling at both the federal and provincial levels) and Pakistan Peoples 
Party. Because of legal restrictions, the groups affiliated with these parties were known as 
27. From discussion with Shahab Uddin Khan (Advocate), Opposition Leader, 19.5.1993. 
2', ý. From interview with Gul Zada Khan, ex-Chairman, 3.5.1993. 
29. See the 'Jazba' 1-0.1.1992. 
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'Mohmand Group' and Khattak Group respectively. Apart from those elected councillors 
who were nominated by the former group, councillors having affiliation elsewhere, were 
also inclined to join the Mohmand group in view of the fact that their party was governing 
the province. Councillors, mostly people of small means, saw a stable and bright future 
while working under the patronage of the party in power. In return for the patronage of the 
local political elite, the councillors were to pay the price in the form of voting for their 
nominated candidate. The party, leaders apparently acted in a democratic manner while 
seeking opinion of individual councillors in the group with regard to the choice of a 
prospective chairman. Out of the three to four elected councillors who offered their 
oo"didature for consideration as chairmanship, the one supported by the majority it-as 
declared to be the nominee of the group. The fact, however, re"wins that the personal likes 
and dislikes of the party bosses happen to be a decisive element in the maki. of a filial 
choice. 1130 
The above observations speak of the stresses and strains which the elected 
councillors undergo at the time of starting their political career at the grassroots level. 
Apart from meeting the felt needs of the local population, a councillor is expected to be 
of substantial assistance in the management of numerous social issues such as arranging 
release on bail of some arrested by the police in certain civil or criminal offences, 
approaching the local police authorities for the release of one detained as a result of 
family feud over landed property. While such problems are faced by the councillor at a 
large scale in rural areas, urban areas are no exceptions. As a result, a local councillor 
finds these problems very difficult to solve while having to confront the ruling group in 
the council enjoying the support of the political party in power that regulates and 
controls the district administration. Seen in this perspective, the elected councillors, 
both returning as independents and those affiliated with other groups, found the 
Mohmand group more advantageous because one prominent member of the family 
happened to be a federal minister holding a key portfolio which meant control over all 
the law enforcing agencies. Another factor which made it more convenient for the 
patrons of majority group to keep the loyalty of the members intact was a typical 
method of chaiýman's indirect election by the councillor. The Punjab Local Government 
Ordinance (1979) provides that "a separate poll shall be held for election of chairman 
and vice-chairman of a local council and the poll shall be held by raise of hands. "31 This 
was an undemocratic provision in that it violated sharply the principle of the secret 
ballot which enables a voter to exercise his right of adult franchise free from all sorts of 
pressures and compulsions. "Raise of hands, " on the other hand, denotes a commitment 
on the part of the voter whereby he finds himself under an obligation to vote for a 
candidate on grounds other than his eligibility, experience and leadership qualities. 
Under this method of voting, even if a voter had been in disagreement with the choice of 
30. Views expressed by Haji Imad-ud-din, vice-Chairman. 
3 1. The Punjab Local Councils (Elections) Rules 1979, Rule 60 (1 & 2), p. 82-A. This provision was 
inserted to the Elections Rules in December 1987 on the eve of local bodies elections for the third 
term held on November 30,1987. The amendment came immediately through a Government 
Notification No. SOV. 2-4/79 dated. 7.121.1987, p. 82-A. 
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the influential patronising the gioup, he would find it extremely difficult to go against 
the choice. The immediate purpose of devising this method by the government was, 
perhaps, to consolidate the party's dominance over the local councils. 
Related to this phenomenon, a question of central importance asked of the 
respondents was regarding the impact which this method of election had on the conduct 
of business in the council and, particularly, on the pattern of mutual relationship 
between the chairman and his colleagues belong to both the treasury and opposition 
groups. Unlike Mardan Municipal Committee, where the choice of chairman was based 
on a consensus of opinion among the elected councillors (though the chairman so 
elected certainly had affiliation with a certain political party), the situation in Gujrat was 
different in the sense that the candidate for chairmanship was essentially nominated by 
the influential and this very patronage had a deeper repercussion on his behaviour 
towards council members, as was revealed from the observations made by the researcher 
during interview and also from watching the council proceedings. Views about this 
question were given by six councillors, one belonging to the chairman's group, two from 
the opposition and three from the rebel group. The respondents supported, in principle, 
the existing method of chairman's election but also pointed out two defects inherent in 
the process namely (a) once elected, the chairman is inclined to favour those councillors 
who voted him to the position and; (b) the show of hands , instead of secret ballot, was 
disgraceful in that the councillor-voters supported a candidate irrespective of their 
personal likes and dislikes. The former defect, in turn, gives births to a number of bad 
habits which included: the chairman's indulgence in doing favours to his supporters in 
order to retain their perpetual support. Similarly, the chairman attributed holding of the 
chairmanship during the pleasure of the patrons, who, not only nominated him but also 
made those in the group to ensure his success. In support of their view-point, the 
respondents argued that it was based on their calculated contention (in the light of a 
number of eventualities) that matters which could be discussed and decided in the 
council meetings, were referred to the patron's consideration. This inclined the attitude 
of the chairman towards his group and culminated in the development of some ugly 
precedents in the council's working. For instance, all sub-committees in general, and the 
important ones in particular, were headed by the "most trustworthy. " Because of the 
random constitution of these sub-committees and the total disregard of the principle of 
specialisation (in terms of giving representation to members on different sub- 
committees on the basis of their academic background and administrative expertise), 
these were largely inoperational. Rather, there were examples where a sub-committee 
was stopped from convening its meetingS32 and matters falling within its purview were 
also unilaterally decided by the chairman. Yet in another case, the chairman by-passed 
32. From discussion with Fajar Hussain, Opposition councillor, 5.5.1993. 
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the recommendations of the sub-committee on finance regarding the introduction of a 
new tax on the business class which culminated into a crisis situation as the traders 
called for a strike which brought the whole business in the city to a standstill. 33 Some 
respondents alleged discrimination in matters such as allocation of funds for 
developmental works but these could not be confirmed through independent sources. 
Rather a sensible clarification was given by another respondent34 who, while sitting on 
the opposition benches but having sympathy with the chairman, lauded the role of the 
chairman who, as he stated 'had set unprecedented eximples of fair treatment with all' 
and deviating thus from the previous practices of discrimination against the opposition 
members. 
Commenting on the impact of chairman's indirect election on the working of the 
municipality, one respondent remarked thus: 
"It is largely the result of the nomination of candidate for chairmanship by someone other 
than the elected councillors that the leader of the house so elected assumes dictatorial 
attitude which is re ected in his relationship with his colleagues in the council. It is an 
alarming situation in that elected people at the grassroots are getting trained in a manner 
not conducive to the emergence of new leadership accustomed to the democratic principles 
of equality, fraternity andfair play. The weak performance of our democratic institutions at 
the higher levels is, in fact, the result of poor training at the local level. 11 35 
Did political parties interfere with the conduct of business by the municipality, 
was another question put to the respondent with a view to determine the impact of party- 
politics on the overall working of the municipality. Eight responses came: two from the 
chairman's group, three from opposition and another three from the rebel group. All 
respondents, while referring to the influence which a local influential family exercised, 
confirmed that not only the party councillors (Pakistan Muslim League) but the 
chairman himself worked under the directives of the patrons. The chairman was 
effectively used as an instrument to tighten party's hold over the municipality and ward- 
off any eventuality that could threaten party's control over the council. To handle this 
gigantic task, the chairman adopted measures that included: convening a party meeting 
prior to attending that of the council with a view to develop consensus of opinion on the 
items appearing on the agenda, providing convenorship to group councillors over all 
sub-committees particularly the most important ones, dividing all sub-committees into 
two broad categories and placing each under the supervision and control of the two vice- 
chairmen, who told this researcher that this supervision was nominal and the sub- 
committees worked under the direct supervision of the chairman. This sort of attitude 
33. On 30.8.1992 complete strike was observed in the city on the call of Anjuman-e-Tajran (Trader's 
Association), the day on which the municipality was to hold a special meeting for the approval of a tax 
to be levied on the traders and which the business community was severely opposed to. 
34. Points derived from the discussion with Mujib-ur-Rahman, Opposition councillor. 
35. From interview with Gul Zada Khan. 
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proved disastrous following the dissolution of political governments at the central and 
provincial levels and the resultant split in the party ranks. While the rebel group 
attributed this separation to the alleged involvement of the chairman in corruption and 
thus damaging the party interests, the chairman termed it defection as a result of the 
changed political scenario in the province. 36 The split in the ruling group proved highly 
disastrous in that it brought the municipal functioning to a standstill and adversely 
affected almost every council meeting including the budget session for the year 1993- 
94. 
Party influence over the working of council was so extensive that the chairman. 
who also held the portfolio of party's city Organiser37 could not deviate from the party 
gul -lines. While the chairman's position was severely threatened as a result of rift in 
the party councillors, the rebels had less courage to exploit the situation by way of 
joining hands with the opposition in an attempt to replace the chairman. The situation 
continued for more than three months affecting adversely every meeting convened to 
discuss municipal problems. The party leadership had its attention diverted towards the 
crisis in national and provincial politics as a result of dismissal of elected governments 
in the wake of opposition's demand for fresh general elections in the country. At one 
stage, the chairman was left with only nine councillorS38 as against twenty-one in the 
rebel group but neither the chairman was willing to resign nor the rebels had some plan 
of no-confidence for the removal of the chairman. While the opposition could play a 
decisive role, the treasury members did not allow them to take any undue advantage of 
their mutual differences. Despite the split, both demonstrated solidarity with the party's 
high command and showed allegiance to their decision with regard to the municipal 
crisis. 19 
Party politics had also some influence over the finalization of the agenda for 
meeting purposes. Confirming this, one vice-chairman stated that the chairman used to 
give a second thuught to the agenda and only those matters used to be included that 
were considered fit for discussion. Items suggested by opposition councillors that could 
likely affect the chairman's position, used to be summarily turned down. While the 
majority of the councillors contested elections from two party platforms, those elected 
as independents, played the role of a balancer by joining the majority group. They were, 
in fact, motivated by party consideration and an important element in doing so was the 
36. See the Jazba, 5.7.1993 
37. This was allowed following the 1986 omission of section 21-A and Clauses h and J of section 21 
which enabled an elected councillor to be a member and an office-bearer in some party organisation. 
See the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (1979), p. 42. 
38. See the 'Jang'(Daily, Lahore, 25.7.1993). 
39. See the Jang' 26.7.1993. The chairman was persuaded to go on leave and powers transferred to the 
vice-chairman. The conciliator, a leading member of the family and an ex-Minister for Provincial 
Department of Local Government and Rural Development applauded the sentiments of the chairman 
for his sacrifices for maintaining unity in the party rank. 
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solution of ward problems which, under the peculiar circumstances of GuIrat 
Municipality, could not be possible without getting affiliated with the group enjoying 
support of the party ruling the province. A councillor, failing to meet the expectations of 
ward people, would see little chances of re-election. Narrating the impact of party- 
politics on municipality's functioning, one respondent said: 
"Compared to my performance during the previous 4-year term while affiliated with the 
opposition, I feel myself to be better placed now because of joining the ruling group oil 
account of my poor performance in terms of solving ward problems. The electorate still 
reposed their confidence in me. Realising that a councillor could be upto the mark if lie is 
either a chairman or a vice-chairman or a convenor of a sub-committee or, at least, a 
members in the ruling group, I gave a second thought to my plan of group affiliation so as 
to be savedfrom a similar embarrassed phenomenon. "40 
One respondent referred to the impact which the party-politics and the resultant 
change of power had on the continuity of development programmes. The development 
strategy41 gets changed with the shift of power without looking to the merits of 
programmes designed by the outgoing group. The existing poor mechanism disturbs, 
instead of giving continuity to the developmental process. 
It was revealed to the researcher that the municipal staff, both belonging to the 
Provincial Unified Grade of Functionaries and those locally recruited equally suffered 
from the effects of party-politics and fear of arbitrary decisions on their official conduct. 
While the chairman depended heavily on the administrative expertise of the chief 
officer, other influential members of the ruling group kept the staff under pressure who 
would find it difficult to maintain their neutrality42 in the performance of their assigned 
administrative tasks. 
Political parties tend to exhibit greater interest in local government affairs and, 
particularly, in seeing what role they could play in strengthening the party's hold over its 
working. A situation like that was observed in Gujrat where the chairman of the 
municipality attempted to design an extensive development plan for the city in 
collaboration with the local (PML) members of national and provincial parliaments who 
were willing to contribute funds out of the huge resources allocated to them under the 
central and provincial government's Special Development Programme. The idea could 
40. From interview with Fazal Muqeem Khan, councillor, 2.5.1993. 
The respondent emphasised the need for the establishment of an executive cell at all major local 
'Is consisting of the principal officers who, while playing a pivotal role in the formulation of counci Zýl I 
council's development plan, should perform the function of briefing the new incumbents to the office 
about the progress taking place in on-going development schemes. 
4 22. The principal officers in charge of different departments under the municipality showed extra-ordinary 
allegiance to the chairman who possesses the initiating authority of writing their annual confidential 
report with first counter- s1 gnature by the respective deputy commissioner and, secondly, by the 
di, isional commissioner. See Guide Book, Local Government & Rural Development Department, 
Government of the Punjab (Lahore) 1983, p. 115 
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not materialise on account of the dismissal43 of national and provincial governments on 
the demand of opposition who considered the action to be a pre-requisite for the purpose 
of a free, fair and impartial general elections. The way local government institutions are 
manipulated by the local influential was narrated by a respondent thus: 
"Here the Local Government laws appear to be made and remade to suit the peculiar 
interests of the ruling class. Directing the chairman of the local council to do something 
even if the matter contradicts with the provisions of law, make the organisation and its 
legalframework ineffective. Conducting council business in a wal, to retain the support of 
majority cause damage to the very image of these grassroots institutions. "44 
Pertaining to the mutual relationship between the chairman and vice-chairman, a 
common view was that the relationship is cordial and friendly if both come from the 
same political party. This appeared to be logical and valid when applied to the 
developments in Gujrat municipality. Views expressed by the respondents (six in 
number) revealed that in the council consisting of 46 members, the existence of two- 
chairmen was a source of strength for both the chairman and the ruling group and the 
spirit of team-work worked well during the first half of the 4-year term. The rift in the 
group took the two vice-chairmen along with several party councillors apart from the 
chairman which proved disastrous for the council as a whole. The respondents, in 
general, held the opinion that the office of the vice-chairman had no functionS45 except 
during the absence of the chairman from office. Its utility under normal circumstances 
was questionable. It was termed as a political gift designed to accommodate the 
comparatively influential councillors in the group to this prestigious position, the 
incumbent of which was, in relation to the role played by the chairman, nothing more 
than a passive spectator. The chairman, on the other hand, was reluctant, although 
authorised, to delegate some of his powers to his colleagueS46 (vice-chairmen) which 
could promote understanding and a spirit of team-work among them leading to greater 
efficiency in the municipal business. The councillors, rather, resorted to further 
strengthening the hands of chairman by provoking sub-section (2) of section 170. Under 
certain circumstances, it did serve the purpose of promoting the common interests of the 
group, but in others, it gave a greater set-back to the unity of the group in that the 
resentment which started developing against the dictatorial attitude of the chairman 
widened the gulf between the chairman and his supporters, on the one hand and the two 
vice-chairmen and his supporters, on the other. The rapidly deteriorating relationship 
43. First, the National Assembly of Pakistan was dissolved on April 18,1993 followed by the dissolution 
of provincial governments. The dismissal of the PML-led governments had a deeper repercussion on 
the overall working of local government institutions. 
44 
. 
From interview with Mujib-ur-Rahman. 
45). Unlike the N-W. F. P., Local Councils Vice-chairman (Powers and Functions) Rules 1987, under which 
certain general powers and functions have been given to the vice-chairmen, the punJab Ordinance Is 
silent on the subject. 
46. Section 170 (3) of the Ordinance, p. 541 
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assumed an added significance when the rebel group, headed by the two vice-chairmen, 
established a parallel authority47 within the municipality and started issuing directives 
to the municipal staff and asking the principal officers to severe links with the chairman. 
One respondent summed up the situation thus: 
"At this municipality, the pivot of all powers is the chairman who is not willing to share 
them even with the vice-chairmen. While a strong chairman could have been in a better 
position to promote the interests of the local influential and the part), in power, the trend 
towards concentration of power and confrontation with the vice-chairmen caused damage 
to the image of the municipality. The solution lies in the exact determination of roles to be 
played by the chairman, the vice-chairmen, the council and the sub-committees. 11 48 
In this case, however, the chairman was seen to be less concerned with the 
uprising against himself and was looking more eagerly to the signals from party 
leadership rather than attempting to heal the wounds of colleagues caused by the rift. 
The facts narrated above exhibit the reasons why a collective check could not be 
exercised in order to restrict the chairman's activities to the legal parameters. The 
respondents (three belonging to the rebel group) held the view that the councillors were 
mostly hesitant to exercise a check over the chairman simply because he had the 
patronage of the influential family. A balance between allowing a free hand to the 
chairman in the exercise of his powers and a collective check on the part of the 
councillors could have been possible, had the chairman been chosen on the basis of 
consensus of opinion of the members. In fact, he was a choice of the patrons and was, in 
a sense, superimposed. The councillors, particularly those from the opposition group, 
had the enthusiasm and necessary talent, in view of the experience gained over the 
years, to keep the council business on its proper track, but the ruling group's 
commitment to promote party interests and the lack of necessary strength on the part of 
the opposition foiled all attempts to threaten the chairman's absolutism. 
How far did this attiLude of the chairman affect the taking of vital decisions in 
the council such as allocation of development funds to councillors. The answer came 
from six respondents: two from the ruling group, one opposition and three from the 
rebel group. The views expressed by them identified a number of realities. For example, 
despite the Government's clear instructionS49 with regard to the distribution of council 
resources for development purposes, there was little enthusiasm to frame council bye- 
laws through which a certain concrete strategy for the equitable distribution of funds 
could be designed in order to give effect to the governmental guide-lines. This, in turn, 
47. Seethe 'Jazba' 6.7.1993 
48. From discussion with Fazal Muqeem Khan, councillor. 
49. The Commissioner, Guiranwala Division, while releasing grants-in-aid to the council vide letter No. 
DLG-93/A. 0. ADP- 1992-93/1409-55 dated 23.2.1993 issued instructions for strict compliance which, 
inter alia, included that the funds were to be utilised on equitable basis among all the councillors with 
their consensus. 
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gave birth to complaints lodged not only by the members of opposition group but a 
substantial number of councillors belonging to the chairman's ruling group were equally 
affected by this situation. For instance, the leader of opposition accused the ruling group 
of having control over the council resources. On the other hand, three respondents 
belonging to the rebel group gave a different interpretation of the situation. A statement 
of their common view-points is summarised below: 
"After separation from the chairman's ruling group, there is generally, a reliance on the 
formal channel for the acquisition of development fiinds. We have little access to the 
special funds lying under the discretion of the chairman. Influential councillors 
surrounding the chairman are the ones who benefit mostly-from the specialfiinds ... 
It is a 
wrong contention that only opposition members face discrimination in such matters. The 
factual position is this that quite a good number of treasury, group councillors relY, like 
many others in the council, on the financial resources formall), allocated to them in the 
annual development programme. " 50 
Another significant point revealed from the views expressed by the respondents 
was that there had been virtually no criterion devised5l for the allocation of resources to 
elected councillors representing comparatively less developed wards. Under such 
circumstances, a general trend had been to approach the local member of national or 
provincial legislatures (MNA/MPA) asking him to undertake certain work out of his 
own development funds, which the local councillor was unable to do on account of the 
meagre resources received from the municipality. Obviously, in such attempts, were 
successful only those councillors who had some relationship, based on party linkage, 
with the respective parliamentarians. 
The respondents were asked to give their comments about the existing 
controlling authority. The question could not be answered for lack of correct perception 
of the term. One elderly councillor was able, on the basis of his prolonged association 
with the system, to highlight certain general principles for the maintenance of a balance 
between autonomy and control. While an essential ingredient of local government is the 
availability of adequate autonomy, a considerable amount of external control is 
indispensable for restricting the council activities to the legal framework. It was 
revealed to the researcher, after studying official Papers and municipality's 
correspondence with the government, that the control mechanism is somewhat 
tightened compared to the zone of discretion. There were evidences of external control 
on ordinary and simple matters. For instance, seeking clearance for the supply of 
C, Sunirnarised version of the discussions with three councillors including one vice-chairman belonging 
to the rebel group. 
51. Section 130 of the ordinance contains relevant rules, notifications and instructi I ions with regard to the 
preparation and implementation of budget. Sub-section (18) of the aforesaid section provides for a 
schedule of new expenditure which could be used as a basis for devising a strategy v -hereby 
grievances voiced by the representatives of backward areas could be adequately redressed. 
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bicycles to peonS52 (meaning the lowest grade government servants). In another case, 
the council, despite passage of a formal resolution to the effect, had to authorise the 
chairman to approach the government for granting approval for the purchase, out of the 
council's funds, of a Land Cruiser instead of a Nissan Sunny. Similarly, the 
Commissioner, Gujranwala Division, called for a detailed report with regard to the 
purchase of vehicles. 53 This provides evidence to the fact that in the Punjab, the control 
-1ý bureaucracy over local councils has still been retained in certain respects. Reference 
in this connection may also be made to a formal request made bv the chairman to the 
Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat asking him to grant permission for the payment of 
monthly salaries to the staff and the POL/Electricity charges. 54 
The municipality is authorised under section 121 (2) to remove encroachment. 
movable or immovable and made anywhere within the jurisdiction of the council. Not 
only that the municipality was required to get the advertisement published in the local 
daily after necessary authentication by the Director General, Public Relations, 
Government of the Punjab, but was also required to send a monthly progress report to 
the Commissioner55 regarding the removal of encroachments. 
In financial matters too, control was exercised on such ordinary issues like 
seeking permission from the Divisional Director, Local Fund Audit for the payment of 
honorarium to certain categories of municipal staff--- a matter that could be tackled by 
the Finance Sub-committee. Furthermore, seeking technical sanction for the utilisation 
of a nominal arnount of rupees one hundred and fifty thousand from the Superintending 
Engineer, Local Government & Rural Development looks anomaloUS56 in that it causes 
delay in the implementation of work which, at times, could be of immediate concern. 
In administrative matters, however, the chairman's refusal to relieve one sub- 
engineer of his services and thus facilitate his transfer elsewhere exhibited a courageous 
and bold initiative on the part of local authority which not only demonstrated that the 
chairman did not accede to all incoming official instructions but also resisted some of 
52. No. 171/Gen dated. 12.2.1992 addressed to the Divisional Director, Local Fund Audit, Gujranwala, 
resolution No. 7 pass-d on 21.10.1992 
53. No. DLG-93/A. 0. Transport/3990-4002 dated. 10.6.1993 addressed to the chairman of all local 
councils in Gujranwala Division. 
54. The budget estimates for the year 1993-94 were prepared under the supervision of the Deputy 
Commissioner in his office. The budget session, scheduled to be held on 28-6.1993 could not be 
convened in view of severe confrontation between the ruling and the opposition on the one hand, and 
the chairman and the rebel group, on the other. The immediate cause of the postponement of the Z__ 
session was the difference over the financial liabilities. See the 'Jazba' 28.6.1993 
Section 121 of the Ordinance, p. 368 
56. This power could be delegated either to the Audit Officer or the Municipal Engineer enabling them to 
decide such cases locally on their merit. In fact, such an arrangement exists in the N-W. F. P., Local 
Government Ordinance (1979) where a municipal engineer in BPS: 17 enjoys powers to accord 
technical sanctions to development schemes valuing RS. 150,0001- See N-W. F. P., Local Councils 
(Works) Rules 1980 (Chapter-IV), p. 120 
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them if they were issued in contravention of the relevant laws and which effected the 
normal working of the council. 57 
A cursory view of certain sections of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 
of 1979 reveal that apart from the officials of Local Government Department, the 
divisional commissioner and the deputy commissioner have also been given controlling 
powers over the local councils. It was in this perspective that the councillors were asked 
whether they felt any retarding effect of the control exercised by the deputy 
commissioner. Answer came from five respondents, one from the chairman's group and 
two each from the opposition and rebel groups. One view was that the District Officer 
had a sympathetic attitude towards the municipality and this presumably due to the fact 
that the ruling Muslim League was also dominating the municipality. In certain matters, 
the deputy commissioner was approached for assistance such as recovery of arrears for 
which powers were available to him under the Land Revenue Act. Similarly, the deputy 
commissioner was required to preside over the council meeting when a motion of no- 
confidence against the chairman or vice-chairman was to be debated followed by a 
voting. The sympathetic attitude of the district officer could also be attributed to the 
age-long tradition associated with the working of this office according to which the 
deputy commissioner happens to serve the district, in most of the cases, under the 
influence of the local elite. This was true so in the case of Gujrat where, compared to 
other biradaris, the Jats represented by the Choudhris exercised greater influence over 
the deputy commissioner. 58 
Other respondents differed significantly who held the view that the traditional 
control of the deputy commissioner had still been continuing and that in certain matters 
this control was much deep rooted. 59 Another factor which strengthened the co, -, itrol of 
the deputy commissioner over the council was the general trend of the population who 
preferred to raise such questions, both verbally and in writing, before the deputy 
commissioner which essentially fell within the purview of the municipality. Perhaps the 
idea behind approaching the district officer was the quick redressal of their grievances. 
This attitude, in turn, had affected the relationship between the municipality and the 
57. In his letter addressed to the Secretary, Local Government, Punjab, the Chairman explained that the 
said employee had been posted there only eight months before and that he had been supervising a 
number of important on-going development schemes undertaken by the municipality. 
58. This was also confirmed when transfer of government officers started at a large scale following the 
installation of interim government at the centre and the provinces. The officer posted at Gujrat as the 
district's new deputy commissioner was resented to by the family terming it a part of the conspiracy 
directed towards causing political harm to the family. It was due to the heavy pressure exerted by the 
family that transfer of the said official had to be ordered after few months of his posting. The change, 
however, did not bring much benefit to the family because all national assembly and most of the 
provincial assembly seats were lost by the family in the general elections conducted by the interim 
ýTovernment. 
59. The respondents referred specifically to the creation of a post and making recruitment against it in fevv Z- 
self-financed educational institutions under the municipality. In both cases, approval of the deputy 
commissioner was required. 
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deputy commissioner. It was as a result of this phenomenon which made the chairman 
to approach the Secretary for ascertaining whether the deputy commissioner was still a 
controlling authority over the municipal affairs. 60 
Irrespective of the official view on the subject, it is also revealed from a number 
of provisions laid down in the ordinance that the deputy commissioner has been 
delegated powers in respect of local councils. This is evident from a number of 
municipal representations referred to the deputy commissioner for approval. It is so 
because the ordinance empowers the latter to declare any expenditure incurred by the 
local council to be an appropriate charge on the local fund. 61 With reference to this 
statutory requirement, the municipality referred cases of expenditures to the district 
officer on a number of occasions in order to be declared a valid charge so as to avoid 
audit objections. For instance, (a) payment of electricity bill in respect of ladies and 
children park (No. 406 dated. 8.4.1993), (b) an expenditure of Rs. 185,000/- incurred 
out of municipal fund on the visit of Chief Minister, Punjab (No. 669 dated. 9.5.1992, 
(c) a donation of rupees twenty-five thousand given to the widow of a police inspector 
who died in an encounter with the docoits. An interesting thing in this representation 
was the involvement of the Provincial Local Government Minister who, in fact, made 
the chairman to take the decision (No. 1016/Gen. dated. 2.7.1992). In addition to these, 
the chairman also approached the deputy commissioner to move the government to 
grant permission for the appointment of a Municipal Magistrate62 as the municipality 
was facing hardships for the removal of unauthorised encroachment, s and trial of 
municipal challans. The ordinance does not provide for the office of Municipal 
Magistr, ate except that of Legal Adviser. 63 
The researcher, on the other hand, witnessed a constructive aspect of the role of 
the deputy commissioner in relation to the municipality which not only facilitated the 
expedient intercourse of the latter with other city-based government agencies but due to 
the intermediary role of the officer, quick responses on matters of immediate concern 
could have been possible. Reference in this connection may be made to the deputy 
commissioner's directives to the Executive Engineer, Public Health Engineering 
Department whereby the latter was advised to negotiate and sort out the problem of 
Gujrat city's main disposal works in order to keep it functional on a permanent basis. 
60. No. 764 dated. 21.6.1993. The chairman stated that contrary to the statutory version with regard to the 
abro, o--, ation of the concept of controlling authority, It appeared that the Deputy Commi ss loner acted as 
a controlling authority in respect of Municipal Committee and Town Committees in the district. 
61. Section 128 (f) of the Ordinance and powers delegated under section 14 read with Rule 170 of the 
ordinance. 
02, The demand was made in the light of a resolution passed by the house in its special meeting held on 
2.1-1993 
63 11111 Section 47, (p. 307) provides for the appointment of a legal advisor initially for a period of two years 
and with the primary duty to tender legal advises to and to appear in legal proceedings on behalf of the 
local council which has appointed or engaged him. In 
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A vital question raised centred around the finances of the municipality. The 
respondents were asked what impact did the financial powers have on the council's 
attempts at seeking self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Only one councillor could answer. 
The researcher, therefore, relied mostly on the data gathered during interviews with 
those dealing with the municipal financial management plus analysis of the council's 
correspondence on the subject with the government. This is how an attempt was made 
to determine Lhe financial health of the council. A general phenomenon (which in fact, 
is common to all urban local councils in Pakistan) was the greater imbalanLe between 
income and expenditure. This could be attributed to certain external as well as Internal 
factors. In external factors included the rigid governmental guide-lines regarding local 
government financial administration. While certain disbursements from the council's 
funds are requirement of the statute, compulsory payments are equally imposed by the 
government which include audit fees, expenses incurred on the visit to the city of a 
government dignitary, relaxation given by the government to traders on octroi tariff as 
well as other unilateral decisions taken by the government which affected municipal 
finance significantly. 
Section 137 empowers the government to grant relaxation in respect of some 
taxable articles in terms of reducing or increasing the existing rate or exempting certain 
items from taxation. A similar decision with regard to the reduction of octroi collection 
rate of soda water from two rupees to fifty paisas per crate made the municipality 
refund rupees 1.2 million as the rebate to the octroi contractors during the year 1991- 
92.64 In yet another case, the government gave relaxation in Rule 7.4 simply on the 
presentation of an application by one octroi contractor allowing him to pay the monthly 
instalment of the amount of bid at the end instead of beginning of each month for which 
the instalment was due. 65 While considering the matter and taking decision thereon, the 
government did not ask for comments from the municipality. On the other hand, while 
the courts could protect the municipal bodies from undue financial losses, their own 
initiatives in the form of issuing stay orders on municipal decisions have not been 
favourable. 66The municipality's measures with regard to its financial management were 
equally effected by the role of the divisional commissioner as arbitrator67 between the 
64. Item No. 3 on the agenda for the council meeting held on 18.5.1993. It revealed from the contents of 
the said item that the chairman initiated and decided the matter as per verbal instruction from the 
provincial minister for local government. Under the rules, the government approves cases of rebate if 
these are duly approved by the house of the respective council. In this case under reference, this codal 
formality was not considered necessary and government approval to the rebate was accorded on 
21.12.1991 
65 Government's letter No. SO. VI(LG)2-3/92(P-11) dated. 29.8.1992 addressed to the Chairman, 
Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
66. An Octroi contractor got stay order from the Lahore High Court (Punjab) against the rejection by the 
municipality of his demand for rebate of Rs. 385,445/- 
67. Rule 19 (2) under section 137 of the Ordinance, p. 484 empowers the Divisional Commissioner to 
arbitrate in cases of lease. 
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local council and the lessee on any dispute with regard to the provisions of lease 
agreement reaching between the parties. In a case like that, the divisional commissioner 
quashed68 a council resolution passed on 18.5.1993 which rejected the contract of tax 
on the transfer of immovable property. 
The divisional commissioner also exercised influence, which, of course, was a 
step towards right direction, over the utilisation of grantS69 released to the local 
councils of Gujranwala division. Channelling the government grant to the councils 
through the commissioner was good in the sense that the objectives to be achieved out 
of those funds were clearly spelled out. 
The municipality's initiatives towards enhancing the financial base was strongly 
opposed by the traders through calling a general strike in the city. Internally, the 
municipal authorities appeared to have little concern over the adoption of economy 
measures and improving the capability of the staff engaged in the departmental 
collection of taxes. Employees of the council (800 in strength) were exempted from 
water rate/sewerage rate chargeS70 causing thus a loss of Rs. 240,000/- annually. The 
chairman, on the other hand, made adhoc and temporary appointments of work charge 
and ministerial staff which was against all governmental instructions and orders. He also 
made appointments againsý leave vacancies which doubled the expenditureS. 71 The 
internal audit also appeared to have been working under pressure in terms of making 
payments for which no legal provision existed. 72 
The weak financial status adversely effected the overall performance of the 
municipality particularly its service-related functions. From a long list of compulsory 
and optional functionS73 the municipality had been able to concentrate on few such as 
sanitation, water supply, street-lighting, fire-fighting and education. Due to the poor 
allocation of resources to these subjects, there was a general complaint with regard to 
the poor quality of service. The Provincial Government's policy of transferring 
completed area development schemes to respective local councils could not be 
materialised, so far as the case of Gujrat municipality is concerned. The Housing & 
Physical Planning completed area development scheme Gujrat-M (for Pakistanis living 
68. The commissioner ordered continuation of the contract. The matter was reported to the Secretary, 
Local Government (Punjab) by the chairman vide letter No. 814/MCG dated. 29.6.1993 
69. An amount of Rs. 61 million was released vide No. DLG-93/A. 0 ADP-1992-93/1409-55 dated. 
23.2.1993. Respective deputy commissioners were to monitor strict compliance of the instructions 
issued. 
70 The Chief Officer, GuJrat Municipality, Letter No. 766 dated. 21.6.1993 addressed to his counterpart in 
the Municipality of Jhelum. 
71. From the inspection Note of the Divisional Director, Local Fund Audit, Gujranwala on the accounts of 
the Municipal Committee of GuJrat conducted in May, 1993, para 8 on p. 3 
7'. Inspection Note ..., para 
8, p. 3 
73. Sections 52-121 of the Ordinance (pp. 320-370). 
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abroad) in 1982 and since then the department had been attempting to persuade the 
municipal committee to take control for further maintenance. '-, 
What capability had the municipality got to administer such vital services like 
education, health and police if these are transferred to the council exclusively, was a 
question put to the respondents. Six councillors gave their views. There was a consensus 
of opinion that the municipality had every capability to undertake these responsibilities. 
Supporting his views one respondent said: 
"Our council consists of several public-spirited and dedicated councillors who could be 
compared in talent with the members of national and provincial parliaments. If a 
gentleman with nominal education and little experience at the Town Committee level 
(referring to an ex-Chief Minister of the Punjab) could be assigned with the charge of a big 
province, there is no point why, these basic tasks could not be handled b), the 
municipalit),. "75 
The respondents, however, put certain conditions to be fulfilled prior to the 
assumption by the municipality of these functions. They, particularly, talked about 
enhancing the financial base and technical capability of the council. For this purpose, 
the central and provincial governments will have to allocate special funds to the local 
councils which they have been utilising at the moment through their own agencies. 
Local councils could, later on, be made to generate their own resources out of these 
services in order to administer them on a self-help basis. Two respondents gave a 
cautious view and feared whether such a transference could be successful. To avoid . -11 
sorts of future eventualities it would be desirable to transfer these services gradually on 
an experimental basis and in a few selected local councils. The progress should be 
watched carefully and the problems diagnosed systematically and, finally, in the light of 
conclusions drawn, a comprehensive national policy be framed for all provinces. 
In support of their contention, the respondents referred to the achievements 
made so far in the provision of educational services to the local residents. The 
municipality has been running educational institutions (one Model High School, 
primary schools, two each for boys and girls) out of its own budget. 
The councillors, while greatly dissatisfied with the present level of health 
services being rendered by the government-owned health institutions, were seemed 
reluctant either to gain control of them or establish their own presumably due to 
professional restraints and financial limitations. They, however, suggested inclusion of 
competent councillors in the hospital committee headed by either the Distfict Health 
Officer or the Medical Superintendent of the District Headquarters Hospitals which, in 
74 111 Deputy Director, Housing & Physical Planning (Jhelum) No. 820 dated. 4.6.1992 in which the 
chairman was assured of a handsome amount to be arranged on account of property tax, water supply 
and sewerage charges from the allottees of the said scheme. 
75. From interview with Irshad Ahmad Khan, Councillor. 
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their opinion, could contribute significantly towards bringing improvement in medical 
services to the local population. 
Regarding police, the respondents gave mixed opinions. While appreciating the 
idea of placing the police department under municipal control in view of the 
unsatisfactory performance of the department, the respondents (two) expressed 
apprehensions that the police personnel could be used by the influential for personal 
ends. Others argued that the number of councillors who think on such lines is marginal 
and such a tendency, even if it arose, could be checked by the majority who are decent, 
public-spirited and believe in the rule of law. Some suggested a gradual transformation 
beginning with a package of reform aiming at the decentralisation of police, on the one 
hand, and overhauling the structure of local councils, on the other. A good start, they 
suggested, could be through the establishment of a formal liaison between the citizens 
and the local police force. Such an arrangement could go a long way in restoring image 
of the police in the eyes of people and would contribute effectively towards law and 
order and elimination of crimes. 
In this perspective of what has been claimed by the respondents, a review of the 
actual performance of the municipality in service-related matters would not be out of 
place. 
Under section 58 of the ordinance, water supply is an obligatory function of the 
municipality. In practice, water supply seems to have been dealt with in a very general 
way. The system runs at a loss mainly because of lack of consciousness about the need 
for efficient management of this service. With growing industrial isation, Gujrat has 
been facing the problem of water pollution through trade and sewerage, effluents and 
other noxious industrial wastes. Presently, the facilities being provided by the 
municipality in the field of water supply and sewerage are, in fact, the result of 
extensive collaboration, both technical and financial, from the provincial government 
Department of Public Health Engineering. The department, under the standing policy of 
the government76 initiates and develops water supply schemes upon an undertaking by 
the respective municipality to contribute its share of the total cost. The municipality is 
required to take full responsibility for maintenance and repairs including recurring 
charges and depreciation, once the scheme is completed. The water supply scheme in 
Gujrat was transferred from the PHED to the municipality in 1987. Out of sixteen tube- 
wells, six are still maintained by the former. The researcher was told that almost 70% of 
the city population had been provided with provision for 35 gallons of water per heaý 
per day. The number of connections stood at the figure of 16915 ( i. e., approx. 1050 
connections from each tube well). The government's instruction to run the service on 
76. Third Urban Development Project, Punjab 1993, p. 5 
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'No profit, No loss' basis could not be materialised. The Inspection Team noted that the 
service was running in deficit. 77 The fact is also revealed from the following table: 
Table: 23 
Expenditure incurred and income raised through 
waterSUDDIV 
Year Expenditure Income % of cost 
recovery 
1988-89 270,0000 250,6435 93 
1989-90 34092184 25690756 75 
1990-91 322,9359 274,5684 85 
1991-92 558,6517 48191130 86 
1992-93 605,7462 415,8252 69 
Source: Taxation Officer, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
The above table shows projections of water revenue compared with its cost. It 
can be seen that the cost recovery ranged between 69 and 93 percent of the total costs. 
While the tariff rate remained constant, the cost recovery factor showed a fluctuating 
trend. 
Education, like health, is a provincial subject, though the municipalities are 
allowed to initiate measures for the promotion of education in their respective 
jurisdictions. Section 68 read with Section 114 of the ordinance78 call upon the urban 
local councils to establish, maintain and manage educational institutions for the 
promotion of literacy. Measures such as construction of buildings to be used as hostels, 
provision of scholarships anct books, training of teachers etc., could be undcrtaken by 
the municipality depending upon the resources of the respective local councils. The role 
of Gujrat Municipality in this sector is illustrated from the details shown in the table 
(No. 24). 
The newly constituted sub-committee on education seemed to had been formed 
randomly as it did not include any educationalist nor were any co-opted79 presumably, 
because the primary concern of the sub-committee is the distribution annually of a fixed 
amount of scholarships among deserving students. The resources earmarked each year 
in the municipal budget for education, as appears from the table, revealed that there was 
considerable enthusiasm to expand the range of efforts directed towards the enrolment 
of more and more children and demonstrating thus the ability to take over the charge of 
77. Director General's Inspection Note (March 12-14,199 1), p. 37 
78. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance (1979), pp. 326 & 355. 
79. A formal provision to this effect exists in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (1979), sub-section 
5(2) ot'Section 37, p. 148 
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Table: 24 
Educational institutions maintained by the: 
1. Provincial Government; 2. Municivalitv: and 3. Private Sector. 
Level of 
institution 
Provincial Government MuniciPa Committee 
I 
Private Sector 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Colleges 
(Degree) 
3 2 --- --- ... --- 
Higher 
Seco 
7 4 --- --- --- --- 
Secondary 9 7 1 --- 2 1 
Middle 2 6 --- --- 7 4 
Primary 10 8 1 1 8 6 
Total 31 27 2 1 17 11 
Source: Details supplied by: 1. District Education Officer (Male) 
2. District Education Officer (Fernale) 
primary education. Willingness to this effect was shown by the councillors during 
interview. 
Table: 25 
Budi! etarv allocations for Education 
Year Total budget 
allocation 
Allocation for 
education 
% 
1989-90 3813,7033 284,3351 7 
1990-91 365395828 41494394 11 
1991-92 417597877 48594953 12 
1992-93 538897800 67590000 13 4 
1993-94 __ 5932,0700 75896500 13 
Source: Details supplied by Accounts Officer, M. C. Gujrat. 
The trend reflecting from the above table also supports the claim of the 
respondents (eight out of ten) who held the view that education upto primary level could 
adequately be handled by them provided the funds presently spent on education by the 
provincial government was placed at the disposal of the municipality in order to be able 
to make a smooth start. 
Though in the field of public health, the ordinance authorises the municipality to 
undertake all such measures that could promote public health80 such as establishment 
and maintenance of health and maternity centres, hospitals and dispensaries, medical aid 
and relief and medical education as well as preparation and implementation of schemes 
for the prevention of the pollution of air, water etc. in actual practice, little attention 
could have been given by the council for materialising the objectives of public health 
and the fact is evident from the table (No. 26). 
80. Section 88-93 on pp. 341-42. 
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The table provides a self-explanatory view of the position and indicates how far 
the council 1-igs behind in the provision of health service. The perform-nce in this vital 
area is deplorable as is evident from the Inspection note which revealed that "malaria 
control measures were being undertaken in a haphazard manner in that the map showing 
the breeding places of mosquitoes was not prepared and the area of ponds was not 
worked out. " 81 
Table: 26 
Health institutions and their maintainim! ai! encies: 
Level of 
institutions 
Provincial 
Government 
Municipal 
Committee 
Hospitals I 
Dispensaries I 
Maternity Centres 1 
Child Health 
Centres 
7 ... 
EPI Teams 21 4 
Source: District Health Officer, Gujrat. 
Like the Municipality of Mardan, the Gujrat Municipa! Committee had been 
spending a substantial share of its budget on the establishment of street lights. In the 
non-development expenditure, a major share was earmarked for the payment of 
electricity charges accrued on street-lighting and tube wells. Random preparation of 
electricity bills as a result of the faulty condition of meters was a major complaint. The 
municipal authorities, on the other hand, seemed to have developed the trend of 
diverting resources to meet other liabilities instead of paying electricity dues regularly 
which resulted in a huge arrears of Rs. 10 million. 82 The WAPDA (Water & Power 
Development Authority) had to depute an Inspection TeaM83 to enquire into the 
grievances of the municipality --vhich also complained that WAPDA was charging a 
commercial rate for the electricity consumed. 
As an obligatory function under section 70, the municipality has been 
maintaining the fire fighting service with a staff of 19 and a fleet of four vehicles 
catering to the need of a 225,000 city population. The Fire Officer told the researcher 
that jurisdiction of the service extends to the whole of Gujrat district. The department, 
apart from its primary duty of fire fighting, also performs the functions of street 
watering and water supply during emergency when there is a supply break down. While 
Inspection Note, Director General (Local Government & Rural Development), March 12-14,1991, 
para 30, p. 42 
Item No. 15 on the agenda for council meeting held on 9.5-1993. The municipality had been 
withholding payment of electricity bill since December 1988 to December 1992. It is revealed from Z111 
the contents of the said agenda that the WAPDA disconnected supply to street lights for almost one 
year for not paying electricity charges. 
83. such an arrangement is very rare and was perhaps possible due to the personal interest taken by the 
Federal Interior Minister, a prominent member of the family dominating the municipality. 
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there was a heavy demand by the industrialists to establish one fire station within the 
jurisdiction of the industrial estate, the municipality was finding it difficult to meet the 
demand due to the small allocations made to the department which, during the year 
1992-93, came to only 2% of the total revised budget for the year. 84 
Under section 118, the municipality is required to perform certain social welfare 
activities such as establishment and maintenance of welfare homes, asylum, orphanages, 
widow homes and other institutions for the relief of the distressed. In practice, little 
attention to many of these welfare services could have been gi\, %In. The activities 
undertaken generally, as appear from the annual development plan of the municipality, 
consisted of the following: 
Public Relations, Flood Relief, Civil Defence, Relief against climatic 
disasters, Burial charges, Sports, and Municipal Library. 
The expenditures incurred on these services during the years 1991-92 and 1992- 
93 constituted one and a half percent of the total development expenditures during each 
year. The social welfare department of the municipality has not been organised in a 
manner that could enable it to take up the tasks as enumerated in the ordinance. 
Similarly, the financial allocations made also were inadequate in view of the 
responsibilities which the said department is required to perform under the rules. 85 The 
municipality appeared not to have complied with governmental instructions over the 
years while making financial allocations for different services of social welfare. This is 
illustrated from the following table: 
Table: 27 
Social Welfare activities in DersDective 
Women Welfare 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 
Total A. D. P 1242ý5000 176390000 200894700 
Amount allocated 100ý000 1509000 200ý000 
% of the A. D. P 0.80% 0.85% 0.99% 
Required % as per 
government instructions 
2% 2% 2% 
Sports 
Amount allocated 200,000 260,000 260,000 
% of the A. D. P 1.60% 1.47% 1.29% 
Required % 1% 1% 1% 
Civil Defence 
Amount allocated 50ý000 509000 509000 
% of the A. D. P 0.40% 0.28% 0.24% 
Required % 1% 1% 1% 
Source: Figures derived from the budget statements of the 
Municipality for the years under reference. 
Estimated financial position of the Municipal Committee of Guirat for 1993-94, p. 4 
Section 130 (9) of the Ordinance, p. 376 
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Services under women welfare, as is indicated above, received allocations far 
below than the required percentage of the A. D. P during these years. A gradual increase 
could, however, be noticed. As against this, the promotion of sports seems to have 
received priority of consideration in terms of generous allocations. But compared to the 
first, it shows a gradual decrease over the years. A similar trend could be observed like 
that of the welfare in both fiscal allocation, being below the statutory requirement and 
successive decrease. Interestingly, the functions to be performed by the council under 
civil defence are not clearly spelled out in the ordinance86 and the funcis earmarked for 
the purpose are placed at the disposal of the deputy commissioner in his capacity as 
Civil Defence Controller. 87 
Under Section 52 of the Ordinance, sanitation is a compulsory function. A 
primary duty in this connection is the collection and disposal of wastes which falls 
within the purview of health branch of the municipality. The municipality employs, for 
the purpose, a huge staff consisting of some 346 persons headed by a Medical Health 
Officer and several other Sanitary Inspectors. On average, each sanitary worker serves 
six hundred and fifty persons if the population of the city is about 250,000 (current 
estimates). The researcher was told that the immediate problems faced by the sanitary 
staff was the shortage of places to dump the solid waste as well as the small number of 
vehicles (which are below the actual requirement). The uncollected portion of the 
garbage which amounts to about 40 percent of the total generated is deposited into 
drains and streets and onto open land. The sewers and drains, hence, tend to become 
clogged with uncollected refuse. It was observed that the coverage and effectiveness of 
sanitation was unsatisfactory (as was also noted by the Local Government 
Department). 88 
The question of water disposal manifested a unique pattern of relationship 
between the manicipality and the provincial government department of Public Health 
Engineering which has the responsibility, under the Government's Standing Policy89 to 
develop certain services-related schemes such as water supply and sewerage within the 
municipal jurisdiction and, upon completion, hand them over to the respective urban 
local council for operation and maintenance purposes. The sewerage scheme was 
commissioned in 1978 anci was completed in 1985. Ever since, the P. H. E. D., had been 
demanding that the municipality take over the charge of operation and maintenance. The 
municipality, on the other hand, was reluctant to do so in view of the defective character 
of the scheme as only one out of four motors was in a working condition. The 
86. SI ecdon 71 of the Ordinance, p. 328 
87. The Deputy Commissioner, in his letter No. CDGT-92/638 dated. 31.10.1992, asked the chairman, 
Guirat Municipality to hand over to him the amount supposed to be earmarked for the purchase of 
civil defence goods under the budget for 1992-93. 
88. Cited in the Director General's Inspection Note .... p. 42 
89. Under this policy the municipality is bound to pay one-third of the total cost of water disposal scheme. 
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municipality insisted on the necessary repair work being done prior to its take over, 
whereas the P. H. E. D., stressed that the municipality should undertake the repair work 
out of its own resources. While the transfer of the sewerage scheme remained in dispute 
due to its disorderly condition, the city population relied heavily on the traditional open 
drainage system which, due to lack of proper cleanliness and regular emptying, had : 71 
added to the sanitation problem. 90 While the municipality lacked technical expertise 
and financial capability to undertake such an expensive and technical project by itself, 
its collaborator (i. e.. the P. H. E. D) handled the task almost unilaterally despite the 
municipality's financial contribution. This non-participation of the latter in the 
implementation process gave way to a number of conflicts and disputes9l which, later 
on, hindered the smooth transference of the scheme to the municipality for maintenance. 
Conclusion 
This case study on the Municipal Committee of Gujrat contains certain clear 
points on the operation of local politics. It reflects a number of significant factors giving 
way to a typical environment characterised by friction, confrontation, crisis and 
reqistance within which the council was supposed to operate. It is on these 
characteristics that the foundation of a shaky and fragile structure of local government 
was based. The study, though restricted to the municipality of Gujrat, is common to 
many other similar situations. An attempt has been made to narrate the way a local 
council, despite its present so-called non-party character, was manipulated by local 
vested interests. 
The rivalry between tribal groups and the resultant continued instability could, in 
fact, be traced back to the beginning of this century when the two groups, each 
supported by other small ethnic groups, entered into a struggle for supremacy over the 
other. Changes in time and the overall economic development had little impact on these 
trends and could, therefore, be seen reflecting the political processes taking place at all 
level s--national , regional and local. Acquiring political positions at the central and 
provincial levels has been an effective source of gaining strength at the local level and 
vice versa.. 
The reformed local government under the Ordinance of 1979 which introduced a 
full elective element in the system has had little impact on the composition of the 
council as is revealed from the professional background of the municipal councillors. 
90. Director General's Inspection Note .... p. 40 
91. The basic cause of the dispute, as was revealed from the Director General's Inspection Note, (p. 41) 
was the selection of wrong site for the disposal works. Certain natural channels such 'Bhimber' and 
'Bolay' nullahs are situated on two sides of the town while river Chenab flows at a distance of 4/6 
miles but the ultimate disposal of sullage water of different areas was not made in the said channels. L- 
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Hailing mostly from the business and land-owning classes, the councillors had but little 
concern 
for the general welfare of the community. The reliance of the opposition groups on the 
local influential patronising them was of paramount significance and exhibited a vital 
aspect in the working of the municipality. There was observed the retarding effect of the 
influence of local elite on the municipality's functioning. On occasions, it appeared as if 
decision-making existed somewhere outside. The degree of influence exercised could 
also be determined from the fact that the rebel group, which emerged in protest against 
the alleged incompetence of the chairman, still relied on the consent of the patrons --- this 
being in utter disregard to the council's formal governing principle of corporate 
authority. 
The overwhelrrfing patronage accorded to the chairman (for his being party's 
Chief Organiser for the city) generated negative repercussions in that the council's 
attempt to enforce accountability of the chairman could not get enforced. The 
chairman's reluctance to share power with the vice-chairmen, the removal of the rebel 
councillors from the convenorship of different sub-committees consequent upon their 
disassociation from the ruling group, the chairman retaining the chair despite being in a 
minority, were the events which demonstrated the extent of support which he enjoyed 
from the local influential. 
Though elected on a non-party basis, the impact of party politics during the first 
and second terms was stated to had been little compared to the third and particularly the 
fourth term when things changed significantly. This not only kept the inter party 
competition and tension sustained at a high pitch but also effected the neutrality of the 
local government personnel particularly those belonging to the Provincial Unified Grade 
of Functionaries cadre who acted as instruments in the hands of a dominant and 
powerful political group. The municipality became politicised to such an extent that the 
elected councillors, with the exception of the committed ones who firmly stuck to their 
party organisation, saw little chances of any meaningful achievements in terms of 
solving ward problems without getting affiliated to the group commanding majority in 
the council. 
The abolition of a controlling authority under the present ordinance of 1979 was 
intended to ensure the autonomy of local government which, in many respects, was 
helpful in materialising the idea. But, from the point of view of serious efforts required 
for effective mobilisation of available resources for the enormous socio-economic 
development and effective co-ordination with the provincial line departments 
particularly those which come in constant contact with the municpality, the absence of 
an institutionalised arrangement to secure effective liaison was seriously felt. In the 
absence of such a mechanism, the municipal authorities approached the deputy 
commissioner time and again to ensure that business was transacted. 
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It appears from the organisational structure and performance evaluation that due 
to limited technical expertise and meagre resources, the municipality was able to 
undertake only a few functions. As a result, provincial line departments played a pivotal 
role in various service-related functions such as education, health, communication, 
social welfare, sewerage etc. 
The municipality's performance in terms of provision of services revealed that it 
would not be desirable to rely on the council exclusively for the provision of all 
essential services in view of the financial constraints and limited man-power expertise. 
There exists brighter prospects of improved and better performance in the field of 
education provided the existing capability of the council is strengthened. A strong case 
for the transference of primary education could be made in view of its restriction to 
small jurisdictions and the greater scope for community involvement both at the 
construction stage and subsequently in management. Financing primar, ' education in 
whole, at the initial stage, by a grant from the central/provincial government is likely to 
improve and enhance the quality of service. 
Certain other basic services especially the garbage collection and disposal 
process need to be organised on the principle of decentralisation in view of the 
continued expansion in the municipality's territorial jurisdiction and increase in the 
density of human settlements. Placing sanitation workers under the control and 
supervision of each councillor, instead of working under the Medical Health Officer at 
the municipal headquarters office, would produce better results. Individual councillors 
would not only assume responsibility for the cleanliness of their respective wards but 
would also facilitate the effective and efficient use of manpower (approx. eight sanitary 
workers for each of the 39 wards). 
The municipality seemed not to have made a full use of sub-committees 
presumably because either those were less competent to handle questions falling within 
their purview or through the centralised tendency part of chairman who did not allow 
them a participatory role in the decision making. It was largely the inactivity of sub- 
committees that council meetings were dominated, on several occasions, by petty and 
simple questions which could, otherwise, be decided upon by one of the several sub- 
committees. 
Chapter Five 
The Zila Council of Gujrat 
Case Study No. 3 
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The district of Gujrat lies between the districts of Gujranwala and Jhelum. With 
a population' of 225,4699 (the share of rural areas being 181,7089 i. e., 81%), it is the 
sixth largest district in the Punjab. The district forms a part of Gujranwala Division and 
covers an area of 2264 square miles. 2 It lies between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers and 
marks the northern limit of the true Punjab plains. Geographically, the district is 
bounded on the north-east by Kashmir, on the north-west by Jhelum, on the south-west 
by Sargodha and on the south-east by Gujranwala and Sialkot. The rural area where 
81% of the district population lives, comprises of 1532 villages. Administratively, the 
district is divided into three sub-divisions known as Gujrat, Kharian and Phalia. (Fig: 5) 
The recent administrative changeS3 reduced the number of sub-divisions to two when 
Mandi Bahauddin was declared a district headquarters with Malakwal and Phalia as its 
tehsils/sub-divisions. 
The district of Gujrat takes its name from the town at its headquarters. It became 
a distriCt4 in 1849 and Mr. E. C. Bayley was appointed its first deputy commissioner. 
The actual date of the coming into being of Gujrat as a District Board could not be 
traced. Information contained in the Punjab District Gazetteer, however, reveal that the 
income of the Board started increasing from 1905-06 largely owing to grants from the 
provincial government for specia'. purposes. 5 At that time, it had the strength of forty 
members, eight appointed by official designation, five nominated by the commissioner 
and twenty-seven elected. With the deputy commissioner as its chairman, the elected 
element hailed mostly from the leading land-owners from the district. The dominance of 
this class remained so with the coming into force of the Punjab Local Government 
Ordinance in 1979. A substanLial majority, with the exception of few coming from the 
business and professional classes, belong to the land-owning class as is revealed from 
the table (No. 28) 
As far the administrative element, the council is headed, next to the chairman, by 
the Chief Officer assisted by an office superintendent, alongwith the supporting staff. 
An Accounts Officer and his staff look after the financial side. The collection of 
different taxes levied by the council is managed by a Taxation Officer and his staff. A 
District Engineer with the help of a Town Planning Officer, a Sub-divisional Officer 
and three sub-engineers along with other technical staff help the Chief Officer in 
designing and execution of all the developmental schemes. A Resident Audit Scheme is 
Economic Survey 1992-93, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division (Economic 
Advisor's Wing), p. 19 
District Census Report (Guirat), Population Census of Pakistan, Part-1), p. 2 
3. Notification No. 786-93/C-50/466 R&G SO-11 dated. 20.5.1993 with regard to the creation of a new 
district of Mandi Bahauddin in the Gujranwala Division. 
-1. PuRjab District Gazetteers (vol. XXV-A) Gujrat District (Part-A), 1921, p. 24 
5. Punjab District Gazetteers ..., p. 144 
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in practice at the Zila Council. The Audit Officer and an Auditor keep a check on the 
financial transactions of the council. 
Table: 28 
Members of the Zila Council Gujrat in their professional background. 
(Elected in December. 199 1) 
Professions: Elected Peasants Ladies Labour Minority Total 
Landlords 55 --- --- --- --- 55 
Businessmen/ 
Contractors 
7 --- --- --- 1 8 
Lawyers/Journalists 9 --- --- --- --- 9 
Industrialists 4 --- --- --- --- 4 
Miscellaneous 7 4 4 2 2 18 
Grand Total --- F-82 14 14 1 21 2 1 941 
Source: Details provided by the Chief Officer, Zila Council Gujrat. 
The majority of the councillors i. e., 87 out of 94 were in the Makhdoom group 
which had the support of the ruling Muslim League at the provincial level. An 
interesting feature of the group supporting the chairman (an influential member of the 
Jat caste) was its diverse tribal background. A good number of councillors belonging to 
the rival Gujjar tribe with diverse party affiliations also supported the chairman. This 
happened despite the traditional rivalry and competition for gaining supremacy between 
the two dominant tribes of the district --- the Jat and the Gujjar. The politics of Gujrat, 
in fact, revolves around these two tribes. The roots of this rivalry goes as far back as 
1450 to 1488 which is also said to be a period of colonization of the district by the Jat 
and Gujjar tribes. 
It so happened that during the reign6of Bahlol Lodhi (1450-1488), the tract of 
the country falling on the right bank of the Chenab, (name of a river flowing from the 
north-west of the district to the south-west), and including part of the district was 
separated from the province of Oialkot, and formed into an independent charge under 
the name of Zila Bahlolpur. The century was an era of great confusion preventing the 
consolidation of the Delhi Empire. The Emperor Jalaluddin Akbar is said to had visited 
this part of the country to assert his authority and, having induced the Gujjars of the 
neighbourhood to restore Gujrat, made it the headquarters of a considerable district, half 
of which was occupied by the Gujjar clans and the other half by the Jats. This new 
district, known as Chala Gujrat, was divided into two primary sub-divisions --- the 
Parganas of Gujrat and Herat, the latter being the Jat and the former the Gujjar country. 
The pre-partition and post-independence (1947) developments in the area 
witnessed major fluctuations in the hegemony of the two tribes. The present day politics 
of the district as well as the city revolves around a tug of war7 between the Jats, 
6. Punjab District Gazetteers .... p. 
17 
7. In the General Elections of 1990, the Jat Choudhris, then affiliated with the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 
won fou: - out of five national assembly seats from the district. The party also won all the eleven 
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represented by the influential Makhdooms, supporters of which are mostly settled in the 
rural areas, and their traditional rivals, the Khitmatgars. Since the rural population is 
mixed, involving substantial elements of other small clans and biradaris (meaning 
religious or caste communities), it is virtually impossible for either of the two strong 
tribes to overcome the other without active support from these smaller communities. 
While the biradari factor is strong enough to unite the tribes, the party organizations are 
gaining equal strength, which is evident from the most effective utilization of party 
platforms for the consolidation of their strength. For instance, the Jats, represented by 
the Makhdooms, are inclined towards the right wing Muslim League. The Khitmatgars, 
on the other hand, who claim to be the spokesmen of Gujjar tribe, are active supporters 
of the Pakistan Peoples Party. The Khitmatgars remained undefeated in the GuJrat 
district for almost thirty-six years i. e., from 1926 when Nawab Sir Fazal Ali was elected 
District Board President, to 1962 when Fazal's son Nawabzada Asghar received the first 
ever defeat at the hands of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi in the National Assembly elections. 
With this began the starting point of the political battle between the two dominant 
groups. The Jats along with few other small clans, organized themselves politically 
under Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, a migrant from East Punjab (India) who rose successfully 
in the national political arena in the 1970s. He gained a considerable country-wide 
reputation on account of his sustained opposition8 to Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then 
prime minister of Pakistan. The family, thereafter, gained profound influence in local 
politics as a result of the inclusion of its members in the national and provincial 
cabinets, particularly, during the martial law government of General Mohammad Zia-ul- 
Haque. This not only strengthened the power base of the Makhdooms but also gave 
them an upper hand over their traditional rivals-- the Gujjar Khitmatgars. Another 
significant factor which gave tremendous political advantage to the Jat Chaudhris was 
the Martial Law Government's policy of a partyless structure of local government which 
became effective ii, the Punjab, as in other provinces, with the promulgation of the 
Punjab Local Government Ordinance in 1979. The non-party elections, particularly the 
one held for the second term in 1983, gave the Makhdooms an opportunity to exert 
influence over the local councils of the district on account of their being already in 
power at the provincial level. The councillors elected in the fourth term elections9 held 
in December 1991, opted to join the group enjoying the support of the provincial 
government. Local councils in the district, including the Zila Council, were thus 
provincial assembly seats. However, in the mid-term elections of November 1993, the Jats, affiliated 
then with the Pakistan Muslim League faced a major set-back as a result of losing all National 011 
Assembly and maximum number of the Provincial Assembly seats. See Report on the General 
Elections 1990 and 1993 (vol. 11), Islamabad, Election Commission of Pakistan. 
81 Waqt'(Dally, Lahore, 30.9.1993). See the Elections'93 Supplement published by the 'Nawa- - 
9. Pun*ab Pakistan was, thus, the only province which arranged the periodic local bodies polls on their J In 
scheduled time. The other provinces i. e., Sindh, N-W. F. P, and Baluchistan could not do so for 
reasons such as deteriorating law and order, flood devastation and political instability respectively. 
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dominated by the Jats until the dissolution'O of local councils in the province. 
Historically, among the rural local councils, the Zila (District) Councils have 
occupied a vital position in the system of local government. It is here at the district level 
that the policies of different government agencies are best co-ordinated in order to 
achieve a planned harmonization of governmental activities. Despite many changes 
since independence (August, 1947), most of the day-to-day problems faced by the 
comn- - man i. e., matters relating to civic amenities, land and property taxes, police or 
judiciary, still relate to, and mostly end at, the authorities functioning at or below the 
district level. Under the present system of local government, introduced by the military 
rulers in 1979, the District Council emerged with a pivotal position around which were 
to revolve the activities of all other nation-building departments. The importance of the 
Zila Council also reflects from the fact that when the Punjab Government abandonedl I 
dual membership, large number of MNAs and MPAs who also held the chairmanships 
of Zila Councils in their respective districts, preferred to retain the latter position in 
view of the influence and prestige which the position carried in the district. The 
chairman of Zila Council Gujrat during the third term (1987-91) opted, however, to 
retain his Punjab Assembly seat and finally got himself inducted into the provincial 
cabinet as Minister for Local Government and Rural Development. The Zila Council 
chairmanship was, thus, left for another member of his family who had, 
temperamentally, little inclination12 to become a politician or to assume a leadership 
role. This very temperament was reflected, later, during the full tenure of his 
chairmanship of the council. 
The Zila Councils were not only made, during the first few years of martial law 
(1980-85) the supreme repository of the popular will, but its chairman too was placed 
higher than the deputy commissioner in order of precedence protocol. This, in fact, 
reflected the government's anxiety to transform the local bodies into bastions of public 
welfare. Keeping this in view, a large number of nation-building departments were 
associated with the District Council with a view to accelerating the process of 
development in rural areas. 
But the Zila Council of Gujrat, viewed from the above perspective, revealed few 
encouraging characteristieF in view of the poor performance in the wake of tremendous 
responsibilities assigned to it under the ordinance. Apart from the hold of a particular 
10. The care-taker government in the Punjab rather curtailed the term of office of the local councils 
through a notification (issued on 15.8.1993) by exercising the powers under Section 26-A of the : _1 Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The action was taken with a view to ensure free, fair and 
impartial general elL, _t1ons scheduled 
for October 1993. 
Cý 
See the 'Muslim' (Daily, Islamabad, 29.7.199 1). As a result of this drastic measure, some one hundred 
and fifty members of the National Assembly and Punjab Provincial Assembly stood disqualified from 
contesting local bodies elections (held in December, 1991). 
the special supplement of the Jazba' This he (the chairman) stated in a press interview appeared i 
(Daily, Gujrat, 9.4.1993), p. 8 
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family of influence over the council's affairs, many elected representatives, with certain 
exceptions, seemed less enthusiastic in t. -rms of making a meaningful contribution to 
the general welfare of the rural population. Though a majority of the elected members 
came from financially stable families, their lack of a true perception of the role to be 
played by them had a retarding effects on the overah working of the council. This lack 
of perception was due, beside other things, to the level of education which the 
councillors had at the time of their election. Table: 29 gives details of their educational 
background. 
With the coming into being of Mandi Bahauddin as a separate district taking 
away the tehsil of Phalia from Gujrat district (the largest among the three tehsils 
constituting 38% of the total district population), the Zila Council was left with fifty 
councillors. The break-up with other details is shown in the following table: 
Table: 30 
Profession and vartv affiliation of members (199 1) 
Profession Number Party Affiliation 
P. M. L P. P. p 
Total 
Landlords 31 28 3 31 
Lawyers 5 4 1 5 
Businessmen 3 3 --- 3 
Industrialists 4 4 --- 4 
Ladies 3 3 3 
Peasants 2 2 --- 2 
Labourers I I I 
Minorities I I --- I 
Total 501 461 4 50 
Source: Details from the A. D. P of the Council for 1993-94 
It appears from the above that an absolute majority belonged to the dominant 
Makhdooms group. The opposition being too few had little to effect the council 
proceedings. A large number of councillors, though politically affiliated with parties 
other than the ruling Muslim League, joined the Makhdoom group for a number of 
reasons. Some of them saw brighter prospects of meaningful achievements compared to 
sitting on the opposition benches, others supported the chairman because he came from 
the same tribe to which their supporters belonged. One councillor had to come in terms 
with the chairman because, through the influence of his family elders, one murder case 
to which the councillor was a party, was amicably reconciled. To many others, joining 
the ruling group was advantageous because they could expect financial support from the 
local MNAs and MPAs all of whom belonged to the ruling Pakistan Muslim League. 
These leuislators received funds under the Tameer-e- Watan (Nation- building) and 
Special Development Plan launched by the Federal and Provincial Governments 
respectively. 
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For this case study, a group of twelve councillors was chosen in such a manner 
that answers to the questions could be had from members with diverse professions, age 
group, academic background, experience and party affiliations. For example, five were 
lawyers, two landlords, two housewives and one each was a journalist, businessman and 
a factory owner. Educationally, seven were graduates, four were intermediate and one 
read upto matric. From the point of view of experience, two respondents were the senior 
most being associated with the system since its inception in 1979, four were elected to 
the council in 1983 (second term), two in 1987 (third term) and the remaining four 
became councillors from the fourth term elections held in December 1991. With regard 
to party affiliation, a majority of them i. e., seven belonged to the Pakistan Muslim 
League, three came from the Pakistan Peoples Party (one being the Opposition leader) 
and two were affiliated with Jama'at-e-Islami. One respondent was in the upper age 
limit i. e., 65 years, one in the group of 45-54, eight in the group of 35-44 and two in 25- 
34. Only one respondent out of twelve, was reported to have undergone a two-week 
training13 programme. Their educational background had a direct bearing on their 
understanding of the 'Green Book' (Punjab Local Government Ordinance). Four of the 
respondents had a full understanding of the rules contained therein, three had partially 
studied the book while the remaining five had not studied it due to their poor knowledge 
of the English language. This, in turn, had some bearing on the exercise of powers by 
the council and its general working condition. Facts to this effect came to light when the 
respondents gave their views with regarding to the working, in general, of the council. 
In all, nine councillors including one from the opposition answered. While admiring the 
government's initiatives ic nvolve local leadership in the administration of local affairs, 
a majority of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction on the way Zila Council was 
functioning. One view was that the council was not working in a democratic manner 
because it was completely subservient to an influential family of the district. The role of 
the chairman was specifically subjected to criticism because his constant absence14 from 
the scene had badly affected the performance of the staff. The state of affairs, in general, 
were explained by one respondent thus: 
The opposition is largely inactive and discouraged in view of the fact that a large 
number of councillors who were elected on the ticket of PPP were obliged to join the ruling 
Muslim League. Weak opposition (consisting of seven members in the house of ninety-four) 
reduced the enthusiasm in council deliberations making the proceedings almost unilateral 
and in contrast to the active role of the opposition in the Municipality of Gujrat. The vice- 
13. The Nawa-e-Baldiat (Monthly), vol. 111, No. 2&3 (Feb-March, 1993), p. 42 reported that over four 
thousand and five hundred people were trained connected directly or indirectly with the local 
government ever since the promulgation of present ordinance in 1979. Those in the neighbourhood did 
not seem to had benefited from this arrangement. 
14. The chairman was reported to had been looking after the family's business establishments located 
outside the district and was, therefore, unable to attend to his council duties except once or twice ir, a 
week and that for too few hours. 
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chairmen15 who could make the availability, of some responsible figures felt b), all 
concerned, were unable tofill the gapfor want of powers. 1116 
The council, however, complied fully with the statutory requirement of holding a 
session in every two months. The following table illustrates the fact. The details given 
indicate some encouraging trends in terms of the participation of councillors in the local 
decision making process. The attendance of lady councillors was not so encouraging. 
One major and genuine reason given to this phenomenon was the reluctance17 of 
competent women candidates to come forward for elections. Even those elected 
behaved as "stooges" of their male counterparts. 
Table: 31 
Meetinjzs and attendance in the Zila Council of Guirat. 
Date Nature of 
meeting 
Attendance 
(Out of 87) 
Ladies 
(Out of 7) 
Resolutions 
passed. 
30.1.1992 Ordinary 83 2 _ Oath-taking 
22.3.1992 Special 82 4 53 
28.4.1992 Ordinary 80 2 51 
1.6.1992 Or 82 3 80 
24.8.1992 Ordinary 83 5 91 
20.10.1992 Ordinary 81 5 57 
12.12.1992 Ordinary 74 5 71 
23.1.1993 Ordinary 63 5 56 
8.4.1993 Ordinary 76 5 76 
26.5.1993 S ecial 64 3 37 
Total 10 Ave: 77 Ave: 4 Ave: 57 
Source: Minutes Book, Zila Council Gujrat. 
Another lady councillor complained against the poor response given by the 
males to ideas which, according to her, "did not go beyond a lip-service". They did not 
receive regular funds equivalent to those of the male councillors except a fixed 
percentage18 of the annual budget to be utilized on services of women welfare 
throughout the rural district. Keeping in view the relative backwardness and poverty 
scale of rural women- population, this allocation was said to be extremely poor. The 
council's sub-committee on women welfare, like several others, was not effectively 
geared to handle questions falling within its purview. Though, there had been much 
15. The Zila council had two vice-chairmen who represented the other two tehsils of the district i. e., 
Phalia and Kharian having thirty-nine and twenty-six councillors in the house respectively. 
16. Interview with Noor Mohammad Khan, councillor (19.6.1993). 
17. Opinion given in writing by Mrs. Musa Khela, lady councillor, 15.6.1993. She suggested that in order t: ' 
to involve dedicated and public-spirited ladies in the programmes of rural women welfare, a high 
powered special sub-committee, working under the Zila Council, be constituted consisting, apart from 
the sitting lady councillors, of lady social workers of repute. Selected Headmistresses of rural 
educational institutions could also be included through co-option. 
18. Presently, government instructions are to make two percent budget allocations for the welfare of 
women. See Punjab Local Government Ordinance (1979), p. 395 
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enthusiasm in the constitution of sub-committees, but with the exception of few, such as 
Auction and Purchase, the most had been largely inoperational. 19 
The male councillors, on the other hand, were faced with a similar hardships. 
They expressed similar concern with regard to the annual allocation of two hundred 
thousand rupees (equivalent to f4255/-) for a huge constituency of twenty thousand 
people spread over20 the territory of 2-3 Union Councils each consisting of 6 to 8 
villages. This disproportion between the resources available to an individual councillor 
and the quantum of problems faced by constituency people tended to produce poor 
results. The following table depicts the nature and level of development work 
undertaken by individual councillors during 1993-94: 
Table: 32 
A. D. P of Zila Council Guirat for 1993-94. 
Ward 
No. 
Name of Councillor Nature of schemes Estimated 
expenditure 
I Ch. Bashir Ahmad Road-making, Drains, Culvert & Streets 190,000 
2 Ch. Asghar Ali Ghural Earth work, Bridge, Streets, Drains 205,000 
3 Ch. Dilawar Khan Schemes 
-not 
submitted. 190,000 
4 Ch. Fazal Haque Community Centre, Street Drains, Soling 190,000 
5. Malik Mohammad Sadiq Streets, Drains, Soling 190,000 
6. Ch. Azhar Hussain Stone laying 190,000 
7. Deputy Bashir Ahinad Community Centre, Link Road 190,000 
8. Ch. Babar Ali Stone laying 190,000 
9. Azmat Hussain Syed Schemes not submitted. 190,000 
10 Ch. Shifaat Hussain -do- 190,000 
II Ch. Amanullah -do- 190,000 
12 Syed Waqar Hussain -do- 19090001 
Source: Details derived from the A. D. P for the year under review. 
The researcher found that in the above ADP (containing details of schemes to be 
executed in forty-five wards of the district and which the council discussed in its 
meeting held on 29.6.1993), as many as twenty-nine councillors, had not submitted their 
proposals in order to be discussed and incorporated in the ADP. This was indicative of 
the fact that the government instructionS21 for drawing up and execution of the annual 
works programme were not complied with accordingly. The nature of the schemes to be 
executed during the year also revealed that the role of Zila Council in the process of 
rural uplift was not widespread as its attention was confined only to the pavement of 
small streets, constructions of drains and shingles etc. The essential services which are 
considered to be vital in any programme of rural development such as education, health, 
19. The Director General's Inspection Note on the working of the Zila Council Gujrat (March 9-11, 
1991 ), p. 3. It was noted that most of the sub-committees did not convene a single meeting ever since 
their constitution. 
20. Gujrat district consisted of hundred and forty Union Councils and some 1532 villages. With the 
separation of Phalia and Sarai Alamglr (May, 1993) and their subsequent inclusion in District Mandi 
Bahauddin and Jhelum respectively, Gujrat district was left with seventy eight Union Councils. 
Chapter-V under Section 40 of the Ordinance, p. 168. 
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agriculture, economic welfare, livestock and dairy development etc., which have been 
prescribed as basic functions of all zila councils, could not be taken up due, mainly, to 
the resource constraints and limited technical know-how. These vital functions, central 
to be well-being of rural populace, have largely been pre-empted by the provincial 
government's line departments. Reference in this connection may be made to the social 
welfare22 and community development services, in which the role of zila council, 
compared to its counterpart i. e., the Department of Social Welfare, Punjab, was almost 
negligible as revealed from the following table. illustrates. It appears that those 
government instructions which require local councils to earmark two percent of their 
budget allocation for the welfare of women were grossly violated. 23 Evaluation of 
the council records revealed that it had also been a routine affair24 in the past. 
Table: 33 
A comparison in the area of social welfare and communitv development. 
Year Zila Council, Gujrat Rupees. Social Welfare Department, Guirat Rupees. 
1992-93 Amount for distribution 
amongthe social welfare 50,000 Amount for distribution 248,8085 
institutions of the district among Non-Government 
having the strength of Welfare Organization 
eighty-eight. 
Beneficiaries: N. A 
-do- Financial assistance to Financial assistance to widows. 
be provided to Handicrafts 400,000 Beneficiaries: 690 306,4257 
Training Centres established 
at eight different places in 
the district. 
Stipends to students. 409,060 
Beneficiaries: 5 28 
Marriages & treatment of patients. 854,800 
Beneficiaries: 313 
Relief to disabled persons. 107,246 
Beneficiaries: 455 
Registered 750 disabled persons. 475 
were assessed and 170 were provided --- 
with employment. 
Total 450,000 1 692,3448 
Allocations made for the programmes of women welfare stood 0.58% and 1.45% 
during the financial years 1989-90 and 1990-91 respectively. 
A general attitude found among the councillors was that of criticizing the 
government for tightening its control over the exercise of powers by the council. But 
this must be seen in the context the of above, when government instructions were 
clearly set aside, which would have, otherwise, provided much relief to a generally 
A function of the zila council under Section 51 (N) of the Ordinance, p. 320 
23. The council's budget for 1992-93 showed an income of Rs. 717,11000/- out of which the share for 
women welfare @ 2% comes to Rs. 143,4220/- Thus the amount actually spent for the purpose 
showed a deficit of nearly one million. 
24. Director General's Inspection Note .... p. 7 
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neglected section of the community such as orphans, widows, disabled, destitute and 
distressed women. The council had, either, no programme for the betterment of rural 
women, or resources were diverted to some other head of account to meet liabilities. 
Irrespective of the reason, the council's powers in this case were not exercised which 
adversely effected the lot of rural women. Councillors, when asked to comment on the 
quantum of powers under the present ordinance, gave mixed opinions. Six councillors, 
three from each of the two groups stated that the powers available, under the existing 
circumstances, were more than sufficient. They agreed that even the present set of 
powers were not being exercised in an orderly manner, the situation in the district, 
otherwise, would have been different altogether from the point of view of rural uplift. A 
senior councillor, while recalling the first few years of the assumption of charge by 
elected councillors (1979-83), referred to the dedication with which the council affairs 
were handled, as a result of which the resources generated through different sources 
almost trebled. The majority of these respondents confirmed that powers in areas such 
as finance and development were not effectively utilized. Others held the view that in 
view of the existing level of education and experience of elected councillors, the powers 
granted to the council are more than sufficient. They emphasised improvement in other 
aspects related to the exercise of powers such as the development, among the 
councillors, of a correct perception of their role and inculcation of a spirit of public 
service so that issues confronting the council could be handled not from tribal, factional 
or political considerations but from a purely humanitarian perspective. One respondent, 
while pointing to the referral of council decisions for governmental approval and, 
particularly, the government's authority to dissolve the local councils with the stroke of 
a pen, questioned the validity of the existence of these institutions. A consensus of 
opinion, however, prevailed with regard to the adequacy of powers but emphasised the 
need for their accurate, decent and modest exercise so that the common good could be 
achieved. 
Keeping in view the peculiar circumstances in the district, a question with regard 
to the impact of party-politics on the conduct of elections, in general, and the election of 
the chairman, in particular, was asked in the wake of government's policy of non-party 
local government polls (held in December 1991). Ten replies came-- seven from the 
ruling and three from the opposition group. The view held by the majority revealed that 
despite the partyless character of the local council polls, the real battle for the zila 
council was between the Jat and the GuJar tribes, the two influential families in the 
district, represented by the Makhdooms and the Khitmatgars. Unlike the previous 
elections (held in 1979,1983 and 1987 for the first, second and third terms 
respectively), candidates were nominated by the political parties to which these families 
were affiliated. This was so because the family enjoying the support of the government 
party was itself engaged in all sorts of tactics in order to be able to win over the 
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maximum number of council seats. The elections had, thus, become unofficially party- 
based. Still the balance of candidates supported by the opposition was heavier In view 
of the election results which revealed that the strength of government-backed elected 
councillors was less than fifty per cent. Others, affiliated to parties other than the ruling 
Muslim League, opted to join the majority party group in the council for the sake of 
stability and continuity of their five-year term of office. 25 Particularly, the 
indep--lentS26 saw brighter prospects by joining the group enjoying the support of the 
government. In certain cases, candidates who were elected from the platform of 
opposition groups i. e., a large number of People's Party councillors, made up their mind 
to join the ruling Muslim League group. One respondent enumerated the reasons thus: 
"The Muslim League group offered better chances of survival because a government- 
backed defeated candidate happens to be in much better position for the good of his 
constituency27 compared to an elected councillor who (if coming from the opposition) is in 
conflict with the ruling group in the council. Further, the ruling group, having the 
patronage of an influential family (which had its members inducted in both the federal and 
provincial cabinets) proved to be more advantageous in terms of having access to the 
district bureaucracy. Similarly, a new entrant to politics at the local level finds his upward 
movement much facilitated provided he had been successful in meeting the expectations of 
his ward population which, as matter of fact, could be possible if the surrounding 
conditions are supportive. 1128 
The non-party elections paved the way for big families to exercise their 
influence on the electoral behaviour of the rural electorate. As a result of the absence 
from the scene of political parties, biradari considerations became paramount and 
comparatively, the influential figures were preferred on account of their ability to be of 
some relief in crisis situations. Families, biradaris and similar other factors acquired 
prominence as result of partyless polls, the effect of which was far greater on the 
election of chairman and vice-chairmen, which, being a matter of prestige between 
families, is beyond the reach of independent candidates particularly those with meagre 
resources. The chairmanship of a zila council has, after all, become a prerogative of 
influential families who utilize this platform to get the family's new entrants to politics 
trained. This is exactly what happened in zila council of Gujrat. The candidate 
nominated by the family was unquestionably and unconditionally supported by a vast 
majority of the elected councillors irrespective of the nominee's personal leadership 
25. Prior to the fourth term elections (held in December 199i), the Government of Punjab initiated two 
drastic measures whereby dual membership was abolished and the term of office of local councils in 
the province was raised from four to five years. 
26. Independents have come to be known as 'Opportunists' whose primary purpose in contesting election 
from an independent platform is to join a group that appears to be stronger making its majonty heavier 
but at the same time making it internally divided. 
-17. This reminds us of the erstwhile Peoples Programme (launched in December 1988 by the Federal 
Government), the execution of which rested, at the district level, on the officially appointed 
'Administrators' who, in certain cases, were drawn from such party workers who had lost their seats in 
the general elections held in the October of the same year. 
28. Views expressed by Zequat Khan (Advocate), Councillor, 16.5.1993. 
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characteristics in the background of his previous absence of an inclination to politics. 
The influence was not confined to the post of chairmanship but was also extended to the 
election of the two vice-chairmen despite their nominal importance. To this effect, 
details were given by a respondent thus: 
" Apart from the candidate nominated for the chairmanship, there was reached, in 
principle, an agreement with the family bosses that a candidate for one of the posts (to 
represent Phalia sub-division in the zila council) will be selected on merit. This proposal 
had the support of some twenty-two councillors out of thirty-fourfrom the iehsil. Another 
candidate interested in the same position had the support of only six councillors but had 
the advantage of being a brother of an influential MPA from the respective constituenc ' N'. This very relationship became a weakness of the Provincial Minister of Local Government 
& Rural Development who deviatedfrom his earlier commitment of choosing by merit. This 
is how the choice of a party member in the parliament was given precedence over the 
opinion of a majority.,, 29 
Another respondent, while confirming the above state of affairs, added: 
"In fact, a group of twenty-two councillors could not cause that much harin to the paro, 
which a single parliamentarian could do in the provincial government of the Muslim 
League. The decision was thus carried despite the fact that the candidate recommended by 
the MPA was, in no way, eligiblefor the post of vice- cha irmansh ip. -3 0 
The partyless system could have given a chance Lo eligible and talented 
individuals to assume charge of local councils. The emergence of public-spirited 
leadership, a few respondents held, could have contributed towards strengthening the 
foundation of local government in the country. 
The councillors were then asked about the impact of this indirect election of 
chairman on the working of the zila council. Three respondents, two from the ruling and 
one from the opposition group, gave their candid view on the subject. The respondents 
belonging to the ruling group had, in fact, contested the elections from the platforms of 
the People's Party and Jama'at-e-Islami but had subsequently joined the Muslim League 
group for some obvious reasons. 31 Commenting on the impact of indirectly elected 
chairman, the respondents held the view that under the existing circumstances, it was 
neither practicable nor desirable to talk about the election of zila council chairman 
through a direct vote. This could be possible at the level of Union Council only on 
account of its small size and ordinary status. To have this at the level of zila council, the 
prospective candidate will have to be a person of extra-ordinary influence, prestige and 
resource. To them, there was no viable alternate, at the moment, to the method of 
indirect election. The defects, whatsoever, attached with the method in terms of the 
subsequent repercussions, could be overcome through a number of means and over a 
29. From interview with Abdul Aziz Baba, councillor, 30.6.1993. 
Y). From discussion with Khayal Mohammad Khan, Councillor, 30.6.1993. 
3 1. The respondent belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami told the researcher that the Jamaat had only three 
seats in the house of ninety-four. Maintaining, therefore, their independent status could have been of 
no benefit, neither for themselves, nor for the population which they represented. 
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period of time. Education, training and the inculcation of the correct perception of the 
responsibilities of local councillor could go a long way in correcting the existing 
shortcomings. The respondents had a consensus of opinion with regard to the influence 
and resourcefulness which a prospective candidate for chairmanship was required to 
possess as was revealed from the performance of chairman of the Municipality of 
Gujrat32 which was evident from the general lack of discipline in the municipality 
sessions. The respondents felt content with the working of zila council because of the 
support of absolute majority possessed by the chairman, his personal strong social and 
financial background and the warm relationship which he had with the Provincial 
Government's Department of Local Government & Rural Development---a line 
department headed by another member of the family. The chairman, himself foreign 
qualified, 33was regarded to be a balanced individual believing in decency and fair play 
which, indeed, lessened the bad effects of an indirectly elected chairman who happens 
to be leaning on his group of supporters. One respondent, however, seemed critical of 
the role of chairman in that his constant absence from the council had demoralized the 
staff. The offices of the zila council appeared to be (from the point of view of command 
and control operations), a headless institution which, in practical terms, revolved around 
its principal officers. 34Explaining the role of the chairman in handling the affairs of a 
(so-called) non-party council, the respondent said: 
"His (Chairman's) impartiality comes to the limelight the moment he conducts the council 
business. Leing a member of influential family, one of his priorities is to ensure how best he 
could promote the interests of the party with which his family is affiliated. The acceptance 
ofeven a concrete suggestion, particularly by a councillorfrom opposition group, depends 
howfar the proposal is in line with the priorities of the ruling group and the preferences of 
the chairman.,, 35 
Thus from the operational point of view, the zila council had turned virtually 
into a party-based institution where the will of the party majority prevailed. To ascertain 
details with regard to the impact of party-politics on the overall working of the council, 
the councillors were asked what positive or negative impact did this factor have on the 
conduct of council business. Nine replies came i. e., six and three belonging to the 
treasury and opposition benches respectively. The respondents, while giving their views, 
touched several aspects of the council activities. A view held by the majority was that 
the duality in Government's policy pertaining to the conduct of local bodies polls, had 
adversely effected the council working. Parties got replaced by biradari who 
3-'. This time the chairman was drawn from the Aram tribe and he was generally referred to as a working 
class member. 
33. He obtained the Degree of Philosophy from the University of Leeds (UK). 
34. Members of the Punjab Local Council Service and heading such departments in the council like: 
General Secretariat, Finance, Taxation, Public Health, and Building & Works. 
35. Views expressed by Abdul Aziz Baba. 
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manipulated these nurseries of democracy for the promotion of their vested interests. 
Because of the isolation of political parties, the local families exercised their influence 
to have more and more like-minded people inducted into the system. The general trend 
of the electorate, on the other hand, to vote for those candidates enjoying the support of 
the government got confirmed. The elected councillors, too, found it feasible on account 
of their partyless candidature, to join the group of prospective chairman for reasons, 
inter alia, the following (in the words of a respondent): 
"... Councillors who do not come upto the expectations of their voters have little chances of 
success in future elections. Voters in the rural areas particularly are least bothered about 
the political affiliations of their representatives. The matter which they are main1j, 
interested in is how quickly does the councillor get their problems resolved. Under these 
circumstances, keeping oneself in the opposition is to put a political career at stake. -36 
This was perhaps a part of the Provincial Government's policy of holding local 
bodies polls on non-party basis so that the councillors elected thus, get automatically 
absorbed into the existing political system. This came true when Gujrat zila council is 
taken as a case study where elected councillors with divergent political backgrounds 
joined the rank of ruling group for one or another reason turning it into an absolute 
majority with only seven members on the opposition benches. Referring, in this 
connection to the influence of local families, one respondent remarked: 
"The dominance of an influential family has deprived it (the council) of independent 
working. Councillors having joined the group, patronized by the family, become bound by 
its party discipline. Thereafter, as a mark of demonstrating loyalty, to the group, they keep 
quiet even if they see some wrong doing. ', 37 
An interesting feature of the zila council was that its chairman, despite being 
elected indirectly, relied more on his family influence rather than his supporters for 
retaining his position exactly in the same manner as was done by the chairman of GUjrat 
Municipality despite the latter's lack of family linkage with the patrons. The councillors, 
therefore, saw it in their larger interest to extend whole-hearted support to a chairman 
whose family had some share in the government at both the federal and provincial levels 
because in that they saw some source of stability for their own survival. Party politics 
did not much effect the councillor's right of access to the council's resources on an equal 
footing. 38 It was confirmed by, at least, four respondents that the past policy of 
discrimination had vanished. One respondent however added: 
"The ruling group does not seem to be much interested in the councils deliberations in that 
they have delegated their collective right of decision-making to the chairman particularly 
36. From intcrview with Noor Dad Khan, Councillor, 4.7.1993. 
37. Noor Mohammad Khan (Advocate). 
38 1n of funds to councillors for development purposes under the ADP for the year 1993-04 The allocat o 
bear witness to the effect. 
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1. n financial matters with the result that decisions on financial matters are taken by him 
unilaterallýv without taking the house into his confidence. This de facto delegation has 
facilitated doing javours to the closed allies by the chairman out of his discretionary 
funds.,, 39 
Discrimination in certain respects was retained insofar the constitution of sub- 
committees was concerned. 40 The council records revealed that out of the total number 
of nine sub-committees, none was headed by an opposition councillor though they did 
have representation on the comparatively less important committees, whereas the trusted 
ones were honoured with membership of the important committeeS. 41 
The way sub-committees functioned and the extent to which members were 
involved in their deliberations was narrated by a respondent having membership on the 
Finance Sub-Committee: 
'Personally I found its deliberations nothing more than a formalLy in that it was the 
Accounts Officer who enjoyed the pivotal position. He used to bring to its meeti . ng certai .n 
read), made proposals, read them outfollowed by a brief explanation and would then ask 
the participants to append their signatures. We would find ourselves mere passi . ve 
spectators with no opportunity being given to make some meaningful contribution. It would 
appear that the whole arrangement is based on some understanding between the chairman 
and the Accounts Officer., 42 
The same respondent also pin-pointed the fact that recommendations prepared 
by these sub-committees have but a little place in the decision-making powers of the 
chairman. A suggestion proposed by the committee with regard to change of venue of 
the proposed Rest House from Kharian to Phalia, the latter being the largest sub- 
division in the district, and the idea of approaching the provincial government for grants 
instead of spending on the said scheme out of the council resources, were both 
summarily turned down. "Sub-committees are, " he continued, "to give an impression 
that an important statutory requirement has been carried into effect whereas, in practical 
terms, they have partially been activated for reasons such as their random constitution, 
involving personal likes and dislikes and the poor enthusiasm to give to their views 
adequate weightage. "43 
It was perhaps a sigh a relief for the respondents belonging to the ruling group as 
they talked about the comparatively peaceful atmosphere in council deliberations in 
contrast with the situation obtaining in the Municipality of Gujrat. Though an 
39. Derived from interview with Dr. Nasim Irfan, Opposition Leader, 21.6.1993. 
40. Constitution of sub-committees, though a statutory requirement, fell within the discretionary power of 
the chairman. The house was only required to accord formal approval to the arrangement in its 
ordinary meeting. 
4 1. The researcher noted that similar practices exist in the British system of local government. In all 24 
committees and 29 sub-committees in the Labour Party dominated Leeds City Council, for instance, 
none was headed by a Conservative Party councillor. Details regaraing membership of Committees 
and Sub-committees provided by the Leeds City Council. 
4", Kh, -al Mohammad Khan, councillor and member, Finance Sub-Committee. 
43. Khayal Mohammad Khan. 
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immediate reason attributable to this phenomenon was the small number of opposition 
members, an equally retarding effect on the morale of the opposition was the improper 
trend on the part of treasury councillors to authorize the chairman to take decisions on 
their behalf on all vital issues which, in fact, were supposed to be taken by the council in 
a corporate manner/as a unified body. This overwhelming influence of a family over 
council affairs coupled with the ruling party's support could have been a source of 
strength for improving the lot of the rural population, but the practices, as revealed from 
the statements of the respondents, suggested that the opportunity was taken to expand 
and consolidate further the hold of the family over the areas serving as constituencies 
for their electoral battle for the several National and Provincial Assembly seats. 44The 
area was stated to have received priority of attention and generous spending combining 
both the government grants and council funds, despite the fact that majority of their 
biradari people were settled in areas other than Gujrat. The researcher was told that the 
authorities turned a deaf ear to the proposal by councillors of spending in the 
proportions of 50,30, and 20 percent in the tehsils of Phalia, Gujrat and Kharian 
respectively. 45 
Unlike the Municipal Committee of Gujrat where, as a result of internal crisis 
within the ruling group, a rift had taken place which parted the two vice-chairmen along 
with a good number of councillors from the chairman, the relationship between the 
incumbents of these two offices in the zila council remained cordial and harmonious. A 
question to this effect was answered by eight councillors i. e., six and two from the 
ruling and opposition respectively. In view of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in 
the council and because J the affiliation of the three important office bearers to the 
Muslim League, there did not arise any sort of confrontation between them. An 
interesting point involved here was that while the chairman belonged to the Jat biradari, 
the two vice-chairmen came from the Gujjar and Arain tribes and were a source of 
strength for the former. The chairman, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to share 
powers with them even while going on a foreign trip despite a formal statutory 
provision46 allowing him to do so. This could, otherwise, develop some kind of working 
relationship between them and, at the same time, could provide for an alternative 
control device over the council affairs during the absence of the chairman from the zila 
council offices. Had one of the vice-chairmen been from a slightly more extensive 
44. It was alleged that huge sums of amount was utilized in the tehsil of Gujrat out of the chairman's 
discretionary funds. The charge could not, however, be got clarified for want of documentary 
evidences and lack of contact with the chairman. 
45. The official statistics also revealed that the three sub-divisions had the population of 765,391 (Phalia), 
530,679 (Gujrat) and 521,019 (Kharian). Though the demand was not in accordance with the 
porportion of the population of the three sub-divisions yet it was thought to be genuine in view of the 
largest population and relative backwardness of Phalia compared to the other two tehsils In the district. 
See 'Humlog', a periodical of the Federal Ministry of Population Welfare (1992), p. 20 
46. Sub-section (10) under Section 37 of the Ordinance, p. 153. 
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opposition, that would have moulded the chairman's approach towards the 
administration of council affairs and could brought him closer to his colleagues in the 
council. The support of an absolute majority and the family's far-reaching influence over 
the council, was a great source of relief for the chairman who mostly stayed outside the 
district looking after the family's business establishments. One respondent explained the 
situation thus: 
"The creation of two posts of vice-chairmen with virtually no powers is to strengthen 
further the position of chairman. This is more than anything else, a device to keep the 
comparatively influential councillors close to the chairman and through them the loyalty 
of other members was kept intact. The latter, however, does not act reciprocallýy, by way 
of involving the former in the exercise of powers. The result is that the vice-chairmen do 
not receive proper training to face eventualities which they are called upon to handle in 
the event of either death of the chairman, removal by a vote of no-confidence or 
resignation. 1147 
What prospects existed to thwart the monopoly of an influential chairman over the 
council affairs by way of exercising a collective check over the exercise of his powers, 
was a question asked of the respondents. Seven replied to the question, five from the 
ruling and two from the opposition group. Most of them narrated the same reasons which 
they had rehearsed in response to the previous questions while referring to the general 
attitude of the chairman to the administration of council affairs. There was a consensus of 
opinion that so far the provision of a free hand to the chairman for the exercise of powers 
was concerned, it was already there. The main deficiency was on the part of councillors 
whose reluctance to ensure the proper use of those powers, for obvious reasons, had 
prevented such an environment from emerging where supremacy of law and not of 
influentials could prevail. The respondents looked at this particular phenomenon from 
different angles. One view was that the accountability of all office-bearers including the 
chairman could be ensured provided the members had access to the information of the 
council which under the existing rules of confidentiality was not possible. 48How could 
one challenge the actions of someone without concrete evidence, was an opinion held by tD 
the respondents. Another view, held by the opposition leader and apparently in sharp 
contrast with the above, was that "had the spirit of exercising a check over the chairman 
been there, the councillors in his group would have not delegated powers to him to be 
exercised on their behalf. "49 An intermediate view was of those who held that the 
47. Zequat Khan (Advocate). Section 28 (3) of the Ordinance provides that the office of chairman or vice- 
chairman shall be filled within thirty days from the date such vacancy Is notified. The Government 
can, however, extend this period for another thirty days. In order to enable the vice-chairman, a 
prospective incumbent of the office, both in the event of casual vacancy and the later filling in of the 
post through election, involvement of the vice-chairman In the exercise of power as a part of his 
training is highly desirable. Z, 
48. The Director General's Inspection Team also noted that none of the quarterly/annual accounts were 
placed before the House despite it being a statutory requirement under the Punjab Local Councils 
(Accounts) Rules, 1981, p. 396 
49. Dr. Nasim Irfan. 
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mechanism was lop-sided in that the councillors, most of them newly elected, found it 
undesirable to develop a confrontation with the chairman over the use of his powers. The 
alleged over-spending in one of the three sub-divisions was cited as an example known to 
everyone but the courage to challenge such discrimination with full vigour was lacking. 
Some gave a moderate explanation to this situation by saying that the councillors were not 
altogether passive spectators. Some of them had been questioning the validity of different 
measures initiated by the chairman. The major obstacle faced by the new local leaders 
was their poor educational background. Apart from this, certain commitments which they 
wanted to materialize at any cost, made them absolutely dependent on the chairman 
because a harmonious relationship with the chairman was considered to be a pre-requisite 
for the pursuit of those goals. A stage, in their opinion, will certainly arrive when, with 
improved education and training and development of a participatory zeal, councillors 
would be able to work with the chairman on equal footing. To achieve this, another 
respondent held, the continuity of the system, guarantees with regard to the regular 
periodic elections based on party politics and the assurances of government's non- 
interference in the local councils were sine qua non. A respondent from opposition 
remarked: 
"It rather seems premature to speak about achieving a balance between the exercise of 
power by the chairman and a collective check by the councillors at this stage and 
particularly at the local level when such traditions are yet develop at the higher levels of 
our democratic institutions. -50 
Which channel did the members find effective for benefiting from the council 
resources? The question was answered by three councillors, all belonging to the ruling 
group. While confirming that no discrimination was done against anyone, insofar as the 
formal allocation of funds for development purposes was concerned, the respondents did 
agree on the significance of informal channels for having favour of the chairman. This 
depended on the closeness of the relationship with the chairman which most of the 
councillors already had. Though the councillors relied on the formal allocations from the 
council, as a result of the attitudinal change, the problem of imbalance between local 
demands and available resources was a major issue faced by everyone. To cope with this, 
certain members approached the chairman5l while others had been successful in their 
contacts with party MNAs and MPAs. 
A cursory view of the financial documents of the zila council, on the other hand, 
revealed an encouraging trend of upward movement which is illustrated from the table. 
An analysis of the financial data (as shown in Fig: 6) reveals that a steady growth in the 
income generating capacity for the first two years. The following two years showed a 
reverse position which, though, slightly improved next year (1987-88). 
50. From intcrview with Mohammad Bilal (Advocate), councillor, 17-6.1993 
5 1. One respondent told the researcher how he managed to get an important road linking the market place 
with sevcral villages repaired with the special financial assistance sanctioned bv the chairman. 
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Fig: 6 
Contribution of important taxes in the income generation of Zila 
Council Gujrat. 
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In 1990-91 it declined again but improved significantly over the preceding years. 
The major shortfall in 1993-94 was on account of the division of the distriCt52as a result 
of which Gujrat was left with two out of three sub-divisions. An encouraging trend 
successfully maintained by the zila council throughout this period was the larger 
proportion of funds earmarked for development purposes. This was despite the fact that 
the council incurred heavy expenditure on the establishment charges. 53 
Among the taxes occupying a vital position in the overall resource generation of 
54 the council are Tax on the Transfer of Immovable Property, Export Tax, and Cattle Fair. 
They collectively generate seventy to ninety-five percent of the total revenue. Fig: 7 
illustrates the share of these over a period of nine years. 
The details exhibit a somewhat fluctuating situation, as insofar, the buoyancy of 
these taxes is concerned. The apparent improvement in the income through these taxes in 
the year 1991-92 was due to the revised levy on Immovable Property TaX. 550n the other 
hand, the year 1993-94 proved to be a period of major financial set-back to the council in 
that the delimitation of the boundary of the district affected both income and expenditure. 
How far were the existing taxation powers used to enhance the resource base of 
the council in terms of introducing new taxes and revising the rates of existing ones? This 
question was answered by five councillors -- all from the ruling liroup. They narrated the 
difficulties lying in the way of an effective exercise of financial powers. Two respondents 
referred to the reluctance which the council was exhibiting in introducing new taxes or 
initiating measures to keep their rates in line with the inflation in that it could provoke 
anger on the part of tax payers. Particularly, they confessed, the council was not 
successful in providing an adequate return of services for the taxes people were paying to 
the council. Other respondents referred to the unsound and ineffective tax collection 
machinery and particularly, the council's reliance on private contractors for the collection 
of council taxes which had certain inherent defects such as the method of auctioning the 
collection right of taxes and the lack of powers to the chairman to deal with the defaulters. 
52. The Government of the Punjab issued two notifications dated 14.6.1993 and 1.7.1993. The former 
declared the merger of Sarai Alamgir Police Station and Pabbi Hills with the District of Jhelum while 
the latter detached Phalia--the largest tehsil in Gujrat, and included in the newly created District of 
Mandi Bahauddin in the same GuJranwala Division. 
53. The budgetary figures for the year 1992-93 revealed that out of the total expenditure of Rs. 
715,21000/- an amount of Rs. 239,26000/- (33%) was spent on the salaries of employees, strength of 
which rose to 770 by that year. 
54. Export Tax, a reý, ised version of the Terminal Tax levied under the Bombay District Municipal Act 
1901, is assessed presently on the gross weight of a consignment including packing and other 
containers at the point of its exit from the boundaries of a district and is levied only on consignments 
by road. 
55. The rate was increased from two and a half to five per cent which (effective August 1991 ) doubled the 
incorne of the zila council from this source. 
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Fig : 
Source: Figures derived from the budget statements of the appropriate years. 
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Despite the advantages of privatising the right of tax collection, the fact remains 
that under certain circumstances the strategy caused adverse effects to the overall 
financial health of the council. In this connection, the following observations made in a 
similar study equally applies to the zila council situation: 
'Privatisation of tax collection is advantageous in that the council which mostlýy has to self- 
finance its expenditures, comes to know in advance about the expected level of revenue 
from a major source like the Immovable Property Tax and the Export Tax. But the adverse 
implications of the privatized right of collection causes, sometimes, significant financial 
losses when cartels of contractors are formed and jurisdictions allocated among members 
of these cartels. Under such a situation, the council faces difficull), in achieving the 
minimum target of growth rate through the auctioning process. 156 
One respondent referred to the inequitable distribution of financial resources 
between the provincial and local gcvernment institutions in that certain taxes of a local 
nature have been pre-empted by the provincial government and the transference of which 
or a reasonable share from them could strengthen the financial health of the council. 
Some irregularity in the payment to the council of the local rate57 by the provincial 
government was also pointed out. The researcher, in a scrutiny of the financial records, 
discovered that the crux of the problem lies in the unsound financial management i. e., 
noor assessment and collection methodology etc., as a result of which targets fixed in 
respect of different taxes are, sometimes, realized and, in others, not. 
The amounts shown under the term 'Estimated' refers here to the accepted bid on 
which the respective tax was leaý-d out for the year. Among the taxes enumerated therein, 
only the local rate and one of the license fees namely Registration Fee, charged from the 
contractors, are collected departmentally, the rest are leased out to private contractors for 
collection for a period of one year. The Immovable Property Tax which brings a lion's 
share to the exchequer of the council showed fluctuating trends over the years. The 
column indicating actual amounts sometimes exceeds and sometimes is less than that 
estimated. On occasions when collections exceeded estimates it was due to the 
termination of the contract sometime during the year either on account of the refusal of 
the contractor to continue the contract or a violation of the deed of agreement by the 
contractor. In such a situation, the council had to make departmental arrangements for the 
collection of the respective tax for the remaining period of the year. Thus the amount that 
could have been earned by the contractor as his net profit, is credited to the account of zila 
council. Similarly, the lower recovery compared to the estimated figure was because of 
56. Aisha Ghaus and Hafiz A. Pasha, A Model of Municipal Finances in Karachi, Karachi, University of 
Karachi (A. E. R. C), 1990, pp. 48-49. 
57. Section 136 of the Ordinance says that all agricultural lands situated within the local area of a zila 
council shall be subject to payment of local rate to be charged at a rate to be fixed by the government Zý 
from time to time. The proportion of the rate to the land revenue and rent in a district does not exceed 
fifty per cent. At present, the provincial government's revenue department assesses and collects and 
credits to the fund of zila council. In turn, the council pays an amount equivalent to three per cent of 
the local rate as remuneration for the collection of local rate. 
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three reasons. 58 Firstly, the contractor's failure to deposit regular monthly instalments and 
the amount becoming arrears by the end of year. Such cases were referred to the deputy 
commissioner for settlement through powers available to him under the Land Revenue 
Act. Secondly, the exemption of certain items by the government from the levy of tax. 
Thirdly, the contractor's approach to the government, and of course recommended by the 
council, for the grant of remission on grounds such as natural calamities (floods, 
earthquake, hailstorm etc. ), strikes and unstable conditions due to political crisis. 
It was also observed that though a greater percentage of the budget was allocated 
for development purposes, a lion's share of the non-development expenditure was 
consumed by the salaries of the staff. A cursory view of the expenditures (shown in 
Table: 34) incurred on each department of the council and the annual percentage increase, 
though, in certain cases due to the increase in existing strength of the staff (as shown in 
parentheses wherever applies), indicates that the increase ranged (during 1991-92) 
between 22 and 51 per cent. The total amount spent on establishment charges reached to 
the tune of Rs. 1408,7000/- during 1990-91 thus constituting 37% of the total expenditure 
during the year. 59This abrupt increase occurred due to a number of measures initiated by 
the government. First, the supervision of all rural dispensaries, health centres and 
vaccination units, heretofore, under the control of District Health Officer (though 
financed by the council) was transferred to the zila council and for which the government 
created a new post of Zila Council Health Officer and subsequently made appointments 
60Secondly, the organizational structure of the council was enlarged and postings thereon. 1j 
by including a few additional posts to it, such as one lady doctor with staff for the mobile 
dispensary, oie deputy chief officer, one assistant accounts officer, one town planning 
officer, two sub-engineers and staff for the newly created water and sanitation branch. 61 
Apart from these, the government's decision to increase prices of essential commodities 
also necessitated the council to give some financial relief to the staff. The creation of the 
several gazetted posts by the government merits consideration. Though information could 
not be ascertained whether similar changes were brought about to the structure of other 
local councils. In the case of the zila council, however, it appeared a political rather than 
an administrative exigency. Most probably the government, in order to reduce the 
58. The Accounts Officer, in his interview held on 16.5.1993 narrated the causes of surplus and deficit 
recovery. 
59. From the budget statement of the Zila Council Gujrat for 1991-92, pp. 1-3. 
60. Power to create posts under Local Council Service rests with the provincial government only. Even in 
the case of non-LCS posts, the powers to amend the schedule of establishment could be exercised by 
the council with the sanction of the government. See Schedule of Establishment Rules 1981, Punjab 
Local Government Ordinance (1979), pp. 302-6. 
61 1 The council budget statement for 1992-93 reveals that three posts of Water and Sanitation Promoters 
in BPS-5 %vere created involving an annual expenditure of Rs. 72000/-. It was despite the government's 
instructions to the Provincial Public Health Engineering Department to take over all rural water 
schemes from the local councils which came true in 1991. 
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pressure on it for tackling massive unemployment, shifted the burden onto the local 
council exchequer. 
The separation of tehsil Phalia from Gujrat and its inclusion with the new district 
of Mandi Bahauddin had little effect on the capability of the zila council to attend to the 
problems of the rural population. The population of the zila decreased by 42 per cent 
reducing the annual income at the same time by 43 per cent. 62 Thus the per capita 
allocation in the budget for 1993-94 was rupees eighteen. 63With this negligible amount, 
how the gigantic task of rural uplift could be undertaken, is evident from the details given 
in Table: 35. It can be observed from details given therein that the largest share of the 
development expenditure which itself fluctuated between 55 and 62 per cent of the total 
expenditure of the council, was consumed by construction and repair of roads. This was 
followed by rural dispensaries which included both provision of medicines and 
construction of building and repair works. The veterinary dispensaries received about the 
same level of allocations with the similar pattern of expenditure. Allocations to these two 
services were significantly enhanced in 1992-93 when rupees 1.2 million and one million 
were earmarked for the purchase of medicines for rural dispensaries and veterinary 
dispensaries respectively. The allocations for building and repair also improved. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the establishment cost on these two services were 
several times higher64than the amount spent on the provision of the actual service to the 
local population. The council's lack of interest in the provision of drinking water could be 
determined from the recommendations of the Finance and Planning Sub-committee which 
proposed the constitution of special committee to report on the question how could the 
council get rid of the scrvice which consumed expenditure but gener. 1ted no income. 65 
Surprisingly, education remained throughout at the bottom of the list, consuming only 
0.5% of the total development expenditure. A significant improvement in 1990-91 was 
not due to some prioritization of the service but a special grant of five hundred thousand 
rupees to a public school. The marginal allocation for education was utilized mainly on 
the distribution of scholarships to college and secondary school students. Thus the role of 
the council, which during the early years had control over the establishment and 
maintenance of primary schools in the district, was restricted to the provision of a tiny 
amount to a selected number of students. A key role in the provision of these essential 
services remained within the sphere of provincial line departments as is shown in 
table: 36. 
62. See the difference between the estimated income for the years 1992-93 and 1993-94 in Table: 8. 
63 1 The budget allocated Rs. 1901,7100/- for development purposes which constituted 47% of the total 
expenditure of Rs. 405 1,0000/- 
64. Budget statistics of the yoar 1992-93 revealed that the total amount allocated for health and veterinary 
services were rupees 8.614 million and 7.516 million respectively. 
65. A total expenditure of Rs. 585,500/- was incurred on water supply during 1993-94 and with no 
income. See budget statement of the ZCG., p. 22. 
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Apart from education where the influence of the education department remained 
overwhelming, the role of the zila council in other vital areas was marginal. In health, for 
example, though the success of the council could not be determined for lack of sufficient 
data in terms of the percentage of beneficiaries out of the total rural population, the 
number and nature of health institutions established and maintained by the zila council, 
compared to those of the Department of Health, is indicative of the fact that much is 
needed , be done to enable the council to provide an adequate standard of health service. 
The capability in road construction or repair of the existing ones alsC seemed to be 
marginal in view of the amount spent over a period of five years which, by average came 
to rupees 19.29 million annually covering some 1532 villageS66 spread over an area of 
about 3643 square kilometres. The rural drainage scheme, one of the vital components of 
the rural development programme was previously the task of the rural development wing 
of the provincial department of local government. The government spent, in all the eleven 
constituencies of the district through the respective members of the provincial assembly, 
an amount of Rs. 308.81 million on one hundred and two schemes of rural drainage 
during 1992-93. These sch%-. mes were identified by the elected members under the Social 
Action Programme67and processed further by the District Development Advisory Board. 
The widespread involvement of national and provincial level pa"liamentarians in the 
developmental activities undermined significantly the role of the zila council in the 
process of rural development in that it shifted both the identification of schemes and their 
execution from the ambit of the zila council to elected parliamentarians and numerous 
provincial government line departments respectively. The respondents, when asked to 
comment on the government's initiative of involving parliamentarians into the process of 
rural uplift, gave mixed reactions, some supporting the idea while others opposed it 
bitterly. Ten responses were given, involving the representation of the ruling and 
opposition groups by seven and three respectively. A general opinion held by the 
respondents was that instead of strengthening the capability of district councillors, in view 
of their greater familiarity with the nature of local problems, in the identification of 
schemes and their execution, this parallel arrangement consisting of the MPAs as its 
important component, is an encroachment into the functional jurisdiction of the zila 
council. An elderly councill-)r, having had the privilege of participation in local politics 
since 1965, placed on record the following observations: 
"This strategy (participation of the National and Provincial Assembly members in 
construction and development sorts of works) has, on the one hand, diverted the attention 
of these legislators from their primary task of legislation and has, on the other, led to the 
66. Gujrat District Gazetteer, Publication of the Deputy Commissionarate, n. d., p. 3 
67. The Social Action Programme (S. A. P) was launched during 1992-93. It aimed to address the neglect 
of basic social services in co-ordinated and concerted manner. It focussed on the need of basic 
cducation, primary health, nutrition, family planning, rural water supply and sanitation. Its Cý 
implementation was primarily the responsibility of the provinces. Beside, a number of programmes 
were launched with a focus on women's uplift and rural development. 
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development of a dilutor), situation where duplication and overlapping have become the 
major characteristics of the local development process. This phenomenon has caused 
damage to the sometime vital position of the zila council. The truth is that it is more a 
politically motivated, rather than a development-oriented, device which is designed to 
achieve desired political objectives particularly by way of floating funds in the name of 
development at a time close to the general elections.,, 68 
The ineffectiveness of the district councillors in the development process was due 
to the insufficient technical and financial resources whereas their counterparts i. e., the 
MPAs had enough funds as well as collaboration of the professional ized lines 
departments. An MPA representing a constituency only four times larger than that of the 
district councillor was allocated funds which were twenty-five times greater. 69 Fig: 8 
illustrates the government's attitude towards the local council in comparison to the 
members of parliament. 
N. B: The district of Gujrat has five and eleven seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan 
and Provincial Assembly of the Punjab respectively. The funds allocated to the 
parliamentarians under various programmes launched by the Federal and Provincial 
Governments differed in quantum. For example, an MNA received fifteen million while the 
MPA got five million rupees. Under special circumstances, this amount could be revised 
considerably. In the table, however, the actual amount fixed under the government policy 
has been shown. 
It was pertinent to note that the respondents, irrespective of their group 
affiliations, looked critically at the involvement of the parliamentarians in development 
functions. They regarded it a major reason of the government's inattention towards the 
strengthening of local government because the legislators' support to the govemment 
carried much w,. -ight compared to that of the councillors. The legislators' role, in the 
perspective of local level development, was regarded as a 'mere wastage of time and 
resources' in that neither the initiators of the schemes were able to get their works 
supervised nor could they see them, under the circumstances, completed because of the 
rapid change of government. To save local development programmes from all such 
eventualities, the respondent emphasised the need for the establishment of a fresh 
mechanism whereby programmes of rural uplift could be identified and executed by 
giving a pivotal role to the zila council. Supporting this, a respondent said: 
The legislators have linked these activities (works of construction and local welfare) 
with their popularity and the chances of their success in the elections are evaluated in 
terms of the achievements they have made towards the enhancement of services and 
solution of problems of local nature. On this very ground, contestants for the national and 
provincial assemblies run their election campaign and seek a mandatefrom. the electorates. 
Members of the zila council, on the other hand, are not inferior to the MPAs in talent and 
the ability to cope with the local demands. The irony is that their potentials have not been 
fully exploited and utilized in the process of rural uplift. Their performance could be far 
68. Noor Mohammad Khan. 
69, A district councillor and an MPA received 0.20 and five millions respectively. 
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more better compared to the MPAs in view of their greater understanding of the nature of 
local problems and peculiarities of local circumstances. , 70 
The greatest disadvantage of the utilization of huge government funds through the 
MPAs has been the relative backwardness of local councillors in seeking practical 
training and expertise in order to be able to participate effectively in the formulation of 
local plans. The existing government funds forthcoming for rural development 
programmes are beiig randoMly7l utilized by the MPAs short of integration with the local 
councillors, on the one hand, and MPAs of the neighbouring constituencies, on the other. 
The participation of the parliamentarians in the process of rural development has, 
however, been a source of relief for the councillors as was revealed from the expressions 
of several respondents belonging to both the groups. While the council resources were too 
meagre to meet the local demands, the goodwill demonstrated by the respective MPAs 
towards the councillors in terms of accommodating their genuine proposals into their own 
set of schemes enabled the latter to undertake works over and above their financial 
capability. However this collaboration, though informal in its kind, did not benefit those 
councillors whose party affiliations differed. The number of beneficiaries was, however, 
substantial. It was confirmed by, at least, five respondents that with the co-operation of 
local MPAs they were able to seek solution to problems which could have, otherwise, 
been impossible to resolve. Certain factors caused this collaboration to happen. 72Apart 
from paternal ties, from which benefitted, at least, one councillor, the basis of this 
collaboration varied from councillor to councillor. Second in importance was the party 
affinity which benefitted a large number of respondents in view of the absolute majority 
of MPAs and local councillors which the ruling Muslim League had in the district. A 
third factor was the usefulness of the councillors to the respective MPAs in terms of 
conducting the election campaign of the latter. Of all these, the immediate factor 
compelling the councillors to make a recourse to the local MPA was the wide gap 
between the available resources and the magnitude of local demands. 
70. Abdul Aziz Baba. The interviewee narrated how two sitting members of the National Assembly and 
Provincial Assembly announced, while conducting their election campaigns, their plan to spend large 
funds for the solution of certain pressing local problems. 
7 1. The opposition leader in the zila council narrated how the route of a rural road, constructed with the 
MPA fund and initially meant to interlink several of the villages and small settlements on the left of 
Bhimber Road leading to Azad Jammu & Kashmir, was constructed in such a way which benefitted a 
few local notables at the expense of a large number of the rural population. 
72. One respondent, also a member of the influential Choudhri family, narrated how his father, an MNA., 
and elder brother, an MPA., and provincial minister, helped him in undertaking schemes of vital 
significance such as construction of school buildings, roads and small bridges, supply of electricity and 
installation of a telephone exchange. Another councillor benefitted fron, the said provincial minister in 
getting a local secondary school upgraded to the level of higher secondary with a cost of three million 
rupees. Sii-nilarly, another councillor asked an MNA and MPA, because of his efforts in their electoral 
campaigns, to provide electricity to certain villages and expand the size of one primary school by 
constructing a few additional class-rooms. 
N" 
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Fig: 
Financial strength of the national and provincial parliamentarians and 
the district councilors towards the programmes of rural uplift in the 
district of Gujrat. 
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192 
The councillors, despite disliking the idea of involving parliamentarians in 
development works, were of the opinion that disassociating them, at this stage, from the 
process seemed improbable. Before the stage arises where a clear line of demarcation 
could be drawn between the functional jurisdiction of the zila council and other agencies 
of development, certain steps aimed at collaboration between elected representatives of 
different levels warranted immediate attention. This arrangement, in the opinion of 
respondents, could assume various forms. First, a certain percentage of the funds 
allocated to MNAs and MPAs in the district, should go to the account of the respective 
zila council to be utilized on schemes identified and designed by it. Secondly, the 
government, at the federal level, should develop a policy guide-line stating the kind of 
schemes to be undertaken by the zila council, MPA, NINA and the Senators. Thirdly, the 
participation of elected members in the process of local development required some kind 
of institutionalized arrangement at the divisional or more preferably at the district level. A 
District Planning and Advisory Board, consisting of the elected representatives of 
different levels in the district, managerial and technical experts from different line 
departments could serve the purpose in a meaningful way. The board should formulate a 
comprehensive prograrnme of action by way of an extensive field survey of the region. 
Pooling together of the meagre and scattered resources could go a long way in eradicating 
the present bottle-necks in the development process of the local areas. 
The lack of an effective co-ordination, which could have otherwise reduced the 
problem of duplication and jurisdictional overlapping, was a major obstacle. Horizontally, 
the linkage with the district based functionaries of government departments and, 
vertically, with other local councils in the rural areas (i. e., Union Councils) was virtually 
non-existent. The statutory requirement of having a Divisional and District Co-ordination 
Committee73 seemed to have not been taken seriously. Particularly, in the case of the zila 
council, this became a vict-n of party politiCS. 74 An encouraging practice, on the other 
hand, was some kind of contact which the zila council was able to establish with the line 
departments by asking the officers concerned to attend council meetings whenever their 
presence was deemed essential to clarify matters pertaining to the working of their 
respective departments. The record of the council proceedings revealed that the concern 
voiced by the councillors were mainly related to the inefficiency and poor service delivery 
73. Section 160-A of the Ordinance, p. 533. 
74. The researcher was told that following the general elections of 1985, some structural changes in the 
organization of District Co-ordination Committees took place in the province as the MNAs and MPAs 
from the district were given membership on it. The chairman of zila council who, heretofore, used to 
head the committee, was replaced by an MPA. In the case of Gujrat, a member of the Influential 
Choudhri family happened to combine the three positions i. e., chairmanship of the DCC and the zila 
council apart from membership in the provincial legislature. Soon a tussle started with an MNA who 
was also interested in the chairmanship of DCC., and was able to won it. This widened the 
confrontation between the supporters and opponents of the newly elected chairman and the result was 
thai. no single meeting of the committee could be convened. 
193 
on the part of a few government departments. 75 The participation of these government 
officials, who were most of the times represented by junior officers, was not regular. 
Though it provided a channel where answers to the queries could be sought from the 
officers attending the meeting, yet it could not prove a substitute for co-ordination which 
obviously envisages the observance of certain formal principles on the part of those 
whose efforts are to be integrated for the accomplishment of pre-determined objectives. 
T.,, _ same was true about 
liaison with the MNAs and MPAs of the district as a result of 
which duplication in development works became inevitable. 76 Si-iilarly, there did not 
exist any linkage with the Union Councils at the grassroots level. The researcher 
happened to visit two union councils in the outskirts of Gujrat City77 to detcrmine the 
impact of this lack of co-ordination on their working. The conclusions drawn are 
illustrated in the table (No. 37). 
The respondents confirmed that the co-ordination with government departments 
was effective only during the first few years of the promulgation of the present 
ordinance. 78The existing liaison, though restricted to the answering by the government 
officers of the questions raised by the councillors during council session, could be made 
more effective, had the chairman been a full-time functionary. Concern voiced and 
grievances faced by the local population could be easily got redressed through the C, 
personal involvement of the chairman in view of his accessibility to the provincial 
ministers and, in certain cases, to the provincial chief minister. The respondents, while 
expressing their views about co-ordination with the Union Councils, looked opposed to 
the very existence of these institutions because of the factional rivalry which develop on 
the occasions of local bodies polls and every periodic elections renewed and widened it 
further. Electioneering at the lowest level, according to them, had caused damage to the 
goodwill, fraternity, solidarity and brotherhood --- sometime characteristic features of the 
village life. In view of the passive character of the union councils i. e., particularly the 
nature and quantum of work undertaken by them, it was suggested that the election of a 
single individual with the direct vote of the people was enough. The candidate so elected 
could serve in dual capacities i. e., chairman of the union council concerned and as an ex- 
75. The minutes of the ordinary meeting held on 8.4.1993 revealed that in all fourty-six questions were 
raised, most of which related to the working of the Departments of Health, Education, Highways and 
Irrigation. 
76. On one occasion, a councillor suggested to the House that a sub-committee be constituted to have 
liaison with the MNA/MPAs so that the zila council does not spend money on such schemes which are 
undertaken with the funds of the legislators. Likewise, the legislators do not spend their funds on 
schemes which have been included in the zila council's A. D. P. (Resolution No. 85 of the council 
meeting held on 28.4-1992). 
77. The Union Councils studied were Madina Sayyadan and Addowal. 
78. The District Co-ordination Committees during those years were headed by the chairmen of zila 
councils and the district based government functionaries were to strictly ensure their attendance in its 
sessions. 
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officio member of the zila council to represent there his respective constituenCy. 79 The 
deputy commissioner exercised some powers in respect of the zila council but was not 
much helpful in seeking co-ordination with the line departments which, in the past, used 
to be his pivotal role as the head of both district counciJ80 and the district administration. 
Five respondent, all from the ruling group, gave identical views with regard to the extent 
the deputy commissioner was helpful towards the smooth functioning of the zila council. 
Their opinion could be summarized as under: 
"His approach to the zila council affairs, under normal circumstances when the provincial 
government and the council in the district of his posting are governed by the same political 
party, is based onfriendliness, sympathy and co-operation irrespective of his personal likes 
and dislikes, He assumes a violent attitude in the wake of a political change at the 
provincial level. He then concentrates on bringing about a change in the lo-valty of 
councillors towards the new government. "81 
It would, however, be incorrect to presume that the deputy commissiener had no 
powers to exercise in connection with the zila council. In fact, both the divisional 
commissioner and the deputy commissioner exercised powers on certain aspects of the 
council working. The following instances illustrate the position: 
a). The chairman, zila council, in his letter No. 904/A. 0 dated. 23.5.1990 entitled "Grant of 
permission for moving over to next grade, " asked the divisional commissioner to accord the 
requisite sanction. 
b). The Chief Officer, in his letter No. 1005/RK dated. 4.6.1990 entitled "Complaint against Medical 
Technician, " requested the divisional commissioner to place the employee under suspension so that 
an enquiry against him could be initiated in view of his alleged absence from duty since April 
1986. 
c). The divisional commissioner appoints Health Technician (BPS: 11) and then places his services at 
the Jisposal of the chairman, zila council for posting. The employee so posted is required to submit 
his arrival report to the District Health Officer. 
d). The chairman, in his letter No. 341/RK dated. 22.1.1991 entitled "Grant of leave on medical 
ground, " forwarded an application of a Rural Health Inspector to the divisional commissioner for 
the grant of leave to him for a period of one month. 
e). The divisional commissioner, in response to the chairman's letter No. 1357 and 1358 both of 
5.9.1992, accorded sanction to declare an amount of Rs. 60,000/- allocated to a Patient Welfare 
Association and in respect of a female patient as valid charge on the funds of the zila council. 
d). The divisional commissioner was approached to declare an amount of Rs. 106589/- spent on 
lunches served to the participants of the zila council meetings of April 28 and May 28,1992 as 
valid charge on the zila council fund. 82 
79. From interview with Iqbal-uddin Khan (Advocate) and ex-councillor. He proposed that the adoption 
of this scheme would make the election process more understandable to the grassroots electorates 
many of whom, while casting two ballot-papers at a time one each for the candidate of Union Council 
and the Zila Council, were unable to differentiate between the two. 
80. This refers to the role of deputy commissioner under the erstwhile Basic Democracies system (1959- 
69). 
8 1. Conclusion drawn from the opinions of five interviewees. 
82. Informations derived from the Zila Council's: a). Minutes of meetings; b). Posting/Transfer File, c). 
Local Government Ordinance. 
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In view of the general complaint against the poor performance of certain 
government departments like education, health, communication and agriculture (as was 
also evident from the number of questions put to the respective government officials), the 
respondents were asked what capability did they posses if all these services or a few of 
them were transferred to them gradually to administer? The respondents, representing the 
ruling and the opposition groups by seven and two respectively, expressed with great 
confidence and enthusiasm, their ability to handle these services particularly the first two 
in which most of the zila councils in the province had proved their efficiency when these 
services used to be administered by them during the pre-1985 period. One view held by 
the respondents was that if these services were conveniently carried out by the District 
Council under the Basic Democracies System some thirty years ago, there was no 
question why these could not be undertaken more satisfactorily today. Through the 
involvement of the community and the personal supervision of the councillors, there 
could be greater prospects of an improved condition in the provision of these services. 
The respondents, being aware of the financial and technical limitations, were conscious of 
the difficulties involved and were, therefore, not in favour of a drastic change in 
government policy. Instead, they favoured a phased and gradual transference of these 
subjects so that the prospects of any major breakdown could be avoided. To strengthen 
the capability of the council in undertaking these services in a satisfactory manner, they 
proposed the initiation of certain administrative and financial measures at the initial stage 
of transference of these services to the zila council. These included, firstly, a policy 
statement by the government spelling out in detail the range and extent of activities to be 
performed by the council in respect of a specific service, say for example, the education. 
Secondly, community participation with particular reference to the involvement of experts 
in a given field whose recommendations and opinions could be of much assistance 
towards the formulation 0' strategy by the council. Thirdly, provision by the provincial 
government to the zila council of all necessary financial83and technical assistance which 
could enable the latter to take over the responsibility of administering these services. 
Apart from education and health, the respondents demanded a meaningful role in the 
development of agriculture which, in their opinion, was central to the well-being of the 
rural population. It was preferred over police, communication and water supply. Keeping 
in view the technicalities involved in the development of agriculture, they emphasised 
greater collaboration between the zila council and functionaries of the agriculture 
department. 
The bureaucracy's approach to these demands was, however, opposite. While 
agreeing with the range of powers available to rural councils that could be exercised 
freely for the general welfare of the masses, there was seen some reluctance with regard to 
83. By this they meant the transference to the zila council of the funds allocated in the provincial budgets 
foi- purposes of primary education. 
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the transference of subjects like education and health in view of the existing calibre of the 
elected representatives at the local level. One opinion was that owing to a lack of 
conceptual clarity and capability to prepare operational plans for implementation, 84 there 
was little likelihood that local councils would be able to deliver the required level of 
services. 
f"onclusion 
This case study exhibits a typical example of the landed aristocracy engaged in 
factional and tribal rivalry around which the politics of zila council of Gujrat revolves. 
The tension between the rival groups seemed to have been defused by way of a political 
contest in which no party affiliation was allowed. It was perhaps the success of this 
strategy that enabled the elected members from all factions to join inhesitatingly the 
ranks of the one that enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the party ruling over the 
province. The patrons seemed to have had little influence over the behaviour of the 
members nominated by them for the contest. While keeping the popular mandate could 
have, otherwise, b, ýen helpful in the emergence of a strong opposition capable of 
exercising an effective check over the conduct of council business by the majority 
group, the partyless local body elections paved the way for those who did not bother 
changing their loyalties. Moreover, under the peculiar conditions of the Gujrat district 
where none of the major tribal groups i. e., Jats and Gujjars, had the individual strength 
to gain an ascendency over the other without the active support of the smaller 
communities, the criterion moulding the political behaviour of the latter was based on a 
search for conditions that could guarantee to them peaceful tenure for the period for 
which they were given the mandate. The group enjoying support of the provincial 
government, could best get these ambitions fulfilled. Without this, as it appears from the 
overwhelming majority of the ruling group, the councillors who came from independent 
platforms found themselves nowhere. This very situation reflected the lack of a political 
environment guaranteeing opportunities for survival and fair treatment to all irrespective 
of political affiliations. Such a situation could have enabled the elected councillors to 
honour the peoples' mandate without much embarrassment. 
The study als, ) reveals the fact that instead of using the local council platform for 
the inculcation of truly democratic behaviour, the promotion of the vested interests of 
local influentials was given preference over all other considerations. The situation 
assumed added significance when one of the influential groups happened to be a partner 
in running the provincial administration. Irrespective of the factors leading to the 
development of such a situation, the opportunities available to the influential group 
were not fully exploited in order to transform the half-hearted loyalty of the councillors 
who, despite their divergent political backgrounds, opted to join the group with which 
84. From intervievv w-ith Khayal Mohammad Khan, the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat. 
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they shared few common interests. Reasons could be numerous, but the lack of 
commitment, failure to designate a dynamic leadership capable enough to administer the 
affairs of a council that represented a population of eighteen hundred thousand were the 
central ones. Financial constraints were, undoubtedly, there but the lack of a formal 
mechanism did not allow the pooling together of the resources being spent by elected 
representatives of different levels. This was despite, in few cases, having a common 
political background. The proper utilization of these scattered resources could have 
benefitted a large segment of the rural popuiation. These parallel endeavours for 
development gave way to duplication and jurisdictional encroachment. 
On the performance of the zila council, in general, there was a feeling of 
dissatisfaction. This was revealed in from the expressions of few prominent members of 
the ruling group. An improvement could have been made in terms of both enhancing the 
financial base and ensuring economic and honest utilization of the available resources. 
This, of course, needed certain initiatives directed towards effective internal liaison 
particularly between the councillors and the staff on the one hand, and the taxation and 
works departments, on the other. It is here that a leadership, dedicated to the affairs of the 
council, could have been of pivotal significance. A strong opposition, which for obvious 
reasons did not exist, could provide a basis of constant check over the performance of the 
ruling group. But its negligible size prevented it from causing a threat to the hegemony 
which the ruling group had acquired. Apart from the internal drawbacks, the government's 
loose monitoring and evaluation system was also responsible for the council's poor 
performance. Tightening governmental control over questions such as asking the council 
to conduct its operations strictly in accordance with the rules of business, was not 
attended to. For instance, the Ordinance makes it incumbent upon the government to 
inspect the working of the local council 'at least once in a financial year'85but in the case 
of the zila council, a gross violation of the rule occurred in that the inspection conducted 
in April 1988 was followed by another in March 1991, involving thus an internal period 
of thirty-four months instead of twelve. Likewise, the use of sub-committees was not 
sufficiently encouraged which could, otherwise, develop a sense of participation in the 
elected element as a whole. Similarly, through the proper application of statutory 
provisions to other aspects of the council's working, an environment capable of 
delivering services to an acceptable level could be ensured. These hampered the 
operations of the council and despite having a role which was restricted to few of the long 
list of functions, a level of satisfactory performance could only partially be achieved. An 
alarming factor in the working of the zila council was the deficient system of taxation and 
particularly, the machinery responsible for the collection of taxes. Fluctuations in the 
level of recovery remained a source of uncertainty. In view of the overall situation 
obtaining in the council's working, it could be stated that mlich was needed to be done in 
order to enable the zila council to be an effective partner in the implementation of rural 
development programmes which the Government in Pakistan has been launching. 
85. Section 154 (1) of the Ordinance, p. 529. 
Chapter Six 
The District Council of Mardan 
Case Study No. 4 
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Situated in the most fertile part of the Peshawar valley, Mardan is the sixth 
largest district in the North-Western Frontier Province. Out of the total district 
population (1981 census) of 881,465, rural Mardan consists of 715,163 (81.13 percent)'. 
Prior to the bifurcation of the district in July 1988 as a result of which the tehsil of 
Swabi separated and was declared a district headquarters, Mardan was considered to 
possesses the most fertile land in the province as almost eighty percent of the rural work 
force depended on farming. 2 Spread over an area of 740 square miles, the district now 
consists of two tehsils i. e., Mardan itself and Takhtbhai. The latter is one of the 
historical places with a number of ancient monuments that remind us of the 
developments that took place over a longer period starting from the advent in this region 
of Greek Emperor Alexander in 326 B. C. 
Geographically, Mardan is surrounded on the north-west by Buner and Swat, on 
the north-west by Malakand Agency, on the west by Peshawar and on the east by Swabi. 
The northern part of the district, as revealed from the map (Fig: 10), is mostly covered 
by hills which are generally barren. Before assuming the status of a separate district in 
1937, Mardan formed a part of the Peshawar district. 3 
Economically, 80% of the rural population depend on farming. Due to the 
indigenous methods of cultivation, the productivity is low. The population of the district 
consists of a number of important tribes such as Pathans, Yusafzais, Khattaks and 
Mohmands. For the lack of accurate official statistics, particularly following the 
separation of Swabi in 1988, the strength of the tribe constituting a majority in the 
population could not be determined. The district has a chequered history of growth and 
has been affected by different civilisation which came to this region oiler a period 
starting from 326 B. C i. e., the arrival of Greek Emperor Alexander, to 1849 when the 
Sikhs were defeated by the British who annexed the Punjab. Hence, this area, being a 
part of the province came under the control of the raj. 4 It was during this period that 
representative institutions based on party-politics grew. A characteristic feature of the 
growth of these institutions was that the process was less affected by the differences 
among the tribes who, as it appears from the historical documents, were seldom at war 
with one another in order to gain an ascendancy by one or a group of tribes over the 
1. Economic Survey 1992-93, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division (Economic 
Adviser's Wing), p. 21 
2. Feroz Shah, Mardan Tehsil at a Glance, Peshawar, Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, 1971, 
p. 5. The provincial military chief minister's decision, though upgraded his home town to the 
Divisional Headquarters level, it separated the district from an agriculturally prosperous region. Also, 
it was in the Swabi (now a district) that an industrial estate of vital significance attracting large-scale 
business, was developed at Gadoon Amazai which brought further prosperity to the area in terms of 
providing job opportunities to the local population. 
3. Mardan had the privilege of having Iskandar Mirza as its first Deputy Commissioner who, later on, 
became the Governor General of Pakistan in August 1955 and subsequently, the first President of the 
country in March 1956. 
4. For a detailed account of the origin and development of different tribes in the region and their mutual 
relationship, see'The Pathans 550 B. C--A. D 1957' by Olaf, Caroe, London, Macmillan, 1958. 
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other-,. Generally, there had been an atmosphere of goodwill and harmony among the 
tribes and it were largely the outside invaders with whom they had been at war. This 
spirit was reflected later in the working of party based democratic institutions in which 
people belonging to various tribes demonstrated patience with minimum resort to 
violence. The facts gathered by the researcher from interviews with the elected 
councillors of the District Council of Mardan revealed that party affiliation had little 
impact over the mode of decisions taken at different stages of the working of the 
council. 
The Punjab Municipal Act of 1910 became a pioneer in the establishment of 
local government institutions in the urban and rural areas of this region. Mardan became 
a District Board under the said act sometime after becoming a district in 1937. There is 
lack of sufficient data with regard to the strength, nature of representation and range of 
functional jurisdiction which the district board had at the time of its inception. In the 
1960s when Ayub Khan, under his Basic Democracies System revived and activated 
local councils in the country, the District Council of Mardan shouldered tremendous 
responsibilities of rural uplift. The council then, with equal strength of popularly elected 
and nominated government officials and headed by the Deputy Commissioner, fulfilled, 
to a large extent, the anticipation of the rural population both in terms of active 
involvement as well as the range of services which the council was able to deliver 
during the first few years of its working during the martial law regime. The post-1965 
developments eroded the image of the council because of the shift of its attention from 
progress to politics as a result of becoming a part of the electoral college through which 
the Przýsident of Pakist, -n and members of the National and Provincial Assemblies were 
to be indirectly elected. The departure of the military ruler in 1969 and the later 
developments proved to be a source of degeneration as the council constantly remained 
under an official administrator and with no meaningful role. 
The termination of represcritative government and the imposition of a third 
martial law administration in July 1977 gave a new life to local government system in 
terms of their revival with a complete representative character. The statute (1979 
Ordinance) promulgated by the military ruler differed substantially in a number of ways 
from that of his predecessor's in 1959. 
The District Council of Mardan was studied in an attempt to determine how far 
the theory and practice of the working of local councils under the present Local 
Government Ordinance of 1979 coincided. The council, at the time of this study, 
consisted of eighteen members including four elected indirectly to fill the seats reserved 
for peasants, labourers, minorities and women. Table: 38 gives details of their 
professional and educational background. It appears that the agriculturists, occupying 
ten seats out of fourteen and filled through direct elections, constituted a majority. They 
were followed by an equal number of members from legal and business professions. 
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Academically, only four had degrees while others had education below 
matriculation. This low level of education, however, did not affect much their 
participatory calibre in view of the fact that a large number of the councillors had a 
prolonged association with the working of local councils and were thus able to gain 
sufficient experience in the administration of local affairs. Two elderly councillors, for 
example, had the privilege of being Basic Democrats i. e., being members under Ayub 
Khan's Basic Democracies System. The participatory experience of the rest, their party 
affiliations and other details are shown in the following table: 
Table: 39 
Personal Vitae of the members of District Council. Mardan. 
Participatory Party Affiliations Training Understanding of Total 
Record the Green Book 
Since A. N. P P. P. P P. M. L J. 1 Nil Yes Nil Partial Full 
1979 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 --- I 
1983 2 2 1 -- 5 --- 3 --- 2 
1987 4 1 2 7 3- 2 2 
Total 7 4 1 _j F- 
Source: Details provided by the Chief Officer, District Council, Mardan. 
It appears from the table that majority of the councillors entered into local 
politics in 1987. For this case study, however, half of the members (nine out of eighteen 
including the chairman) were interviewed. Among these also included two former 
chairmen who served the council during the first and second terms. Party affiliations of 
those interviewed were as under: 
Pakistan Muslim League 2 
Pakistan Peoples Party 4 
Awami National Party 2 
Jama'at-e- Islami I 
The first question regarding the general working condition of the council was 
answered by seven respondents representing all the major political groups. While 
agreeing to the effect that the District Council successfully served as an effective 
channel of involving local leadership for attending to the solution of problems of local 
nature, almost every respondent complained against the unfavourable attitude of the 
provincial administration during both the pre-1985 military and post-1985 elected 
civilian administration. They talked freely about both the external and internal obstacles 
which, in their opinion, greatly hindered the smooth functioning of the council. 
Externally, an environment was not provided where they could concentrate on their 
statutory obligations. The District Council of Mardan was one of those several local Z7 
councils which, under both the military and democratic regimes, happened to be headed 
by a chairman who was affiliated with a party which was severely opposed by both the 
ined in power military government and the rni I itary -installed political party which remal 
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for a longer period following the general elections of 1985 which restored the 
democratic set-up in the country. The opposition-dominated local councils had to face a 
tough time. Inifiation of inquests on charges of malpractices and the dissolution of a 
council were some of the official measures which badly effected their working. 
Criticising such official steps, one respondent said: 
"Dissolving the local government institutions with the stroke of a pen (referring to the chief 
minister's administrative order o August, 1991) is unethical, undemocratic and illegal. The 
alleged charges of corruption, embezzlement of public funds and irregularities of other 
sorts do not seem to be a genuine and logical groundfor dissolving the popularly elected 
democratic institutions. Such arbitrary steps, in fact, exhibit the government's real designs 
with regard to local councils and negates her tall claims of promoting democracy in the 
country. Why not the government resorts to the remedial measures prescribed bY the 
ordinance for bringing those involved in the misuse of power under trial. -5 
The researcher noted a consensus of opinion in the views of the interviewees, 
most of whom had the privilege of having council membership since 1979 i. e., when the 
existing local government ordinance was promulgated. They found little difference in 
the attitude of both military and civilian rulers towards opposition. The idea that the 
military rulers adopted a liberal policy in terms of promoting the cause of local 
government was said to be not totally correct. One leading councillor and a well-known 
figure in the district (because of having been an ex-chairman of the council), narrated 
the involvement of the provincial administration in his removal from chairmanship 
through a vote of no-confidence by the councillors. He said: 
"The provincial government left no stone unturned in instigating the councillors against 
filiation with the Peoples Party. All techniques of pressure were me simply because I had af 
employed against me. These included the stoppage of provincial grants, withdrawal of 
conveyance facilities and constitution of committee headed by the Deputy Commissioner to 
conduct enquiry into the allegations of financial irregularities. As a final resort, my 
opponents were made to move a vote of no-confidence. In the officially launched plan of 
ousting me from the office were involved the provincial chief minister and an influential 
cabinet member both caming front the district. The government did all this despite its 
professed policy of politics-free local government. 116 
Internally, there could not evolve a mechanism whereby council business could 
be conducted in a corporate manner. Rather the chairman, coupled with few strong 
supporters, had great influence over the council deliberations. A ma or difficulty faced 
by the council, on the other hand, was that majority of its members were less educated 
and had, therefore, little knowledge of the council powers. Most of the members had not 
acquired a copy of the 'Green-Book'. There was little use of the device of sub- 
committees as all except the 'Finance Sub-Committee', had little role in the council's 
decision-making process. Financially, the council seemed to be stuck between limited 
5. From interview with Shad Mohammad Khan, Councillor, 1.4.1993 
6. Views expressed by Abdus Salam Khan, Ex-Chairman, 10.2.1993 
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resources and the numerous local demands. 7This phenomenon had a direct bearing on 
the service delivery role of the council that remained restricted only to few areas such as 
construction of shingles roads, open drains, culverts, small water supply schemes and 
small bridges exhibiting, thus, a low profile compared to the tremendous responsibilities 
conferred on the coiincil under the 1979 ordinance. 8The main cause attributable to this 
phenomenon was the lack of a clear line of demarcation between the sphere of influence 
of the council and the provincial line departments on the one hand, and the councillors 
and local M. P. As, on the other. Several functions meant to be performed by the council 
were dealt with by the respective departments of the provincial government. The council 
also lacked capability, because of financial constraints and limited technical know-how, 
to take up the operation and maintenance responsibilities of the schemes developed by 
government agencies such -is the Public Health Engineering Department. One 
respondent, an ex-chairman who subsequently became an M. P. A., narrated, in the light 
of his experience, the changing role of the council thus: 
"The pre-1985 role was exemplary in that the council was used as an effective channelfi9r 
the rural uplift. Apart from satisfying numerous felt needs of the population, the council 
was also assigned with a supervisory role over the district based fiinctionaries of 
government departments. The period was historic for two reasons. It guaranteed greater 
involvement of elected councillors in comparatively larger tasks which was also a source 
of training for them in terms of enhancing their level of experience in the administration of 
local affairs. It was the result of this encouragement which gave them necessary motivation 
to run for a parliamentary seat and the result of 1985 general elections revealed evidence 
to this effect. Secondly, district councils appeared, in view of their pivotal role in the 
process of rural development, to had acquired the place recommended for them in 
numerouv government reports and research studies. The post-1985 developments gave a 
major set-back, for there started a wave of confrontation between the M. P. As and local 
councillors which resulted in the erosion of the powers once available to the latter. Finally, 
there occurred a drop-scene of this whole process when the representative government took 
the arbitrarý, decision of dissolving local councils prior to the completion of their mandated 
tenure. It paved the way for M. P. As not only to stabilise their mollopoly in the local areas 
but also have a control over the district council jl,, n, 4. v which, under the government 
directives, are now being utilised through them. The random use of the council resources 
has, however, bred disrepute and not supportfor them. " 
Similar views expressed by other respondents gave the impression that from the 
functional point of view, the role of the council eroded significantly, during the years 
preceding the restoration of the representative set-up in the country. This was, in fact, 
authenticated by four other respondents including two former vice-chairmen. In 
response to a question whether the ordinance of 1979 gave unprecedented powers as 
7. One respondent narrated that it needed seven hundred thousand rupees to construct one-mile metalled 
road, Even if half of the distance had been covered, the councillor would be left with little to respond 
to other demands of the local population. The councils' A. D. P for 1990-91 revealed that, by average, a 
councillor received fifty five hundred thousand annually for the uplift of his constituency. 
8. See chapter IX (Part-11) of the N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance, 1979, pp. 42-48 
9. Forn interview with Malak Abdul Karim, ex-Chairman, 26.2.1993 
206 
was claimed by the military ruler? 'O The respondents gave identical views. Drawing a 
corollary between the 1979 ordinance promulgated by General Zia-ul-Haq and the one 
introduced in 1959 by the then military ruler, one respondent said: 
"The government seemed to had relied heavily on the strategy designed In the 1960s. While 
bypassing the existing class of politicians, the government has erected a self-styled 
democratic set-up making it a pivot of governmental attention and assigning to it a central 
role in the drive for development. In certain cases, the tasks assigned are such that the 
local councils have little capability to undertake them. The local councils received special 
treatment during the martial law. But there took Nace a shift in government policy when 
the politicians were allowed to get in. Now, with the increasing reliance of the provincial 
chief minister on the members of parliament, the former does whatever the latter demands 
of him and while acceding to their dictates, the provincial head has gone to the extent of 
getting Kd of the elected local bodies. "II 
Another respondent, while referring to the pre-1985 period, confirmed that the 
council, apart from enjoying vast powers, had meaningful collaboration with the 
provincial line departments which significantly enhanced its capability in the delivery of 
wide ranging services particularly in the field of education, health and communication. 
The police used to seek co-operation of the local councillor while undertaking enquiries 
into certain case. The extent of the councils' jurisdiction started reducing gradually. All 
important questions, particularly in the financial spheres and previously decided by the 
council independently, are now placed for government approval. The structure of the 
district council, in terms of its composition and party background of the members, 
differed from that of the Zila Council of Gujrat. While the non-party polls in the case of 
the latter absorbed a significant majority of the elected members into the group enjoying 
government support, there had been little effect of the partyless polls on the political 
affiliations of the former where the councillors successfully maintained their party 
connections intact. This factor hampered immensely the overall conditions inside the 
council. Due to the absence of a group constituting a clear majority, the prospective 
candidate for chairmanship had to seek the support of more than one group. Though 
successful as he was, still the presence of uncertain conditions hindered the smooth 
functioning of the council. It was in this background that the respondents were asked 
about the impact of group politics on the councils' working. Seven respondents 
representing all groups including three ex-chairmen answered. Their views contradicted 
one another. One group denied any major effect of the internal group politics as well as 
the external party politics. Supporters of this view-point maintained that the principle 
which guided the councillors for choosing leader of the house, for example, was the 
personal characteristics and leadership qualities of the candidate running for the post. 
Political affiliation did not influence much the choice of the councillors. They cited the 
10. President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq's address to the First All-Pakistan Local Bodies Convention 
held at Islamabad on 5-6 March, 1980. See the Pakistan Times (Daily, Lahore, 9.3.1980). 
From Intervicw with Shad Mohammad Khan. 
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example of electing the chairman after the 1987 local bodies elections who had 
affiliations with the People's Party but had the support of all other groups in the council. 
It was, however, agreed that the chairman so elected had a greater inclination towards 
those supporting him. For the chairman too, it was a tough time to retain support of the 
groups with divergent political backgrounds. "A little carelessness", maintained an ex- 
chairman, "could lead to devastating effects on the chairman's' position. " 120ne reason 
for such an apprehension was the vice-chairman who enjoyed total support of the 
Muslim League ruling the province at that time. 
An opposite view of the situation was given by those who not only supported the 
chairman but were also his co-party members. They were critical of the duality of 
government policy which, while claiming the detachment of politics from local 
councils, did all it could to ensure control of these institutions by like-minded 
councillors. How far was then the involvement of the government in the removal 
(through a vote of no-confidence) of the chairman? A respon&: nt belonging to the 
chairman's' party clarified the position thus: 
"Personally I did not see an), evidence of the provincial governments' involvement. The 
removal of the chairman was, in fact, the result offrustration and anger arising out of the 
discriminatory treatment given to his own party councillors. He favouredfew influential at 
the expense of other trustworthy colleagues. Our requests fell flat on him and finally we 
made up our mind to oust him from the office. The vice-chairman tookfull advantage of the 
situation who, enjoying sympathy of the provincial government, An important aspect of this 
whole process was the post no-confidence developments when the vice-chairman assumed 
charge of acting chairman and continued serving in this capacity for almost one-and-a- 
half year. This illustrates the open support which the government extended to the party 
member in contravention of the statutory requirements. 1113 
The group politics inside the council had some effect on the allocation of 
development funds which, to some respondents, was unequal. Lack of documentary 
evidence could not confirm the complaint. The chairman, on the other hand, gave a 
different interpretation of the issue saying that the discretionary funds placed under the 
disposal of the chairman was used as per recommendations of the councillors. Other 
areas of its utilisation included: Special grants for religious institutions, donations for 
community welfare programmes, meeting expenditures of the chief ministers' visit to 
the district, and announcement by the chairman of special funds while paying a visit to a 
certain constituency in the district. It was observed that the members exercised vigilance 
over the utilisation of council funds to the extent that once the chairman had to justify 
12, From interview with Abdus Salam Khan. 
13. From interview with Shad Mohammad Khan. The government was bound, under the rules, to hold 
elections to fill in zhe vacant post of the chairman within fifteen days from the date such vacancy was 
notified. Later, an amendment to this rule vide N-W. F. P., No. XXII of 1987 provided that in any case 
the extension in the election to the office of a chairman shall not be for a period of more than three 
months. See Section 33 of the Ordinance, p. 25(a). 
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his donating a nominal amount of fifteen hundred rupees to a welfare institution 
working in his constituency. 
The respondents were asked whether they experienced any external pressure 
while forming post-election groups and, particularly, in the process of electing the 
chairman. Answers came from eight councillors whose views differed significantly 
because of their interpretation of the point from different perspectives. One idea was 
that since the local bodies' elections were not free from party politics, it did have its 
effects on the subsequent developments. Party considerations were deeply involved in 
both the formation of groups and the choice of candidate for chairman. They denied any 
external pressure in deciding these issues. Another view was that the whole processes 
were governed by non-party considerations because the choice of the candidate for 
chairmanship was based on the personal characteristics, leadership qualities and 
experience of the prospective candidate. A third view was that the government, being 
uncertain of any substantial gain in the elections, deliberately adopted the policy of 
holding these elections on non-party basis enabling the councillors so elected to join the 
group enjoying government support. 
The analysis of the researcher is that the political developments inside the 
council reflected the outside political trends. For example, during the first term (1979- 
83) when parties were banned from participating in local government elections, 
councillors were even reluctant to identify their party affiliations, if any, for fears of 
possible disqualification for which specific provisions existed in the ordinance. 14 Party- 
politics and its impact on council business became more apparent during the second half 
of the second terni (1983-87) when the provincial government Was jointly being run by 
civilian and military leadership. The military installed political party wanted to ensure 
its control over as many councils as possible and in this attempt it did not care to follow 
important statutory requirements. 15The third term (1987-91) was crucial in terms of the 
increased involvement of parties in local government politics though still under the 
cover of partyless elections. 
Those confirming parties' influence held the view that it was the party affiliation 
of the elected councillors which facilitated the formation of groups consisting of like- 
minded councillors. The result was the emergence of, at least, three strong groups. Two 
of them, both opposed to the ruling Muslim League, created an alliance and this 
facilitated the election of a Peoples' Party candidate for the post of chairman. The 
influence of local notables or the use of money was ruled out. An opposite view, held by 
three respondents, was that the government's policy of party-free local elections was 
fully honoured and, therefore, only a candidate who could carry confidence of other 
14. Section 28-A of the N-W. F. P., Ordinance (1979), p. 24 
15 11 of Mardan worked under acting-chairmen for Both the District Council and the Municipal Committee I 
about ten months following the removal of their respective chairmen through vote of no-confidence 
in August, 984. See the Nawa-e-Waqt (Daily, Lahore, 16.6.1985). 
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groups was eligible to become leader of the house. For example, one respondent belong 
to the Jama'at-e-Islami supported PPP and PML candidates for the posts of chairman 
and vice-chairman respectively. Being the only candidate elected from his party 
platform, he did not enjoy enough support of other groups to run for either of the two 
positions. The respondents, in other words, were of the opinion that irrespective of party 
affiliations groups were constituted on personal understanding, friendship and the 
determination to choose a selfless, honest and dedicated chairman. There had reached an 
agreement among the elected councillors with regard to a candidate and government 
pressure for electing a 'desired candidate' was successfully resisted. 16 Another point 
revealed to the researcher from a number of responses was that due to the absence of an 
active role of the parties, other factors like family background, financial status and, 
obviously, support from the district notables particularly the local MPAs played a key 
role in the determination of a choice of leadership by the elected councillors. The idea of 
choosing a leader of the house on the basis of his, leadership qualities worked 
successfully only during the first and second terms. The changed circumstances during 
the third term led to the adoption of a unique method of choosing the chairman through 
lot. The method, perhaps as a trial, was adopted due to certain compelling factors such 
as the increased involvement of party politics for winning the post, the absence of a 
strong party group of councillors to settle the question on majority votes and the 
increasing pressure from outside to seek the election of a desired candidate. Although, 
this saved the process of electing the chairman from all sorts of undue pressures, both 
from within and without, the resultant drawbacks of the method were soon realised 
when the chairri-in so elected proved to be incompetent for the tremcmdous 
responsibilities which the incumbent of the post was called upon to perform. 17 The 
councillors, most of whom had had the privilege of winning the election from 1979 and 
1983, adopted this method as a precaution to protect the council working from the 
adverse effects of the chairman's indirect election which they experienced during the 
previous two terms. Could a chairman elected by lot ensure the intended safeguards? 
The answers given by seven respondents revealed that the method had little effect on the 
attitude of the chairman so elected. He still demonstrated some preferential treatment to 
a few politically influential councillors and, interestingly, this inclination was not 
essentially towards co-party members. Having satisfied with the loyalty and support of 
the party councillors, the chairman usually attempted to seek the sympathy of powerful 
councillors in other groups with a view to consolidate his authority. In such attempts, 
the chairman often demonstrated, over-enthusiasm which, sometimes, led to the 
16. Shad Mohammad Khan narrated how an influential cabinet minister hailing from the district launched 
a hectic campaign for the election of his brother to the post of chairman, 
17. The first chairman elected through lot had to be removed through a vote of no-confidence only six 
months after the assumption of office simply on account of his ineligibility to handle the council 
affairs. 
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development of bitter resentment among his own party councillors. Such an attitude 
culminated, once, in the ousting of a chairman through a vote of no-confidence in which 
his own party councillors played a pioneering role. A close ally of the chairman narrated 
the event thus: 
"The chairman could, at least, demonstrate neutrality and equality towards the members in 
view of winning the post through lot. He failed to fulfil the general expectations and soon 
got inclined towards the influential councillors. This developed frustration and agony 
among the rest and they, including his party councillors at the forefront, decided, at one 
stage, to tender a collective resignation in protest against the discriminator), treatment. 
Instead, the decision taken by the aggrieved members was to replace him through a 
democratic method. 11 18 
It was confirmed by three respondents, including an ex-chairman, that the 
support given to a chairman by members of different groups did not essentially lead to 
stable conditions based on an affinity of thinking. Uncertainty still prevailed forcing, 
thus, the chairman to concentrate more on keeping the extended support intact than the 
service-related aspects of the council. Regarding this apprehension of the chairman of 
being ousted through a vote of no-confidence, one respondent said: 
'Presently, there does not seem to be a feasible substitute of the chairman's indirect method 
of election. His election through a direct vote would lead to several problems, inter alia, 
the question of ensuring his accountability. Certain defects are, undoubtedly, attached with 
the indirect election but the statutory requirements itself provide the remedy. The 
prescribed method of his removal provide necessary safeguards whereby the chairman can 
work with a peace of mind. After all, the requirement is not of simple but of a two-third 
majority and, therefore, only an extra - ordinarily inefficient chairman can provoke the 
anger of members constituting two-third of the total strength. 1119 
Apart from internal complications, the working of the district council was also 
effected from certain external factors in view of its peculiar composition i. e., being 
dominated by the members of opposition parties. The position reflected from the 
expression of a respondent was such that no chairman could hope to be successful 
unless he enjoyed sympathy of the provincial government and, internally, the support of 
influential members. He worked under constant pressure as the sword of no-confidence 
was always hanging over his head. The councillors, despite possessing the calibre to 
give a sense of direction to the collective human endeavours in a corporate body, were 
concerned more with the acquisition of as much benefits as possible for their respective 
constituencies. This was a question of their survival being connected with their ability to 
fulfil local expectations. 
The dependence of the chairman, on the other hand, on the councillors for the 
sustenance of his position had a direct bearing on the way he exercised his 
administrative and financial powers. This phenomenon led to the development of a 
18. Shad Mohammad Khan. 
19. Views expressed by Malak Abdul Karim. 
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situation where the councillors, particularly those supporting the chairman, benefited 
much from the informal help which the chairman -, xtended to them apart from the 
formal allocation of funds to the members which, under the rules, was required to be 
equal irrespective of the members' group affiliations. Answering a question whether the 
informal relationship of the councillors with the chainnan i. e., blood, caste or political 
was a source of benefiting from the council resources, six respondents including an ex- 
chairman authenticated the fact that the indirectly elected chairman had to oblige his 
supporters. Four of these respondents belonging to two different groups confirmed that 
they sought from the chairman additional funds. Two of them, relatively more close to 
the chairman, worked as a channel for fulfilling the additional demands of group 
members. One of them, though affiliated to an opposition party, received additional 
funds, from the chairman's discretionary funds, for the construction of three streets in 
his constituency. 
It revealed to the researcher, however, that the discretionary funds of the 
chairman, which the respondents referred to, was consisted of only a fraction of the 
council's annual budget and was, in fact, earmarked to meet unforeseen20 expenditures. 
It was out of this limited funds that the chairman had to meet the additional demands of 
his group councillors. This nominal amount, coupled (perhaps) with some other under 
the head of 'contingencies' (for which no details or classifications could be found in the 
council's budgetary statements despite a statutory requirement)21 proved a headache for 
the chairman as he, under constant pressure from the loyal councillors, had to decide on 
'priority basis' i. e., favouring a few and ignoring others which, sometimes, also included 
his own party councillors. One such respondent told the researcher how his demand for 
funds for executing a small scheme was turned down for want of resources while 
acceding, at the same time, to the demand of another party councillor for a scheme 
(construction of a bridge) that involved heavy expenditures. These alleged unfair 
practices cauced insurmountable damage to the chairman's position. The chairman, 
while confirming the improper use of discretionary funds, gave the following 
explanation: 
"In view of the limited council resources and the pressing demands of the members, the 
chairman has to be a bit cautious in terms offulfilling the statutory requirements, on the 
one hand, and expectations of the members, both ruling and opposition, on the other. While 
handling such a complicated task, he often gives preferences to the relatively backward 
areas in the district. This preferential attention, however, slightly effects the quantum of 
allocation to other areas. The chairman's informal connections with the members does play 
a role in shaping his response to the individual demands. The underlying principle 
governing this sort of tendency is, obviously, consolidation of the chairman's position and, 
20. Para 94 of the N-W. F. P., Local Councils (Budget) Rules 1980 provides that a sum not exceeding one 
percent of the revenue income may be provided as a 'reserve' to meet unforseen expenditures. See 
pa,.,,,, c 66 of the ordinance. 
2 1. Para 89 of the above. 
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at the same time, the promotion of the interests of his group --- [he materialisation of which, 
under certain circumstances, becomes his primary concern. 1122 
The situation in the district council of Mardan, from the point of view of mutual 
relationship between the chairman and the vice chairman, was different from its 
counterpart in the Punjab (the Zila Council of Gujrat) where the incumbents of the two 
offices were a source of strength for one another on account of their affiliation with the 
-erwhelmingly dominant ruling group. In Mardan, for instance, the vice-chairman 
despite possessing no formal authority, had been at the centre of all efforts directed 
towards the replacement of the chairman. No single group could ever hold both 
positions in the district council. The rivalry between the two office-bearers became 
more critical during the third tenure (1987-91) when the coming into power of the 
Muslim League gave necessary encouragement to the council's vice-chairman who was 
able to conduct a successful campaign against the chairman with the active support of 
the provincial administration. Five respondents including two ex-chairmen narrated 
their experiences with regard to the causes of tussle between the two and its adverse 
effects on the council's working. Representing a larger representative body like the 
district council, the chairman had accessibility to governing political figures and senior 
executive officers. The vice-chairman, on the other hand, found himself nowhere in 
terms of possessing no privileges and powers despite holding a position next to the 
chairman. This caused uneasiness on his part particularly if he came from a different 
party other than that of the chairman's. Internally, the chairman had a fragile support 
coupled with the threats from the vice-chairman who, as a former student leader, had 
enough experience of playing the game of power politics. Thus, the kind of environment 
available to the chairman, both internal and external, was not conducive enough to 
enable him to fulfil his statutory responsibilities with a peace of mind. This situation 
occurred both during the martial law period and later under the representative 
government. 23 
The given circumstances, in sharp contrast to those of the Zila Council of 
Gujrat, which provided conditions for effective checks and balances, could not be 
overcome. The question with regard to the provision of a free hand to the chairman as 
long as he exercised the council powers genuinely and exercising a collective check in 
the wake of deviations, was answered by four councillors including two ex-chairmen. 
While agreeing to the point that such an ei, vironment had yet to develop, a greater 
improvement had taken place over the years in the mutual relationship between the 
22. From interview with Abdus Salam Khan. 
23. It is evident from the fact that after the removal of the chairman in August, 1984, the affairs of the 
district council were administered by an acting chairman (the vice-chairman) for a period of one year 
simply because the elections for choosing a new chairman could not be held. Later, an amendment was 
introduced by the civilian government in 1987 fixing the period of holding elections in the event of a r_1 z: 1 
casual vacancy. This, too, was not observed when the vice-chairman continued serving the council for a 
period of one and a half years following the removal of the ý, ice-chairman in 1990. 
213 
chairman and his colleagues in the council. Recalling their experiences as Basic 
Democrats (1959-69), they referred to changes in the behaviour of present-day voters 
and elected councillors. Elected chairmen, in their individual capacity, however, 
demonstrated an attitude which not only created greater rapport between the chairman 
and the councillors but also avoided the development of uncertainties that could hamper 
the overall working of the council. 24 The continuation of the system of local 
government in the country, the respondents held, could lead to the development of those 
conditions where an effective mechanism of checks and balances could gradually 
evolve. For this, the need to induct qualified and public-spirited individuals into the 
system was emphasised. Emphasising certain pre-requisites for the fulfilment of the 
desired conditions, one respondent said: 
"Apart from the inculcation of the spirit of public service through formal education and 
training, certain statutory provisions (by bringing amendments to the existing ones) could 
pave the way significantly in this direction. The chairman, for instance, could be required 
to release periodic reports pertaining to different aspects of the council's working. This will 
keep both the treasury and the opposition members informed about the day-to-day 
development of the council business. Thus, the opposition in particular, will be able to 
evaluate and discuss questionable matters in the council meetings ... The minutes of the 
meetings should, likewise, be required to be signed not onl 
-v 
by the chairman but by all 
those attending the meeting. Only then could it exhibit a true picture of the council's 
deliberations. -25 
From the point of view of service related functions, the District Council of 
Mardan, like its counterpart in the Punjab, did not give an impressive image of service 
provided. A comparison between the statutory requirementS26 and the actual role of the 
council, exhibited a wide gap. It was the few nominal activities to which the role of the 
council was confined. The following table illustrates the service scenario: 
Table: 40 
R=zre of services vrovided and the share of allocation from total exi)enditure. 
Year Metal Road Shingle Road Bridges/Cul-verts Water Supply Education 
1984-85 11% 18% 33.5% 2% 2% 
1985-86 N. A 13% N. A 1.5% 3% 
1986-87 8% 9% 8.5% N. A 2% 
1987-88 9% 25.5% 6% 5% 5% 
1988-89 23% 8.5% 25.5% N. A 4.5% 
1989-90 8% 41.5% 16% 3% 3% 
1990-91 10% 25% 8% 1.5% 
1991-92 23.5% 10.5% 9% 1% 
Source: Details provided by: 1. Accounts Officer, District Council Mardan 
2. Data Centre, Local Council Board, Peshawar 
24. Councillor Said Rahman Khattak explained how an ex-chairman launched a successful campaign after 
a notice of no-confidence containing a set of allegations was served to him. It was following a series of 
deliberations with individual councillors that he finally persuaded them to withdraw the said notice. 
25. From interview with Shad Mohammad Khan. 
26. Part-11 (Chapter-IX) of the N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance (pp. 412-48) provides for a long 
list of functions to be performed by the district councils in the province. 
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The prioritisation of schemes and the allocation made from the council's annual 
expenditure is indicative of the fact that the Annual Development Plan (ADP) lacked 
clarity and objectivity in terms of the formulation of the plan in a phased manner. The 
fluctuating percentage share to each sector in the overall budgetary allocation testifies 
the truth. Communication seems to be the most emphasised priority in the plan whereas 
education and water supply the least attended services while health seemed to be not a 
matter of concern for the council as no funds were earmarked for the purpose during 
these years. The council's role in promoting education was confined to the provision of 
scholarships to poor and other deserving students. Its capability in this sector would 
have been enhanced, had the council been authorised to utilise the so called 'Education 
Cess' levied on the export tax and credited to the provincial government accounts. 27The 
following table illustrates the position: 
Table: 41 
GlimDse of the council's role in theDromotion of education. 
Year Export Education Allocation for Council's measures for 
Tax bid cess charged education out of the promotion of 
offered council resources education. 
1987-88 810,0000 130,1250 600,000 Adult education, 
medical inspection of 
school children, grant to 
educational institutions 
and scholarships. 
1988-89 941,4644 122,5000 738,000 
1989-90 8067,000 106,4375 450,000 
1990-91 1119,5500 164,2500 850,000 
1991-92 130 7,8044 201,0000 748,749 
1992-93 1339,5834 180,0000 450,000 
Source: District Council's budget statements of the appropriate years. 
The respondents were asked whether it was due to the technical and financial 
constraints or from some changes in government policy. Six respondents gave their 
opinions. Five of them attributed the difference to the change in government policy 
whereas one respondent attributed it to the limited financial and technical capacity of 
the council. Those attributing the restricted role to the shift in government policy after 
the restoration of the democratic set-up in the country in 1985, held the view that prior 
to that political change, the district council had proved its worth in the provision of 
certain basic services such as education, health and communication and the performance 
was almost parallel to those of the respective government departments. The council had, 
particularly, acquired enormous technical expertise in the field of road building. The 
27. Currently the provincial government charges the education cess @ 15% on the total amount of bid 
offered by the contractor for the collection of export tax for the year. 
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respondents also claimed to had acquired greater efficiency in the administration of 
primary education through effective local supervision. 28 
Apart from a substantial control over these services, the chairman of the council 
enjoyed greater prestige in the overall administration of the district and he had a say in 
the utilisation of funds on these services by the respective provincial departments 
functional at the district level. A major hurdle faced by the council in the administration 
of these services was that of finance and it was, therefore, compelled to play a 
supplementary role instead of assuming full control of these services. There prevailed a 
consensus of opinion among the respondents that the handing over of the funds, 
currently utilised through the government agencies on primary education, basic health 
and similar other social welfare activities, to the district council, would go a long way in 
strengthening the functional capability of the council. 
An assessment of the council's range of service-related activities, in the light of 
details provided by the respondents, revealed that the functional jurisdiction of the 
council started narrowing gradually following the coming into power of an elected 
government after the 1985 general elections conducted by the military government on a 
non-party basis. With this started a reversal of the pre- 1985 government development 
strategy which envisaged increased involvement of local government institutions. The 
civilian government, a product of partyless general elections and lacking the entire 
paraphernalia of a strong governing body with concrete programme, depended heavily 
on the country's traditional bureaucracy. This not only enhanced the already prestigious 
status of the bureaucracy but provided it with ample opportunities to tighten further its 
grip on the goverr mental striicture. Thus the preliminary measures initiated by the 
military government and directed towards the shift of power from the bureaucracy to 
elected democratic institutions suffered from a transgressive reversal. There did not 
occur any meaningful change in the attitude of bureaucracy towards elected local 
bodies. 
Apart from the gradual erosion of the council powers, another factor of vital 
significance was the government's introduction of a special development programme 
(the first of its kind was Premier Junejo's Five Point Programme) under which a new 
practice of undertaking works of construction and development through the national and 
provincial legislators started. This indulgence of MNAs and MPAs in development 
activities (mostly of a local nature) not only created problems of functional overlapping 
but also gave way to rivalry and confrontation between the members of the parliaments 
on the one hand, and the elected local councillors, on the other. This was revealed from 
the expressions given by the respondents in response to a question regarding the impact 
28. One respondent narrated how certain lady teachers of a primary school were warned, through the 
District Education Officer (Female) ýigainst their irregular and umpunctual attendance at the place of 
their work. 
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of the participation of the members of parliament in local developmental activities. The 
respondents, seven in number, termed the process something unprecedented and a direct 
encroachment into the sphere of influence of local councils. The following table gives a 
comparative view of the role of the three categories of elected representatives in the 
process of local uplift: 
Table-, 42 
ComDarative view of the role of elected reDresentatives in local develonment- 
Level of Party Funds Funds Nature of schemes 
representation. Affiliation. allocated. utilised. undertaken 
Roads: 15 
Senators: 1 P. M. L 1289,4552 610,2197 School building: 2 
Irrigation: 1 
M. N. As: I A. N. P 1392,4000 1 1250,4103 1 Roads: 25 
Details of funds and schemes executed could not be acquired. 
M. P. As: 3 P. M. L: 1 Under the Social Action Programme, however, each member of 
A. N. P: 2 the parliament could propose schemes to the extent of rive 
million rupees in his resp ctive constituency. 
Lcal P. M. L 1168,4900 819,1644 Drainage, premix roads, street 
Councillors: 18 A. N. P pavements and culverts. 
P. P. P & J. 1 
Source: Divisional Director, Local Government & Rural Development, Mardan. 
There was almost a consensus of opinion on the point that the parliamentarians 
(both national and provincial) should look to their respective businesses and their 
indulgence in matters like construction and development simply diverts attention from 
their primary responsibilities. The respondents claimed greater familiarity with the 
nature of local problems as a result of their permanent contact with the local population 
and the competence to solve them. Explaining the position, one respondent said: 
"We understand more what the people require at a certain time. While a parliamentarian 
tends to maintain some distance between himself and the people, a local councillor does 
not rather cannot. Due to the peculiar nature of our representation (in terms of people's 
easy accessibility to us) and the small size of the constituency, we happen to be in a far 
better position to comprehend what the local population requires at a given time ... Taken 
in this context, the government's approach does not seem to be realistic in view of the fact 
that while it did not strengthen our hands in the administration of local problems, it has 
opened avenues of conflicts and tussles between the representatives of the two levels. -29 
The situation became troublesome when, following the dissolution of local 
councils in the province, the role of the district council came to a standstill as a result of 
handing over of its charge to an official administrator who, also holding the position of 
the Divisional Director of Local Government and Rural Development, could only 
exercise a distant control over the council affairs, leaving thus the principal officers 
under the chief officer to play a pivotal role. A significant development that followed 
was the distribution, on equal footings, of the council development funds among the 
29. From interview with councillor Hidayatullah Khan, 21.2.1993. 
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MPAs of the district for utilisation in their respective constituencies. One respondent, 
while criticising the way council funds were being utilised, remarked: 
"They (the MPAs) have been using the funds randomly without proper planning and 
without looking to the exigency of the local problems. They listen to the suggestions of only, 
those who have been campaigning for them in their constituencies. Actually, they are 
enlarging their vote bank by obliging the people in one way or another. ', 30 
The lack of understanding between the legislators and the councillors and the 
calculated efforts of the former to strengthen their monopoly by curbing that of the 
latter, added to the already tense relationship between the two. It was confirmed from 
the expressions of, at least, four respondents that the relationship between the 
representatives of the two levels was not cordial rather it was characterised by enmity 
and confrontation. They took a serious view of the utilisation of council resources 
through the MPAs. In the words of an elderly respondent: 
"This, in my opinion, is a political bribery which only an unstable government lacking self- 
confidence, can afford to offer. The government has, in fact, been affording this in return 
for the members wholehearted support to it. It is strange enough that to keep this kind of 
situation intact, the parliamentarians of both sides i. e., the treasury and opposition, have 
set aside their mutual differences while taking a united stand against local government 
institutions in the province ... 
Now, (since) development activities has become an integral 
part of the present-day role of the parliamentarians, it isfutile to talk of the seclusion of the 
development programme from the ambit of the legislators' role. Designing a concrete 
development strategy, on the other hand, appears to be the alternative course of actions 
with particular emphasis on the drawing of a clear line of demarcation between the spheres 
of influence of the three levels of representatives. -31 
The provincial government had visualised these sorts of jurisdictional problems 
and had, therefore, come with the idea of a co-ordination machinery at the Gistrict 
level32 headed by the chairman of the respective district council. Three respondents, 
each having the privilege of being the ex-chairmen of the District Council of Mardan, 
confirmed that the creation of the co-ordination committee not only elevated the prestige 
of the district council's chairman but also served as an effective device of harmonious 
relationship with the district-based government agencies. Subsequently, it paved the 
way for the formulation of a comprehensive District Annual Development Plan 
involving the joint efforts of all district heads of important government departments. It 
also revealed from the expressions of the respondents that the co-ordination was 
meaningful both vertically as well as horizontally. With this, the rural councils at the 
grassroots level received necessary activation in their responsibilities towards rural 
uplift. Later, the provincial government's decision to appoint one of the MPAs from the 
district as chairman of the district co-ordination committee proved disastrous in terms of 
30. Views derived from interview with councillor Ziauddin Khan, 7.4.1993 
3 1. Views expressed by Shad Mohammad Khan. 
32. In the N-W. F. P., the District Co-ordination Committee was established through a Government 
Notification of May, 1980 which spelled out its powers and functions. See N-WRP Local 
Government Ordinance (1979), pp. 50-52 
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its gradually deteriorating role. It so happened that the comparatively tight schedule of 
the MPA prevented him from attending to his new assignment and thus the one time 
functional organ of effective liaison virtually became a dead body as membership of the 
chairman of the district council on the co-ordination committee was terminated. The 
government's past strategy of rural development through the effective participation of 
the district councillors went into oblivion. Commenting on this changed attitude of the 
provincial government towards elected local bodies, one respondent said: 
"The elected provincial government bears sole responsibility for this sad state of affairs. 
The co-ordination committee, as long as it worked under the headship of the chairman of 
the district council, was on the way to establish the traditions of popular control over the 
district administration. The government's initiatives aiming at the organisational changes 
weakened rather than strengthened the roots of this tradition. Their disregard to 
established institutions for the acquisition of certain cheap and short term political 
objectives negates their claim of promoting the cause of democracy. "33 
The ineffectiveness of the co-ordination had its all-round implications. It 
isolated the council from the rest of the district based government departments. 
Similarly, the one time close liaison with the higher authorities at the district and 
provincial levels ceased to exist. The institutions suffering mostly from the severe of 
this collaboration were the union councils. The termination of support, both financial 
and technical, from the provincial government on the one hand and the severe of linkage 
with the district council, on the other, brought a complete standstill to the already 
nominal role of these grassroots elected councils. The dissolution of local councils in 
the province in August 1991 gave a severe blow to them in the sense that while the 
development funds of the district council were diverted to the local MPAs for utilisation 
in their respective constituencies, Union Councils had nothing to spend on public 
welfare. A visit, by the researcher, to one such council at Toru in the outskirts of 
Mardan city, testified evidence to this effect. The following table illustrates an insight 
into the whole state of affairs: 
Table: 43 
nt-taik exhihiting the role of a Union Council in rural UDlift. 
Year Provincial 
grants 
Nature of work executed Non-development 
expenditure 
Share from 
local rate 
1988-89 88725 Drainage, pavement of 
streets. 
6657 --- 
1989-90 196000 Shingle road, construction of 
shade for local bus stand. 
7972 --- 
1990-91 127500 Repair of several link roads. 6595 --- 
1991-92 ... --- 7261 --- 
1992-93 --- --- 8967 --- 
1993-94 --- --- 3298 --- 
Source: Secretary, Union Council Toru (17. i. 1994) 
33. Views derived from interview with Abdus Salam Khan. 
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It appears that the union council depended exclusively on government grants. 
The period from 1991-92 onward indicates complete termination of development works 
in view of the stoppage of grants as a result of the dissolution of local councils. The 
council had no income of its own despite the power to levy a number of taxes. 34People 
did register cases of births and deaths but no charge could be made for lack of a formal 
government notification. 
It was pertinent to note that unlike General Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies 
system which provided an in-built mechanism of co-ordination at different levels, 
assigning the headship of all important organs of the system to seasoned bureaucrats, the 
ordinance of 1979, introduced by another military ruler, made a complete departure 
from the previous traditions in that an elected representative, for the first time, was 
assigned with the task of seeking co-ordination of government departments with the 
district council. 
Apparently, though the deputy commissioner was excluded from participating in 
district council administration, the actual practices revealed that he still exercised 
enormous influence over the affairs of district council. The possession of powers by him 
under the land revenue act was the only course available to the council to get its arrears 
of revenue recovered from the defaulters. While the denial of powers of collector35 to 
either the chairman or the chief officer of the council made them increasingly dependent 
on the deputy commissioner in his capacity as district collector, the tight business 
schedule of the latter could enable him to pay only a little attention to such 'ancillary 
matters' which meant delay in the recovery of dues and the consequent bad effects on 
the overall badgetary performance caused by the paucity of funds. 
As long as the district co-ordination committee was functional, it served as an 
effective liaison between the district council and the numerous government departments. 
The vacuum created by the virtual disappearance of the co-ordination machinery could 
adequately be filled by making it obligatory on the district heads of all government 
departments to ensure their attendance36 in the council meetings (in line with the 
practices in the Punjab) whenever their availability was requested. 
34. The local government ordinance (1979) provides for some twenty taxable items (p. 93). The only tax 
introduced and collected in 1984 was that on profession generating that year a sum of rupees four 
hundred and twenty-six. The council has since been depending on a separate grant from the rural 
development department for meeting its establishment charges. 
35. Conferring on the chairmen of the local councils, particularly those of the district councils and the L_ 
municipal committees, the position of honorary magistrates, has been a long standing demand of 
those concerned with the development of a strong local government in Pakistan but the grounds on 
which the idea could not be acceded to included, inter alia, the apprehensions that it might lead to 
local rivalries. See chapter on Financial Resources in Report of the Local Government Commission, 
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, December, 1982. 
36. In view of the lack of this formal liaison, the only course of action available to the district council was 
to air its grievances to the concerned department through the passage of a formal council resolution 
which. for obvious reasons, used to receive exceptionally little response. It was keeping in view such 
state of affairs that the respondents felt the need of the deputy commissioner's involvement, to a 
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The financial condition of the district council was not very different and 
exhibited similar trends like the other councils covered in this series of case studies. 
Having complete reliance on a selected number of taxes with resource generation that 
fluctuated off and on, the council suffered heavily with the tragic problem of a resource 
gap. This adversely effected the already restricted range of service-related operations. A 
critical evaluation of the tax administration of the council revealed that the existing 
--tern. of tax collection suffers from a number of drawbacks and needed to be 
established on sound footing. The following observation, made by the audit during its 
periodic review of the council's financial record for the year 1993-94, gives a self- 
explanatory view of its tax administration: 
"The export tax for 1993-94 was leased out for Rs. 176,100001- The contract had to be 
cancelled on 25.11.1993 on account of the council's failure to establish a tax post (to avoid 
evasion of tax) at the outskirt of the districtfOr reason of law and order. The council then 
made departmental arrangementfor its collection till 14.12.1993, when it was re-auctioned 
as per government directives for the remaining period ending June 1994, for Rs. 
90,250001- The cancellation of the contract without forefeiture of the earnest money and 
recovery of risk and cost from the former contractor and its reauction resulted into a loss 
of Rs. 29,432461 1137 
The above observation provides an insight into the mechanism of the way this 
important tax, bringing a lion's share to the revenue generation of the council, is 
administered. Apart from the inherent defects in the contracting method, there are other 
aspects of this tax administration which are affected, directly or indirectly, by the 
government decisions. One such area is the government's power to exempt taxable 
items from the schedule of taxes. This caused, sometimes, substantial damage to the 
anticipated income affecting, in turn, the overall ADP of the council. The provincial 
government, for instance, released a schedule of export tax in May 1992 to be effective 
for a period of three years. In September, the same year, an order came exempting38 the 
wheat anct flour from export tax without assigning any reason or, at least, taking the 
council into confidence. 
The government, at the same time, encourages the local councils to ensure ten 
percent increase per annum in the generation of revenue from all sources of income. 
The council, however, in very rare cases achieved the target set by the government. The 
fact is illustrated from the table (No. 44). 
limited extent, in the working of the district council in view of his enormous influence over the 
district administration. 
37. Para II of the Audit Report for the year 1993-94 in respect of District Council of Mardan. 
38. Such changes in the midst of financial year provide genuine grounds to the private contractors for 
demanding rernission in the payment of taxes. Reference in this connection could also be made to the 
grant of a remission amounting to Rs. 130,7286/- to the export tax contractor on account of tobacco 
and tobacco items for the year 1990-91. 
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This grim financial position reflects the relatively poor efforts directed towards 
the elimination or, at least, reduction of those factors which create hinderances in the 
effective tax administration. Despite heavy reliance on revenue from the above taxes, 
the council had been at the mercy of private contractors who, in their efforts for profit 
maximization, indulge frequently in the harrassment of tax payers. The failure to fulfil. 
in letter and spirit, the contractual obligations by the private contractors, caused 
financial set-back and effected the council's ability to operate some of the local services. 
In the words of a respondent: 
"It is in rare cases that the council receives the entire amount of bid offered by the 
contractorfor a given tax. While adopting all possible means to maximise his income from 
the leased out tax, he (the private contractor) leaves no stone unturned in getting reduced, 
by seeking remi . ssi . onS39 for one or another reason, the net amount payable to the council 
under the terms of the agreement. Short of these practices, if the council receives the 
agreed amount of bids from the main taxes (e. g., the Export Tax and the Cattle Fai -), that 
would suffice the council to meet its major policy objectives.,, 40 
A question regarding this shaky financial health despite wide taxation powers 
was answered by four respondents--- three of them ex-chairmen. Their candid and frank 
discussion unearthed certain hidden aspects of the, otherwise, brighter account of the 
cooncil's financial administration. The council's reliance on private contractors for the 
collection of all major taxes and the corresponding set-backs caused by the inherent 
shortcomings in the method of contracting, the lack of necessary government support 
for activaýing departmental machinery of collection, the council's reluctance to exploit 
new sour--es of revenue generation for fear of possible public reaction and ever- 
increasing proportion of budgetary allocation for meeting establishment charges were 
attributed to be the primary reasons for the council's inability to maintain a minimum 
level of service standard. The respondents voiced concern over the inadequate tax base 
of the council in view of the larger segment of the population being served and the range 
of services required to be provided. Generally, there was noted a sense of discontent in 
the views of the respondents over the distribution of financial resources between the 
provincial government and the local councils. They made a strong plea for the 
transference to the local councils of a fixed percentage of the income from provincial 
taxes. 
39. The respondent narrated how on two occasions i. e., the demolition of the historic Babri Mosque in 
Banaras (India) and the opposition parties call for a long march against the ruling party brought the 
country to a standstill and the resultant disturbances gave enough grounds to the contractors to claim 
remission in payment. 
40. Views expressed by Malak Abdul Karim. 
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Conclusion 
Elected on a non-party basis and composed of divided strength, the District 
Council of Mardan exhibits an interesting example of an elected local council faced 
with the dilemma of unhealthy relationship with the provincial government. It provides 
an example how an elected body emerging from a partyless elections suffered from the 
adverse effects of party-politics simply because it was dominated by members affiliated 
with opposition parties. In fact, the case study reflects the widened gap between the 
official policy of politics-free local government and the deliberate attempts to 
destabilise a council machinery that had differences with the party ruling over the 
province. This was true both during the military rule (1980-85) and the subsequent 
period of the military-in stalled civilian government (1985-onward). A confrontation 
with the provincial leadership remained a characteristic feature of the council's working. 
Thus, the external pressure coupled with the uncertain internal situation were the 
stumbling factors effecting badly the developmental activities of the council. 
The council, though representing all major political parties in the district, had the 
problem of a lack of a strong single group enjoying clear majority. The absence of the 
needful not only promoted chaos but the chairman, whose election was dependent on an 
alliance between two powerful groups within the council, had a hanging position 
because of the threats of no-confidence. He was, thus, faced with a situation that had 
greater resemblance with that faced by the provincial chief minister as a result of a 
coalition government. The fragile foundation, on which the authority of the chairman 
rested, had a direct bearing on the style with which he handled council business. The 
alliance, though, facilitated the election of chairman and vice-chairman representing 
both the groups, the arrangement simply promoted instability and uncertainty as the 
chairman so elected had his attention mostly focused on the consolidation of his 
authority rather than concentrating on the fulfilment of his vital statutory obligations. 
His initiatives, in a large many cases, had a connection with the question of his survival. 
The government policy had little effect on the loyalty of the elected members 
who kept their party affiliation intact and all efforts of their manipulation by the 
government were strongly resisted. Of course, the members had to pay a huge price. 
Functioning in a peculiar Pakhtoon environment with membership drawn from 
traditional Pakhtoon tribes, the councillors demonstrated no problems while turning 
against their own co-party chairman whenever he was found to be deviating from the 
principled stands of equity, decency and fair play. 
Administratively, the council devoid of the effective use of sub-committees, 
could provide little opportunities of practical training through increased participation in 
the decision-making, process. Their low level of education and the resultant poor 
understanding of the council's powers hindered the development of a true perception of 
the role the councillors were supposed to play as members of the district's important 
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representative elected body. This was evident from their poor commitment to pro. -: Je an 
effective mechanism of checks and balances in their relationships, particularly, with the 
chairman. This could bring into being a conducive environment whereby accountable 
performance on the part of everyone could be ensured. The responsibility for the lack of 
such a condition equally fell on the government on account of her failure to seek strict 
compliance of those statutory provisions that could ensure supremacy, and not 
personification, of law in the conduct of council business. 
Likewise the council, assigned with the tremendous responsibilities of rural 
uplift, lacked essential components such as administrative and technical support from 
the government and a sound financial management of its own. The government, instead 
of strengthening the position of the council as a vital component of the rural 
development strategy, preferred to make parallel arrangements by involving elected 
representatives of the higher levels. The programme, being founded on political 
grounds, was deeply resented by the elected councillors describing it an encroachment 
into their functional jurisdiction. 
Chapter Seven 
Provincial Governments' Relations 
with the local councils 
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In contrast to the Basic Democracies Ordinance of 1959 and the Municipal 
Administration Order of 1960 regulating the rural and urban local councils respectively 
in General Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies system., the one promulgated during 
General Zia's regime differed significantly in view of the fact that eight different 
ordinances were promulgated which enabled the provincial governments, federally 
administered tribal and northern regions to devise organisational forms of their own, 
keeping in view their different geographical, cultural and demographic concerns. A 
model ordinance was designed at the federal level to be adopted by the provincial 
governments after necessary changes to suit their conditions. 
The ordinances promulgated in the provinces of Punjab and the North-West 
Frontier had many things in common except the difference in strength and composition 
of various local councils constituted in the Punjab having the largest population in the 
country. The fundamental principles governing the operations of the local councils 
remained identical during the first few years of their promulgation i. e., as long as 
martial law was enforced. Both the provinces have in their organisational structure the 
Departments of Local Government and Rural Development with the primary 
responsibility to ensure the orderly working of local councils in the respective 
provinces. Headed by a cabinec minister with responsibility for policy matters, liaison 
with the provincial chief minister on matters of his department and conducting the 
business relating to the department, the department has a hierarchy of officers heading 
the administrative, regulatory, general and development wings of the department and 
stretched over from the secretariat level to the district level in the frontier province and 
the tehsil level in the Punjab (Table: 45). Apart from the secretariat officers who have 
responsibility for assisting the minister in the formulation of policy, its execution when 
duly sanctioned, ensuring efficiency and discipline in the conduct of departmental 
business and submitting all proposals for legislation to the cabinet with the approval of 
the minister, the department has, in both the provinces, several attached departments 
such as Directorate General of Rural Development, Directorate General of Inspection, 
Provincial Local Council/Government Board, and the Local Councils Election Authority 
which deal with different aspects of the working of local bodies. In Punjab, the Local 
Councils Elections Authority works under a Judge of the Lahore High Court as its 
chairman whereas in the N-W. F. P., the Secretary to the Government for Local 
Government and Rural Development also acts as its chairman. In spite of powers 
available to them under the respective ordinances, the election authorities in both the 
provinces cannot enlist a complete electoral administration of their own and rely 
increasingly on field officials of the provincial government. 
' 
Khawaja Mohammad Yousuf, 'Elections to Local Bodies in Punjab. ' 49th Advance Course in 
Administration and Development, N. I. P. A., Lahore, pp. 59-63. The author recommended to bring 
these authorities in line with the Election Commission of Pakistan by declaring them as autonomous 
bodies. This will enable them to perform functions outside the executive machinery of the government. 
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While the activities of the last three attached departments are restricted to the 
headquarters level, the directorate of rural development has a network of field 
establishments starting from the division level and reaching the district level. In the 
Punjab, it goes further down where a Project Director, working under the Assistant 
Director and having his office located at the Markaz (sub-division) level, oversees the 
working of a number of union councils falling within its jurisdiction. 2 
The stated objectives of the department of local government and rural 
development, in relation to the working of local councils, are classified as under: 
Policy formulation i. e., promulgation and up-dating of laws, rules and 
guide-lines for establishment and working of local councils and certain other 
matters like election, training, research and project identification etc.; 
2. Co-ordination involving consultation with the Federal Government and other 
departments of the provincial government; 
3. Administration of services i. e., recruitment and administration of personnel 
of BPS: 16 and above belonging to both the local council service and the 
rural development; 
4. Inspection of local councils which is done in a programmed manner through 
a number of officers and teams of the department. 3 
It was clear to the researcher both from the government pronouncements and 
4 
views obtained from the senior secretariat officers that side by side with powers and 
autonomy granted to the local councils, the government has maintained a mechanism of 
control over these institutions for their supervision and intervention takes place only 
when there is a gross violation of the laws/rules governing the system and other acts 
detrimental to public interests. In principle, this provides for the basis of relationship 
between the provincial governments and the local government institutions wherein the 
latter were provided with an independent environment within which to operate. The 
facts gathered during the course of four case studies revealed that the availability of 
such an environment depended upon certain pre-requisites understood from the 
expressions of a large number of respondents. Political affinity, willingness to 
accommodate official policy, particularly in the event of an abrupt change of 
government at the provincial level, were the grounds determining the actual pattern of tý' 
2. A former Project Manager told the researcher that the Markaz Councils, headed by one of the chairmen 
of respective union councils and with membership available to the respective district councillors and 
officers of nation-building departments, played an effective role in seeking co-ordination, execution 
of development programmes and supervision thereon. Their position declined gradually, particularly 
after 1988, when the process of electing its chairman discontinued. 
3. See Guide Book (1987) Local Government & Rural Development Department, Government of the 
Punjab, pp. 3-4. Almost similar functions have been outlined in the N-W. F. P., Local Government 
Ordinance 1979 (See Organisation of the Department, Part-1) , pp. 1-3 
4. Secretaries to the government of both the provinces expressed the view that the erstwhile controlling 
authority over the local councils stands abrogated now and there is simply a supervisory role exercised 
by tile parent department and to facilitate this there are powers delegated to officers posted at the 
divisional, district and sub-divisional levels. 
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relationship between the two levels of government. 5 
A cursory view of the Local Government Ordinances reveal that the provincial 
governments, being creator of the local councils, enjoy the powers to regulate their 
activities in all respects. The government may, by notification, extend, curtail or 
otherwise alter the limits of a local council or declare that any local councils shall cease 
to be a local council for reasons to be enumerated in the declaration. 6 The exercise of 
power under this rule has largely been motivated by political considerations. 7 It appears 
that the provisions of the ordinance have not been adhered to strictly and provincial 
governments have frequently used their discretionary powers for granting municipal 
status. This is evident from significant overlaps in the ranges of population of different 
levels of urban and rural local councils. 8 
The government may also divide a local council into two or more local councils 
or amalgamate two or more local councils into one local council and as a result of this 
division or amalgamation, the directly elected Muslim members shall become the 
members of such local council/s as if such members had been elected to that local 
council/s. 9 In the Punjab, the powers under sub-section (5) of section 6 were exercised 
by the Commissioners of the Divisions within their jurisdiction. In certain other matters, 
the district bureaucracy in Punjab was given a powerful voice in relation to the local 
councils compared to the north-western frontier province where the district officers had 
a small role to play in the administration of local affairs. This is evident from the orders 
The changing pattern of relationship between the Provincial Government of Sindh and the Metropolitan 
Corporation of Karachi illustrates a relevant example. The corporation, being the largest urban local 
council in Pakistan, was dissolved in February, 1987 on the alleged dispute over the transfer to the 
corporation of the motor vehicle tax which constituted an important source of its income till 1970. The 
drastic action was, however, motivated more by political considerations than by financial exigency in 
view of the fact that the provincial chief minister and the mayor of the corporation had affiliation with 
opposite political parties and the former did not like to see the corporation, affecting the lives of some 
ten million people, become a po" or base in the hands of opposition. At a later stage, there was seen a 
highly cordial relationship between the chief minister (head of a defected group of P. P. P in Sindh) and 
the ethnic Muhajir Qaumi Movement which dominated the corporation simply because the latter was a 
source of great strength to the former in the provincial assembly. 
6 New Local Government Laws in Punjab (1979), Sub-section (5) of section 6, pp. 10- 11. 
7. An ex-Principal Staff Officer to the Secretary, Government of the Punjab told the researcher that the 
prescribed criterion for upgrading a local council is not strictly followed as the government possess the 
power to upgrade certain council to the higher status even if it does not fulfil the required strength of 
population. The same is true of the Frontier Province where a number of union councils could not be 
declared town committees despite exceeding the population of ten thousand. 
8. See Local Government Administration in Pakistan (vol-1), a publication of the University of Karachi 
(Applied Economics Research Centre), n. d. The executive summary on the spatial organisation of 
local and provincial governments in Pakistan gives evidence to this phenomenon. 
9. The elected councillors interviewed for purposes of case studies in the two provinces narrated that there 
was a sharp contradiction between the stated policy and the way this rule was applied in different 
occasions. References, in this connection, were given to the dissolution of Peshawar and Mardan 
District Councils following the creation of two new districts of Charsadda and Swabi in Peshawar and 
Mardan respectively. In a similar situation, however, the District Council of Bannu was not disturbed 
after the creation of the new district of Karak for the simple reason that majority of the elected 
councillors there had affiliation with the ruling party. Interestingly, the said councils were later revived 
after a prolonged legal battle when there took place a change of government following the death of the 
rnilitarý, ruler in a plane crash in August, 1988. 
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and notifications issued by the provincial government delegating powers to the 
divisional and deputy commissioners to deal with a number of problems arising from 
the working of local councils within their jurisdiction. Details of such powers appear in 
Annexure: D. 
The elected members, interviewed for the purposes of four case studies, differed 
significantly over the government's claim to be granting maximum autonomy to the 
local councils and often termed the government control as something absolute. The 
respondents held the view that the application of the rules contained in the ordinance 
depended upon a number of other factors which determined the actual pattern of 
relationship of the local councils with the provincial government. "It remains cordial, 
they said, "If the political party ruling the province also dominates the counc 1. " 10 I 
The method of electing the members for the reserved seats for women, 
minorities, peasants, labourers (in both the provinces) and, particularly, the chairman of 
the markaz council (Punjab oply) has warranted severe criticism. The dominant groups 
play a pivotal role in filling these seats and, therefore, the members thus elected find it 
difficult to adopt an independent line of action in the conduct of council business in 
view of their being dependent on the will of the majority group. " Similarly, the election 
of chairman of markaz council by 'show of hands' negated the principle of secret ballot 
and paved the way for the election of a 'desired candidate. ' There was revealed to the 
researcher some significant aspects of the election phenomenon, particularly, with 
reference to the election of Mayors and Chairmen of major urban and rural local 
councils in both the provinces. Apart from the process being influenced by the 
influential local families, some evidence of interference by the ruling party at the 
provincial level was also observed. 12 The role played in this connection by an influential 
family in the election of chairmen of the municipality and zila council of Gujrat and that 
of the provincial government of N-W. F with regard to the mayoralty of Peshawar 
10. Situation obtaining in the Punjab following the local bodies elections held in 1987 and 1991 for the 
third and fourth terms respectively testified the contention. Likewise, the cordial relationship in Sindh, 
during the period of Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali, heading a defected group of Pakistan Peoples 
Party, who was extended with whole-hearted support by the ethnic Muhajir Qaurm Movement, 
confirmed the assumption. 
The Local Government Commission advised the provincial governments to introduce the system of 
separate electorates for the election of minority members instead of leaving them to be chosen by 
sitting council members. This pronouncement, made as early as 1982, was incorporated into the mode 
of elections by the provinces and the succeeding elections were held on the basis of providing separate 
electorates to the minorities [See section 13(2) of the Ordinance, p. 23]. For filling other seats reserved 
I'or special groups, the old method was retained placing, thus, the members so elected on the discretion 
of majority group. This proved to be a stumbling block in the way of promoting, by these members, 
the cause of their respective groups. 
See the 'Dawn' (Daily, Karachi, 4.1.1988). The Parliamentary Opposition Group blamed that the 
Government machinery In Punjab was adopting undemocratic and unwarranted ways for winning over 
the support of the councillors, elected on non-party basis in 1987, in favour of PML-nominated 
candidates for the seats of mayor and chairmen. 
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Municipal Corporation produce concrete evidences. 
13 In the same manner, increasing 
the number of vice-chairmen 14 in major local councils of the Punjab, the provincial 
government, by accommodating representatives of different factions of elected 
councillors, attempted to manipulate their support in favour of the chairman having 
political affiliation with the party ruling the province. 
The method of electing chairman and vice-chairman by the elected councillors 
raiý -' much controversy because of the alleged inclination of the chairman so elected 
towards his supporters. The prevailing controversy reached its apex when the 
government's instruction (in Punjab) came declaring that the "poll for the election of 
chairman shall be held by raise of hands. " 15 
Determining the term of office of local councils falls within the ambit of the 
provincial government and it was only in the Punjab that the government increased the 
term of office from four to five years bringing it at par with that of the national and 
provincial legislatures. The statute authorises the provincial government to curtail the 
term of office of the local bodies. ' 6 In both the provinces, this provision was arbitrarily 
applied against the sitting local councils long before the completion of their term. While 
in the N-W. F. P., the step was taken during their working for the third term (1987-9 1), in 
Punjab, the decision was taken in the first half of the fourtli term period. 17 Thus, 
originally elected for the extended term of five years, the elected local councils could 
13 
. The election of mayor of the corporation 
for the second term assumed a crisis situation involving in the 
battle the military Governor, on the one hand, and the civilian chief minister, on the other, who 
participated actively for the victory of their respective candidates having family relationship with the 
two chief executives. 
14. See section 12(2) of the ordinance which increased the number of vice-chairmen to two in certain 
councils and three in others, p. 22. 
Sub-section 60(2) under section 23 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance. The amendment came 
immediately after the local bodies polls held in the province for the forth term held in December, 
1991. 
16. Section 26-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (1979), p. 101. A similar provision exists in 
the Ordinance of N-W. F. Local councils in both the provinces became victim of this provision in view 
of the fact that the institutions were dissolved prior to the completion of their term of office. In the N- 
W. F., these were dissolved in August, 1990 whereas in the Punjab these were dissolved in August, 
1993 following the change of government at the provincial level. The elected local councils could 
hardly complete twenty o, it of the mandated period of sixty months (five years). The decision was 
taken in response to the demands of major political parties who wanted impartiality in general 
elections scheduled to be held in Oct. 1993. 
17 Against the backdrop of the dissolution of the local coun, ils two contradictory reasons were given i. e., 
the rampant corruption and massive irregularities committed by mayors and chairmen of 'some of these 
local councils' [see the 'Nation' Daily, Lahore, 16.8.1993] and the government's plan to hold fair, free, 
impartial and transparent elections to the national and provincial assemblies in October, 1993 (see the 
'Frontier Post' Daily, Peshawar, 16.8.1993). The fact is that the holding of general elections has no 
nexus with the existence/non-existence of the local councils and this finds no support from the 
provisions of the ordinance. It is pertinent to note that the funds of all local bodies institutions were 
frozen in a bid to ensure free and fair general elections. It was followed, just two weeks later, by the 
drastic action of dissolution on the ground that the freezing of the local bodies funds had failed to 
restrain the councillors, mayors and chairmen, most of whom having loyalty to the PML(N), from 
utilising official facilities and privileges for personal aggrandisement and in favour of their favoured 
candidates in the general elections of Oct. 1993. 
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hardly work for a period of one and a half year. 18 Local councils in the Punjab, the 
political base of Pakistan Muslim League, were specifically chosen for dissolution 
whereas in other provinces, mere suspension of local councils was treated to be enough 
for fulfilling the care-taker government's mandate of holding free and transparent 
general elections. Similarly, in the N-W. F. P., while dissolving the local councils before 
the completion of their tenure in August, 1991, the Local Government Ordinance was 
amended in order to hold the forthcoming elections within eigh, -een months. 19 The 
sitting provincial assembly unanimously endorsed the government action in this regard 
through a bill . 
20 After this period lapsed, the government came with another amendment 
increasing the required period to twenty-eight months for the holding of fresh elections. 
The assembly again unanimously passed a bill to legalise the government action. 21 The 
question of holding or with-holding elections to the local councils, therefore, seemed to 
fall within the discretion of the respective provincial government. While these elections 
used to be conducted well in time during martial law 22 period, the restoration of civilian 
order proved to be a stumbling block in the regularity of these polls. The reluctance to 
hold these elections could be attributed to certain political factors. A general opinion 
held by the experts was that the political parties, having a weak organisational set-up 
and lack of adequate public support, do not take the risk of losing grounds at the 
grassroots level while being in power. 23 With the possible greater turn out of the 
opposition councillors, the defeat could be attributed as a vote of no-confidence against 
18. The elected local councils in Punjab held their first meeting, under the fourth term, on 9.1.1992 and the 
Government Notification No. SO(LG. )3-32/93 curtailing their term of office was issued on 15.8.1993. 
19. The Provincial Government (N-W. F. ) dissolved the local councils on the grounds of their alleged 
involvement in gross financial irregularities and other corrupt practices. The government action was 
regarded to be based on prejudices, enmity and bias aiming at getting rid of the entire local councils 
instead of initiating enquiry against the irresponsible ones. A similar action dissolving the Municipal 
Committee of Dera Ismail Khan and the Town Committee of Havelian (both in the N-W. F. ) on 
charges ofcorruption and disqualifying members of both the councils for any future elections, had led 
to heated debate in the provincial council of that time. The military chief minister, presiding over the 
meeting of the Provincial Council, had agreed to deal only with the responsible councillors in future. 
See the 'Nawai-e-Millat' (Daily, 4.2.1982). 
20 The provincial assembly had, in fact, advised the government to postpone the local bodies polls 
scheduled to be held on December 17,1992 in view of the destruction caused, in certain parts of the 
province, by heavy rains. A unanimous resolution supported by both the treasury and opposition 
benches was passed to this effect. This indefinite postponement had preceded by three earlier 
postponements by the provincial government, the present being the fourth one. The beneficiaries 
(MPAs) of the non-existence of local bodies succeeded, thus, once again. See the 'Muslim' (Daily, 
Islamabad, 18.9.1992). 
21. See the 'Frontier Post, 12.11.1993. The required period of twenty-eight months completed in 
December, 1993 and no elections could take place until now (July, 1995), local councils working, 
therefore, under the appointed administrators drawn mostly from the district bureaucracy. 
221 It is on record that the first three periodic local bodies elections were held throughout Pakistan in 1979, 
1983 and 1987. The fourth-term elections (1991) could take place in the Punjab only. 
23 The reasons given for the postponement of elections by the provinces, though, differed significantly, 
these had a common political element. In Sindh, for instance. the government anticipated sweeping 
defeat at the hands of ethnic Muhajir Qaumi Movement in the major urban areas such as Karachi, 
Hyderabad and Sakkhar as had happened in the last elections held in 1987. In the N-W. F. P too the 
coalition government was not prepared to take the risk of losing major local councils, particularly the 
district councils, at the hands of opposition parties. 
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the government. 24 An equally valid opinion was of those who held the view that the rise 
and fall of a party's graph of public support cannot solely be determined by the results of 
local polls. It is rather the winning of seats in the provincial and national assembly 
elections that determines party positions. While in local politics the factors influencing 
the electorates behaviour are 'biradari', kinship and the like, party slogan and 
programmes determine the choice of electorates in national and provincial level 
PolltiCS. 25 
While no legal remedy was sought in the Frontier province because of the short 
duration lying between the dissolution and the commitment of conducting fresh 
elections by the government, in the Punjab the question of dissolution was challenged in 
the court of law through a writ petition by a group of aggrieved zila council chairmen. 26 
The government's action was regarded to be unlawful and in contradiction with several 
provisions of the constitution of Pakistan. In a prolonged legal battle involving a critical 
evaluation of the provisionS27 under which local councils were dissolved, the 
government claimed its action to be justified on the following ground-s: 
rI 
... the impugned notification had 
been issued under lawful authority, without an), 
jurisdictional defect. The writ petitioners, in fact, had come to the court with unclean hands 
as they were members of a political party and having been promoting its interests in 
violation of Rules 19 and 20 of the Punjab Local Councils (Conduct of Members) Rules, 
1981... Under the notification, only incumbents had been substituted for a limited period, 
fresh elections had been called, to be held in the month of January (1994) wherein the 
electorates would be free to elect the individuals of their choice ... the term offive years 
could bc curtailed as a preventive measure for holding of fair, honest and transparent 
general 2lections. The powers vesting in the Government had been usedfor achieving an 
objectiv( of greater public good.. The government, on the basis of enough material, 
deemed it expedient to exercise its powers to prevent the apprehended interference in the 
general election by the councillors. " 
28 
The biggest defence argument was that the councillors, by associating 
themselves with a particular political party which, while in power, had subverted the 
24 
. 
From interview with Dr. Syed Adil Hussain, Former Head of Politics Department, University of 
Karachi (14.5.1992). The reasons of flood devastation and law and order problems for postponing the 
polls are but mere pretexts. Once the government is sure that its party candidates will be able to return 
in a large number, elections will be arranged forthwith. 
Mr. Ehsan Ullah Khan, Former Provincial Minister for Local Goverriment & Rural Development (N- 
W. F. P) explained that the postponement of local council elections for fear of opposition victory was 
unsound. 
26 See Writ Petition No. 9009 of 1993 filed in the High Court at Lahore (Punjab). 
27 Section 26 (A) of the Punjab Local government Ordinance (1979) remained a heated issue during the 
hearing of the case by the court. It was pointed out in the writ petition that elections to the local 
councils were held on December 28,1991 and the first meeting of the councils was held on 9th 
January, 1992. The term of the councils was for a period of five years commencing from the date of 
the first meeting and the notification curtailing the term was, therefore, not sustainable. The grounds 
urged were that Section 28-A of the Punjab L. G. 0 (1979) was discriminatory, unreasonable, without 
any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion, gave arbitrary, unfettered, uncontrolled 
power to the executive arm of the government, did not indicate the circumstances and point of time at 
which its provisions were to be applied, nor any procedure to be followed was prescribed. 
28 See the Judaement Sheet of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No. 9009 of 1993, pp. 6-8 
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provisions of the Ordinance and foisted chairmen and mayors of their own choice. 
Referring to the text of the notification 29 , the court advised the provincial government in 
its verdict pronounced in January, 1994 that to restore the political capacity of the 
voters, elections to the local councils be held till 31 st March, 1994 failing which these 
institutions will stand revived w. e. f I st April, 1994. Neither could the government fulfil 
promises of holding fresh elections 30 nor could the councils be revived for reasons such 
as the prevailing political uncertainty at the centre and the provinces .31 The provincial 
government, in fact, waited a signal from the federal government which itself was 
reluctant to revive these institutions in view of its working on a new arrangement of 
district government to replace the existing system of local government. Later, even 
though it became clear that the federal government was less enthusiastic about its 
programme of district government, the Punjab leadership was confronted with 
differences in the coalition (Peoples Democratic Alliance) over the distribution of 
councils between the two partners in the alliance. A dead-lock over the question was 
causing delay for the provincial government to make some advancement towards 
holding of elections. 32 The revival of local councils through fresh elections had similar 
fate elsewhere in the country because of their postponement for one or another reason. 
Finally, one solution sought was to replace the existing administrators of local councils 
by appointing political administrators, to be drawn mostly from the district chiefs of the 
two political parties constituting coalition and a consensus to this effect had reached 
between the coalition partners of the provincial government. 33 While in the N-W. F. P., 
local councils already stood dissolved on similar charges of corruption, those in the 
Punjab and Sindh were "issolved by the respective care-taker provincial governments in 
response to heavy pressure exerted by the major political parties who doubted the 
holding of fair and free general elections in the presence of local councils dominated by 
29 
. 
The Punjab Government Notification of August, 1993 dissolving local councils in the province 
announced to hold fresh elections in January, 1994. 
30 
. 
The Punjab Local Government Ordinance provides that the initial step to be taken against a local 
council, in the event of charges levelled against it, is mere suspension. If the charges are proved as a 
result of enquiry to be conducted within two months of suspension, the council may be dissolved. 
Fresh elections are then to be held within three months if the remaining term of the local council is not 
less than nine months. See section 159 at p. 532. 
31 
. 
The chief minister handled the question diplomatically saying he had no objection if the Provincial 
Election Authority, headed itself by a retired judge of the High Court, could complete the 
arrangements required for the purpose of 
holding elections by the end of March, 1994. See the 'Dawn, 
2.2.1994. 
32 See the 'Jang' (Daily, London, 5th, 7th, 13th & 15th March, 1995). While the PML (JuneJo Group) was 
,: laiming right over all those 
local councils previously dominated by the PML (Nawaz Group), the 
PPP, principal partner in the coalition, was of the opinion that only those councils failing within the 
constituencies that were won by its party candidates during the last general elections (October 1993) 
should come under the control of the PML(J). One source regarded these as delaying tactics to avoid 
going to polls as the coalition was not sure of the intended outcome of the proposed local council 
clections. 
the See the 'Frontier Post' dated. 4.2.1994. The idea could not, however, be materialised in view ot 
1-cmoval of the government through a vote of no-confidence. The elections being still awaited. 
34 
a specific political party, particularly in the province of Punjab. 34 The double standard in 
the outlook of the leading politicians towards local councils is reflected from the fact 
that the same alliance of political parties was heavily funded by the party heads of local 
councils in the province while undertaking massive long march 35 --- a technique 
36 
employed by the alliance to exert pressure for the resignation of Federal Government . 
The care-taker government's contention of saving the general elections from the 
influence of sitting local councillors, allegedly affiliated with a major political party, 
raised controversy. A question put to a leading advocate as to what guarantees exist that 
the subsequent local bodies elections in the province (which were scheduled to be held 
following the general elections for national and provincial parliaments) will not be 
interfered by the sitting MNAs and MPAs who carry greater prestige and influence 
compared to the local councillors, was answered thus: 
"While the government policy of a politics-free local government is but a myth, political 
parties cannot afford to ignore the grassroots institutions. Whenever in power, the), 
certainly like to see that like-minded candidates occupy seats in the local councils in order 
to be a source of strength for the higher levels of representative institutions. Dissolving the 
national and provincial legislatures to ensure fair and free local government elections will 
simply give way to a vicious circle which, in practical terms, is neitherfeasible nor logical. 
So far the question of influencing the local bodies polls by sitting members of the 
parliaments, it makes no difference whether the), are inside or outside the parliaments. 
They are influential anyway and nothing can stop them from influencing the local polls. " 
37 
The duality in government policy was much resented by both the elected 
councillors and experts having concern about the future of local government in Pakistan. 
Introduced by the military rulers, the idea behind politics-free local government was to 
keep the major political parties, particularly the Peoples Party, out of the arena of local 
politics in view of the possible danger of acquiring, by the party, a power base that 
could threaten the ruling military junta. Special provisions 38 were incorporated into the 
34 See the 'Jang' dated. 7.5.1993. The P. D. A. (an alliance of several political parties headed by the 
Pakistan Peoples Party) advised opposition councillors in all major urban and rural local councils to 
compile details of corrupt practices by the ruling P. M. councillors so that the demand for dissolving 
local councils could be strengthened. The alliance was of the view that the existing local councils, 
elected under the former IJI government, were dominated by the party workers and, hence, could be 
effectively used to influence the outcome of forthcoming general elections. 
35 A unique pressure technique of its kind and a recent development in the politics of Pakistan whereby 
government in power was forced to resign for fresh elections in a way other than democratic method. 
The opposition, lacking enough support inside the parliament to move a vote of no-confidence, 
resorted to mass mobilisation when a huge procession consisting of hundreds of thousands of party 
workers was arranged to march towards the capital. The objective came true when the military 
intervened, apparently in an attempt to avoid a large-scale bloodshed, and made the government to 
resign and face a fresh electoral battle. 
36. See the 'Khabrain' (Daily, Lahore, 17.8.1993). It was only after the termination of elected governments 
that demand for dissolving local councils in the province was put forward by the opposition alliance. 
37 From interview with Choudhry Hamid-ud-Din, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court and Lahore High 
Court, Punjab (24.9.1993) 
38. See section 28-A (p. 24) and section 21-A (p. 47) of the N-WRP and Punjab Local Government 
Ordinances respectivcly. One respondent, interviewed in connection with the case study of District 
Council Mardan narrated how one of his colleagues was declared disqualified when his participation 
in the death anniversary of his party's founding father was proved. The disqualification powers against 
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Ordinances discouraging entry into local government of such elements who had 
affiliations, in any manner, with political parties. Rules were also amended depriving 
the local councillors and chairmen of their right to be heard before suspension. 39 These 
provisions were rigorously applied against a large number of elected councillors whose 
political affiliations were proved . 
40 The policy was retained even after the lifting of 
martial law and the installation of succeeding full-fledged representative governments 
had no effect on the mode of election introduced by the military rulers. The elected 
governments have, however, been amending the electoral provisions from time to time 
to suit their peculiar interests. Interestingly, these measures are discussed unilaterally in 
party meetings, not in the legislature, and then transformed into law with the assistance 
of bureaucracy .41 In the Punjab, for instance, the law was amended to the effect that "a 
candidate shall not be disqualified from contesting election by reason only of his being a 
member or office-bearer of a political party. 42 The government had itself been violating 
the law by issuing statements with regard to the victory, in the local council elections, of 
like-minded candidates. Surprisingly, similar statements made by the opposition leaders 
were viewed seriously and were threatened dire consequences including disqualification 
from council memberships . 
43 A large-scale involvement of sitting parliamentarians and 
cabinet members of central and provincial governments in the election campaign was 
also noticed. In certain cases, parliament members and cabinet ministers belonging to 
the ruling party (in Punjab) were divided and had their respective groups patronised. It 
the local councillors were granted to the provincial secretaries. In Punjab, due to its big population and 
area, such powers were exercised by the Divisional Commissioners. See the 'Muslim'dated. 2.12.1981 
reporting the policy state. nent of Federal Minister For Local Government & Rural Development. 
39. See the 'Nawai-e-Waot' (Daily, Lahore, 4.2.1982). Local councils were also prohibited from passing A 
resolutions or discussing the matters of government departments or offices. This rigorous control was 
questioned on the ground that if accountability of local bodies can take place then why not of the 
government departments. 
40 
. The 'Sarhad' 
(Daily, Peshawar, 21.12.1982) reported that two chairmen of Union Councils and three 
councillors belonging to different local councils were terminated on account of taking part in political 
activities. 
41. In a similar move, the ruling IJI parliamentary party, in its meeting held on 6.10.1991 (two months 
before the fourth term local bodies elections in the Punjab) endorsed a resolution banning display of 
banners and bill-boards during the election campaign. In his letter (No. PA-DS-III(CMS)/91-519 
dated. 7.10.1991) addressed to the Chairman, Punjab Election Authority, the chief minister sought his 
guidance and comments for incorporating this decision within the legal framework of the electoral 
laws. The Secretary, Local Government pointed out that no such provision exists in the existing 
electoral laws which could encompass the desired object. A provision could, however, be made in the 
rules to make it an election offence. At the same time, it was clarified that putting such a restriction 
would be in contravention of article-19 of the constitution of Pakistan which guarantees display of 
banners and bill-boards as a part of freedom of speech. See summary of the Secretary, Local 
Government (Punjab) for the chief minister dated. 13.10.1991. 
42 The Punjab Committee for Local Bodies recommended that the restriction with regard to the 
participation of candidates holding party-position should be lifted. This was added vide Punjab Local 
Government (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1987 which not only enabled a large number of local 
councillors to join the ruling Muslim League but also paved the way for the mayors and chairmen of 
major urban and rural local councils to act as a party's local organisers. 
43 2.1987). Soon after the third term local council elections See the 'Pakistan Times' (Daily, Lahore, 12.1' 
in Punjab, held in November 1987, some opposition councillors claiming party affiliations picked their 
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appeared from this game of internal group politics as if they were not members of the 
same but of opposite political parties. 44Commenting on this state of electoral process, 
one respondent said: 
"The government policy is based on unhealthy traditions and does not serve the cause of 
democracy in the country. Why don't they (the government) come with a straight-forward, 
sincere and clear mechanism. Announcing something and doing something else is no 
service to democracy. Had the policy been implemented in letter and spirit, it could have 
produced positive results in terms of the induction of public-spirited local leadership as 
was observed during thefirst term of the local councils (1979-83). The government, infact, 
is frightened from the strength of opposition parties and does not like to see major local 
councils dominated by the opposition councillors. " 45 
The crux of the problem lies in the fact that there is no prohibition laid in the law 
regarding the change of political affiliation by the elected councillors or making a 
recourse, by them, to the electorates for a fresh mandate in the event of such change of 
loyalty. This has facilitated for every new incumbent of provincial government to bring 
'Is under their influence . 
46 the heads of all major and important local counci A good 
evidence to this effect were the hectic efforts undertaken by the Punjab government 
towards the replacement of sitting council chairmen in view of their alleged affiliation 
47 
with the opposition party . 
In the Punjab, on the other hand, a constructive development of far-reaching 
consequences was the abolition 48 of dual membership disallowing the legislators to 
simultaneously hold an office in the local council. It was a step in the right direction in 
that it removed the local councils from the stronghold of local influential who, in an 
own figures and claimed positions which, according to the ruling party, created an untoward 
atmosphere in the province. 
4-4. See the 'Family' (Weekly, Lahore, dated. February 4-10,1992), p. 12. Soon after the announcement of 
the local bodies polls held in December 1991, the chief minister of Punjab claimed his party's 
sweeping victory and termed it as a 'popular mandate' in favour of the ruling party. The Secretary- 
General of Pakistan Muslim League (Punjab Branch) took serious notice of the split of the party 
workers into groups and the alleged alliance, in certain places, with the opposition Pakistan Peoples 
Party. He directed all district heads of party organisations to submit reports regarding the linkage of 
party candidates with the said opposition party. 
45 From interview with Saeed Ahmad Jan, Ex-Mayor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation (12.9.1992). Also 
see the 'Dawn' dated. 21.8.1991. The Punjab chief minister announced that the local council elections 
for the fourth term will be held on non-party basis but the office-bearers and workers of political 
parties would be fully eligible to contest with the only restriction of using party flags or banners during 
their campaign. 
46 The chief minister of the care-taker government in Punjab (formerly a strong arm of P. M. L., who, 
later, formed a government in alliance with the P. P. P) announced a number of incentives for local 
councils such as powers of zila council chairmen to approve budget of market committees, utilise the 
sports funds heretofore subject to the approval of the respective deputy commissioners, designating 
them as chairmen of sugarcane cess committee and project director of development schemes. 22 out of 
32 heads of zila councils in the province assured the government of their whole-hearted support. See 
the 'Jang' dated. 20.5.1993. 
47 See the 'Khabrain' dated. 12.5.1993. The new provincial government was rather put under pressure by 
the parliamentarians to bring forward like-minded candidates as council chiefs as the measure was C, 
treated to be vital for the smooth functioning of the coalition government. 
48. See the Dawn dated. 21.8.1991. The ban on dual membership was regarded as a step towards 
strengthening institutions rather ttian individuals. The objective of banning dual membership was LI 
stateJ to keep local councils free from political pressure and to boost their efficiency. 
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exceptional cases, could not do justice to the dual positions held by them. Despite the 
fact that both the constitution of Pakistan and the respective local government laws 
disallow holding dual membership of elected houses, defiance of the law was observed 
at both the federal and provincial level S. 49 The interest which the local influential take 
in the working of local councils is illustrated from the fact that the idea of banning dual 
membership, before it was finally executed, was severely resented and criticised by 
different political lobbies. Some were furious as the proposal directly affected their 
family's hard-earned standing in the district . 
50 The development programmeS51 launched 
by the federal and provincial governments and the active involvement, in the execution 
of these programmes, of parliamentarians was already a source of strength and it 
successfully reduced the intensity of this slightly shaken prestige of the legislators due 
to the abolition of dual membership. The creation of this parallel machinery, 
undertaking almost similar developmental activities like those of the local councils, had 
a deeper repercussion on the morale of local councillors which was evident from the 
expressions of the elected councillors and experts interviewed for the purpose of this 
study. 
Specific provisions exist in the local government ordinances regarding the 
development of rural areas to be one of the important responsibilities of district 
councils. Due to the changing government policy, however, a vital role in the process 
has since been being played by the members of parliament identifying projects and 
executing them with the financial assistance of both federal and provincial governments. 
Execution of these schemes solely rests with the several line departments of the 
provincial government. As a result of this changing strategy, not only the idea of 
decentralisation to be practised at the district level through the elected representatives of 
the people and in accordance with the local government laws could not be materialised, 
but at the same time, a vital function of public welfare to be performed by the district 
councils with community participation has undergone considerable decline. 
The policy of the government with regard to the delegation of powers and 
functions to local councils has undergone fluctuation. At times they were, in a sense, 
over-burdened with responsibilities, while at others they were left with very nominal 
activities to undertake. The respective provincial ordinances provide potentially for a 
41) 
The Federal Ministers For Local Government & Rural Development and that of the Punjab both had 
the chairmanship of their respective district councils. By the time the decision was implemented, there 
were over 2500 such public offices held by the MNAs and MPAs belonging to the Punjab. This 
hegemony of few influential families was in no way advantageous to the development of local 
crovernment institutions. 
50. See the News (Daily, Lahore, 29.7.1991). In practical terms, however, the abolition had little effect on 
the domination of district councils by the influential families as the sitting members of legislatures 
were replaced by other members of the respective families. Interestingly, a good number of MNAs and 
MPAs opted to resign from their seats in the assemblies in order to retain chairmanship of the district 
councils. 
This dovelopment, first of its kind, started during the period of former premier Mohammad Khan 
Junejo as a part of his 'Five Point Programme. ' 
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higher degree of decentralisation of functions to the local counc iIS52 though there exists 
a controversy with regard to the actual sphere of influence which both levels of 
government enjoy for the provision of those services. 53 Inspite of considering the matter 
of delegation of powers to local councils very sensitive, the provincial governments are 
of the view that going beyond a certain limit would cause problems which will not be 
conducive to the orderly growth of these institutions. Specially, in view of the existing 
cz,,, L-e of local councils who have yet to gain the required degree of experience to 
handle increased powers and authority, the achievement of the O-sired objective of 
maximum welfare for the maximum number of people could not be guaranteed. While 
agreeing that the policy of gradual transference of powers which are commensurate with 
their organisational capability would be desirable in terms of promoting the institutions 
of local government, they prefer the observance of enough caution in delegating such 
powers to local councils. 54 The bureaucracy, in particular, was of the opinion of being 
extra-cautious in making such delegations. 55 
The actual practices, as revealed from the four case studies in the two provinces, 
contradict what appears in the statutes. Their functional spheres of influence were much 
wider during the first few years of the promulgation of present ordinances which is 
evident from the additional functions, apart from their statutory responsibilities, which 
were assigned to local councils in both the provinces. 56 Such a policy had a deeper 
impact on the morale of people in that it infused a new spirit of confidence and trust in 
the people. An awareness that local leaders had the capability of solving local problems 
was developed. 
52 The Local Government Ordinances provide for identical list of functions consisting of compulsory and 
optional duties leaving it to the respective local councils to take up functions depending upon their 
financial capability and technical competence. 
53 A French delegation of professors, while visiting the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (the largest 
urban local council in Pakistan) was astonished to find that the traffic police was not under the council. 
See the 'Jasarat' (Daily, Karachi, 27.10.1982). 
54 See Policy Statement regarding 'Delegation of Powers to Local Councils under the Local Government 
Laws, p. 3. During the early days when the government entrusted certain important powers to these 
institutions, it was noticed that the councils had acted quite irresponsibly by exceeding the authority 
delegated to them. A -umber of serious allegations were levelled against some councils which 
culminated in their dissolution. This made the general public to voice concern against the tendency of 
concentrating too many powers in local councils at that stage. 
55. See the introductory part to the study on 'AdministraLlon Through Local Councils' conducted by the 
Services, General Administration and Information Department of the Government of Baluchistan in 
1984 identifying the areas such as maintenance of law and order, collection of revenue, co-ordination, 
certain development and judicial function etc., where involvement of the heads of local councils could 
be considered. With the exception of few, transference of the rest were not considered to be in the 
larger interest of the people in view of the existing level of education and competence of local 
councillors. 
56. In the N-W. F. P especially the government departments were asked to prepare their Annual 
Development Plans in consultation with the local councillors and to give due consideration to their 
proposals. In practice, though, the concerned departments submitted their ADPs before the District 
Councils only for approval and Municipal Committees were largely ignored. See the 'Jlhad' (daily), 
Peshawar, 9.4.1980. 
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Annexure: E lists those functions which they performed in collaboration with the 
line/nation building departments of the respective provincial governments. The elected 
assemblies, following the non-party general elections of 1985, demanded the withdrawal 
of powers 57 delegated to local councils during martial law period. The respective 
provincial governments acceded to the demands and the powers given to them in June 
1980 stood withdrawn. Proposals to curtail the powers of local councils were suggested 
even during the martial law in view of the poor handling of cerain matters by these 
institutions. 58 Following the withdrawal of many powers from local councils and a new 
role for parliamentarians side by side with substantial federal and provincial financial 
assistance, the role of provincial line departments in the provision of local services has 
overshadowed that of the local councils particularly in the rural areas. While the 
grassroots Union Councils are virtually inoperative, the district councils have been 
confronted with financial constraints in view of their limited resources and the wide 
range of services to be provided across the district . 
59The concentration of development 
activities and the relative improved financial position of urban local councils is 
illustrated from the Table: 46 
The question of inequitable distribution of financial resources has assumed 
added significance in recent years. The dispute has particularly arisen over the 
usurpation, by the respective provincial governments, of certain taxes which, by their 
very nature, are local in character. 60 For instance, the Motor Vehicle Tax '6 
1 Betterment 
Tax and the existing percentag,., charged by the provincial government for the collection 
of Urban Immovable Property Tax. 
57. See the 'Mashriq' (Daily, Peshawar, 12.6.1985). The N-W. F. P Assembly constituted a high level 
committee to settle the distribution of powers between MPAs and heads of the local councils. The 
assembly resented a press statement of Dr. Mahboobul Haque, Federal Minister For Finance & 
Planning in which he allegedly talked about the proposal, under the consideration of the federal 4: 1 
government, to increase the powers of local councils. 
58. Speaking in the Federal Council, Pir Abdul Sattar, a member from the N-W. F. P demanded immediate 
withdrawal of powers entrusted to local councils in connection with education because of the damage 
caused to the prestige and decorum of education by these institutions. See the 'Muslim' dated. 
17.1.1983. 
59 The Local Government Commission too admitted that the existing sources of most local council-, are 
not sufficient to allow them to perform their functions satisfactorily or to raise the level of civic 
services. See para 53 on p. 7 of the report (vol. 1). 
60 This being in contravention of the recommendations of Local Government Commission Report asking 
the provinces to allow taxation powers to local councils that are clearly demarcated areas of taxation 
and revenue raising, free from encroachment from the higher tiers of government. See p. 68. 
61 Demand for the transfer of this tax from the provincial government of Sindh to the Metropolitan 
Corporation of Karachi was the root cause of the latter's dissolution on February 12,1987. An ex- 
Mayor of KMC told the researcher that ever since the promulgation of the Municipal Act of 1881, 
MVT (once known as the wheels tax) used to be collected by the municipal authorities and this was so 
till 1970 when the provincial government started collecting the tax because of the absence of elected 
local councils. With the phenomenal expansion of mechanised transport, revenue from this source 
increased enormously and in view of its constituting one of the major items of receipts, the provincial 
iTovernment was reluctant to part with it. Urban 
local councils have similar disputes with their 
respective provincial governments. 
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A cursory view of the sources of income available to the federal, provincial and 
local government institutions reveal that these are unjustly distributed particularly in 
relation to the latter as is illustrated from the following table: 
Table: 47 
Details of taxes levied bv the Federal- Provincial ýmci TA)(-. nl Covernmi-nt-, 
Federal Provincial Local 
Import Duty Duty Octroi 
Excise Duty Motor Vehicle Tax Tax on Transfer of Propert 
Surcharges Urban Immovable Property Tax Export Tax 
Income and 
Corporate Taxes 
Land Revenue Local Rates (Water etc. ) 
Sales Tax Entertainment Tax Cattle Fairs. 
1qra Surcharge Electricity Duties Other Minor Taxes 
Export Duty Cotton Cess 
Wealth/Gift Tax Excise Duties 
Tax on Professions/Trade/Callings 
Hotel Tax 
Capital Gains Tax 
Other Taxes 
Source: Local Government Administration, an A. E. R. C 
(University of Karachi) publication, n. d., p. 61 
There is no doubt that the local government ordinances provide for a large 
number of taxes which the local councils can levy depending upon the local 
circumstances. Statistics reveal that the efficient exercise of these powers significantly 
improved the financial health of the local councils. With the emerging trends of 
improper use of these ýowers 62 made the respective provincial governments to ask the 
councils to refer vital financia! matters for prior government approval. This process, 
involving enough time and causing, sometimes, unnecessary delay in the quick disposal 
of cases, could have been undertaken at the district level, had the existing Resident 
Audit Scheme 63 been strengthened and streamlined. 
Apart from the reluctance of the local representatives to generate funds through 
all these sources, the rates of those levied cannot be revised on an annual basis making, 
thus, the financial base of these institutions inelastic. The expenditures, on the other 
62 
. 
The Secretary, Local Government Punjab, in his interview (28.10.1993) referred to the abuse of power 
in areas such as pooling in contract, share in contract, leakages in collection of taxes, purchase at 
highcr rates, favours to contractors resulting in loss, employment of favourites in large number and the 
attitude of disregard to laws, rules, regulations, procedures etc. He attributed political pationage and 
the lack of accountability despite a well-devised control mechanism as the major reasons for above 
wrong practices. 
63 The scheme, as a part of internal audit of local councils, suffers from a number of defects. Having no 
separate office of his own, the Resident Audit Officer relies on the respective local council for the 
provision of these services which, in turn, effects his professional responsibilities in a profound 
nianner. This is evident from the Punjab Local Fund Audit Memo No. PDP/I (49(/3073 dated. 
13.5.1992 warning all Resident Audit Officers not to entertain any bill for payment unless it bears a 
stamp of budget provision. The schemes suffers from similar problems in the N-W. F. P as was told to 
the researcher by an officer of the like stature. 
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hand, keep on increasing due to a number of factors causing deficit financing on the part 
of a large number of local councils. The fact that the existing method of tax collection is 
defective, is officially acknowledged. There has still been an attitude of adhocism in 
government policy with regard to the mechanism to be employed by the local councils 
for the collection of their taxes. At times, the emphasis is on departmental collection 
and at others, directives are issued to lease out the right of collection to private 
contractors. 64 The fact that the official policy with regard to the collection method is 
characterised by uncertainty is illustrated from the following piece of government 
communication on a reference from the head of a Municipal Corporation in Punjab: 
"All corporations may be informed that the RuleslStanding Instructions should befollowed 
strictly. They must make preparationfor departmental collection in case the contractors do 
not come forward. " 
65 
Though the basic motive behind privatisation has been a desire to check evasion 
and corruption through intensive supervision, the method is tantamount to confessing 
that the local councils cannot manage their financial affairs. The powers of the 
government to decide what should be the mode of collection of local taxes, has broken 
the will of the councils to devise a method of their own keeping in view the local 
circumstances. While the method of contracting cannot be safely recommerded because 
of its inherent drawbacks, 66 the method of departmental collection could not equally 
have been developed on sound footings otherwise even at the existing rates revenue 
could be raised to a substantial level. Likewise, the government's power to exempt any 
taxable item from the payment of tax causes tremendous financial loss to local councils. 
A decision of this kind taken with regard to the grant of exemption to Pakistan 
Telecommunication Corporation from the payment of Octroi tax caused a loss of rupees 
two hundred millions to urban municipal authorities of the province. 67 
64 The 'Jang' dated. 11.5.1993. The daily published detailed instructions of the Punjab Government 
directing local councils to auction their taxes by the end of June that year. 65 
No. SOV (LG) 1-58/81 dated. 27.5.1993 
66 
Several instances have proved that the powers delegated to the private contractors to collect certain 
taxes on behalf of the local councils have been misused in an attempt to extract the maximum tax 
revenue for their own benefit. Further, it has been noticed that despite strict provisions with regard to 
the grant of rebate, the contractors find grounds to claim remission which under certain circumstances 
causes significant financial loss to the councils. A special audit conducted by the Punjab Government 
into the financial transactions of local councils following their dissolution on August 15,1993 
revealed that a huge amount of rupees 270 million was remitted to the export tax contractors during 
1990 to 1993 and was the result of collaboration between the elected council chairmen and officials of 
local government department. See editorial of the 'Jang' (24.1.1994). Also see the 'News' dated. 
28.9.1993 reporting that the Punjab Local Government Department granted rebate of Rs. 150 million 
to the contractors of 26 zila councils by granting relaxation on property tax. 
67 
The Punjab Local Government Letter No. SO. V-LG. 197/86 SKB dated. 24.3.1993 was issued under 
rule 136 of the Octroi Rule, 1964. While a municipal body is required to seek prior government 
approval before granting such exemption, the government is empowered to take unilateral decision CI 
without consulting the local bodies. This government order remained operative for only three months 
and had to be withdrawn due to pressures from the contractors. Since the decision was taken in the 
second half of the budgetary year, it entitled the private contractors to claim compensation for the huge 
loss thus sustained. See the 'News' (28.9.1993). 
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A related aspect was the role of the courts which was largely resented due to its 
unilateral decision of issuing stay orders regarding the decisions of the local councils 
aiming at the correction of a situation arising out of a breach of deed of agreement by 
the private contractors. 68 
The ultimate repercussion of this phenomenon II is that local councils find it 
difficult to maintain balance between their income and expenditures. 
69 This is despite 
clear government instructions that the non-development expenditures of local councils 
must not exceed fifty percent of the total expenditure. A major hurdle in the way, as 
pointed out by the local councils, was removed as a result of positive government 
response. 70 To balance the situation, the flow of grants-in-aid from the provincial 
governments is largely motivated by political considerations rather than financial 
exigencies .71 For the councils, provincial grants seemed to be an unreliable source of 
income as was illustrated from the following comments of a respondent: 
"We rely solely on our own sources of income as there is no meaningful financial aid 
forthcoming from the government. Even if a grant is provided, that constitutes a small 
percentage of ourfinancial requirements. It is, therefore, not a reliable source in that the 
government policy to-date has been to allocate grants on an adhoc basis and with political 
objectives. Unless the government grants are regularised, local councils cannot build up 
their institutional capabilities on a permanent basis. " 
72 
Experiences show that the appropriate time which the provincial governments 
find appropriate for the provision of such financial assistance are the occasions close to 
73 
the local bodies elections. This practice of releasing funds to local bodies just before 
the elections dates back to the military regime and was retained later by the succeeding 
68 
. This caused delay in the payment of monthly instalments of generated revenue to the councils 
by the z: 1 
contractors paralysing, thus, the whole range of activities. A consensus of opinion was that the courts, 
before issuing stay orders regarding the decisions of the local councils, should first listen to the view- z: 1 
point of the concerned council and that the disputes concerning these bodies should be handled on 
priority basis within shortest possible time. 
69 The Secretary, Local Government Punjab, confirmed that almost 60% of the local council budget goes 
to meet the establishment charges, payment of liabilities etc. 
70 A general complaint was that expenditure on health, sanitation and education staff etc., sometime, 
increases the limit laid down by the government. In the interest of efficient functioning of the local 
councils, the Government of Punjab excluded expenditure on the above branches for the purview of 
non-development expenditure and declared expenditure on them to be a development charge. 
71 Jalil R. Malik, An Investigation into the Finances and Financial Management of the Lahore Municipal 
Corporation, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Islamabad, n. d., p. 3. The author 
is of the view that the Grants-in-aid payment to the local authorities needs substantial modifications as 
they do not serve any useful purpose at present. 
72 From interview with lkramullah Shahid, ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee of Mardan. 
73 This has been a general trend both in military and civilian regimes and irrespective which party rules 
the province. Reference may be made to the provision, by one former chief minister of Punjab, of a 
special grant of rupees one million and two million for each district council and each municipal 
corporation in the province respectively to enable them to 'expedite the completion of development 
projects. ' Interestingly, only few days before the provincial government had, through a notification, 
directed all local councils to utilise only 25% of their resources on development. Following the 
announcement of the chief minister, this restriction on the utilisation of ADP was withdrawn allowing 
the councils now to utilise the maximum possible funds on development programmes. See the 
'Pakistan Times' (12.11.1987). 
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civilian regimes . The fact that the existing mechanism of grants-in-aid to the local 
councils is not governed by any hard and fast rules is illustrated from the funds released 
to the councils in the N-WEP during a period of five years. (Table: 48). 
Currently, there is revenue transfer arrangement between the provincial 
governments and the urban local councils only. The Provincial Excise & Taxation 
Department collects the urban immovable property tax on behalf of the respective 
municipal body and transfers the net proceeds of the tax after deducting the cost of 
collection. The rate of deduction varies i. e., 5% and 15% in the N-W. F. P and the Punjab 
respectively. Despite statutory provisions with regard to the collection of the local rate 
by the government and their transfer to the district councils, the tax does not constitute a 
meaningful source of revenue generation. Its proper utilisation could, otherwise, give 
tremendous relief to the grassroots union councils in their development endeavours. 75 
Thus, the absolute reliance of the councils on their meagre resources, particularly, the 
district councils, has adversely effected their level of expenditure on service-related 
76 operations . 
Policy measures initiated at the higher levels aiming at strengthening the 
financial base of local councils has generally been resisted by the provinces. Through an 
initiative of this kind, the Federal Government Commission 77 asked each provincial 
government to earmark 10% of their total public sector outlays for implementation 
through local councils. 78 The proposal, which could have ensured decentralisation and 
better economic prosperity for local councils, was turned down by the provinces. The 
opinion held by the Punjab government was that the provinces formulate their plans 
within the over-all framework of the Federal A. D. P. Likewise, the districts formulate 
their plans within the over-all framework of the Provincial A. D. P. Hence, any deviation 
from the existing framework of provincial A. D. P will lead to chaos and will not help 
towards the fulfilment of national aims and objectives. 79 
74. See the 'Frontier Post' (Lahore, 9.8.1993). In the Punjab, Chief Ministers Ghulam Haider Wyne and 
Mian Manzoor Ahmad Watto released Rs. 2.2 billion and Rs. 400 million respectively at the close of 
elections though the scheduled local bodies elections in the latter case could not take place. 
75 District Councils are required, under the rules, to distribute fifty percent of the net proceeds of local 
rate among the union councils within the district according to a formula based on the strength of their 
population. 76 Statistics revealed that the per capita development expenditure incurred by the Zila Council Gujrat 
(Punjab) and the District Council of Mardan (N-W. F. P) for 1993-94 was Rs. 14/- and Rs. 42/- whereas 
during 1992-93 it was Rs. 24/- and Rs. 29/- respectively. ZI) 
77. See Chapter- IV (para. 4) of the Report of Local Government Commission (Vol. 1), Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development, Government of Pakistan, 1982. 
78. ive year period. See 'Power This could approximate to expenditure of rupees five to six billion over af 
of Money' (Article) by Hina Faisal Imam published in the 'News' dated. 23.10.1987. 
79. See the Government of Punjab's No. PS/SLG/DSR/4/83 dated 5.1.1983 containing replies to the draft 
report of the Local Government Commission, p. 8. A major argument given was that a lion's share of 
the Provincial A. D. P i. e., 72% to 75% is already utilised for the benefit of the rural areas with the 
active involvement of the rural local councils in the planning and implementation process. If the 
Federal Government was to allocate 10% of all the development expenditure (alm3st equal to the 
prc, cnt-day Provincial A. D. P) directly to the local councils then the probability is that they may not 
ensure efficient utilisation of the funds because of their lack of ability to plan and execute for such a 
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The Government of the N-W. F. P., on the other hand, simply did not agree with 
assigning of any additional provincial revenues to local councils. The view held on the 
question of federal grants to local councils was that these should be routed through the 
Provincial A. D. Ps so that the existing formula for distributing the development 
allocations amongst the provinces is not disturbed. 80 
The devices available to the provincial governments to regulate the working of 
iu.., l councils cover wide variety of their activities such as project approval, budget and 
tax proposals, change in the schedule of establishment, 81 appointrr-mt and transfer 82 of 
83 Provincial Unified Grades of Functionaries and the periodic audit, inspection , 
supervision of local councils, and conduct of special audit. 84 There were instances 
revealing that the question of job description was not strictly adhered to at the secretariat 
level apart from the individual local councils where it seemed to be a common problem. 
For instance, while the Local Government Board in Punjab was focusing on the 
administration of personnel affairs, the one in the N-W. F. P was concerned more with 
the regulatory and supervisory duties rather than dealing adequately with the human 
resource development. 85 Though training institutionS86 existed in both the provinces, 
their training courses were either not relevant to the requirements of local councils or 
the council functionaries (both elective and official) werL least interested in their 
training programmes. 87 
80. See the Provincial Government's views on Recommendation Nos. 55 and 70 contained in its letter No. 
DS/LG/0001/11/1 dated. 11.1.1983. 
81. Beside other things, approval for this is needed when the council makes recruitment locally usually on 
junior posts. This is so because the provincial governments exercise, apart from an exclusive say in the 
matter of LCS officers, control over the employees of local councils with powers to impose ban on 
fresh appointments, changing their scales of pay and announcing financial relief ( to be met, of course, 
by the respective local council) for these low-income employees. 
82 Normally, the chairmen of local councils are not consulted with regard to the posting and transfer of 
the L. C. S officer which create problems in the smooth functioning of these institutions. An aspect of 
vital significance of the L. C. S officers is their treble responsibility. Apart from the provincial Local 
Council Board which decides their important personnel matters, it is the council chairman who has the 
authority to adjudge their performance and initiates their annual confidential reports. Interestingly, 
these A. C. Rs are then required to be counter-signed by the Deputy Commissioner/Commissioner as a 
result of which the officers find themselves under pressure and are bound to adhere to the instructions 
of the bureaucracy as well. 
83. Both the N-W. F. P Local Councils (Inspection) Rules, 1988 and Section 154 of the Punjab Local 
Government Ordinan,: provide for the inspection of local councils to be conducted at least once in a 
financial year. In practice, however, the law could nowhere be carried in letter and spirit. 
84 
. 
Experiences revealed that the provision of special audit has generally been carried out to deal with the 
local councils dominated by opposition councillors. 
85. The Secretary, Local Government explained the position stating that there were taking place frequent 
transfers of senior officers without his consultation effecting adversely the day-to-day working of his 
department. He had, therefore, to rely increasingly on the in-charge of Local Council Board in view of 
his profound knowledge and experience in local government laws though many of these questions, he 
admitted, did not fall within the purview of the board. 
86 These are: The Local Government Training Institute at Lalamusa (Punjab) and the Pakistan Academy 
For Rural Development (N-W. F. P). 
87 11111 It was evident from the government notifications 
from time to time asking the heads of local councils to 
ensure that employees working under them attend training courses/seminars 
for which they are 
nominated. Reference may be made to the 
Government of N-W. F. P., letter No. SO (LG- 1) 13-75/85 of 
20.4.1985 and No. AO. I/LCB/Estt/ 10-5/91 of 6.6.1991. 
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The device of inspection was taken to its extreme when intended for political 
victimisation while at the same time adopting leniency in favour of party councillors 
despite proved charges of corruption. " Party interests come in the way of taking action 
against the defaulters. Next to the law-making, an area of effective government 
influence over the local councils is the conduct of audit and more particularly the special 
audit. The device, normally adopted by a new government coming to power either as a 
result of fresh elections or a change of government through a vote of no-confidence, has 
generally been employed as pressure valve to make the opposition councillors shift 
loyalty or forego certain genuine demands in return for the leniency shown by the 
government despite proved charges of irregularities . 
89This state of affairs is indicative 
to the fact that the inspection and audit system is less effective and requires substantial 
overhauling. The special audit itself identified the areas demanding modification and 
necessary improvement. 90 One view held was that had the exercise of audit been kept up 
on a regular basis and with the same amount of enthusiasm and spirit, chances of large- 
scale corruption could have been lessened. 
From the functional point of view, though there existed some kind of interaction 
between the provincial line departments and the local councils, the need for a permanent 
arrangement was strongly felt. Due to the lack of a concrete policy governing the 
relationship between the two i. e., development of certain schemes by the line 
departments and their handing over to the respective local councils for operation and 
maintenance purposes, dispute always arose on such question affecting thus the 
operation of vital public services such as water supply and sewerage. For one reason, the 
reluctance of the local councils was justified on the ground that once the scheme, 
completed by certain line department of the provincial government, was taken over, they 
would find it difficult to undertake repair works due to the lack of technical expertise 
91 
while the department, on the other hand, did not consider itself bound to extend 
technical assistance which brought no financial return but did demand the allocation of 
adequate time and energy. 
88. See 'The News' dated. 2.2.1994. A reference to this effect was made in the Punjab Assembly about the 
charges of gross irregularities and bungling, prima facie established, committed by the Municipal 
Committee of Murree, a council dominated by the ruling party councillors. 
See 'the Nation dated. 23-1-1994. The special audit conducted by the care-taker government following 
the dissolution of local councils in the Punjab in August 1993 detected as many as 263 and 116 cases 
against elected councillors and government officers respectively. Some of these cases, being serious in In 
nature, were referred to the Anti-corruption Establishment but the outcome of which could not be 
known. 
90. In financial matters, for instance, these included the allotment of contracts, provision of rebate to the 
contractors as well as allotment of leases. See the 'News'dated. 23.1.1994. 
91. From the teleprinter message issued by the Superintending Engineer dated. 7.10.1992 and addressed to z: 1 
all Executive Engineers of Public Health Engineering Department of the 
Government of Punjab. 
It was perhaps due to this lack of 0&M capability on the part of local councils that the chief minister 
of Punjab ordered immediate taking over of rural water supply schemes 
from the local bodies. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite slight differences in the organisational set-up of local councils in the two 
provinces, the general processes and the nature of relationship between the two levels 
appeared to be identical in many respects. Facts and figures in this study, coupled with 
the four case studies conducted in two important provinces of Pakistan in the context of 
inter-governmental relationships prove the contention. The conditions prevailing in the 
two provinces and their linkage with the federal government as a part of over-all 
political scenario had a direct bearing on the pattern of such relationship. Certain 
elements determined the actual role of local councils and the nature of their relationship 
with the provincial governments. The actual practices as observed in relationship 
processes did not appear to be in conformity with, if not contrary to, the 
pronouncements made at the official level and from party platforms. 
The general attitude exhibited by the provinces demonstrated that the question of 
local government and its development on democratic lines is not on their priority list. 
Political expedience has prevented such a plan from emerging. Policies and programmes 
in the field of local government have largely been motivated by the promotion of vested 
interests. This is evident from the shift of policies taking place in both the provinces 
since the promulgation of the present ordinance in 1979. Some of these policy measures 
adversely affected the very basis of the system. They also proved to be a retrogressive 
step in terms of the role of these institutions in socio-economic and political 
developm(--nt of local areas. 
Ccrdial relationship in both the provinces depended on the question as how far 
the party ruling the province dominates local councils in the province. Details obtained 
from the field and opinion sought from experts confirmed the contention to a large 
extent. This was true in view of the fact that the political affinity and political 
differences played a determining role in shaping and re-shaping the pattern of 
relationship and the general attitude of the bureaucracy towards local councils. 
Certain policy measures, though, proved to be of short-term advantages for the 
ruling party, their repercussions, on the other hand, had been of grave and lasting 
consequences. This did not allow the emergence of a responsible local leadership that 
couid claim credit for better performance and assume responsibility for wrong doings. 
An unfortunate phenomenon was that the ruling party, introducing a new policy, was 
itself at the forefront in matters of deviation. 
Political parties, in general, have not encouraged the development of local 
councils on democratic lines. Instead of treating them as a strong base for the progress 
of democracy, these institutions were seen in the context of strengthening their party 
position or causing damage to the political status of opponents. Opposition parties, in 
particular, treated them as a stumbling block in their way as was noticed in the 
unanimous decisions, taken one after another, by members of both sides of the 
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N. W. F. P., Assembly with regard to the postponement of local council elections in the 
province. From this could be deduced the principle that instead of considering the 
holding of periodic elections as their statutory responsibility, provinces have treated the 
question in a way as if it falls within their discretion. Avoiding elections for little hope 
of securing the 'desired results' does not, in any way, serve the cause of democracy. 
Due to the peculiar administrative set-up in the country where the judiciary 
works under the control of the executive, the former does not seem to be much help in 
providing redress for government's excessive intrusions into local councils. Judicial 
verdicts reminding the government of its legal duty failed to move the provincial 
leadership. This calls for the need to expedite the process of separating judiciary from 
the executive which, in fact, has been a long awaited promise by the politicians. 
A general attitude noticed in both the provinces was that in order to acquire 
support of the sitting councillors, particularly the heads of larger councils such as the 
Municipal Corporations and the District Councils, every new government announces 
certain incentives and privileges which is itself indicative to the fact that the government 
recognises the role of local councils in the provision of support and strength to the 
higher levels of government. 
In the recent years, the role of provincial line departments in the provision of 
services has increased. In some of these services, falling within the purview of local 
councils, their role has overshadowed that of the councils. Perhaps, elected 
representatives of the higher levels were frightened of the increasing influence of local 
councillors in the development of local areas. To balance the situation and restore the 
prestige of parliamentarians, the idea of special development programmes was 
introduced envisaging the active involvement of the MPAs in the identification and 
execution of development schemes. The balance could not, however, be maintained as it 
tilted in favour of the parliamentarians which, in turn, adversely affected the general 
performance and developmental role of local councils. 
It appears that the early decisions with regard to the development role of local 
councils was the result of some random approach. The need for preliminary research 
and study was, perhaps, not taken into account to determine their sphere of influence in 
accordance with their financial capability and administrative/technical competence. 
Emotional decisions, as opposed to gradual transfer of powers and functions, have not 
served any meaningful purpose. Particularly, with the transfer of responsibilities, 
financial needs were not given adequate attention. Neither was any attention paid to 
ensure the proper and efficient utilisation of the locally generated resources. The result 
was that the councils, in most of the cases, failed to keep their non-development 
expenditure within limits and soon got involved into malpractices. Such tendencies, not 
checked at the initial stages due to the improper monitoring system, provided a ground 
to the government for drastic action when situation went out of control. 
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Certain vital areas like equitable distribution of financial resources, moni'., )ring, 
mode of election, in general, and that of the chairman, special interests, in particular, 
and the relationship of chairman with the council and the opposition members need 
reformation. The idea of establishing the institutions of 'Local Government 
Ombudsman' with powers to investigate and redress grievances arising out of the 
internal management of local councils and their external relationship with government, 
semi-government and non-governmental organisations seems to be a possible reform. 
Had the control mechanism been applied as part of the guidance and training of 
local councils, it would have gone a long way in improving their general working 
conditions. They were either not applied at the appropriate time or were rigorously 
applied on 'specific occasions' culminating in the complete breakdown of the system. 
Seen in this context, the existing relationship does not exhibit even the principal-agent 
pattern which ensures, at least, the existence of locally elected institutions. 
Fig : 11 
Income and Expenditure of Metropolitan and Municipal 
Corporations in the Punjab. 
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Fig: 13 
Source: Data Centre, Local Government Department, Lahore 
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Chapter Eight 
Issues to be settled 
A set of recommendations prepared in the light of 
observations made in the field 
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Issues to be settled 
The system of local government in Pakistan, when seen in the broader 
perspectives, reveals that unless certain key issues are settled before-hand, there are few 
prospects for any durable and lasting solution to the question of determining the place 
and role of local government. The development of local government during the period 
under consideration reveals that, despite significant structural changes that occurred 
during the period, there has been little change in the actual degree of governmental 
control and, hence, in the extent of autonomy enjoyed by local government. 
Because of the undetermined status and role of local government institutions, the 
general treatment meted out to them has not been conducive enough to lay down a basis 
on which the foundation of a sound political system could be erected. The ruling class, 
in particular, has ignored this aspect that without strong and stable lower level elected 
institutions, a super structure cannot be erected and made to operate successfully. 
This section of the conclusion is based on the suggestions proposed by the 
respondents. Below is presented a summary of the most relevant suggestions which, in 
the opinion of the researcher, would make some contribution towards improving the 
system of local government in Pakistan. 
In order to assign a genuine placc, to local government in the political system of 
Pakistan, certain pressing problems confronting the system itself will have to be 
resolved. 
Stability and continuity of the elected central government 
First among these is the stability and continuity of elected government and the 
determination of the role to be played by different elements in the society such as the 
bureaucracy and the military. The existing problem is that even the elected civilian 
government is threatened by a possible take over by the military for one or another 
reason, with the result that no civilian government can expect to complete the mandated 
period without the blessing of the military. 
Pakistan's greatest plight since independence has been its inability to establish 
stable-and effective political institutions. Its failure of institution building have been 
both a cause and a consequence of additional failures. Pakistan's decision-makers have 
often sought the quick-fix solution to problems of institution-building, often scuttling 
existing programmes or institutions when they encountered resistance. Pakistan's 
chequered history of local government is a case in point. None of the numerous local 
government programmes established over the decades since partition have survived a 
change of regime, many have not lasted long enough for that. 
The major cause of unstable and uncertain position of elected government at the 
top could be attributed to the denial, to the local councils, of the principles underlying 
the higher levels of elected institutions. For instance, local bodies are managed today 
(January 1996) by persons having no representative status and no authority to impose 
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levies and taxes in the name of the people. Local councils face such a phenomenon 
during the period of elected politicians who claim to be working for the development of 
democratic rule. 
Central-provincial relations 
The political and administrative trends prevailing in the relationship between the 
centre and the provinces has had a direct bearing on the working of local government. 
Particularly, the question of provincial autonomy, which has remained a matter of deep 
controversy, has caused severe damage to the growth of democratic institutions 
including local government. The lack of a breadth of vision and an eagerness to promote 
party interests have created such a situation, despite clear provisions with regard to 
provincial autonomy in the constitution. 
The question of central-provincial relations which was first raised in 1952-53 by 
the leader of National Awami Party in former East Pakistan, is still a burning issue in 
the politics of Pakistan. The question assumes sensitivity when different political parties 
happen to be in control of centre and the provinces. Their policies and priorities 
contradict and hence affect their mutual relationship. Though the constitution of 1973 
provided an acceptable pattern of relationship' but the way those provisions were put to 
operation tended to put the balance decisively in favour of the centre. The first ever 
violation of the provisions relating to provincial autonomy occilrred when the very 
architect of the constitution dissolved the provincial assembly of Baluchistan, ruled at 
that time by the coalition of NaLlonal Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. The 
provincial government of the N-W. F. P., under the same coalition resigned in protest 
against the central government's action. The party ruling the centre then formed its own 
government in both the provinces in collaboration with like-minded groups. 
The question of stable provincial-local government relations without 
determining, or for that matter resolving, federal-provin--.; a! relations is inconceivable. 
The federal government is allegedly unwilling to grant the level of autonomy to the 
provinces guaranteed in the constitution, the provinces too seem reluctant to fulfil their 
responsibilities towards local bodies. The rule of law is a fundamental pre-requisite to 
settle such crucial issues and the federation will have to take the precedence in this 
direction without incapacitating, of course, its own position. This is essential in view of 
the dual approaches which the politicians attach to the question when being without 
power and changing their mind once they happen to be at the helm of affairs. Unless 
provinces are allowed to function within their constitutional limits, they cannot be 
expected to allow local councils carry out their role free from all undue pressure and 
interference. 
U ike the previous constitutions of 1956 and 1962, the one of 1973 was approved by all po itica 1. nil I 
parties. 
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A lawyer gave the following solution to the problems: 
"Past experiences reveal that provinces behave and function nicely when the centre is 
strong. With a weak centre, provinces tend to dissipate or disintegrate because of their 
demand for greater autonomy which, in fact, is a secessionist trend. Personally, I see the 
solution in applying the Islamic principle of governance with concentration of power at the 
centre i. e., vesting power in one man who is guided by the Quranic injunctions and the 
Prophet Mohammad's (Sallallaho alaihe Wasallam) tradition of consultation with the 
people. 112 
The pattern of relationship which the constitution had prescribed at the time of 
its promulgation in 1973 has undergone fluctuation due to the eleven years of martial 
law rule. One opinion, therefore, is that since there has emerged new political realities 
and changes have taken place in the socio-economic culture as well as in the general 
attitude of the people, the setting up of a high level constitutional review commission 
seems inevitable to suggest changes based on the changed circumstances. The point 
emphasised was that while a weak centre will be tantamount to the collapse of 
governmental machinery, weak constituent units in a federation also looks illogical. A 
balance needs to be devised based on the political realities and the genuine demands of 
the provinces. 3 
Induction of parties into the local government 
In the larger context of the future of democracy, some strategy needs to be 
developed for the gradual involvement of political parties at grassroots level which will 
help improve matters by making the base for democracy stronger. In urban areas, the 
political parties' unofficial pressure in municipal government (For instance, Muhajir 
Qaumi Movement in the major urban areas of Sindh) is an acknowledged reality. The 
need is to make it legal and official. In rural areas, however, big landlords may feel 
uncomfortable. But in the larger national interest, a firmer political grip on the organs of 
local government will help check their (landowners') control over the lives of common 
rural people. 
One opinion is that local councils should be left above political processes and be 
kept free from the effects of party politics because these institutions demonstrated 
efficient functioning during the first few years when there was no involvement of 
political parties. There took place an unprecedented amount of social welfare and 
development activities. On the one hand, it strengthened the position of military regime 
in terms of improving its image in the eyes of public, and on the other hand, the general 
population demonstrated enthusiasm and interest in the community development 
programmes. 
The responsibility for this hatred, inter alia, goes to the political parties for their 
failure to play a creative role in the promotion of local government. The major concern 
From interview with Ch. Hamiduddin, Advocate, Lahore High Court. 
3. A. U. Saleem, ex-Director General, Lahore Development Authority. 
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of politicians, in general, has been to manipulate local bodies for the promotion of party 
interests. Revolving around the personalities and lacking strong foundation at the 
grassroots level, the party leaders focus more on the superstructure i. e., holding and 
consolidating power at the central and provincial levels and to achieve this, they contact 
masses at the grassroots level only during the time of elections. For instance, with the 
emergence of a quasi-elected government in 1986 under the supervision of martial law, 
there took place a decline in goodwill towards local councillors. The subsequent 
developments, particularly in 1988 and onward worsened the relations further. This was 
despite the fact that most of the parliamentarians had their career started at the local 
level but they forgot that local councils were the breeding place for the creation of new 
leadership who filled the vacuum at the higher levels when parties were denied 
participation in the political processes. It was the newly emerged leadership which 
successfully established a channel between the military administration and the people. 
While an outright rejection of the idea seems undesirable in view of local 
government's position as the primary school of democracy, great care is needed to be 
taken while adopting the policy of party involvement in local government politics. 
Experiences reveal that when a partial involvement of political parties was allowed, it 
proved fatal to the smooth functioning of local councils. Party bickering not only 
delayed the work of a councils but it also brought the whole local administration 
virtually to a standstill, (as revealed in the case studies) when party considerations were 
taken to their extremes. 
Decentralisation 
Determining the spheres of influence of provincial and local government 
For local government to flourish, the past experiences need to be taken into 
account because a general consensus, in the light of prolonged trial and error since 
independence, is that without a genuine decentralisation of powers, meaningful 
participation of the people in the management of local affairs cannot be ensured. An 
autonomous environment based on a meaningful plan of decentralisation and delegation 
of powers needs the highest priority. 
There is a strong case for the strengthening of local councils, particularly those 
in the rural areas, to accelerate the pace of development in villages. To achieve this, the 
idea of decentralisation of authority is overemphasised and its incorporation into the 
constitutional provisions is recommended. Vital policy guidelines such as the powers of 
the provincial governments vis-a-vis local bodies need to be clearly defined. 
The transfer of certain key services to the local councils, such as primary 
education and health, has produced encouraging results in the past. Convinced of the 
achievements made, the provincial governments, particularly in the N-W. F. P., diverted 
hundred per cent of the resources on these sectors to the local councils which enabled 
them to widen their sphere of influence in these vital areas. This government policy of 
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greater involvement of local councils in the provision of essential services was 
withdrawn during the second term of office i. e., 1983-87 following the general elections 
of 1985 which revived democracy at the central and provincial levels. The allocations 
previously made to the local councils then reverted to the newly inducted 
parliamentarians who were given a role in the development of local areas under the 
government's Five Point Programme. 4 
The fulfilment of the demand of the local councillors of transferring to them the 
administration of primary education and primary health care, depends on how far they 
develop their financial and technical capability to administer these services. In view of 
the poor performance by the local councils in these sectors in the past, the provincial 
governments are reluctant to transfer primary education to the local councils on the 
ground that their administration is not uniform, there is a lack of continuity in their 
policies whereas the education department of the provincial government is in a position 
to provide a continuity of policy and an overall control. The present situation, in the 
words of a contemporary, was thus: 
'A duplicate role is being performed by the provincial government's education department 
and the local councils. While in the larger urban areas, educational institutions to the level 
of middle are manned by the respective local councils, the role of their counterpart in the 
rural areas, such as the district councils, is confined to the grant of a meagre amount of 
scholarship to poor students. The government is trying to assign to the local councils a part 
of the educational function so that the task, being large enough, could be collectively dealt 
with at both levels. 115 
The official view on the demands of delegating more powers and functions to 
the local councils is that once these institutions prove themselves worthy of efficient and 
effective exercise of powers already available to them, the idea of extending their range 
of activities could be taken into account. 6Provincial line departments have significantly 
influenced the working of local councils. In both the development and maintenance of 
services, the formcl- exercises a greater influence whereas the latter has only partially 
acquired some capability of maintaining those services once handed over to them after 
completion. In view of this greater reliance of local councils on the provincial 
government's financial and administrative support, the demand for drawing a clear line 
of demarcation between the sphere of influence of the two levels of government looks 
untimely. 7 
The image of municipalities in major urban areas needs to be restored in view of 
the increased involvement of development authorities in the development of city's 
4. Senior government officials confirmed this abrupt change in government policy. Abdur Rauf DervI, 
Divisional Director, Local Government & Rural Development, Mardan. 
5. Ch. Hamiduddin. 
6. Abdur Rauf Khan, Secretary, Local Government & Rural Development, Government of the N-W. F. P 
was of the view that the existing duties such as rural roads, water supply, primary education and Z-- 
primary health care are but tremendous tasks involving greater public interest. 
7. Imtiaz Masroor, Secretary, Local Government & Rural Development, Government of the Punjab. 
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infrastructure. Local councils have virtually no role in such vital issues like town 
planning, housing, particularly the SiLe development schemes, which has since 
transferred to the provincial departments in view of the technical incompetence of major 
urban councils. 
While considering the determination of the jurisdiction of local councils and 
other government agencies, attention is equally needed to be focused on the relationship 
between the urban municipalities and the development authorities. One view given was 
that while these authorities, unlike the outside world, cannot be made to work under the 
control of the respective municipal administration, some kind of linkage between the 
two is essential so that a balanced development of the urban infrastructure be achieved 
through collective endeavours and pooling together of resourceS. 8 
Provincial-Local Relations 
The relationship of local government with provincial governments and the nature 
of executive and legislative control needs to be determined. Keeping in view the past 
experiences of the abuse of power in the local councils (both financial and 
administrative), a process of cleansing through accountability of corrupt elements and 
their disqualification, if found guilty, from contesting elections in future, will make for 
hualthy development. 
If the existing machinery of control and supervision is overhauled there is no 
reason why local bodies cannot be made effective agencies of local development. The 
mechanism of control should be 3treamlined so that effective compliance of laws and 
official instructions thereunder could be achieved. Sometimes a lenient attitude is 
adopted despite violation of laws simply because of political affinity. 9 The government 
took no notice of the failure on the part of Sukkur Municipal Corporation to call a 
meeting for six months. 10 
There is a strong plea for the maintenance of a ba! ance between the powers given 
to local councils and the control and supervision exercised by the provincial 
governments. There is a rider to the interference by the provincial functionaries and that 
rider is that the acts, deeds and resolutions of local councils should be in conformity 
with law governing them and shall not be against the public interest. II 
The government's stand on the termination of controlling authority over local 
councils was seen with suspicion. 12The respondents were of the view that the direct 
8. Umar Yousuf Deda, lawyer and an ex-Deputy Mayor of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. 
9. Zafeer Gul Zafar, Councillor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation narrated how the government took a 
lenient view in annual inspection and audit of the corporation in return for the support extended by the 
councillors to a government nominated candidate for mayoralty. 
10. Javid Qayum Khan, et al., Sukkur Municipal Corporation (Field Study Tour Report), Lahore, Pakistan 
Administrative Staff College (Session-52), January 1989, p. 22 Z-1 
Ch. Hamiduddin. 
12. Qamrul Haq Siddiqui, Officer on Special Duty, Government of the Punjab, referred in support of his 
argument, to sections 153,156 and 157 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979. 
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control exercised through the divisional and deputy commissioners in the past has now 
shifted to the provincial governments. Since the government finds it difficult to 
supervise the working of a large number of councils in the province, powers to ensure 
their orderly working have been delegated to officers posted at the divisional and district 
levels. 13 Another respondent also confirmed the supervisory role assigned to the 
divisional and deputy commissioners in the Punjab. These powers are to ensure that 
local councils do not adopt a resolution which is in contravention of the rules on the 
subject. 14 
Emphasising the need for the continuation of some kind of control, one 
respondent put it thus: 
"Government interference and control has to be kept in view of the behaviour and 
demeanour of the local councillors. If independent government officers are not allowed to 
control them, then there is every possibility on the part of councillors to go astral'. Neither 
should they be allowed tofunction above the legalframework, nor they be strangled bl, the 
provincial government when desired. 1115 
The councillors' demand of curtailing the quantum of official control was 
interpreted in a different way by a government officer. To him, local councils already 
had an unbridled freedom of action and their demand is simply to get rid of the 
institutional check and balances. Let them first rome up to the level when they be 
allowed to go their own way. 16 
The relation between the provincial and local government are based on goodwill 
and co-operation if elected functionaries at both levels are affiliated to either one party 
or like-minded political parties. The situation was explained by a respondent thus: 
"If chairman of certain local council comes om the same party ruling the province, then fr 
he has access to important political figures such as the chief minister, the minister of the 
parent department, and sometime, to the prime minister. A government official under the 
administrative control of whom the chairman works, lacks such accessibility. This leads to 
the process of co-existence that develops between the elected people and the bureaucracy. 
The whole attention is focused on this and the main objective of development and service 
goes out of sight. 1117 
13 Malik Mohammad Siddique, ex-Secretary to the Federal Government of Pakistan on Basic 
Democracies & Local Government and Salahuddin, Editor, Takbir International shared the view that 
the past control exercised through the district administration has now shifted to the officers of the L- 
II 
respective provincial departments. 
14. Irritiaz Masroor clarified that the control mechanism is not rigid and intervention takes places when 
there is a gross violation of the laws governing the system and detrimental to the public interests. 
15. Ch. Hamiduddin. 
16. Shahid Ashraf Tarar, ex-Divisional Director, Local Government and Rural Development, Gujranwala 
(Punjab). 
17. Mansoorul Islam, Deputy Director, Bureau of Statistics, Department of Planning & Developmcnt, 
Government of the N-W. F. P., Peshawar. 
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Safeguard against arbitrary dissolution 
The elected councillors voiced their concern against the arbitrary suspension and 
dissolution of local councils. A consensus on the issue was that the government policy 
of dissolving local councils for the involvement of few members in unlawful activities 
should be changed. 180ne mayor of a municipal corporation expressed his concern thus: 
"Councillors are not angels. A few of them may be involved in irregularities. Individual 
cases of misconduct and the initiation of an enquiry does not justih, outright dissolution of 
a council. Those found guilty need to be dealt with in their individual capacity. Parti, 
politics seems to be one of the causes 19 behind all governmental actions of dissolution. We 
do not know why the politicians have turned against us? The government gives more iveight 
to the views of parliamentarains who always had a tussle with the local councillors on 
questions of local development. 1120 
Had the attitude of parliamentarians been favourable towards the elected 
councillors, the bureaucracy would have found it difficult to pass arbitrary judgements 
(e. g., curtailing the period of local councils) against them. The immediate need is to 
develop a climate of goodwill and understanding between the elected members of 
different levels on the one hand, and between the local councillors and the bureaucracy, 
on the other. 21 
Another mayor who suffered from a similar government action proposed 
the following: 
"The local councils should be freed from the environment of uncertainty. They should be 
allowed to work for the full term. Of course, under special circumstances, an elected 
member, found guiltýy of misconduct, could be removed and prosecuted under the rules 
followed by subsequer, disqualification if the charges levelled come true. Dealing with 
dishonest elements in this manner will prove more effective in discouraging irregularities 
than causing unnecessary suffering on an innocent majority. 1122 
government officer, while confirming the real motive behind cases of 
dissolution, remarked: 
"Though the government gives financial irregularities as the basis of dissolution, in fact, 
the political factor is at the forefront. The remedy does not lie in the abrogation of the 
system rather in tightening the machinery of accountability. 
" 23 
While the elected councillors blamed the government of excessive actions on 
flimsy grounds, the official view differed. A senior government officer remarked: 
18. Mohammad Nisar, Councillor, Municipal Committee Mardan. 
19. Shah Faridul Haque, Vice-President, Jamiat U1 ama- e- Pakistan, Karachi, argued that local councils are 
generally dissolved on party considerations. In support of 
his view, the learned politician referred to 
the example of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation which was 
dissolved by the Sindh provincial 
government with the purpose to eliminate the hegemony of opposition councillors. 
20. Saeed Ahmad Jan, ex-Mayor, Peshawar Municipal corporation. 
21. Mohammad Nawaz Khan, Councillor, Municipal Committee Mardan. 
Abdus Sattar Afghani. ex-Mayor, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. 
-13. Abdur Rauf Dher-, 'i disclosed durin-, -, interview with the researcher. 
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"Provincial government has only used the authority when circumstances in a local council 
necessitated the taking of such a drastic action. While doing so, the requirements ofjustice 
have always been fulfilled. The courts supervise the actions of the government ven, 
jealously even when there are good reasons for dissolving a council, suspending the 
membership of a chairman or a councillor. To decide cases and complaints against elected 
councillors, there exists an Appellate Authority to undertake in-depth analysis of matters 
before government action could be put into operation. Further, we are bound by the verdict 
of High Court that under the principle of natural justice, explanation must be called from 
the individual before initiating proceeding against someone. " 24 
The dissolution of local councils in 1993 to ensure free and fair general elections 
gives enough evidence to the fact that government actions are largely motivated by party 
considerations. The remedy suggested was that dissolution cases should be decided by a 
3/4 ma ority of provincial assembly and not by the administrative act of an individual. 
Local councils, being popularly elected institutions, deserve adequate support of 
parliament against arbitrary actions. 25 
In the event of dissolution, some prominent citizen of the area known for his 
honesty and public service reputation should be appointed administrator instead of a 
government official who does not give enough time to the council administration 
because of his pre-occupation with regular official duties. 26 
internal organisation of local councils 
As revealed in the case studies, the internal management of local councils suffers 
from a number of factors in which the most significant one is the indirect election of the 
chairman and his subsequent inclination to his group of councillors. Several problems, 
discriminatory in nature, emanate from this phenomenon. The problem becomes 
sensitive and leads to a major source of discontent among opposition councillors. 
The respondents proposed direct election of the heads of local councils instead 
of electing them indirectly through the councillors. The method can relieve the mayor so 
elected from the undue pressure of his colleagues in the council and can provide him 
with an independi-rit environment to decide things on their merit because of his direct 
and independent mandate from the electorate. However, in an event of differences of the 
majority with the mayor, it can give way to an inevitable rivalry between the directly 
elected mayor and the councillors. Thus, apart from these internal complications, some 
external factors can also hinder the applicability of the method of direct election. For 
instance, the attempts on the part of provincial government in seeing the 'desired' 
candidates elected for council leadership as is illustrated from one of the case studies. 
The interest taken in such matters by the provincial government could be determined 
24. Javed Ahmad Qureshi, ex-Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab explained the position during 
interview. 
25. Latifullah Khan, Councillor, District Council, Mardan. 
26. Munir Khan, Councillor, Municipal Committee Mardan. The normal procedure now is to assign 
additional responsibilities of administrator to the Assistant or Deputy Commissioner of the concerned 
district who. being responsible government officers, find it difficult to give enough time to the council 
business. 
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from the fact that this, in the recent past, led to confrontation between the elected 
provincial chief minister and the militarýl governor. This happened over the mayoralty of 
Peshawar Municipal Corporation (NWFP) following the 1987 local bodies' elections - One view was that the existing indirect method of chairman's election he 
amended because the chairman is presently elected on the principle of a s1mple m ority aj 
vote, remains under pressure during the period of his office as the sword of no- 
confidence remains hanging over his head. Either a direct vote27or a clear mikjorltv %lote 
from the elected councillors will place the chairman in a stable position to give a long- 
term policy and ensure its implementation during the term of his office. 28 
Interference in making the choice of a chairman in an opposition dominated 
local council, should be dispensed with. Elected members should have the freedorn to 
choose a chairman of their own wthout external pressure. This will allow a genuine 
leadership to emerge based on personal characteristics and leadership qualities. 29 
The general complaint that a chairman of local council dominated by opposition 
faces a tough time unless he comes to terms with the leadership ruling the province 
needs adequate redress. The official view on this complaint ývas presented by a 
respondent in this manner: 
"No doubt that the ma , yor/chairman 
is an elected head of a council, he is supposed to 
comply with the policy of the provincial government. An act of denouncing the policY of the 
provincial chief executive can never be tolerated. Despite part), differences, courtesv 
demands that the chairman maintains a cordial relation with the provincial chief executt . ve 
and carries out his all lawful directives. 1130 
Regarding the office of the vice-chairman, a large number of respondents 
proposed that it should either be strengthened by delegating to him certain powers of the 
chairman or it should be abolished altogether. At the moment, he is simply a councillor 
carrying the designation of vice-chairman but with no meaningful role to play. He may 
be given a role in matters such as sanitation and water supply. If a chairman enjoys 
power to spend twenty-five thousand rupees subject to no council approval, then the 
27. Yaqub Khan, ex-Mayor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation held the view that a directly elected 
chairman/mayor will face the same problems particularly in the passage of annual budget by the 
council unless he has a strong group of supporters. What would be the nature of relationship of a 
directly elected chairman with his colleagues in the council. The chairman may argue that being Z: ' 
elected by the people, he is not responsible to the council. The solution, to him, lies in the conduct of a 
free and fair election of the leader of the council where the elected members could exercise their 
choice without external pressure. Javed Ahmad Qureshi suggested that in the event of disregarding, the 
legitimate demands or acting in a way contrary to common interests, the chairman should be 
liable to 
be removed by a 2/3 or 3/4 majority of councillors. A more appropriate and effective way would 
be to 
eradicate the ineffectiveness of the chairman on the one hand, and ensuring his accountability. on [lie 
other. 
28. Arbab Mohammad Tariq, ex-Mayor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation. 
29. Agha Syed Ali Shah. ex-Mayor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation. Councillor 
Zaf'eer Gul Za'far 
narrated that during the controversy over the post of mayor betýveen two 
leading candidates, the then 
prime minister had intervened advising them to accept the posts of mayor and 
deputý mayor 
respectively bypassing, thus, the real chooser i. e., the elected councillors. 
30. Tanzeemul Haque Haliml, ex-Secretary, N-W. F. P., Provincial Assembly, 
Peshawar. 
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vice-chairman should have power to spend ten thousand rupees on matters falling within 
his jurisdiction. 31 
The existing method of election of lady councillors based on the likes and 
dislikes of the majority group in the council was severely criticised. The lady 
councillors, so elected, become an instrument in the hands of the ruling group. Under 
the existing circumstances, an appropriate solution lies in co-opting prominent ladies 
known for their social welfare activities in the area. They should be treated as 
spokeswomen of the entire female population of the area and be empowered to 
formulate plans on their behalf. Female councillors should work independently in the 
form of a "Sub-committee on Womens' Welfare. " Their performance would improve 
compared to their role in the male-dominated council where they find it difficult to 
express their views with confidence. 32The functionaries of provincial line departments 
such as education, health, social welfare and community development should take the 
proposals of lady councillors into account while formulating their annual plans for the 
district. 33 
The local government service should be brought in line with other services of the 
government. The existing method of recruitment to the Provincial Unified Grade 
Functionaries (PUGF) should be amended and instead of making recruitment through 
the Local Government Board (LGB), a Provincial Local Government Service 
Commission should be established and the same principles be applied for recruitment as 
for other government services. This will bring talented man-power into the service of 
local government. 34 
Though the purp )se of the PUGF is to provide a corps of government employees 
who could ensure impartiality of the administrative element of local counci]S, 35 these 
officers work under pressure if there develops controversy between them and the elected 
councillors. In the event of disagreement on certain statutory matter between the elected 
chairman and one of the several principal officers, the former gets rid of the latter by 
way of his transfer through the LGB. 36The local government board, on the other hand, 
lacks an independent agency to conduct enquiry into the disputes between the two in 
order to determine the genuineness of the charges levelled and do justice. 37An equally 
3 1. Qamar Zaman Gill, Opposition Leader, Municipal Committee Gujrat. 
32. Ikramullah Shahid, ex-chairman, Municipal Committee, Mardan. Mrs. Zubaida Sayeed Chaoudhry of 
the Zila Council GuJrat also expressed similar views. 
33. Mrs. Zubaida Sayeed Choudhry, Lady Councillor, Zila Council Gujrat. 
34. Major (Retd. ) Nasim Akbar Faruqi, ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee Gujrat. The official view, 
however, was that the existing provisions and procedure are effective for the recruitment of competent 
man-power provided the prescribed mechanism is followed strictly. Interview with Jameel Murtaza 
Hussain, Secretary, Local Government Board, Lahore. 
35. Jameel Murtaza Hussain. 
36. Qamrul Haq Siddiqui. 
37. Zakir Ali Khan, ex-Managing Director, Karachi Water & Sewerage Board, Karachi. He narrated that if 
I no, against the party interests and the officer tries to cOmpk with the rules, he is termed as one worki .g 
should, therefore, be transferred elsewhere. 
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valid complaint of the councillors against the procedures of LGB was that the frequent 
transfer of principal officers adversely effects the council working in that a new 
incumbent hardly gets familiarity with the council business that he is served with a 
transfer order. 38 
The official view was that the principal officers are fully at the mercy of the 
chairman of respective council who is authorised to write their annual confidential 
reports (ACR) which serve as an important criterion for determining their future in 
terms of promotion, transfer etc. 39 The cause of differenc. -s between the elected 
councillors and the principal officers was said to be the lack of experience and lack of 
familiarity on the part of the former and the compulsion imposed by the rules and 
regulations on the latter. To overcome such difficulties, a comprehensive and 
meaningful programme of training for both the councillors and the administrative staff 
was suggested. 40 
All important decisions in the local councils should be made after careful 
analysis of the matter in hand by one of the sub-committees. This will activate the 
presently dead sub-committees and impart necessary training to their members in the 
process of decision-making. 41 Opposition should be adequately represented on these 
committees in order to give them a sense of meaningful participation in the council 
affairs. 421n order to give stability to the office of chairman, the procedure of his removal 
should be amended and existing 2/3 majority required should be substituted for 3/4 
votes of the total number of members. 43 
Likewise dual membership should be abolished, as in the Punjab, in the rest of 
the provinces in view c" the fact that a member holding two positions simultaneously 
cannot do justice to his responsibilities. Both institutions demand full time functionaries 
and nobody can ride on two horses simultaneously. 44 
The lack of co-ordination, both vertical (with elected representatives of the 
higher institutions) and horizontat (functionaries of district-based government line 
departments) has been one cause of the improper performance of local councils in the 
development of local areas. Past experiences of seeking co-ordination at the district 
level suffered from a number of factors mainly the political. It becomes difficult to 
38. Jamshed Ahmad Khan, Chairman, Zonal Municipal Committee, Karachi South suggested that principal 
officers should be posted for a fixed period and should not be transferred earlier unless there are 
genuine reasons for doing so. 
39. Jameel Murtaza Hussain. The researcher was told that the officers of the local council service are 
required to strike a balance between the duties entrusted to them from the government and the 
priorities of the chairman. Since an officer does not like to be frequently transferred from one place to 
another, he has to adjust tne desires of the chairman. 
40 Shah Mahmood Hussain Syed, Municipal Commissioner, Zonal Municipal Committee, Karachi 
Central. 
41. Ch. Irshad Ahmad, Councillor, Municipal Committee Gujrat. 
Z71 uJrat. 42. Dr. Mohammad Asahar, 
Opposition Leader, Zila Council G 
43. Ajmal All Khawar, Councillor, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
44. Malik Mohammad Siddique. 
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combine efforts if elected people from the district are affiliated with different political 
parties. The respondents see the solution in bifurcating the legislative and 
developmental functions. This, according to them, will enable both levels of 
representatives to concentrate properly on their respective taskS. 45 
The respondents emphasised the need for a machinery at the district, or in some 
cases at the tehsil levels, to achieve co-ordination between the respective local councils 
and the provincial line departments such as the P. H. E. D., WAPDA., PWD., Education, 
Health, and Police etc. 46 
Financial Methods 
Local councils, in general, are faced with the problems of imbalance in their 
income and expenditure, a substantial percentage of the latter being spent on the 
establishment. The ever increasing strength of staff causes a major difficulty for the 
economy of these institutions. While in Western countries, the establishment charges 
constitute a tiny share of the budget, local councils in Pakistan allocate a significant 
portion of their income to the salaries of employees and payment of electricity bil]S. 47 
During the years preceding 1979, there was seen a great enthusiasm towards local uplift 
activities in that local councils earmarked almost sixty per cent of their resources for the 
purpose. Those in urban areas were unable to maintain even a balance. 48 
A consensus of opinion among local councillors is that the finances of local 
councils have not been properly developed. The situation, except changes in the tax 
rates, is almost the same as existed during the first decade of independence. To them, an 
appropriate solution lies in finding alternate and permanent sources of income with 
minimum effect on the common people. 49 
The official view that local councils also share responsibility for their unsound 
financial position was acknowledged by the councillors. Despite authorisation to levy 
taxes on all items listed in the schedule of taxes, local councils lack the political will to 
doSo. 50 Apart from the need to initiate necessary measures by the federal and provincial 
45. This idea suggested by Abdur Rauf Dhervi reflects opinion of large number of elected councillors who 
strongly demanded relieving MPs from developmental functions. 
46. Mian Mohammad Nazim Ansari, Vice-Chairman, Municipal Committee Gujrat. 
47. Arbab Mohammad Tariq told the researcher that recurrent expenditure of the corporation constituted 
eighty per cent of the whole budgetary resources and only 1517c of the resources could be allocated to z: 1 Cý development purposes. 
48. Abdur Rauf Dervi. 
49. Arbab Mohammad Tariq differed on the question saying that the problems is not that of the lack of 
resources but their efficient and economical utilisation. If in a certain area the market rate of renting a 
shop is two thousand rupees, then occupant of a council's ship in the same area pays only fifty rupees. 
50. Mohammad Yaqoob Khan differed on the ground that his council did propose new taxes in each 
annual budget but when people protested against those measures, the corporation had no option but to 
withdraw the proposed taxes. The official view on the question was that if a local council is not 
levying tax on certain item in the schedule of taxes, the reason is not the refusal of sanction by the 
government, but the reluctance of the council for fear of earning displeasure of the 
local population. 
From interview with Abdul Ghafoor Sheikh. 
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governments, the need to strengthen and restore the will of the local councillors to levy 
taxes boldly is also important. 51 
A legal expert, confirming the above state of affairs, gave the following 
comments: 
"There are vast powers of taxation which if exercised properly, could turn most of our local 
councils self-reliant in matters of finances. It depends, however, on the characteristics of 
the person heading the council. The idea oa public man, holding public offices like 
chairman or mayor, was to introduce more public views in their worki'?, -. Unfortunatel 
, I., here it is taken to be the self-adoration of the person. After entering into the set-up Of 
bureaucracy, he becomes a part of that andforgets why he was sent to that office. -52 
Another official, while clarifying the general complaint of the councillors with 
regard to the inelastic resource base, commented thus: 
"Councillors are generally reluctant to take the risk of sacrificing their office for the sake 
of the financial stability of the institution. After all, someone will have to take the initiative. 
Staying in public office for ever is not their birth right. Under the oath administered to 
them, the councillors are bound to be loyal more to the institution. People pay taxes 
willingly when they feet' that local councils are spending according to broad consensus of 
communities involved and alsofor legitimate purposes. -53 
Views of the elected councillors were identical on the subject. One such respondent 
admitted that: 
"Seen in the national perspecti . ve, there does not exist a balance between the financial 
health of the centre, provinces and the localities. Financial disputes between the two higher 
levels of government have affected elected institutions at the bottom. The failure to achieve 
a stable foundation offinances could also be attributed to the local councils who have only, 
partially been able to exploit and generate incomefrom the available sources. "54 
The researcher observed that things could be substantially improved if the 
internal financial management of local councils was overhauled with particular 
emphasis on the enforcement of financial discipline. This naturally calls for the 
development of sophisticated package of surveillance devices in order to be injected into 
the local councils system. Specially, in view of the general practices and the trends of 
the private contractors, a feasible alternative to the existing contracting method is 
needed with particular emphasis on strengthening the departmental machinery of tax 
collection. 
To eradicate malpractice in the council finances, the provincial governments 
introduced the system of pre-audit and post-audit schemes. To apply the former, 
principal officers called Resident Audit Officers were deputed in all major local 
councils. Being ill-equipped with apparatus and relying heavily on the facilities 
5 1. Urnar Yousuf Deda. 
52. Ch. Hamiduddin. 
53. Tanzeemul Haq Halimi. 
-ý4. Saecd Ahmad Jan. 
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provided by the respective local council, the performance of the officers' were badly 
effected as a result of which the intended results could only partially be achieved. 
Guaranteeing independence to the auditor is necessary for bringing efficiency 
and decency in the financial management of local councils. To ensure effectiveness of 
the audit, no one should stand immune from the evaluation of action and the resultant 
accountability. The audit places little emphasis on a review of collections. Lost revenue 
due to managerial inefficiency or due to laxity of taxation staff is not considered an area 
to be commented upon by the audit. 
To ensure the judicious use of the existing council resources, an effective system 
of financial management and accountability should be devised. The internal audit should 
be streamlined and be made independent of all pressures. The external financial control 
on a sixth monthly basis be arranged so that unfair use of resources could be timely 
detected and the responsible elements could be brought to book. 55 
Recovery of Taxes 
The concept of local government demands that there should be a policy of self- 
reliance and minimum possible dependence on external financial assistance. 
Government grants should be for specific purposes in which involves the interests of 
national and provincial governments such as education, health and communication. 
Reliance on government grants will defeat the real purpose of local government. Instead 
the efficient exercise of taxation power and effective machinery for the collection of 
local government taxes needs to be ensured. 56 Another view was that even if the 
machinery of collection gets improved, the resource base of local councils is not wide 
57 enough to meet all thi-ir financial needs. Because of their reliance on private 
contractors for the collection of major taxes, local councils suffer badly when these 
contractors delay, or in some cases withhold, the payment of instalments of taxes for 
one reason or another. The only course of action available to such local councils is then 
to approach the district magistrate to help in the recovery of outstanding dues. A 
solution generally suggested to deal with the cases of arrears was the delegation of the 
powers of recovery to the chairman or the chief officer. Presently, the deputy 
commissioners exercise such powers under the Land Revenue Act which involves a 
time-consuming process. 58 
55. Ch. Sanaullah, Senior Instructor, Local Government Training Institute, Lalamusa, Punjab. 
56. Qamrul Haq Siddiqui. 
57. Mohammad Yaqub Khan. The officials interpret it in a different manner. They hold the view that if 
local councils restrict their activities within the laid down parameters, they would rarely face financial 
embarrassment. It is only when they take up projects involving huge expenditure that they get into 
financial crisis. From interview with Abdul Ghafoor Sheikh, Sindh Local Government Accounts 
Committee, Karachi. 
58. One such advocator was Abdur Rauf Dervi who expected greater achievements as a result of direct 
action. 
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Fulfilling the long awaited demand for the vesting of power in the chairman or 
the officials of local government department for the recovery of taxes could bring 
significantly improve the financial position of local councils. 59 Apart from other 
corrective measures, one area of enhancing the financial base could be the exploitation 
of the existing financial resources to the full by more efficient collection and adjustment 
of-rates, taxes and charges which have remained static for many years despite inflation 
and economic growth. Besides exploiting the potential of already available sources, the 
avenues of leakage's need to be identified. Apart from remedial steps to be taken by the 
government, the local councils themselves need to-remove the existing deficiencies 
found in their financial administration. 
Review of tax structure and collection machinery 
Some policy guidelines needs to be devised with regard to the collection of taxes 
by local councils. Presently, under the contracting system, though the local councils 
receive a fixed amount, they lose, on the other hand, a huge amount that goes to the 
contractors as their net profit. The departmental collection, wherever introduced on 
experimental basis, has produced good results. Despite few inherent problems, the 
exercise has been advantageous e. g., it boosted the income, created more job 
opportunities, and reduced the quantum of public complaints which was a characteristic 
of contracting system. 60 
Schedule of local council taxes be reviewed after every three years. Provincial 
governments should share with the local councils net proceeds of those taxes which are 
local in nature such as Motor Vehicle Tax. 61 The courts of law should deal with local 
council cases on priorit,, basis and with a minimum period involved. Presently, the law 
courts have the tend. -, -, icy of issuing stay orders in favour of private contractors without 
consulting first the respective municipal authorities. This causes, sometimes, greater 
financial embarrassment in view of the delayed payment to the council of instalments of 
taxes collected by the private contractors. 62 
Financial Assistance 
The pre-emption, by the provincial governments, of some taxes of a local nature 
has caused a major setback to the finances of local councils. In view of the financial 
difficulties faced by local councils, there is a strong case that these taxes should either 
be transferred to local councils or be shared with them on an annual basis. This will go a 
long way in eliminating the existing deficiency in the service delivery. 4n 
59. The matter was also recommended in the report of Hussain Haider (1969). The present position is that 
local councils rely for this purpose on the district bureaucracy which, sometimes, has no direct interest 
in ensuring recovery of local taxes. 
60. Qamrul Haque Siddiqui. 
61. See details from reports and recommendations of expert committees if similar proposals were given in 
this respect. 
62. Rahmat Shah, Councillor, Municipal Committee Mardan. 
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In major urban areas, local councils deserve to benefit from the proceeds of 
motor vehicle tax. If the provincial governments are willing to share 50% of the net 
proceeds with the concerned municipal authorities, it will have a great effect on the 
service-related activities of those councils. 63 
Tax structure of the three levels require adjustment periodically 
One view held is that as long as the federal and provincial governmerts are 
stronger in terms of political power and revenue generation. there is going to be a less 
effective role at the local level. A consensus of opinion emerging is that the existing tax 
structure of the federal, provincial, and local government requires scrutiny and possible 
consequential adjustments. In this connection, the National Finance Commission can 
make an effective contribution. 
The views expressed by the elected members and government officials on the 
subject lacked consensus. The official view with regard to the imbalance in local 
councils income and expenditure was that councils are vested with enough taxation 
powers which have not been adequately exercised for reasons such as local pressure, 
inelastic tax rates, defective collection machinery. 64 
Similarly, the official view on the transference of certain taxes of a local nature 
was that though the suggestion sounds good it would be at the cost of provincial 
governments' existing programmes because the government is fully committed and any 
reduction in its already meagre resources will cause a havoc to the entire programme of 
action. Alternatively, the government's efforts are directed towards improving the local 
councils ability to generate fully the local resources. 65 
Federal assistance on a regular basis 
The federal government too is under an obligation to extend financial assistance 
to local councils on a regular basis. This is how the central government in the developed 
societies undertake development at the local level in the partnership of local government 
as a result of which the achievement of the minimum level of service provision becomes 
possible. 
Both central and provincial governments should make special allocation in their 
annual budgets to give financial assistance to the local councils. The fact that 
government grants to local councils are occasional was confirmed by a government 
official. 66A formula could be devised for the distribution of funds based on certain 
criterion with particular emphasis on the size of population and backwardness of the 
area. 67 
63. Prof. Dr. Hidayatullah. Director, Institute of Management Studies, University of Peshawar. 
64. Imtiaz Masroor. 
65. Imtiaz Masroor. 
66. Jameel Murtaza Hussain. 
67. Sheikh Mohammad Aslam, Legal Advisor, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
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Functions 
Determination of the developmental role of the representatives of the three levels 
In principle, the statutory duties assigned to local councils in Pakistan are not 
lesser than those of developed nations, but in practice, there is a world of difference 
between the two. 
The involvement of parliamentarians in petty developmental activities as a result 
of launching, by the federal government, of the special development programmes, has 
undermined the prestige of these elected representatives. 68 There existed a sharp 
reaction against the strategy69 which has since been carried without the necessary legal 
ratification. 70 
The parliamentarians admit that there has come into existence a parallel structure 
for project identification and execution at the local level which the elected councillors 
term as an encroachment into their sphere of influence. 71 
The primary consideration behind involving the parliamentarians in the process 
of local development was the achievement of certain political objectives. Shorn of this 
objective, there is no reason why the local government system could not be rehabilitated 
in its correct form. The truth is that by providing basic amenities to the local population, 
local councils had gained political support. As money was spent and displayed locally, 
people felt that local councillors would abide by their promises and fulfil their 
commitments responsibly. This new-found confidence in local councils reinforced their 
68. Altaf Hasan Qureshi, Editor, Urdu Digest, Lahore linked the origin of this involvement to the 1985 Z: ý 
general elections in Pakistan held under the military regime and on non-party basis. The national 
alliance of political parties called MRD (Movement for the restoration of democracy) boycotted those 
elections as a result of which majority of the candidates were those who carne to the parliament with a 
municipal background. The political party formed later on (Muslim League headed by Mohammad 
Khan Junejo), in an attempt to keep the party organisation intact, prescribed the same kind of activities 
which the members had been undertaking since 1979. 
69. Prof. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, 
Lahore held the view that the parliamentarians have their compulsions. In a society which suffers from 
under-development and poverty, the major demands which the voters make on the members of national 
and regional parliaments are the demands which fall with the purview of local councils. Since the local 
councils lack full capability to meet these expectations, the voters ask for them from the 
representatives of higner institutions. The members then are forced to get funds for the purpose. 
Without this, the MPs are treated to have failed in their job. 
70. Dr. Mohammad Afzal, ex-Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, Islamabad. 
The researcher was told that involvement of federal legislators, members of the Senate of Pakistan and 
those of the provincial assemblies in 1985 was an incident of history. Who did it, and why did they do 
it, is a question yet to be examined. The programme now is so deep-rooted that no government can 
reverse it as it would incur the displeasure of party legislators. 
71. The parliamentarians disagree with this notion. To them, the strategy is designed to expedite the 
process of development at the local level which the local councils are unable to cope with on account 
of their meagre resources and poor technical know-how. When asked why not the funds are placed at 
the disposal of local councillors they being more familiar with the nature of local problems and 
demands, the answer given was "they (councillors) have no connection with the centre. Though the 
funds are utilised through the members of parliament but their ultimate beneficiaries are the local 
population especially living in the villages. From interview with Mohammad All Khan Hoti, Senator. Z-1 
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political power which since 1985 has been overshadowed by the national and provincial 
parliamentarians. 
This caused a conflict of interest between chairmen of district council and the 
MPs in the district. 72 A district council's annual budget amounted to 30-40 million 
rupees whereas a member of the provincial assembly received five million rupees for the 
development of his constituency. The comparatively strong financial position of the 
chairman of district council made the MPs resentful as they thought that the district 
council would carry more developmental activities and hence more prestige and 
popularity. 73 In such a situation, if the parliamentarians are influential members, then 
they create obstacles in the smooth functioning of the council. 74The solution lies in the 
adoption of a softer attitude on both sides. While the government needs to adopt a 
generous policy towards local councils allowing them a meaningful participation in the 
process of local development, the elected councillors particularly the chairmen of 
councils should adopt neutrality in the conduct of council business. 75 
In view of the above state of affairs one suggestion proposed was that to avoid a 
wastage of energy and resources and to ensure proper and efficient utilisation of 
government funds, the principle of division of work must strictly be applied to the 
existing developmental role of MNAs, MPAs and local councillors. Relieving MPs from 
these activities will be in the 'largest national interest' and will enable 'competent, 
intelligent and dedicated leadership to emerge' who would concentrate on matters falling 
within the purview of national and provincial governments. 7613ven if the MPs want to 
play a developmental role, they should do so in collaboration with the local councillors 
who are more knowledgeable with the local problems as a result of 1heir intimate 
contact with the local population. 77A working relationship would then become easier to 
evolve between the members of provincial assemblies and the local councillors. 78 A 
major hurdle in the way is the provincial legislatures, the members of which would not 
72. Prof. Dr. Hamid Hasan Kizilbash, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore 
explained that one reason of the tussle could be the nurture of local councils by martial law 
governments as a means of keeping the political parties out of power. On the other hand, there are 
evidences to suggest that wherever local bodies leadership and political parties have been able to work 
out an understanding (e. g., during Muslim League period in the Punjab from 1990-1993), the fon-ner 
have been encouraged by the latter. 
73. Abdur Rauf Khan agreed that the provincial legislators did not favour local bodies to assume their 
proper role and function. They want to keep their hegemony intact in their constituencies. The absence 
from the scene of local councils consolidates their position specially with the disbursement of local 
council funds to the respective MPAs for utilisation on local development. 
74. Ehsanullah Khan, ex-Minister for Local Government & Rural Development, Government of the N- 
W. F. P., did not see any hostility between the representatives of the two levels. The transference of 
certain powers from local councils to the members of provincial assembly was a natural phenomenon. 
After the coming into being of elected provincial governments, the representatives had the legitimate 
right of asking for their powers which heretofore were delegated to the local councillors. 
75. Ehsanullah Khan. 
76. Masood Akhtar Advocate, Gujrat. 
77. Mohammad Azam Chishti, Councillor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation. 
78. Ehsanullah Khan. 
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favour a withdrawal of functions which they have been undertaking in their 
constituencies as a part of strengthening their vote bank. 79 
About the role of the district councils in the process of rural development, it was 
proposed that all development works should be carried out by them. Apart from 
financial and technical assistance to be provided to them by the provincial governments, 
the grants presently administered through the district officers of rural development 
department should go to the respective district councils. Likewise, the Assistant 
Directors and District Engineers currently working under the control of the Directorate 
of Rural Development, should be placed on the staff of district council so as to enrich 
the competence of these institutions. 80 
Special care is, therefore, needed for determining the range of duties to be 
performed by the urban and rural local councils. Given the conditions in Pakistan, their 
function will have to be determined in the light of problems now confronting the 
society. The researcher holds the view that the co-operation of local government must be 
enlisted in the task of the government's initiative for the elimination of ignorance, 
disease and low productivity. The role of local councils in the delivery of services could 
only be enhanced if such efforts are accompanied by delegation of commensurate 
financial powers. 
Reform Initiatives 
It is a tragedy that initiatives to develop or discard a local government system 
has always originated at the federal level. The credit for the former goes to the military 
regimes while for the latter to the elected governments. Reform efforts too have largely 
been initiated under military regimes. Elected governments have generally attempted to 
introduce a system of their own based on the exigency of their political needs. Reference 
in this connection may be made to the constitution of a Local Government 
Commission8l in May 1982 and the constitution of 'Task Force' in 1993 to prepare plans 
-mment. While the recommendations of the former for the setting up of district gov, 
could only partially be enforced, the idea of introducing a district government (at the 
district level) did not provoke enough enthusiasm. While supporters of the idea regarded 
it a practicable suggestion, the opponents presented an equally valid argument. 
Application of the idea of administrative reforms to Local Government 
79. Mohammad Ali Khan Hoti, Member, Senate of Pakistan. The respondent was optimistic that by 
defining powers and responsibilities as well as the division of funds between the two, the problem 
could amicably be resolved. The government will have to take the MPs into its confidence that the 
proposed legislation is not going to curtail their powers. 
80. A. U. Saleem. 
81. The purpose was to review the working of local government, suggest ways and means for greater 
decentralisation, attract maximum participation of the people at the local level and allocate and 
mobilise financial resources, to study the administrative structure and the training of councillors and 
staff. See Introductory part of the Report of Local Government Commission, Islamabad, Government 
of Pakistan, 1982. 
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The scope of actministrative reforms, which has so far been confined to 
provincial and federal governments only, needs to be expanded to include local 
government with particular emphasis on such vital areas like management and 
development through maximum local participation and ensuring responsibility and 
accountability. It will be useful to develop a system of checks and balance and to permit 
performance evaluation. Initiatives towards ensuring least interference from above, 
strengthening the planning process, provision of a well co-ordinating machinery at the 
district level, better training of elected councillors and the staff, and guaranteeing their 
existence will make the local government a success. 
The constituencies of local government should be enlarged and a prescribed 
number of candidates obtaining the largest number of votes should be declared elected. 
Members so elected should then put their collective endeavour towards the betterment 
of the population. 82 
The creation of a high-powered body consisting of experts to review the working 
of local councils on an annual basis is the immediate need of the time. Such review over 
a longer period of time, say four or five years is not desirable because matters under 
consideration become too complicated over the years. Provincial governments should be 
constitutionally bound to abide by the recommendations of the board. 83 
The lowest unit at the grassroots level in rural areas needs to be transformed 
into a traditional panchayati form which is more nearer to the temperament of villagers. 
Members of the panchayat should be elected by all sections of the village population. 
The head of the panchayat should decide things through consultation and on the 
principle of merit. This will help reduce the rivalry which sweeps village life. 84 
For seeking effective co-ordination between the district council and the union 
councils, some structural changes in their constitutions be brought about. The head of 
union council should be made ex-officio member of the respective district council. This 
will help dedicated, responsible and public spirited leaders to come forward and 
represent the interests of local population in an effective manner. The councils so 
constituted will emerge as true representative institutions of the masses. 85 
Constitutional status 
This question arose great enthusiasm as some twenty respondents from different 
walks of life gave their views with, of course, differences in their approaches. In 
general, the granting of a constitutional status will assign to these institutions a specific 
place in the political system and will ensure their continuity. 
Despite priority of attention given to the local government, the truth is that 
neither the military nor the civilian rulers have taken concrete steps towards assigning to 
82. Altaf Hassan Qureshi. 
83, Abdur Rauf Dhervi. 
84. Masood Akhtar Advocate. 
85. Ch. Mohammad Zulqarnain Sahi, Councillor, Zila Council Gujrat. 
276 
it a deserving status in the political system of Pakistan. Its image has been badly 
damaged especially under an elected governments. There has also been eroded the kind 
of enthusiasm which the general public demonstrated during sixties in the process of 
local development. Due to change in the attitude of both the politicians and the general 
public, the spirit of local participation and serv;,. Ie to the people that used to be in the 
past, is no more discernible. The lack of community interest and financial constraint 
have adversely effected the overall performance of the local councils. Local government 
in Pakistan, when seen in the comparative international context, has not worked very 
well as autonornous institutions functioning as a nursery for democracy and political 
development and providing services to the local communities. The reluctance to activate 
them for the purpose has been, in general, on the part of provincial governments under 
whose jurisdictional purview they fall. 
In view of the above realities, a consensus of opinion among experts is that a 
constitutional status would help to strengthen local government. If there is embodied in 
the constitution a general statement of policy or declaration of principles in favour of 
decentralisation to locally elected bodies, this would emphasise both the democratic 
character of the constitution and indicate the direction for future growth. To assure 
flexibility and freedom for growth, the structure, powers and functions of local 
authorities should be left to be dealt with by ordinary law or regulation. 
The respondents posed a counter question as to what guarantees exist that the 
constitutional provisions with regard to the continuity of the system will be followed in 
letter and spirit? Will not the provincial governments met out the same behaviour to the 
local councils which the federal government has been doing to the provinces. One 
distinguished educationalist commented thus: 
"Of course, constitutional provisions will enable local government system to work 
I. ndependentl - 
y, but it should be borne in mind that institutions do not always work on the 
basis of what has been laid down in the constitution. Despite guarantees with regard to 
provincial autonoiny, for instance, differences between the centre and the provinces are 
widening in the countrýy. Unless a political culture is developed where there prevails 
awareness, tolerance and an environment of confidence to do things independently, there 
are few chances that granting simply constitutional status will produce meaningful 
results. -86 
Elaborating the above point further, another educationalist remarked: 
"Under the existing circumstances, it is not possible that a political party holds power at all 
levels at a given time. We need to develop such a political culture where the provincial 
government does not take it as an issue when a certain 
local council is dominated by 
opposition parties. If people have given them a mandate, the), should 
be given every 
opportunities to serve the community the), deem fit. 
Creating hindrances in their wal, is 
anti-thesis of all democratic norms and deserves all 
discouragement. " 87 
86. Prof. Dr. Asrar Hussain, ex-Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. 
87. Prof. Dr. Adil Hussain, ex-chairman, Department of Political Science, UnIversIty of Karachi. 
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Despite the differences in opinion, the need for drawing a clear line of 
demarcation between the of provincial and local Lyovernment is specificalIN J 
emphasised these days. Local bodies would be effective provided their authority is 
recognised and their elective character is constitutionally guaranteed. 
Recognising local government as a distinct tier of government will entitle it to a 
fixed percentage of the total federally generated revenue in the country. In fact, such a 
proposal was made by the federal government in 1982 and also recommended by the 
Local Government Commission but the matter could not be carried out because of the 
refusal of provincial governments to cut their annual development plans by ten per cent 
each year. 
In general, the MPs see a conflict of interests in their relationship with the local 
councillors. The governments, both central and provincial, who rely heavily on the 
support of their members in the parliament, cannot go against the desires of their 
members. The government itself is not a barrier. It is the will of the legislators which 
prevails. 88 Particularly, the weak chief minister of a coalition government has always 
been a tool in the hands of parliamentarians and lacks the capacity to resist their 
demands. 89 
A constitutional status can only be accorded if political leaders at the centre are 
willing to do so. Generally, there is a reluctance on the part of central leadership to take 
an initiative in this direction with the result that whenever a new party comes into 
power, it identifies shortcomings in the system of local government introduced by its 
predecessor and, instead of bringing improvement in it, considers its outright abrogation 
as the only remedy. Incorporating into the constitution of certain fundam, --ntal questions 
related to the system of local government and its recognition as a third tier of 
governmental machinery is recommended. The emphasis should be on the provision of 
adequate legal protection so that the continuity and sustainability of local government 
system could be guaranteed so that it is not be subjected to the vagaries of national 
party politics. 
Doing so will free them from the grip of the provincial governments. In the 
absence of such safeguards with regard to financial and functional jurisdiction, local 
councils in Pakistan have, until now, largely functioned as subsidiary administrative 
units of the respective provincial governments. 
Since the subject of local government appears on the concurrent list of the 
constitution, it would be desirable if the federal government made legislation on 
important aspects of the subject and then making the federated units abide by that 
legislation. The federal government can make it obligatory on the provinces to maintain 
88. Tanzeemul Haque Halimi 
89. Abdur Rauf Khan 
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the elective character of these institutions and ensure the timely holding of periodic 
elections. 
Conduct of timely local elections 
In the recent years, the question of holding periodic local government elections 
has aroused controversy. The government dissolved local councils in 1993 to ensure 
free, fair and impartial elections. The promise of holding subsequent elections to local 
councils did not materialise for political reasons. A strange phenomenon was that the 
government, both the provincial and the federal, were afraid of the possible influence of 
local councillors on the results of general elections. The government perhaps ignored the 
evidence that the elected members of national and provincial assemblies carried greater 
influence, in comparison to the elected local councillors, in manipulating the behaviour 
of the local electorate. 
There was a consensus in the opinion of educationalists, elected councillors and 
civil servants that the responsibility for withholding local government elections goes to 
the provincial government. A major hurdle in the way of provincial governments to go 
ahead with the plan of elections is the party MPs who do not want someone else to get 
the credit of serving the community. 
The provincial government should be constitutionally bound to hold fresh 
elections in the event of either the expiry of the council period, dissolution of a local 
council/s or disqualification of an elected councillor. The period involved between the 
two stages must not exceed three months. 90 
There were differences of opinion with regard to the mode of local government 
elections. Some were of the view that a partyless elections provides opportunities for 
candidates of strong character to come forward on the basis of their ability to serve the 
community. Others held the view that the government should give up duality in its mode 
of elections and come with some concrete policy. To one respondent, the government 
was frightened that any setback in these elections would bring the popularity of the 
ruling party at stake. There is no point of holding party-based elections when the 
government party itself is actively involved in the electioneering. 91 
Association of Local Authorities 
There are certain measures which the local councils themselves can initiate to 
safeguard their interests such as survival of the system and protection of any untoward 
attack on the existence of these institutions. A very good start in this direction had taken 
place in the 1980s when forums were constituted, both at the federal and provincial 
levels consisting of the elected representatives, to promote the cause of local 
government in Pakistan. Reference in this connection may be made to the creation of 
I All Pakistan Mayor's Conference' and the Provincial (N-W. F. P) Committee of the 
90. Nasim Masih, Minority Councillor, Municipal Committee Mardan. 
91. Prof. Dr. Adil Hussain 
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Chairmen of Local Councils. Represented by chairmen of all urban and rural local 
councils (except union councils), the basic objective of this arrangement was to 
motivate local bodies to work with the spirit of co-operation and understanding, to 
design a strategy for the solution of common problems, to have contact with both federal 
and provincial governments for the airing of matters of common concern, and to 
communicate to the government peoples' feeling on vital national issues. 
There are about eighty thousand elected councillors in Pakistan. This huge 
strength with peoples' voting power is not properly organised. With the object of 
providing a forum where elected chairmen of local councils within the province can 
exchange views and discuss problems of common interests, the creation of a'Provincial 
Council for Local Self-Government' is suggested. Likewise, a council could be set up at 
the federal level to co-ordinate all such efforts for safeguarding the interests of local 
government system in the country. 
A committee consisting of the chairmen of selected local councils (urban and 
rural) should have periodic meetings with the provincial chief ministers to discuss 
matters of mutual interests. This contact between the representatives of the two levels of 
government will develop greater understanding and help to remove bottlenecks lying in 
the way of smooth functioning of local councilS. 92 
The desired outcome 
The solution of the problems involved in the inter-governmental relations does 
not lie in getting rid of the opposite tier of government. If the central government 
attempts at a crack down on the provincial governments, it would not materialise. 
Likewise, the provincial government's efforts to disencumber itself of the local 
councillors will be an attempt in futility. Each of the three levels in a federation has its 
utility and importance with corresponding roles. 93 Exigency demands greater 
understanding and co-ordination among the three. A constitutional solution, spelling out 
in unequivocnl terms the jurisdiction of each level of government, seems to be an 
immediate need of the time. If the present state of conflict and confrontation continues, 
then a major breakdown of the governmental machinery is inevitable. 
Presently, although the prevalence of certain unfortunate realities such as the 
abundance of political parties with loose organisations and programmes, the politics of 
personalities and decline in the quality of leaders, the mismanagement of council 
resources and functions, have all combined to erode the image of local government but, 
based on the experiences already gained, there are opportunities for the success of the 
92. Rahim Khan Bacha, ex-chairman, District Council Mardan. The respondent also suggested that 
members of the committee should have the privilege to attend those meetings of provincial assemblies 
in which matters related to local councils are discussed but with no right of voting. 
93. Fida Mohammad Khan, Member, Senate of Pakistan, narrated that one way to achieve this is to 
guarantee the continuity of local government and regular elections to all 
levels of government. With 
I tý 
the new leadership emerging from the bottom and gradually reaching the top, an environment of good- 
will and cordiality in the relationship between MPs and local leadership will 
develop. 
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development of local government with little additional effort needed. To have this, the 
politicians will have to broaden their vision, tolerance, and respect for common and 
national interests. 
The solution to most of the problems lies in seeking self-sufficiency and self- 
reliance. Local people and their leadership should come up with their contribution, both 
physical and financial. The spirit of community participation based on an aptitude of 
self-help can go a long way towards solving certain pressing problems requiring long- 
awaited solutions. 
Over a long period of mistakes and errors, Pakistan has achieved a possible 
institutional frame-work of local government duly backed by a national consensus. 
Local Government should be allowed and continued to function independently, free 
from pressure, as an instrumert of political and popular education and development. 
And those who are to run local government must imbibe an intense and conscious sense 
of responsibility. A very high level of devotion to public affairs and a zeal for the 
service to community can only make them and local government a success. 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
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CONCLUSION 
It is pertinent to note here that in drawing the conclusion of the study, the same 
approach has been adopted as throughout the preparation of this thesis i. e.. analysing the 
pattern of central-local government relations from the political, financial, and 
administrative perspectives. Based on the findings of the research, these three major 
components i. e. are sub-divided into several other components depending upon the 
nature of the facts gathered. 
An administrative perspective 
Keeping in view the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan, the hierarchy of which 
reaches down the local level, a conclusion drawn is that it exercises a considerable 
degree of influence over the elected institutions including the local councils. A clear 
example of the bureaucratisation of the system of local government was that of the 
Basic Democracies so vigorously manipulated by the bureaucracy in that the officers of 
the district administration were assigned a pivotal role. The control was vigorous 
because the general model of communication flow was from top to bottom without 
having any feed-back from bottom to the top. Under the system of Basic Democracies, 
bureaucracy enjoyed an upper hand with only a secondary role assigned to the elected 
representatives. All important tiers of local government, with the exception of Union 
Councils, were headed by the bureaucracy. The elected members were at most 
considered fit for the position of vice-chairman carrying no powers. 
Ever sincl, -, independence and more particularly during the military regime, 
opportunities were availed by the bureaucracy to acquire a paramount status in the 
machinery of gov--rnment. Its role subsequently led to a situation which was threatening 
and challenging to other institutions of representation at all levels. The first elected 
government (1972-77) took notice of it and launched the administrative reforms in 1973 
as a result of which there occurred a change in attitude but these could not be 
institutionalised because of confrontation among the politicians themselves and the 
reluctance to develop truly representative institutions especially at the local level. The 
military take over of 1977 changed the scenario once again when the bureaucracy 
regained its lost strength and status as a result of the disappearance of elected 
democratic institutions. Later in the 1980s when the n-fflitary ruler attempted to 
restore democracy and the start was taken from the grassroots institutions, there was 
seen, unlike the Basic Democracies Order of 1979, some reduction in the hold of 
bureaucracy vis-a-vis elected local councils. This being one of the characteristic features 
of LGO 1979 in order to develop a truly representative local government system with 
minimum role given to the officers for ensuring compliance of the laws. Though the 
kind of supervisory role played in the past by the deputy commissioner was no more 
there but that was replaced by a new mechanism whereby officers of the LG & RDD 
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and the network of field officers were keeping an eye on the operations of local councils 
falling within their jurisdiction. 
Functions 
Under the 1979 ordinance, the functions of local councils are so many that there 
is hardly anything which is not listed in the statute under the compulsory and optional 
categories despite the limited financial and human resources and even more limited 
administrative capabilities and efficiency of the leadership at the local level. 
The role of local councils seems to have undergone fluctuation. During the first 
few years of the promulgation of 1979 Local Government Ordinance, the local councils 
enjoyed enormous powers as a result of the generous policy adopted by the military 
ruler. The elected heads of local councils enjoyed greater prestige making them the 
social leaders and powerful figures of their respective areas. They worked excellently 
because of the enthusiasm for development and the absence of hierher elected bodies. 
Later, the effects of party politics and the emergence of elected institutions at the 
national and provincial levels and the transference of certain categories of powers and 
functions to them restricted their range of activities. 
With the revival of democracy at the national level, major services previously 
devolved on local councils were withdrawn and re-centralised either in government 
departments or development authorities. With this there started a gradual decline in both 
the prestige of local councils as well as the quality of services rendered by them to such 
an extent that the role of the biggest urban local council in a province became restricted 
to water supply and sanitation only. Not only that, but in the provision of both the 
services, not the city corporation but its counterpart, the Development Authority, was 
showing a better performance. 
The official explanation for these developments was usually the failure of the 
councils to discharge their duties effectively. The truth lies, however, in the increasing 
involvement of party politics, both from within and without, government's reliance on 
higher elected institutions (i. e., the National and Provincial Assemblies), diversion of 
financial resources to alternate agencies of development, and local councils' financial 
and technical incompetence to cope effectively with the questions effecting the daily 
lives of masses. 
From the functional point of view, one significant point revealing from the four 
case studies was that despite details mentioned in the statute, the sphere of influence of 
local councils vis-a-vis other government and autonomous agencies was yet to be clearly 
laid out. Their operational domain remained vague. Yet another significant point 
revealing from the same studies is that while the role of urban local councils in service- 
related matters was not very encouraging, that of the rural local councils falls below the 
average standard. This testifies the point that the poor standard of civic services in 
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villages has become the second, after employment, major cause of rural-urban migration 
in Pakistan. 
L appears, therefore, that the task of delegating powers and functions to local 
councils was not the result of some careful planning. The early enthusiasm of involving, 
on a large scale, the local leadership in the administration of local problems resulted in 
the over-burdening of tasks on councillors. The principles of balance was disregarded as 
a result of which local councils became obsessed with duties for which they had little 
financial and technical capacity. This amounted to strangling them before they could 
reach a level of maturity. 
Decentralisation 
The principle of gradual devolution of power as adopted by the British during 
the pre-partition period, was not taken into account. The British had allotted sanitation 
at the initial stage and as the time passed, the old rules were changed and new 
responsibilities assigned keeping in view the success gained by the local councils in the 
municipal spheres. This factor seems to have been disregarded while delegating powers 
and assigning responsibilities to councils under the 1979 ordinance. Things were 
handled more randomly as a result of which clashes of interests occurred when the 
higher levels of elected institutions came into existence with the restoration of 
democracy in 1985. 
The first such problem faced by the local councils was the jurisdictional 
overlapping that had arisen on account of the introduction of special development 
programmes (i. e., Peoples Programme, Tameer-e-Watan Programme etc. ) launched by 
the elected orcvernment with federal funding and the involvement therein of the 
members of parliament. One purpose behind this strategy was to improve the party's 
image by undertaking some development work in local areas through party members of 
parliaments and placing huge development funds at their disposal. This not only 
involved the MNAS, MPAs and Senators in petty development functions essentially of a 
local nature but also created problems of duplication. By taking over certain categories 
of functions supposed to be undertaken by local councils, the process diverted national 
leaders' attention from their primary role of law making. The undertaking, by the 
national and provincial legislators, of minor development activities was treated as an 
encroachment upon the jurisdiction of local councils. 
The activation of these parallel elected institutions in the process of local 
development caused problems of maladministration in that different institutions did not 
follow strictly the given framework and this promoted mismanagement and corruption. 
The funds given to the parliamentarians for uplift purposes, were utilised for 
strengthening the position of the ruling party and securing the vote bank. Local 
councillors resented this arrangement. They held the view that politicians, particularly 
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those in power at the federal and provincial levels, did not want local government to 
flourish because in their strength and effectiveness they saw their careers at risk. 
Overlapping 
There had been little efforts to reconcile the hostility and confrontation between 
the two with regard to the undertaking of development in local areas. This hostility, in 
the ultimate analysis, damaged the weaker institutions i. e., the local councils. A 
tendency on the part of MNAs and MPAs was to have control over the development 
funds to have the sole credit of carrying development in their respective constituencies. 
An unfortunate aspect of this parallel arrangement for local development was the lack of 
a single verying piece of legislation on the matter. It was simply under an 
administrative order that funds were released to parliamentarians to undertake 
programmes of local uplift. An important factor which added to the hostility between 
the two was their allegiance to different political parties. If a majority of councillors in a 
given council belonged to the opposition, then the ruling national or provincial party 
tried to improve the party's image in that constituency by accelerating the pace of 
development through involving the party MPs and placing substantial development 
funds at their disposal. Thus the funds actually meant to be given to the local councils as 
grants-in-aid were diverted elsewhere for political gains. 
At one stage, differences between the local councillors and the parliamentarians 
reached to such an extent that the former announced setting-up of a body consisting of 
chairmen of all district councils (then 72 in number) in Pakistan to safeguard the 
interests of district councils and check the undue interference of legislators (both 
national and provincial) in their affairs. These differences arose following the non-party 
elections of 1985 bringing significant change in the role of local councils. Not only that 
the newly elected MNAs and MPAs started interfering with their working but most of 
the powers previously enjoyed by the district councils were also taken back and the 
share of district councils in development (A. D. Ps) was reduced. 
The emergence of Development Authorities 
Yet another factor affecting functional jurisdiction of local councils, particularly 
those in the urban areas, has been the coming into being of a new device of urban 
development through autonomous bodies and largely self-financing called Development 
Authorities. Working under the administrative control of the Provincial Government's 
Department of Housing and Physical Planning. these authorities perform civic functions 
in urban areas independent of the control of the municipal body. 
In recent years these bodies have taken over some of the vital responsibilities of 
the urban local councils particularly in areas like housing, drainage, and road 
maintenance. Financially sound and technically well-equipped, these agencies ensure an 
orderly expansion of the cities. The shift of responsibility has been due, mainly, to the 
1. See The Jang (Lahore), 19.10.1986. 
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inability of the municipal bodies to cope effectively with the problems arising out of the 
large scale urbanisation. A general opinion is that municipal bodies cannot be solely 
relied upon in view of their financial constraints and poor technical know-how to 
develop the infra-structure particularly the land development. The researcher observed 
councils lacking capacity to formulate a master plan for undertaking the concrete 
development of the local areas and this is more true about the district councils whose 
planning process was haphazard being formulated randomly without fulfilling the basic 
requirement such as a field survey and data collection. No good impression could be 
formed about the development efforts of the councils particularly of the district 
councils. 
Defective co-ordination 
The defective co-ordinating machinery worsened the situation further. The 
abolition of a controlling authority, though elin-finating the hegemony of the bureaucracy 
over the elected local councils, it produced certain negative consequences as well. For 
instance, it reduced only partially the extent of control which, unlike the practices under 
the Basic Democracies system, moved the control centre to the provincial capital. The 
absence of the Deputy Commissioner from the scene left a vacuum at the local level 
which was not easily filled by the alternate arrangements introduced to facilitate co- 
ordination of field activities and encourage co-operation between local councils and the 
various government departments. The constitution of co-ordination committees at the 
district level, the replacement of the chairmen of district councils by the influential 
member of the parliament from the area did not produce fruitful results in that the 
machinery only partially succeeded in ensuring effective co-ordination at the district 
level. A major hurdle was the effects of party-politics which, as revealed in the case 
studies, caused the breakdown of the machinery in both provinces. The federally funded 
national development programmes, which developed conflict and differences between 
representatives of different levels, necessitated the formation of some kind of forum that 
could resolve the problems involved. The matter was not been taken up seriously as the 
idea, whenever initiated, was affected largely by political considerations. It appeared, 
thus, that the political aspect had overshadowed the service related aspect of the system. 
The Control Mechanism 
The government's regulatory framework seemed to be less effective in keeping 
the local councils within the efficient exercise of council powers. In view of the absence 
of such a mechanism, the only course available to the government was to withdraw 
basic and necessary powers from all the local councils when the circumstance so 
demanded. For instance, the provincial government of Sindh had to withdraw from local 
councils the power to sanction commercial schemes like the allotment of plots, 
commercial complexes, conversion of parks and amenity points into commercial uses. 
Similarly, the councils were prohibited from rejecting the highest bid in any auction and 
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entering into any contract without inviting an offer in auction. Similarly, the system of 
internal and external accountability was only partially operative. Annual inspections, 
though provided under the law, was not regularly carried out and no formal machinery 
for registering and handling of complaints existed. The inspections were merely a 
routine exercise which did not lead to results. 
Ministry of Local Government 
The federal ministry which, under the terms of its establishment, is responsible 
for initiating measures for the development of local government, has been pre-occupied 
with duties other than those falling within its purview. As a result of the launching of 
special development programmes, the ministry has been dealing, since 1985, with the 
questions such as scrutiny of the development schemes proposed by the 
parliamentarians, establishing liaison with the respective provincial departments in 
connection with the clearance of those schemes, and disbursement of funds to the 
executing agencies. The settlement of these questions has engaged the ministry into a 
large number of other activities as a result of which its primary task has gone into the 
background. The local councils stood dissolved while the ministry was busy in 
distributing development funds among members of parliament. The change in 
government policy had changed the whole scenario. 
The Financial Perspective 
The sources of income generation and sphere of influence in terms of service 
provision of the three level of governments reveal that these are unequally distributed. 
One study conducted on the subject discovered that out of the total revenue generated in 
1990-91, percentag( shares accrued to the federal, provincial and municipal 
governments stood as 88,5 and 6 per cent respectively. 
2 In terms of the expenditure 
incurred, the share stood as 68,28 and 4 per cent respectively. This indicates why local 
councils offer a low level of service provision. 
While most of the important sources of income are pre-empted by the central and 
provincial governments, the taxation base of local councils consists of the left-over 
sources of revenue. Even this residual base is not normally free to be tapped at will 
because all taxes and charges are subject to the approval by higher levels of authority. 
Apart from the inequitable distribution of financial resources between the three 
levels of governments, there is inequitable distribution of resources between urban and 
rural local councils. It is on account of this financial constraints that local councils, 
particularly in the rural areas, have found it difficult to undertake a meaningful 
developmental role. The projection of future developments has shown a growing 
Hafiz A. Pasha et al., A Study on Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Spending in the Social 
Sectors and Increasing Resource Mobilisation in the provinces. Province of the N-W. F. P., A Report 
prepared for the Canadian High Commission in 
Islamabad (Pakistan), 1992, p. 2 1. 
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disparity between the finances of urban and rural local councils i. e., the rapidly growing 
urban sector as opposed to a slow growing rural sector. 
This is also evident from the findings of the Local Government Commission 
(1982) which noted that even if the provincial governments succeed in resolving the 
disparities in income of urban and rural local councils, a vital fact still ignored by the 
federal and provincial governments is that local government expenditure is and 
continues to be a small percentage of public expenditure as "the major forms of taxation 
of income, property and commerce remain in federal and provincial hands. " 3 
The unequal distribution of resources between the provincial government and 
local bodies had effected the quantum and quality of services as a result of which an 
increasing proportion of the population remains denied of access to the services. The 
urban areas are the worst sufferers in the delivery of municipal services. In this situation, 
the councillors have to opt among various services like water-supply, road formation, 
drainage, street lights etc. Since all of them are obligatory services, their prioritisation 
becomes a difficult task. In the process, many acutely needed services are denied to the 
municipality wards. 
Budgetary position 
The local councils appear to be self-financing entities in view of their complete 
reliance on local sources of income. A careful analysis of the financial transactions 
gives, however, a contrary situation because of the rising liabilities with respect to 
energy charges, imbalance between income and expenditures. The weak financial 
condition of local councils is evident from their inability to undertake development 
works as legaly stipulated. Fulfilling the rising expectations of the local population has C) 
been adversely effected by the meagre resources at their end. 
Potential to raise income 
The generation of financial resources is key to the strengthening of local 
councils' performance and improvement of their management capability. They did show 
sign of picking up in this critical area. For instance, between 1979-80, their revenue 
4 
increased by about 90 percent . Despite such significant 
improvement, the local 
government expenditure is still a small percentage of public expenditure as whole. It 
also revealed from the case studies that there was a general reluctance to exploit new 
sources for augmenting their resource base. While their own sources of income were 
restricted and the collection machinery defective, the flow of funds from the centre and 
provinces was small. 
3. Report (Unpublished) of the Local Government Commission, vol. I (Chapter on Financial Resources), 
Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1982. 
4 Strategy For Management of Resources in the Eighties, National Management Paper (1983), Lahore, 
Pakistan Administrative Staff College, p. 44. C) 
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Response of tax payers 
Attempts on the part of local councils to expand their tax base of local councils 
proved an exercise in futility because of the response of the local tax payers. This 
phenomenon has given birth to several problems of local finance including the councils' 
failure to maintain a balance between developmental and non-developmental 
expenditures, which now seems to be a characteristic feature of local government 
finance in Pakistan with a significant percentage of the budget earmarked for the 
payment of salaries, user charges on the consumption of electricity for street lights and 
water supply schemes. If there is any evidence of unwillingness on the part of 
consumers to pay for the services they receive, that is because of the poor quality of the 
service or a general dissatisfaction on the councils' service-related operations. This has 
led to skewing in council tariff structures and the dependence on indirect taxes has 
increased for funding council services. 
Unfulfilled Government Commitments 
Measures to review the financial resources of local bodies with an attempt to 
expand and diversified them were adopted during the military rule when in 1982 the 
federal government set up a high-powered Finance Commission for the purpose. The 
commission looked into the financial position of local councils, their potential resources 
and their capacity to impose local taxation to meet an increased demand on them for the 
fulfilment of development programmes in their jurisdiction. The commission 
recommended that 10% of the total allocation should fall to the share of the local 
government with powers to formulate their own five-year plans with an accent on local 
resources and self ýelp. The planning commission was to consult the local bodies before 
preparing development schemes in different areas of the country so that maintenance 
and supervision of projects could be entrusted to them. 5 
This was followed by another significant decision taken by the federal 
government in 1988 with regard to the establishment of a local government fund in 
every province to give grants or matching grants to different tiers of the local bodies. ' 
There was little advancement, however, towards the designing of a well-set policy on 
grants-in-aid. Therefore, the provision of grant, if any, continued to be either adhoc or 
specific. The past practice of providing regular grants to local councils had since ceased 
to exist. As an alternative to the inelastic tax base of the local councils, the respective 
provincial governments sought a solution by directing a 10% increase in the amount of 
See The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 16.5.1982. 
6. Sartaj Aziz, Federal Minister for Local Government & Rural Development announced this on the 
occasion of 3rd Punjab Local Government Convention held at Lahore on 17-9.1988. He also talked 
about the assignment of new responsibilities to local bodies such as recruitment of staff and 
establishment of Development Councils in every village. The scheme aimed at increasing the 
responsibilities of the councils that included construction of roads and supply of electricity to rural 
areas, setting up of commercial centres, utility stores, workshops for tractors and provision for LI 
telephone connections in villages. See the Pakistan Times, 19.9.1988. 
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bid offered by the private contractors over the previous year. A conclusion drawn from 
the case studies revealed that the actual outcome was far below the target laid down. 
Thus the government's promises to provide a stable financial base to the local councils 
in order to be able to meet local demands, have proved simply to be lip service. Even the 
initiatives taken in this direction during the military regime have only partially been put 
to operation. 7 
Inefficient utilisation of resources 
Apart from the resource constraints, local councils also suffer from the lack of an 
efficient machinery for the management of local finance. The most significant one is the 
reliance of local councils on private contractors for the collection of revenues of major 
taxes instead of improving the departmental tax collection machinery making it more 
convenient for tax payers to pay. The auction system was subject to numerous potential 
abuses which the local governments were ill equipped in both staff quality and 
organisational terms to control. While the auction system could not be afforded in view 
of the shortcomings attached to it, there was hardly any planned initiative either on the 
part of the government or on the part of individual councils for a permanent solution to 
the problem in terms of working out some efficient method of tax collection with 
particular reference to the strengthening of departmental tax collection machinery. Had 
their collection machinery been effective, the available resources would have been 
sufficient to meet local demands. Not only was the collection machinery was faulty, the 
cost recovery of certain directly consumed municipal service such as water also had a 
very limited cost recovery. 
Audit 
Despite elaborate arrangements prescribed in the law for the audit and inspection 
of local councils, these two functions have remained largely ineffective. This was due, 
largely, to the absence of a mechanism for ensuring immediate action suggested by the 
inspecting agencies. The machinery to apply sanctions for non-compliance with 
auditor's recommendations also looked inefficient. 
Government approval 
Despite a long list of permissible sources of income, local councils still need a 
prior sanction of the government and it was so particularly when the council intends to 
bring about a change in the rate or basis of charging. Sometimes the government's 
decision, having financial implications, adversely effected the functional capability of 
local councils. Annexure-A illustrates few such examples. 
7. See the Report of the Local Government Commission ... 
The Commission recommended the 
transference, by the provincial governments, of certain revenue resources from certain taxes to the 
local councils. These included: motor vehicle tax, sugarcane cess, registration/transfer fees on 
agricultural property, royalties on sugarcane minerals, entertainment tax, income 
from inland fisheries 
? -- C, 
etc. 
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Another point revealing from the financial administration was that despite 
formidable statutory provisions guaranteeing the financial security of local councils, 
there had been relatively little impact in practice in ensuring financial autonomy for 
local authorities. For instance, despite formal commitments to financial decentralisation, 
the practice was more on strengthening governmental control. 
The way local councils in general and those in the urban areas in particular claim 
to be handicapped from the functional and financial constraints is illustrated from the 
deliberations of the All-Pakistan Mayor's Conference (Gujranwala, March 4/5,1991) 
which demanded that the corporations be made autonomous in monetary matters, grants 
be restored, changes in tax rules be introduced, Motor Vehicle Tax be transferred to the 
urban local councils, and disbursement of grant-in-aid to corporations out of the grant 
made by the federal government be arranged. Administratively, the demands included 
the putting of an end to the commissioner's controlling authority, establishment of a 
metropolitan police, conferment of authority to the corporation to create new posts and 
filling them, exemption of major plans from government sanction and authorising 
magistrates of corporations to impose summary fines. 8 
The Relationship seen in its political perspective 
The changing pattern of government i. e., military revolution, then reversal to 
democracy and again a switch over to martial law, has not developed a conducive 
environment for the smooth growth of local government. While the military's interest in 
the promotion of local government has centred around the need to devise a channel of 
having rapport with the general population, the civilian governments have avoided 
reviving them from fear of losing political ground. Even during m1litary regimes, when 
local government has been given preferential treatment in terms of revival and growth, 
attention has been focused on the super structure of the political system i. e., the central 
and provincial governments and their functioning. 
Absence of a stable policy 
There is an absence of an unequivocal government policy towards local 
government. The deterioration of the system could also be attributed to the lack of a 
concrete and consistent policy that could ensure the continued existence of local 
councils and particularly the continuous involvement of an elected element in its 
working. Every time when the institutions are revived, it is essentially a new experiment 
without a real linkage with past practice and experience. At times, local government 
suffered from total neglect while in other situation they became a pampered institution 
of the ruling elite. A policy to this effect could neither be devised by the military rulers 
nor the elected democratic governments. So much so that even for the holding of fresh 
elections, the sitting elected councils are dissolved in order to ensure fair, free and 
impartial elections. 
See The News ki-ahore), 4.3.1991. 
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Federal Government's Role 
Initiatives to set up and develop a local government system in Pakistan has 
always been taken by the federal government and specially by the military rulers. The 
provincial leadership has largely been reluctant to make some significant contribution 
towards the development of local government despite their claim of exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter on account of being a provincial subject. Experiences reveal 
that r-form initiatives directed towards the restoration and strengthening of local bodies 
have generally been undertaken at the federal level and that too during the military 
regimes. Experiences also reveal that the coming into power of an elected democratic 
government has proved to be a retrogressive step towards the growth of local 
government. One reason for the neglect of local government by the provincial leadership 
is their greater reliance on the members of parliament for the survival of government 
rather than the local councillors. 
After independence, the credit for promulgating ordinances (first in 1959 and 
then in 1979) establishing local government goes to the army. The only difference was 
that while the former assigned a pivotal role to the bureaucracy, the latter curtailed 
influence of the bureaucracy by giving to the system a completely representative 
character with no provision for nomination from outside. This is a reminder of the old 
days during the British period such measures used to originate at the centre. On the 
reverse, the responsibility for slowing the process also goes to the federal government 
and this unfortunate situation has happened during period of elected government. 
The peculiarity of the situation in Pakistan is that military rule, which often 
disrupted the process of democracy, seems to emerge as the sustainer of local 
institutions. The military, compared to the representative governments, have been more 
enthusiastic about setting up local bodies because by doing so, they do not lose power. 
Rather it protects them from the threat of any new power centre from emerging. In the 
restoration of representative institutions at the federal and provincial levels the military 
sees a threat to their authority because it demands a corresponding decentralization of 
power. 
Military regimes, despite their reluctance to restore democracy through reviving 
elected bodies at the higher levels, have always preferred to develop local bodies calling 
it a first step towards the restoration of elected institutions at the higher levels. Since the 
common people are more concerned with the solutions to their basic problems, their 
sympathy and support provide a sufficient ground for the dictatorial regime to claim 
legitimacy. The military government, in fact, wishes such an environment to develop in 
society so that their rule may be prolonged. 
In their enthusiasm to revive local government and expedite the drive for 
development at the local level and particularly in searching for a base for political 
support, the military tended to lose balance as they entrusted to 
local councils powers 
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which were meant for elected representatives of the higher levels. Their greater reliance 
on these institutions gave to the local system an extra-ordinary prestige. For instance, 
General Zia gave representation to elected councillors in the Federal Council (Majlis-e- 
Shoora) and the provincial councils. This not only introduced an element of distortion in 
the system but also produced negative implications. Not only that, but the military rulers 
(especially General Ayub Khan) went to the extent of converting the system into an 
-lectoral college provoking, thus, public resentment against the system. For instance, 
despite Ayub Khan's good start with the basic democracies system in terms of arousing 
enthusiasm in the community for the process of nation-building, the attachment of a 
direct political objective diminished its vitality. The image developed during the first 
few years could no longer be there because people, in general, turned against the system 
and their hatred not only led to the demolition of the system but its creator as well. Now, 
whenever the military comes into power, it goes back to the same approach i. e., 
bureaucratization and political manipulation in the local institutions in order to side- 
track the politicians. 
A careful analysis of the development of local government during the military 
regimes would reveal that despite priority of attention being given to the system at the 
initial stage, even the military rulers start looking to other sources of support, resulting 
therefore in a significant change in their attitude toward local councils. It is evident from 
the fact that during the absence of the higher levels of elected bodies, there used to take 
place local body conventions at the national level, serving as a forum for direct 
conversation between the military rulers and the elected representatives and where the 
latter used to be consulted and taken into confidence about vital national issues such as 
foreign affairs, health, education etc. Subsequently, when nominated councils were 
constituted at the national and provincial levels, they became the main forum for the 
deliberation of these national questions and began to lose their local focus. Despite so 
much interdependence, the military's failure to devise a sustained local policy has 
caused major setback to the promotion of the local system. 
Attitude of civilian rulers 
Compared to the military regimes, the role of elected govemments towards the 
development of local government has not been encouraging. They have generally been 
reluctant to strengthen local government and provide a conducive environment for 
growth. It is evident from the fact that the cnly local bodies elections conducted by an 
elected government was that of 1991 and that too in the province of Punjab only and 
surprisingly on a non-party basis. The system has, unfortunately, suffered a major 
setback during the periods of elected government. The elected governments have either 
attempted to abrogate the existing system (as happened during 1972-77) or replace it by 
a new one (when the idea of District Government was put forward in 1993) reflecting 
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the elements of prejudice, enmity and intolerance of elected national leaders towards 
local government. 
Another reason for this is that democratic governments have not worked in 
Pakistan for long periods and, therefore, the ielationship between local government and 
democratic functioning at the higher levels has not been strengthened. At times when 
there have been elected governments ruling the centre and the provinces, their mutually 
tense relationship have had deeper repercussions on local government. There are 
instances of the policy directives of the federal government being defied by a province 
where an opposite party was at the helm of affairs. It is only under military rule that the 
centre's directives become binding on the federated units as a result of a centralized 
machinery headed by military officers tightly knit with the central high command. 
Replacing the system 
A unique phenomenon has been the tendency, on the part of every new elected 
federal government, to do away with the system of the predecessors instead of bringing 
about improvement with the intention to make it a driving force in the lives of the 
citizens. Efforts have always been directed towards replacing the old with a new system. 
For instance, the system of Basic Democracies (1959-69) was abolished by the 
succeeding elected government despite some strong points in the system-9 With all its 
imperfections, it provided an effective and necessary means of communication between 
the Government and the people. Abolishing it altogether discarded the years of hard won 
experie-ice of local government especially in the rural areas. Another system introduced 
by yet another military ruler in 1979 was replaced by the succeeding elected government 
in 1988 and particularly in 1993 when new administrative machinery was proposed at 
the district level in the light of a new social contract. 
There has been observed a great enthusiasm in the government's plan for district 
government but it went into oblivion with great speed. Perhaps the government 
underestimated the hegemony and power of the landlords and the bureaucracy. While 
the bureaucracy was not willing to play a subordinate role, the ruling party was hesitant 
to share power at the local level particularly in the Punjab where there were greater 
chances of the returning of candidates belonging to the oppositon Pakistan Muslim 
League. For having a government at the district level, the electorate too would have 
demonstrated care in making their choice as the elections results of the provincial 
assembly influences behaviour of the electorates while casting votes for local 
institutions. There were greater chances that the ruling party might not benefit from the 
division of votes as it did in the national and provincial elections. 
9A reference in this connection may be made to the recommendation of the senior civil servants 
submitted to the interim government of General Yahya Khan (1970-71) in which they proposed that 
'shorn of their electoral role and with the title "Basic Democraciy" replaced by 'Local Councils' the 
system with minor modifications should and must continue. See Shahid Ali Rizvi, Local Government 
in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas, Karachi, The Centre for Research in Local Government, 1980, 
p. 23 1. 
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Elections becomes an issue 
It is the central government which plays a decisive role in settling some of the 
key issues pertaining to local councils' elections. The military rulers, con-ling to power at 
the expense of disrupting the process of democracy, have been enthusiastic in 
conducting local government elections and have, thus, emerged as the patron of local 
government system. This is evident from the number of local bodies' polls conducted 
during military regimes. For instance, polls were conducted only once during the 50s, 
twice in the 60s under the Basic Democracies system, remained suspended during the 
70s and revived in 1979 for local bodies polls in 1979,1983 and 1987 and 1991 
consecutively at the regular interval of four years. The fact remains there that while the 
military rulers needed support of the local councils for legitimacy and stability, the latter 
in turn, being in a stage of infancy, required patronage and support, both political and 
financial. Both mutually benefited. 
The elected governments, on the other hand, do not think themselves legally 
bound to conduct polls according to the legal schedule and feel free to schedule 
elections based on the suitability of the existing political condition producing the desired 
electoral results. Rumours start spreading long before the holding of elections while the 
government does not deliver a clear cut stand on the question. The responsibility for 
failing to design a programme with a policy whereby local bodies elections could be 
conducted on prescribed dates and fixed modality rests on the federal government, 
policy-making being one of its primary duties. 
In the event of identical party rule at both the levels, the provincial leadership 
tends to take the c. -, atre into confidence before taking some major step in this direction. 
One such question was that of dual membership which had deeper political implications 
particularly in the Punjab. The central and provincial minister of local government 
arrived at consensus on vital questions before finalizing the plan for holding local 
bodies elections for the fourth term. It is pertinent to note here that the whole of 
Pakistan was ruled, at that time, by the Pakistan Muslim League. 10 
Instead of creating a conducive environment for local government growth, 
elected governments have followed, since 1988, policies and practices of stifling local 
government. The tendency, in general, has been that of avoiding local bodies' elections 
for reasons such as an apprehension of losing these elections to a strong opposition, 
deteriorating law and order circumstances, natural calamities, plans to revise population 
census data and the preparation of new electoral rolls etc. Surprisingly, these factors did 
not create problems when the question of holding national general elections arose. The 
denial of participation to the elected representatives of localities has developed local 
disinterest in the system. The matter has equally harmed the image of parties who have 
deprived themselves of strong connections with the population at the grassroots level. 
'(). See The News, 23.7.199 1. 
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A unique element introduced by the military in the local politics was the 
introduction of non-party elections. Originally, the idea of non-party elections of local 
bodies was given by General Zia when he conducted the first such polls in 1979 under 
the present Local Government Ordinance 1979. The members so elected had, 
apparently, no political affiliation of their own and were, therefore, in a position to join 
the group enjoying the support of the provincial government. This, in turn. created 
problems of floor crossing. Cases of changing loyalties occurred in local councils. The 
wards represented by the changing councillors suffered a meagre allocation of funds 
having little relationship to needs. Introducing non-party democracy was, undoubtedly, a 
deliberate attempt to disassociate political parties from participating in local level 
politics. Having achieved the desired results, the principle was later applied to the 
national and provincial bodies when federal and provincial councils were established 
consisting of social notables and representation was given to the members of selected 
local councils from all the provinces. 
General Zia's purpose in depoliticising local bodies was to let a new leadership 
emerge based on spotless character, new enthusiasm and public-spirit in order to replace 
the existing class of politicians. The idea of keeping political parties away from political 
processes goes back to the military revolution of October 1958 when a presidential 
proclamation not only abrogated the constitution of 1956 but also dissolved the national 
and provincial parliaments, abolished political parties and froze their assets. For almost 
forty-four months of the early period of General Ayub as president and Chief Martial 
Law Administrator there were allowed no political parties and politics in the country. 
Thus the national and provincial assemblies elected in May and June 1962 respectively 
came into existence with no political parties and no political activity preceding them. 
Elections under an elected government 
Though the non-party elections were introduced during military rule, they were 
successfully retained during the successive representative regimes with substantial 
improvements made in other aspects such as the bar on dual membership (a privilege 
once available to the members of the national and provincial parliaments) and the same 
day polling for Muslim and non-Muslim voters etc. 
The elected government's claim of holding local government elections on non- 
party basis had been a misnomer in view of the fact that political parties have, in fact, 
actively participated in the competition. In fact, the provincial governments themselves 
have been actively involved in seeing their candidates elected. They have manipulated 
these polls in order to achieve the desired results. 
During the first three elections i. e., 1979,1983 and 1987, one could understand 
the reasons why the authoritarian regime (in the last case a quasi-democratic regime) 
wanted to exclude the political parties. Under the democratic governments, insistence 
on a non-party basis was less justified. The elections were non-party only theoretically. 
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In practice, however, virtually all political parties were in the field behind the scenes, 
sometimes even openly. The law might have provided against the participation of the 
parties, but they were there under different labels such as Islam Pasand (Religious 
Parties) Awam Dost (Peoples Party), and Haq Parast (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) etc. 
Candidates affiliated to political parties shown in the parenthesis, identified themselves 
in such a manner that could drop the hint that they owed allegiance to the political 
, irties. 
Voters had no difficulty in recognising the candidates whom they wanted to vote 
for. 
There took place another significant development when the care-taker 
government gave a severe blow to the institutions of local government. Responding to 
the demands of opposition, the care-taker premier ordered the dissolution of local 
councils throughout Pakistan and the freezing their funds. The action was taken to 
enable the general elections (1993) proceed without being affected by the local councils 
and their members. The plan was to conduct fresh elections for local councils once the 
general elections were completed. By doing so, the interim government acted over and 
above its mandate. '' This created much controversy on some serious questions such as 
whether the local councillors, most of whom come from poor families, carry a greater 
influence than the local MPs, and what guarantees exist thal. once elected, the MPs will 
not manipulate the local bodies elections in order to get the 'desired' candidates elected. 
Role of the provincial governments 
The two ordinances promulgated by the military rulers in 1959 and 1979 differed 
slightly in that the former sought to achieve uniformity by providing an identical 
organisational structure and functions for all local bodies. Though, at a later stage, the 
provincial governments were allowed to make changes in the light of local 
circumstances, there were ample opportunities for the centre to exercise its influence. 
The 1979 Ordinance, on the other hand, made the provinces the sole repository of 
powers to exercise in the field of local government. 
The position of local government vis-a-vis the provincial government has been 
fundamentally weaker because of the little autonomy available to local government. 
This is so despite specific provisions in the local government ordinances and special 
mention in the speerhes of provincial and central government ministers and in the party 
manifestos. They have been so subordinated by the provincial governments and 
exploited by politicians of both sides that instead of developing, these institutions have 
been dwarfed and crippled. 
The provincial governments all over the country have been resorting to 
supercession or dissolution of local bodies as a remedial measures against politicking 
and corruption. This testifies the contention that when elected national and provincial 
on, a care-taker government can manage only the day-to-day affairs and cannot Under the constituti 
indulge into policy determination or any 
long term measures. 
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assemblies, the highest seats of legislation, are dissolved on political grounds, the 
survival of small units of a self-governing system cannot be guaranteed. 
General reluctance to permit elections 
While the cantonment boards, the counterpart of several urban local councils, 
have conducted their periodic elections on regular basis and at their fixed time, 12 those 
of the local councils have frequently been postponed by the provincial authorities for 
one or another reason. Provincial governments seem least interested in the revival of 
elected local government through conducting pe-iodic elections. Thus, these institutions 
rely for their existence on more senior levels of government. Elections to local councils 
have become prey to party politics and fully at the mercy of respective provincial 
governments. As a result of delay in the holding of these elections, affairs of local 
councils have been administered by the bureaucracy. The absence of elected element 
from the scene has had negative effects on the adequacy of local councils. 
Provinces seemed divided over the question of either assigning a political 
character to local councils by holding party-based elections or keeping them free from 
party-politics. Experience in the case studies reveals that despite being elected on a non- 
party basis, these institutions become centres of party-politics to such an extent that the 
promotion of party interests overshadows their primary role of public welfare. Council 
funds meant for public welfare are routed to promote party interests such as spending on 
the party leaders' visit to the area or arranging party meetings. 
Provincial leaderships rely so heavily on the approval of the centre that the party 
ruling the province does not dare to dissolve the councils without the concurrence of the 
centre. Yhe dissoiution of local councils in Sindh by Chief Minister Syed Muzaffar 
Hussain Shah with the approval of Mian Nawaz Sharif in October 1992 illustrates an 
example. The fresh elections scheduled to take place in January 1993 did not happen 
until December 1995 despite the same party (Peoples' Party) rule at the centre and the 
provinces. The reason could be the lack of confidence in gaining control over the local 
councils in major urban areas of the province particularly in Karachi and Hyderabad 
where the ethnic Muha ir Qaumi Movement enjoys substantial public support. 
' 3 
The provincial government's powers to amend the laws of local government 
have been exercised largely on political considerations designed to satisfy the ends of 
the ruling party in the provinces. The provincial goverriments which are always vocal 
for autonomy for themselves are less stringent in applying the same principle in respect 
of local government. 
There are instances which reveal that local councils dominated by councillors 
affiliated with opposition parties had to face a tough time in that neither the government 
12 See The Jang (London), 23.9.1995. The Ministry of Defence announced the holding of cantonment 
board elections throughout the country on the expiry of their tenure in 
November, 1995. 
4n 
13 
. See 
The News, 5.10.1992 
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nor its administrative machinery extended co-operation to such councils. Attempts had 
also been made to get rid of such councils on one or another pretext. Reference in this 
connection may be made to the dissolution of ma or urban and rural local councils in 
Karachi and Lahore. 14 
Local institutions have generally been manipulated by the rulers, both military 
and civilian, in a manner that could serve their particular interests. If Pakistan's 
experiences in the field of local government has been less than encouraging, it is mainly 
because of the frequent bureauCratic and military interventions as well as the refusal of 
the parties led by agrarian landowners to countenance representative rule at the 
grassroots level. 
14. The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation was dissolved on 12.2.1987 over a controversy over the 
transferrence of Motor Vehicle Tax from the provincial government. 
The Zila Council of Lahore was 
suspended in March 1989 on alleged rampant corruption. 
Both these councils were dominated by 
opposition councillors at the time of their 
dissolution. 
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Annexure: A 
A PIDI%TD IX 
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
CABINET SECRETARIAT 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES DIVISION 
Yesterday Minister of State called me and told that the 
Prime Minister intends to bring basic changes in Local Government 
System prevailing in Pakistan. The Minister of State directed that 
the existing. Local Government system of the country as well as 
other countries, specifically Turkey and India, may be stuA? d and 
recommendations may be made for improving the existing system. 
2. He was of the view that majority of the problems of our 
people are of local nature. One of the solution is to replace the 
Provincial Assemblies with the District Assemblies. The District 
Chief Minister with a smal I Cabinet may exercise the powers of 
present Provincial Government. He also mentioned about a report 
written by a Committee headed by Mr. Javed Hashmi presently 
Minister of State for Special Education and Social Welfare, which 
may be studied. 
3. Under the work distribution in this Division, the 
Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development has been allocated 
to D. G-IV. It is therefore, suggested that he may kindly be 
requested to carry out this assignment on urgent basis. 
Sd/- 
Muzaffar Hussain Mohal 
Director General 
23.10.1991 
1ý 
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Annexure: B 
Characteristic features of the District Government proposed by the Task Force on 
New Social Contract: 
Each District in Pakistan will have a District Government (DG) to be elected in 
proportion to the population of the urban 'and rural areas. The Chairman of the 
Union Council will be member of the District Assembly (DA). The urban areas 
falling within the corporations, municipal committees and town committees will 
elect representatives to the DA. The provincial government will be the controlling 
authority of the apex corporations in the provincial capitals to avoid overlapping 
and any conflict in the provincial capitals. 
=> District Mayor (DM) will head the DG elected by the DA. There will be four 
Deputy Mayors in each DG. The DM will exercise overall supervision over the 
district administration including revenue, Zakat and Ushr. The DM will write the 
ACR of the deputy commissioner and superintendent of police. The DG will also 
oversee functioning of local bodies. The Deputy Mayors will have different 
responsibilities. There will be a functional distinction between the functions of 
DG and those of municipal committees, town committees and corporations. 
=> Deputy Commissioner appointed in consultation with the DM will be the District 
Secretary (DS). He will be the head of the secretariat and will assist the mayor. All 
cases submitted to the DM will be routed through the DS. The elected DG will 
control the entire gamut of district administration except that of collector and 
District Magistrate. The DC will continue to perform the functions of collector of 
revenue and district magistrate. The DC will be appointed for at least three years 
and will serve as a link between the DG and the provincial government through 
the Chief Secretary. 
=> DM will be given the power to inspect any provincial department within his 
district. In c2se where they cannot take action they can recommend some action to 
provincial government. 
The election to the DA will be on party basis and the DG will only replace the 
existing district councils. The DA will pass the annual budget, make bye-laws, 
exercise powers of district council and frame rules of business for DG. 
All developmental and nation-building tasks will be supervised by the DG. It will 
also be the controlling authority for municipal bodies corporate. The DG will levy 
taxes on these: Transfer of immovable property, professions, trades, advertisement 
of cinemas, dramatic and theatrical shows and other entertainments, toll on the 
export of goods, inter-district roads, bridges and ferries, rate for the provision of 
water works or the supply of water and fee for market, fair, agricultural shows, 
industrial exhibitions and tournaments etc. 
The tier of commissioner will be abolished besides abolishing the divisions. The 
essential functions of divisional tier will be reallocated at the 
district level. 
=> Financial procedures similar to those prescribed 
for the provinces under the 
constitution will be replicated for the districts. Annual audits of 
DG and bodies 
and organisations under its control will be made mandatory through the provincial 
government. Internal audit mechanism will be set up 
in each district. 
=> To make the DG accountable and to arrest the tendency of partiality 
because of 
party affiliation, the strongest deterrent against this eventuality is accountability 
which is a long process. 
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The DM will represent the state at the district level as specified in Article 7 of 
the constitution to be responsible for the co-ordination of the work of nation- 
building departments of the provincial government and other government 
agencies, maintenance of law and order in the district, control and policy making 
for social welfare, Zakat, Ushr, agriculture departments at the district level, anti- 
corruption establishment, carry out activities of relief during emergencies and 
controlling local bodies in the district. 
The DG will be adequately funded in relation to responsibi I 'ties and resources of 
piovincial and federal governments. Provinces will provide statutory criteria for 
allocation of funds to the districts. Allocation criteria will be Cuch that each 
district gets equitable resource allocation. 
Source: Points derived from the Report of the Task Force on New 
SocWContract, published in The News (Lahore), 
25 th January- -onward, 1994. 
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Annexure: C 
Sources of income for Municipal Committees under the N-W. F. P., 
Local Government Ordinance, 1979. 
Tax on import of goods and animals for consumption, use or sale. 
Tax on annual rental value of buildings and land. 
Tax on cinemas and cinema tickets. 
Entertainment tax on dramatical and theatrical shows. 
0 Tax on transfer of immovable property. 
Water rate. 
Conservancy rate. 
0 Tax on all kinds of vehicles. 
0 Lighting rate. 
0 Tax on birth of children. 
0 Fee for erection and re-erection of buildings. 
0 Marriage tax. 
0 Fees for licenses, sanctions and permits granted by the municipal committee. 
0 Fees on slaughter of animals. 
0 Tax on professions, trades, callings and employment. 
0 Market fees. 
0 Tax on advertisements. 
0 Tax on feLStS. 
0 Tax on animals and sale of animals. 
0 Toll tax on roads, bridges and ferries maintained by a municipal committee. 
0 Fees at fairs, agricultural shows, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and other 
public gatherings. 
0 Tax for the construction or maintenance of any work of public utility. 
0 Parking fees. 
0 Fees for specific services rendered by the municipality. 
0 Any other tax which government is empowered to levy by law. 
Source: N-W. F. P., Local Government Ordinance 1979, Part-11 (Chapter XXII), pp. 95-96. 
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Annexure: V 
Powers delegated to Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Assistant 
Commissioners in respect of Municipal Corporations and Zila Councils-, Municipal 
Committees and Town Committees; and Union Councils respectively under the Punjab 
Local Government Ordinance, 1979 and rules framed thereunder: 
POWERS DELEGATED Relevant Rules: 
1. Appellate powers against rejection of nomination papers. 16 of the Punjab Local 
Councils (Elections) 
Rules, 1979. 
2. Power to notify names of returned candidates 22 and 41 of the above. 
3. Authority before whom Declarations of assets and liabilities Local Councils 
are to be filed by members of local councils; (Declaration of Assets 
and Liabilities of 
Members) Rules, 1980. 
4. Power to receive requisitions and to convene meetings of local Local Councils (Vote of 
councils for No-confidence motions; No-confidence against 
Chairman or Vice- 
chairman) Rules, 1980. 
5. Powers of appellate authority against orders of Mayors and Local Councils 
Chairmen; (Appeal) Rules, 1980. 
6. Powers to specify functions to be performed by an urban local Section 71 of the 
council for the civil defence of its local area; Ordinance. 
7. Powers to specify such boats, appliances and equipment as an Section 72 
urban local council should have to provide for the fighting of 
floods, rescuing of people from flood-affected areas and 
affording relief to flood-stricken people; 
8. Power to approve the rate of fares fixed by an urban local Section 85 (3) 
council for use of public vehicle; 
9. Power to declare any part of the public water course to be a Section 97 (2) 
public ferry and to entrust the management therefore to the 
concerned local council; 
10. Power to accord sanction to a proposal by an urban local Section 98 
council to decla course as a public fishery; 
11. Power to accord sanction to a proposal of an urban local Section 100 (2). 
council for e )ply Scheme; 
12. Power to accord approval to a proposal of an urban local Section 103. 
council establishing, maintaining and managing animal homes, 
cattle-farms and - oultry 
farms; 
13. Power to approve proposal of an urban local council to frame Section 105. 
and execute a livestock scheme; 
14. Power to accord sanction to a proposal of an urban local Section 107. 
ouncil for executing famine works and ordering 
famine relief c 
measures and also to specify the nature of such measures; 
15. Power to declare any burial or burning place which is open to Section 108 (2) 
public for burial or burning to be vested 
in an urban local 
council; 
16. Power to direct an urban local council to take steps Section 113. 
regarding the excavation of tanks and reclamation of 
low lying 
area ; 
1-7 D, -. xiicur tr% cnPrifV i wisures for adution by an urban local Clause (e) of section LI.. -.. - -- -r- -- 
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council for the prevention of beggary, prostitution, gambling, 118. 
taking of injurious drugs and consumption of alcoholic liquor, 
juvenile delinquency and other social evils; 
18. Power to accord approval to a proposal of a local council for Section 124. 
sponsoring or promoting community development project; 
19. Power to accord sanction to a proposal declaring an Clause (f) of section 
expenditure to be an appropriate charge on the local fund of a 128. 
local council; 
20. Power to receive annual statement of estimated receipts and Section 130 (1). 
expenditure of local council; 
2 1. Power to have the budget prepared if not prepared by a local Section 130 (2). 
council before the commencement of any financial year and 
certify the same; 
22. Authority to receive audit report and to constitute local Section 132 (3 & 5). 
councils Accounts Committees; 
23. Powers to receive inspection reports from the Inspecting Section 155. 
Officers regarding action taken by local councils on such reports 
and to issue directions thereon; 
24. Power to: Section 156. 
a). suspend the execution of any order/resolution passed or 
made by a local council; 
b). prohibit the doing of any thing proposed to be done by a 
local council. 
25. Power to direct any local council or any person of an Section 157. 
authority responsible thereto to take such action, as may be 
necessary for carrying out the purposes of the ordinance and to 
appoint a person or persons to give effect to such directions; 
26. Power to cause an enquiry to be made into the affairs of a Section 158. 
local council and to take such remedial measures as may be 
warranted by the findings of such enquiry and to make/order in 
respect of cost of the enquiry and all the ipcidental and 
consequential matters. 
27. Power to require a local L )uncil to m Section 168 (1) 
28. Extension and curtailment of limits of local council. Section 6(5). 
N. B: Powers available to the Commissioners only in 
respect of all local councils within the Division. 
29. Power to create posts in local councils. Local Councils 
(Schedule of Estab. ) 
Rules, 198 1. 
30. Power to quash proceedings of local councils. section 156 (a). 
3 1. Power to: Municipal Servant 
a). approve appointment of Authorised Medical 
Attendant-, (Medical Attendance) 
b). sanction re-imbursement of Medical Charges to servants of 
Rules, 1962. 
]-^nl r1r%11nr'; 1r' 
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Annexure: E 
Functions of Line/Nation Building Departments transferred to local councils and 
their chairmen. 
A-ariculture Department: 
I- Supervision of Extension Work: 
Apart from carrying out the technical supervision and overall administration, the 
following extension work will be carried out with the clos - supervision and 
collaboration of zila councils in the district: 
a). Having prepared the district level plans, programmes and deve! opments 
schemes, the Deputy Director of Agriculture will get them approved from 
the zila councils incorporating suggestions, if any, made by the council. 
Progress reports will also be furnished to the zila councils; 
b). All functions like holding of mass media, dissemination of technical know- 
how, holding of agriculture shows, competitions and organising farmers 
training programmes will be carried out with the financial support and 
collaboration of the zila councils; 
c). Zila councils will be involved directly for carrying out production and plant 
protection campaigns in the district; 
d). Monitoring and evaluation of all the programmes of agriculture department 
will be done through zila councils. 
2. District Advisory Committee Chairman. 
The Chairman of the zila council will act as Chairman of District Agricultural 
Advisory Committee. 
3. Agricultural Input3: 
All agencies engaged in the supply of fertiliser to the farmers will provide to the 
zila councils list of their bulk sale depots i. e., location and normal out turn. For 
opening bulk sale depots and sale-points at particular places so as to fulfil the 
economic proposition, the directions of zila councils will be promptly carried 
out; 
4. Market Committees. 
Necessary amendments were made to give powers to the zila councils for 
suggesting panels for the constitution of Market Committees previously administered 
through the Agricultut, -Produce 
Market Ordinance, 1978. 
5. The elected representatives will be involved while fixing the market fee. 
Auaaf Department: 
1. The department, while retaining the administration of all important shrines 
and mosques, will constitute 'Religious Purposes Committees' with 
representation given to the local councillors to the extent of 1/3 of the total CN 
strength. 
329 
2. The Zonal Administrators of Auqaf will, while administering the local 
shrines/mosques, consult the local Religious Purposes Committees 
constituted by the respective urban and rural local council. 
3. The budget for the local shrines and mosques will be prepared by the 
Department in consultation with the concerned Religious Purposes 
Committees. 
4. In case of difference of opinion between the Religious Purposes Committee 
and the Departmental functionaries, the matter will be referred to the Chief 
Administrator of Auqaf for final decision. 
Communication and Works Department: 
Selection of sites of building of primary schools and health centres would be 
done by the zila councils. 
Education Department: 
1. Selection of site of schools to be made by the zila councils in consultation with 
the respective union councils. 
2. The District Education Officer to be responsible and overall in-charge of 
primary education in the district and its administration, discipline etc. 
3. The District Education Officer will maintain liaison with the zila council 
through its Education sub-Committee. Any recommendation made by the Zila 
Council/Education Committee will be examined and analysed by him and 
given due respect and consideration. 
4. The District Education Officer will keep the Zila Council/Education Committee 
informed of the educational activities in the primary sector. For smooth 
functioning of the sector, the District Education Officer will seek ready co- 
operation of the elected representatives, and will at the same time, render every 
p( ssible help, assistance and advice. 
5. District Purchase Committee for the purchase of equipment and furniture for 
primary schools only in the province have been reconstituted as follows: 
1. Chairman, Zila Council of the District 
2. One representative of Deputy 
Commissioner of the District. 
3. Local representative of Local Government 
Department. 
4. Local representative of the Industries 
Department not below the rank of A. D 
5. District Education Officer 
Food Department: 
Chairman of the Committee 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member/Secretary 
For the allotment of Ration Depots, Local councils will be intimately involved 
and for this purpose the following 
five Allotment Boards in each district were 
constituted: 
a). Zila Allotment Board For Rural Areas, 
b). City Allotment Board For Corporation Limits, 
c). Municipal Allotment Board 
For Municipalities, 
d). Town Allotment Board For Town Committees', 
e). Allotment Board For Cantonment 
Areas. 
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Each of the above boards consisted of five members. Headed by the 
Mayor/Chairman of the respective local council, with membership available to the 
Deputy MayorNice-Chairman, a nominee of the Deputy Commissioner, representative 
of respective electoral unit and the District Food Controller or his nominee. these 
allotment boards were empowered in respect of allotment of Ration Depots against a 
clear vacancy. Chairmen of Union Councils, member of zila councils in the rural areas 
and councillors of the urban local councils were authorised to check Ration Depots in 
their respective jurisdiction and, on detection of any irregularity, report the matter to the 
respective Allotment Board for necessary action against the depot-holder. 
Forestry and Wildlife Department: 
1. The existing functions being performed by the Forestry and Wildlife 
Department will continue to be performed as such but the zila council will help 
in motivation in addition to supervision of Forestry Department. The district 
level officers of the department will submit monthly activity report to the zila 
council concerned. 
2. A committee, headed by the chairman of the respective zila council with 
Divisional Forest Officer to act as Secretary and three other members, one 
representative of the Deputy Commissioner and two other elected councillors 
to be nominated by the zila council, was to supervise the Anti-wild Boar and 
Anti-rodent campaigns. 
Health Department: 
1. Selection of sites for Basic Health Units and Rural Health Centres to be made 
by the zila council in consultation with the union council concerned. 
2. Operational 'unctions of Rural Dispensaries have been transferred to the zila 
councils. 
3. District Health Officer to assist zila council in performing their functions in 
respect of Rural Dispensaries. 
4. Further transfer of functions of other health facilities to be considered in the 
light of experience of functioning of the Rural Dispensaries under the 
administration of the zila councils. 
Housing and Physical Planning Department: 
I. Schemes such as rural water supply, sewerage and drainage will be executed 
through the Public Health Engineering Department under the general 
supervision of the zila councils. 
2. The district health of the PHED will submit a monthly progress report to the 
respective zila council. 
3. The District Officer of PHED will attend local council meetings whenever 
required to do so. 
Industries and Mineral Development Department: 
Chairman, zila council was notified as Chairman, Auction 
Committee for grant 
of leases of minor minerals 
in each district in place of the Deputy 
Commissioner. 
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Irrigation Department: 
In view of the highly technical/Quasi-judicial nature of irrigation works, the 
Irrigation Department shall continue to perform its functions. However, the 
Irrigation Sub-committee of the zila council shall supervise the performance of 
the field staff of Irrigation Department. 
A. Labour Department: 
The Chairman, zila council shall head the following organisations in the 
district: 
a). District Management Workers Education Cess Committee; 
b). District Employment Exchange Advisory Committee. 
Local Government & Rural Development Department: 
1. The elected chairman of zila council will be the Project Director for Rural 
Development at the district level. All the engineering staff of the department 
at the district level will be under his operational control; 
2. The Rural Development funds, which are now lying in the personal Ledger 
Account of the Deputy Commissioner, and all future release of such funds, 
will hencefortý be lodged in the new Personal Ledger Account, to be opened 
in the name of Chairman, zila council; 
3. A Project Committee, consisting of the chairman and vice-chairman of the 
zila council, two other elected members, Assistant Director of the LG&RD 
to act as its Secretary and the Chief Officer of zila council, will have 
complete operational, financial and monitoring control of the rural 
development projects in the district. All payments from the Personal Ledger 
Account of the Chairman, zila council will be authorised by this committee 
after proper scrutiny of the works. 
Planninji and Development Department: 
1. Finalization of List of Schemes: 
The zila council will have powers to select schemes for inclusion in the Annual 
Development Programme in respect of Rural Water Supplies, Rural Health and Rural 
Education. 
2. Approval of Schemes: 
Schemes costing upto Rs. 1.5 m in respect of rural water supplies, rural health 
and school education in rural areas would be approved 
by the zila councils. For rural 
development programme schemes, all sanction powers would vest in zila councils, 
except for foreign aided schemes or province-wide schemes. 
District Technical Review Committees, headed by the Deputy Commissioners 
and with the district heads of all the 
departments, as well as the Chief Officers, zila 
councils/Municipal Committees/Town 
Committees as members, would review the 
progress of all A. D. P schemes in the provincial 
A. D. P ielating to the district and take 
necessary steps to remove bottlenecks and ensure expeditious execution. 
The chairmen of all zila councils in the Division would 
be members of the 
Divisional Co-ordination Committees with co-opting chairmen of the Municipal 
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Committees and Town Committees in the Division with the primary function to discuss 
schemes pertaining to these local councils. 
Social Welfare Department: 
1. Registration of voluntary agencies to be done on the recommendations of 
the chairmen of respective local councils; 
2. Supervision of the work of voluntary Social Welfare Agencies will be done In by the local councils. 
Water And Power Development Authority: 
Selection of villages for electrification to be made by the zila councils in 
consultation with the union councils. 
General Administration: 
The chairman, zila council shall head the following organisations in the district: 
a). District Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
b). District Religious Advisory Board, if any. 
c). The chairman shall be Chief Scout of the District; 
d). The chairman shall be competent to recommend cases for the grant of 
Agencies of Salt, Cement and Vegetable Gee in rural areas. 
e). Mayors of Corporations and Chairmen of Municipal Committees at District 
Headquarters shall be non-official visitors of the jails situated within their 
respective Corporations/Municipal Committees. 
Source: See the 'Dawn' (daily), Karachi, 13.2.1980. The local councils in the 
Punjab were granted some additional powers hitherto performed by fourteen 
different nation-building departments to enable them to play a pivotal role in 
the overall development of the province. In September 1981, similar 
functions and powers were delegated to the local councils in the N-W. F. P., 
formally announced by the military chief minister in Provincial Local 
Bodies Convention held on 10.2.1980. For details of these additional powers 
See Part-V of the N-W. F. P Local Government Ordinance. 
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Annexure: F 
Instances of Government decisions affecting rinancial health of local councils 
I- The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation lost Rs. 2 crore annually when the Road 
Tax on motor vehicles was merged with the Provincial Motor Vehicles Tax in 
1969 on the pretext of public convenience and rationalisation. 
2. The taxes of purely local nature like sugarcane cess, cotton cess, and fee on paddy 
are not reimbursed to the local councils. 
3. Fines and penalties on account of municipal offences are assigned to the 
government. Governor, Sindh has allowed 50% of thes-6-1 collections to local 
councils recently. 
4. Local councils spend crores of rupees on street lighting, but the octroi tax on the 
import of electricity within local areas has gone into disuse. The provincial 
government of Sindh is now recovering electricity duty, which is not transferred to 
local councils. 
5. Provincial governments have been issuing instructions for waiving octroi duty on 
items like woollen yam, for carpets (loss of Rs. 75 million to Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation annually), fertiliser, sugar etc. 
6. The proposals of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation/Karachi Development 
Authority to enhance water rate were not allowed by the previous government for 
fear of law and order situation and not due to reluctance on the part of local 
authorities to enhance these rates. 
7. The District Boards of the past were empowered, subject to certain conditions, to 
levy taxes which the provincial governments had the power to impose. Such 
provisions may be restored as elsewhere in the subcontinent. 
8. In Rawalpindi district, the local tax on export of resin, timber and sheep was 
abolished in 1976. The export tax on crude oil, imposed by the Jhelum District 
Council, was also stopped in 1968. This resulted in a loss of Rs. 14 lac annually. 
9. The local councils bear expenditure on reception of distinguished visitors without 
compensation being given by the government. 
Source: From the summary for inter-provincial conference issued by the Secretary, 
Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, 
Government of Pakistan, dated. June 12,1980 
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A Note on Field-Work Activities 
Keeping in view the nature of research and the methodology used, the researcher 
undertook a data collection tour of Pakistan to observe the working of local councils in 
the context of their relationship with the provincial and federal governments. For the 
collection of data for this study, both primary and secondary sources were used. The 
sources of secondary data are cited in Annexure-I of this report. The data collected 
through primary sources constitutes a central position in the preparation of this study 
and for this the following methods were used: 
Interviews were conducted with the elected councillors (belong to both treasury 
and opposition groups), Mayors/Chairmen of local councils, municipal officers in 
charge of finance, works etc. 
Interviews with the senior executives in the Federal Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development and their counterparts in the two provinces 
of Punjab and the N-W. F. P. 
Candid and informative discussions also took place with experts and practitioners 
involved in the promotion of the system such as politicians, University teachers, 
journalists, training instructors, lawyers, retired senior government officers etc. 
0 Watching the proceedings of local councils with a view to determine the 
participatory level of elected councillors and their role in the council's decision- 
making process. 
The objective of the field work was to widen the scope of knowledge of the 
political and administrative setting of local government operations in two provinces of 
Pakistan in addition to what was available in official records and in other sources. The 
exercise, in general, was successful in that certain vital aspects of the working of the 
present local government system were discovered. The purpose of this note is to briefly 
depict the experiences gained during the extensive field work activities. 
The unexpectedly unstable political condition which Pakistan suffered at the 
time of the survey delayed the process of data collection. A significant development in 
this connection was the controversy between the President of Pakistan and the Prime 
Minister which culminated in the termination of elected government through the 
exercise of powers available to the former, under the Constitution's 8th amendment. A 
prolonged legal battle and the final pronouncement by the Supreme 
Court restored the 
LTovernment to complete the mandated period. This was 
immediately followed by a tug 
of war between the combined opposition parties and the ruling 
Muslim League. The 
opposition demanded fresh elections and to pressurize the government, they resorted to 
the 'Long March'---a practice of arranging a huge procession and leading it towards the 
capital. The already deteriorating political and 
law and order situation gave way to 
serious internal crisis inviting the military to intervene. 
The ruling party was persuaded 
to resign so as to facilitate mid-term elections. A process of 
hectic electioneering that 
335 
began swept the whole country in November 1993 and caused a major setback to the 
smooth conduct of field work. Thus the research plan, originally de-, igned to cover a 
period of one year, exceeded the designed period. 
The method of interviewing the different sets of respondents varied. For 
government officers to be interviewed, prior permission was needed from the competent 
authority as the official functionaries were bound, under the rules of business, not to 
release information without the necessary departmental clearance. The same was 
granted on request wherever necessary. Government officers, particularly heads of 
district administration in one of the provinces still could not be interviewed despite 
fixed appointments due to their pre-occupation with routine administrative affairs. 
Problems were mostly faced in interviewing the elected local councillors. While 
most of them were willing to be interviewed, others seemed reluctant for unknown 
reasons. Efforts were, however, made to prepare them for the same through the 
assistance of intermediaries. The use of tape recorder served many purposes. Not only 
could the views of respondents be heard again but the views expressed could be 
evaluated in different perspectives. Many were delighted to have their interviews 
recorded. Others seemed rc; luctant and, therefore, the mechanism had to be abandoned 
on a number of occasions to enable the respondents express themselves freely. A 
significant aspect of the data collection exercise was that while a good number of 
interviews took place on the appointed dates, an equal number of appointments 
underwent frequent postponement because of unanticipated circumstances. 
For purposes of interviews during field work, some fifty letters along with 
questionnaires were despatched to prominent personalities in the field of local 
government two months before travelling to Pakistan. Others were recommended by 
these experts and were contacted subsequently. Altogether, some 160 persons were 
contacted, out of which III (i. e., 69.37 per cent) could actually be interviewed. 
Interview results of a few had to be discarded because little of substance was revealed. 
The places visited for this survey included Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, 
Mardan, Gujrat etc. The background of the respondents, through their professions, is 
shown in the table (No. 50) 
For each category of respondents, separate questionnaires were administered. 
These questionnaires were pre-set and duly approved by my supervisor in the light of 
intended objectives. Interviews with experts, however, produced some new ideas which 
could be further explored through further discussion. Discussion with educational 
experts and retired government officers was indeed thought provoking. 
With the exception of few elected local councillors, there was a general 
willingness to engage in frank and free discussion of issues. 
References to the persons 
interviewed along-with their designations, dates and places have been cited throughout 
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the body of this thesis. To avoid personal embarrassment, fictitious names have been 
used in the case studios. 
Table: 50 
Table showing the professional background and number of persons 
interviewed duriniz the field work. 
Professional 
Background 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
of total 
University Teachers 9 8.11 
Legal Experts 6 5.41 
Journalists 2 1.80 
Training Instructors 5 4.50 
Civil Servants 20 _ 18.02 
Politicians 6 5.41 
Mayors/Chairmen 14 12.61 
Municipal Officers 14 12.61 
Elected Councillors 35 31.53 
Total III 1 100.001 
Source: Notes prepared during the field survey. 
Despite being the first ever experience of research anu fac[-finding through 
interviews in the field amidst embarrassing situations, the researcher enjoyed the 
exercise and gave enough knowledge and confidence to undertake similar and related 
research endeavours in future. The information gathered was valuable and, if explored 
further, could be used in the analysis of aspects other than the one investigated in this 
thesis. A consolidated list of the personalities interviewed appears in Annexure: G. 
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Annexure: G 
List of Sources from where secondaLy data was gathered 
Library of the National Assembly of Pakistan in Islamabad; 
National Library, Islamabad; 
National Centre For Rural Development, Islamabad; 
Deputy Director, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 
Islamabad; 
National Institute of Public Administration Library, Lahore: 
Pakistan Administrative Staff College Library, Lahore; 
Quaid-e-Azam Library, Lahore; 
Pakistan Study Centre Library, University of Karachi, Karachi; 
Applied Economics Research Centre Library, University of Karachi, Karachi; 
Pakistan Academy For Rural Development, Peshawar, 
Municipal Training and Research Institute, Karachi; 
Local Government & Rural Development Department, Government of the 
Punjab, Lahore; 
Local Government & Rural Development Department, Government of the N- 
W. F. P., Peshawar; 
Divisional Director, Local Government & Rural Development, Mardan; 
Accounts Officers, Municipal Committee, and District Council of Mardan; 
Assistant Director, Local Government & Rural Development, Gujrat; 
Accou-its Officers, Municipal Committee, and Zila Council of Gujrat; 
Reference Library of 'The Pakistan Times' (daily), Lahore; 
Personal Library, lkramullah Shahid, ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee, 
Mardan. 
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Annexure: H 
University Professors 
I- Prof. Dr. Asrar Hussain, ex-Chairman, Department of Political Science, 
University of Peshawar. 
2. Prof. Dr. Hamid H. Kizilbash, Department of Political Science, University of the 
Punjab, Lahore. 
3. Prof. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Chairman, Department of Political Science, 
University of the Punjab, Lahore. 
4. Prof. Dr. Hidaytullah, Director, Institute of Management Studies, University of 
Peshawar. 
5. Dr. Inayatullah, ex-Director, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 
Peshawar. 
6. Prof. Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Ex-Vice Chancellor, University of Karachi. 
7. Prof. Dr. Mohammad Waseem, Department of International Relations, Quaid-e- 
Azam. University, Islamabad. 
8. Prof. Dr. Shahid Ali Rizvi, ex-Chairman, Department of Political Science, 
University of Karachi. 
9. Prof. Dr. Syed Adil Hussain, ex-Chairman, Department of Political Science, 
University of Karachi. 
Legal Experts 
10. Choudhury Hamid-iddin, Sr. Advocate, Supreme Court and High Court, Lahore. 
11. Mr. Masood Akhtar, Advocate, Punjab High Court, Gujrat. 
12. Sheikh Mohammad Aslam, Legal Advisor, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
13. Sheikh Rafiq Ahmad, Advocate, District Courts, Gujrat. 
14. Syed Sharif Hussain Bokhari, Advocate, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Lahore. 
15. Mr. Umar Yousuf Deda, Advocate and Ex-Deputy Mayor, Karachi Metropolitan 
Corporation, Karachi. 
Journalists 
16. Mr. Altaf Hussain Qureshi, Editor, Urdu Digest, Lahore. 
17. Mr. Mohammad Salahuddin, Editor, Weekly Takbeer International, Karachi. 
Training Instructors 
18. Mr. Khan Badshah Fayyaz, Principal, Municipal Training & Research 
Institute, 
Karachi. 
19. Mr. Khan Mohammad Bhatti, Instructor. Pakistan Academy 
for Rural 
Development, Peshawar. 
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20. Mr. Mohammad Azim, Instructor, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 
Peshawar. 
21. Mr. Sajjad Mahmood, Instructor, National Institute of Public Administration, 
Lahore. 
22. Choudhury Sanaullah, Senior Instructor, Local Government Training Institute, 
Lala Musa, Punjab. 
Civil Servants 
23. Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Sheikh, Member, Sindh Local Government Accounts 
Committee, Karachi. 
24. Mr. Abdur Rauf Dervi, Divisional Director, Local Government & Rural 
Development, Government of the N. W. F. P., Mardan. 
25. Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan, Secretary to the Government of N. W. F. P., Department of 
Local Government & Rural Development, Peshawar. 
26. Mr. Abrar Ahmad Malik, Deputy Director, Ministry of Local Government & 
Rural Development, Islamabad. 
27. Mr. Ansar Ahmad, Lirector, HQ/Admn. Department of Local Government & 
Rural Development, Peshawar. 
28. Mr. A. U. Saleem, ex-Managing Director, Lahore Development Authority, Lahore. 
29. Mr. Imtiaz Masoor, Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Local 
Government & Rural Development, Lahore. 
30. Mr. J'ameel Murtaza Hussain, Secretary to Government of Punjab, Local 
Government Board, Lahore. 
31. Mr. Javed Ahmad Qureshi, Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore. 
32. Dr. Mohammad Afzal, ex-Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of 
Local Government & Rurp] Development, Islamabad. 
33. Mr. Mohammad Anwar Khan, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Local Government 
& Rural Government, Islamabad. 
34. Mr. Mohammad Shabbir Ahmad, Deputy Director, Ministry of Local Government 
& Rural Development, Islamabad. 
35. Malik Mohammad Siddique, ex-Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, 
Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, Islamabad. 
36. Mr. Mansoorul Islam, Deputy Director, Bureau of Statistics, Department of 
Planning & Development, Government of the N. W. F. P., Peshawar. 
37. Syed Nizam Uddin, Deputy Director, Mardan Development Authority, Mardan. 
38. Mr. Rang Elahi, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Rutal 
Government, Islamabad. 
39. Mr. Saeeduzzafar, Officer on Special Duty, Government of Sindh, Karachi. 
40. Mr. Shahid Ashraf Tarar, Ex-Divisional Director, Local Government & Rural 
Dev-lopment, Government of the Punjab, Guji-anwala. 
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41. Mr. Tanzeemul Haque Halimi, ex-Secretary, Provincial Assembly Secretariat, 
Peshawar. 
42. Mr. Zakir Ali Khan, ex-Director General, Karachi Water & Sewerage Board, 
Karachi. 
Ministers/MPs/Senators/Politicians 
43. Mr. Ehsan Ullah Khan, ex-Minister for Local Government & Rur. ] Development, 
Government of the N. W. F. P., Peshawar. 
44. Prof. Shah Faridul Haque, Vice-President, Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan, Karachi. 
45. Mr. Fida Mohammad Khan, Member of the Senate of Pakistan, Peshawar. 
46. Malik Meraj Khalid, ex-Federal Minister for Local Government & Rural 
Development, Lahore. 
47. Mr. Mohammad Ali Khan of Hoti, Member of the Senate of Pakistan, Mardan. 
48. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, ex-Finance Minister, Government of Pakistan, Lahore. 
Mayors/Chairmen 
49. Mr. Abdul Ghaffar of Mayar, Ex-Chairman, District Council, Mardan. 
50. Mr. Abdus Sattar Afghani, Ex-Mayor, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, 
Karachi. 
51. Agha Said Ali Shah, Ex-Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Peshawar. 
52. Mr. 1kram. Ullah Shahid, Ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
53. Mr. Jamshed Ahmad Khan, Chairman, Zonal Municipal Committee, Karachi 
South. 
54. Mr. Mirza Mohammad Siddique, Ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
55. Arbab Mohammad Tariq, Ex-Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Peshawar. 
56. Mohammad Yaqoob Khan, Ex-Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Peshawar. 
57. Major (Retd. ) Nasim Akbar Faruqi, Ex-Chairman, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
58. Mr. Rahim Khan Bacha, Ex-Chairman, District Council, Mardan. 
59. Mr. Saeed Ahmad Jan, Ex-Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Peshawar. 
60. Mr. Said Rahman Mohmand, Ex-Chairman, District Council, Mardan. 
61. Mr. Mohammad Azam Chishti, Councillor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation. 
62. Mr. Zafeer Gul zafar, Councillor, Peshawar Municipal Corporation. 
Municipal COmmissioners/Chief Off icers/Municipal Officers 
63. Agha Akhtar Ali Kizilbash, Chief Office, District Council, %/Iardan. 
64. Mr. Aman Ullah Khan, District Engineer, District Council, Mardan. 
65. Mian Bashir Ahmad, Accounts Officer, Zila Council, Gujrat. 
66. Mr. Gulsaf Khan, Accounts Officer, District Council, Mardan. 
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67. Mr. Hamid Haroon, Cantonment Executive Officer, Mardan. 
68. Mr. Hashmat Khan, Taxation Officer, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
69. Sheikh Javed Ahmad, Resident Audit Officer. Municipal Committee & District 
Council, Mardan. 
70. Shah Mahmood Hussain Syed, Municipal Commissioner, Zonal Municipal 
Committee (South) Karachi. 
71. Choudhury Mohammad Anwar, Chief Officer, Municipal Committee, Gujrat. 
72. Mr. Mohammad Jameel, Chief Officer, Municipal Committee. Mardan. 
73. Sheikh Mohammad Sajid, Resident Assistant Director (Audit), Municipal 
Committee & Zila Council, Gujrat. 
74. Mr. Nisar Mohammad Khan, Accounts Officer, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
75. Dr. Qaiser Ali, Medical Officer, Municipal Committee, Mardan. 
76. Mr. Zafar Ullah Khan, Municipal Engineer, Mardan. 
Councillors 
Municipal Committee, Mardan 
77. Mr. Ehsan Ullah Bacha. 
78. Mr. Fazal-e-Malik Malak. 
79. Mr. Mehr Zada. 
80. Mr. Mohammad lqbal. 
81. Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Khan. 
82. Mr. Mohammad Nisar. 
83. Mr. Munir Khan. 
84. Mr. Murad Khan. 
85. Mr. Nasim Masih. 
86. Mr. Rahmat Shah Afridi. 
87. Mr. Said Anwar Khan Advocate. 
88. Mr. Sher Bahadur Khan. 
District Council, Mardan 
89. Mr. Latif Ullah Khan. 
90. Malik Shamroz Khan. 
9 1. Mr. Mohammad Nazeer Khan. 
92. Mr. Nasrullah Khan. 
93. Mr. Niamat Shah Khan. 
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Municipal Committee, Gujrat 
94. Mr. Ajmal Ali Khawar, Advocate. 
95. Mr. Inayat Ullah Butt. 
96. Mr. Mirza Farman Ali. 
97. Choudhury Mohammad Irshad. 
98. Mian Mohammad Nazirn Ansari. 
99. Mr. Qamar Zaman Gill. 
100. Mrs. Shafqat Masood. 
Zila Council, Gujrat 
101. Chaudhry Asghar Ali Ghural, Advocate. 
102. Choudhury Azhar Hussain. 
103. Syed Ejaz Hussain Khayali. 
104. Dr. Mohammad Asghar. 
105. Choudhury Mohammad Ashraf. 
106. Choudhury Mohammad Riaz Wariach. 
107. Choudhury Mohammad Zulqarnain Sahi. 
108. Mrs. Saira Imtiaz. 
109. Mrs. Zubaida Sayeed Choudhury. 
110. Choudhury Shaukat Mahmood, Advocate. 
111. Choudhury Tauseef Liaquat, Advocate. 
